memorandum is offeredorking group in the Office
of National Estimatesontribution to discussions; it has not been approved by the Board of National Estimates nor coordinated with other Officea of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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3. Before considering reactions to thest options, it should be emphasized that the situation in North Korea ie not at all dear. While the broad outlines and motives of Kim II Bung's policy have been apparent for wallear, some recent developments are worth noting. Lastajor address byung seemed to be moving toward an even harder line; In any event he forcefully reiterated forth Korea's support for revolutionary action ln the South. This has been followed by even greater emphasis on US aggressiveness. Including warnings over "spynd more exhortation to the populace to be vigilant, etc.
his line has been accompanied by further changes within the North Korean leadership. It appears that tho removal of top level figures beginning6 was related to policy torexd south Korea, indicating that this policy may have been
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opposed. Thua, the recentarticularly the guerrilla raid in Seoul, soems tourther development of thia eggreiiBivc line, and may be related to tha Internal problems of Kim II Sung.
5. Tola could be significant in that North Korean reactions might not necessarily follow the ecurae which would seen dictated by prudence and by what we believe to be their basic policy of stopping shortesumption of the Korean War.
Original document.
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