Seetat
APPROUID FOR RELUSE HATE1
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM
OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Outlook for Nigeria
88
CENTRAL INTELLXOEHCE AOBIfCT OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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SPECIAL MEMORANDUM8 SUBJECT: Tho Outlook for Nigeria*
We believe that, no matter vhat the military outcome, the protracted civiland the political upheavala which preceded It have already considerably damagedostwar prospects for national development. It Is difficult to seeitterly resentful and widely hated Ibo people could be reabsorbed Into Nigeria's polity and society. Traditional tribal anlmooitieB and political ontsltles amongre likely to worsen. we see no national leadership in sight, military or civilian, which would he capable of assuaging Intergroup antagonisms and sjsjn^Tig tha broad popular backing needed to carry out thetasks of political, economic, and social reconstruction. Hence, we estimate that political instability will plague Algeria for some considerable time to come, and that tribal and regional strife will seriously threaten the country's unity.
Soviet Influence In Nigeria, sparked by Moscow's wilLlngneBs to provide military equipment to the Federal forces, has increased and is likely to persist after the war. The OS and the UK haveiminution of influence, in part because the Federal government has resented their declaredla the civil war. After the war, Algeria is likely toore nonallgned and less pro-Western foreign policy than in the past, and the competition for influence among foreign countries vill probably add one more disruptive factor to the Nigerian scene.
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It wen prepared by the Office of national Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research In the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Clandestine Services.
1. ORIGINS OP THE WAP.
prolonged civil strife is rooted in theIncreased contact among its diverse tribal andintensified rather than diminished mutual antagonisniB.
By the time of independencehe generally better-educated Xboe from Eastern Nigeria already dominated commerce snd the public services in much of the country. They displayedattitudes toward the more tradition-bound Rousa-Fulanl of the North and the core relaxed Yorubac of western Nigeria. Moat non-Xbos in turn developed considerable antipathy toward the pushy, clannish Easterners, ranging from Yoruba resentment of the Ibo superiority complex to the Benaa view of Ibos as "slave material."
founding fathers, both British endsome of the obstacles to national unity, fashionedin which each of the three major tribal groupsa region which embraced its own homeland aa wellof looser tribea. The major weakness in thewas that, by weight of numbers alone, thevirtually assuredermanent majority in the As the scope and Importance of the central government
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increased, its dealnation by the conservative Moslem Borth became intolerable to the more modernised Southerners. After efforts to loosen the Northern grip by constitutional means failed, Ibo army officers in6 snuffed out the parliamentary system by assassinating key Hausa-Fulani leaders, which led to tho establishmentilitary regime, the Federal Military Oovern-oent (RO). econd military coup, this one by northern officers against tho Ibo heed of the FMO,eries of bloody massacres of Iboo and other Easterners living in the North set the stage for the secession last May of the Eastern Region oft the "Republic ofnd for tha subsequent civil war.
II. THE VIEW FROM BIAFRA
3. The massacres and the lack of remorse displayed by the northerners convinced the Ibos that they cculd act live in any Nigerian state dominated by Northerners. The more recent slaughter of civilians by Federal troops advancing through Ibo settlements in the Mld-Waet and the Knot and the bellicose statements of none Federal commanders give new substance to Ibo fears. Most Ibos now believe that the invading Federal forces are Intent uponthorn or reducing them to permanent subjugation.
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the bo clrcuxetanccs, the Ibo war effort isthe seeming Lack of any alternative to continuedbattle perfonsance of Blafran troops, though hardlybeen adequate to keep the numerically superior andFederal forces from penetrating deeply Into the Ibo Colonel Ojukwu, Blafran Chief of State, appears tosupport of the overwhelming majority of Ibos and hisis accepted, or at least not openly opposed, by theunder Blafran rule. ederal blockade and sol sure ofcoastal towno has brought Eastern exports of petroleumpalm oil, the traditional crop,alt and largely cutfraa the outside world. But there Is as yet nothe resultant economic pressures will soon force Ojukwufor peace. Though nutrltlcoal standards have declined,assureB an adequate supply of foodstuffs. Also aof arms and other goods procuredariety ofIn Europe is flown in by night via the PortugueseSao Tome.
III. TBS VIEW FROM LAGOS
in Lagos, rising pressures against theof General Gowon call Into question the ability of the FUG
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to sustain ltd war effort. Gowon baa gained scese stature merely by surviving In officeearaif and byuch-needed image of dignity and honesty. But he has not von the oupport of all military cccmandere, the more headstrong of whom pay scant attention to orders from Lagoa. Though veilby his fellow minority tribesmen of northern Nigeria, who cake up the bulk of the army's rank and file, Gowon has done little to attract popular support from Nigerians generally. So far as we can determine, bis government lo neither effective nor popular. His cabinet, the Federal Executive Council,n ansembloge of opportunistic politicians, distinguished mainly for their oppooition to the former parliamentary regime. It servesridge of sorts between the military chiefs and the civil service, but its members appear more interested infor political dominance in postwar Nigeria than in coping with current problems.
6. Gowoneing pressed to speed the termination of the war. Federal military commanders, dissatisfied with the slow pace of battle, areolder approach with Iobb regard for the possibilitiesegotiated peace, and with lees attention to the prevention of atrocities against Ibo civilians. The chiefs
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of the minority tribes of the Korth are calling for an early end to the war, whether by victory or negotiation, alleging that they are Buffering by the absence of the men who have beenInto the army from their areas.
Hlgeria'a economy la beginning to showcaused by the dislocations of the war. For onecost of arrno purchases abroad hae contributedharpforeign exchange holdingsecline in norunilltaryrevenues have fallen off since the virtualpetroleum production last summer, and the costs of supporting
a much larger army are straining the budget. The situation is by no means desperate, but the costs are beginning to pinch and the discomfort Index will rise es the war continues.
no less importance to Governrimeassessing the FMD's ability toilitary victoryrumbling of rising tribal and political discord In adifferent areas. The tensions among the Yorubao andYorubas and the government are particularly ominous. feuds and traditional clan rivalriesrowing mutual distrust between YoruVegenerally and FHG military leaders. In addition, local
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feud* are aeraloplog among Jterthern tribeetween Tire and Rausas, and in the multitribal Mld-Veot.
9. Ocvon hopes to assuage soma of the restive tribal groups, particularly the ml rarities in the Berth, byow internal arrangement of twelve subordinate statestrong central government In place of the four formerly seol-autoiioBous regions. Be ha* preelalmedarch as statehood day. In our view, all indications ere that the new eirrangament. If carried out aa acbedulad, would exacerbate rather than relieve tribal tensions. Some new states will contain antagonistle tribes or elans which already are bickering over the leeatloa of state capitals, control of patronage, and the division of regional assets. Moreover, nearly all Sorthero state* willbort-age of tjualiflod local talent to staffnd eamolealone. Indeed, there are not even enough Northern civil servant* to sac the present single regional government, let aloo* *lx new atates. Hence, nany of the new states will either have to rely on educated Yorubes or expatriates In -oc-sHcrerie number* or face ala local government* Put realdent Yorubas In widelyNorthern eltleo are Increasingly resented by the local populace as were the Ibo* In the past. Some Yorubas have already left the North for the safety of their homeland.
ouch key matters as the formula forfederal revenues to the states and the degree ofthe states to the FMG are still undecided. The statea much greater degree of autonomy than Govonin mind. Indeed, seme look forward toarchindday. At the least, the establishment of theis likely to encourage existing centrifugal tendencies.
IV. POSTWAR PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
cannot at this stage predict with anythe duration or the likely outcome of the war. We doout the prospectictory byheof its claim to independence. If the Biafrans succeedthe Federal forces out of Eastern Nigeria, or ifforceo withdraw from the struggle because of athe FMO, Biafra would probably gain diplomaticEuropean states which have shown sympathy for theirPortugal and France, and probably from some Africanwell. Its economic prospects would be fair to good, onceproduction resumed. Bolstered by the successfulfor independence, it could probablyigher levelstability than normally prevails in West Africa.
A Biafran victory would almost certainly worsen the prospects for the rest of Nigeria. Much would depend on theof ending the war, the state of mind of Mlgerlancommanders, and tho degree of discord among the tribalof the army and of the country. At the least there would bo considerableenting of tensions among tribes and factions, and some violence, which could load to tribal warfare, secessions,eneral break up into smaller component states.
On the otherederal military victory would nottable, unified Nigeria. Rather, it too would be likely toelease of pent up antagonisms among non-Ibos. The fko, lacking any firm institutional framework or nationalwould have to rely mainly on the army and police to moke its writ effective. The capabilities of the police are limited, and their numbers too few for maintaining order over large areas. As for the army, Gowon himself regards itational liability in terms of maintaining order and oecurlty. The trocpo have been hastily mobilized snd are largely untrained and undisciplined. ItB few competent officers would be too thinly spread to actand in concert. let Gowon apparently does not plan to draw heavily upon civilian political leadership to sseiet inostwar Nigeria. And, if he follows his Intention
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of discarding acne of the leportant civilians now In the FMO, he would probably speed the emergence of new civil strife.
14. There would alsoroblem of demobilising ormuch ofnan Federal airy. Kany of the new recruits who came from the ranks of the unemployed or from menial positions have high expectations of mustering out benefits, which may not be fulfilled because of financial stringencies. The return to civilian life of large numbers of disgruntled veterans, in tha unsettled conditions likely to prevail after the war, could leadesurgonoe of the traditional practice of employment of bands of armed thugo by local political bosses, or simply to more disorder.
15- In addition to the task of preserving some sort of unity and order In non-Blafran Hlgeria, the FMO would face theproblem of dealing with the defeated Tbos. It is difficult to seeitterly resentful and widely hated Ibo people could be reabsorbed into Algerian polity and society. If the Federal army Is assigned the task of pacifying Iboland, there wouldertainly be continued violence, if not masaacres, which could loadesurgence of Ibo resistance.
l6. Some of these horrors might be avoided if an effective political leader or group, civilian or military, were to appear
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co the scene and win bread popular support. But ve see no promising person or organization on the horizon. The net effect of tvo years of coups, assassinations, massacres, and civil vsr has been to obliterate the Institutions and relationsfclpo of the old federal system, and to deplete the ranks of capable military officers and political leaders. Hence, we doubt that the fragile political and administrative apparatus and mediocre leadors of the FMO will be capeble of dealing effectively with the complicated tasks of political, social, end economic reconstruction. In sum, ve believe, whatever the outcome of the war, that politicalwill plague Nigeria for some considerable time to come snd that tribal end regional strife will seriously threaten the country's unity.
V. NIGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
17. During tho course of theonsiderable shift has occurred in Nigeria's relations with foreign powers. The moot conspicuous development is the rise of Soviet Influence in Lagos, largely sparked by Moscow'e provision of military aircraft and other arms to the FMOtage in the war when no other great power vas willing to do so. The USSR has furnished over USll-llon of military equipment and several score of technicians. In
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addition, It han renewed earlier offers of economic aid,for the rebuilding of roads and bridges after the war. In the wake of Soviet involvement, the East European Communist countries and the UAH have also contributed to the FMO'e wax effort.
L8. The Soviets are moving quickly to exploit along customary lines the advantages offered by their new acceptance In Lagos: they are planning to add somedditional personnel to their mission; they are breathing some life into hitherto dormant Soviet-Nigerian friendship societies end forming nev ones; they are also lavishing attention on leftist trade unions, courting journalists and broadcasters, and disseminating Soviet propaganda including anti-US material' This ostentatious display hasood many Nigerians, including members of the educated elite, that the Sovlete ore helping their efforts to preserve Nigerian unity. ajor blunder, the USSR con expect to develop its influence further at very little cost or risk, at least so long ne the war lasts and probably for Borne time thereafter.
19* Recent Soviet sueceseee in building influence stand out the more starkly, in that prewar Nigeria hod beenestern preserve. The OS2 has extended overn aid. But most Nigerians, again including tho educated
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elite, resent the US policy of ncninvolvwsent in the civil vex. Believing that our refusal to ship armo to tho FMO either is basedro-Blafran bias orack of interest innified Nigeria. The 'JK also lost considerable Influence early in tha war bytand similar to that of the US. eras Seles to the FMO have only partially restored Lagos' confidence in UK Intentions.
20. The US will continue to maintain some influence In poetvar Nigeria, if only because most Nigerians are avare of the post vllllngneoe of the US to provide large amounts of economic end other aid. The FMO Is not without qualms about rising Soviet influence and probably hopes that the US will furnish considerable aid for reconstruction and for subsequent economic development. Nonetheless, the postwar outlook isigerian foreign policy more nonallgned and less pro-Western then In the past. There will probably be considerable competition for influence between the USSR and the Western powers, and this in Itself is likely tourther element of disharmony in Nigerian internal affairs.
21. Should Biafra make good its claim to independence, it would probably maintain friendly relations with France andthe sources of sympathy and clandestine support during the war.
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Anti-British feeling, nowigh pilch, would certainly persist
time, and would make it difficult for Shell-BP and ether
us commercial interests to reestablish relations. ostwar Biafra would scon look to Washingtononsiderable amount of aid and support, and its relations with the us would largely beby the response.
FOR THE BOARD CF SATIOKAL ESTIMATES:
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Original document.
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