CESTRAL EUIGEICE AGIICT OFFICE CF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8
KLMDftATOcN FOR THE DIRECTOR*
SUBJECT: Possible Developments in the Xorean Situation
1. The US ii confronted by two separate hutproblems in Korea. Of immediate importance laof the Pueblo and its crev. Beyond thia, howover,faces tbe cniestion of how to cope vith North Korea'sline. This policy, now soreeer in development,
is designed to ahaJce popular confidenca ln the Seoul government, strain US/RGK relations and undermina South Korean support for the US in Vietnam. Thua, any course of action by the US needa to ha measured ln terms of its impact on these two problems.
This meccuranchmi is offeredorking group in the Office of National Estimatesontribution to discussions; It has not been approved by the Board of Ifetienal Estimates nor coordinated with other Offieea of the Central Intelligence Agency.
3- Before considering reactions to these options, it should he emphasized that the situation in Korth Korea is cot at all clear. While the broad outlines and motives ofung's policy have bean apparent for wellear, some recent developments are worth noting. Lastajor address byung seemed to be moving toward an even harder line; ln any event ha forcefully reiterated North Korea's support for revolutionary action in the South. This haa been followed by even greater emphasis on US aggressiveness, including warnings over "spynd more exhortation to tha populace to be vigilant, etc.
U. This line has been accompanied by further changes within tha North Korean leadership. It appears that the removal of top level figures beginning0 was related tc policytenrard South Korea, indicating that this policy may have been
opposed. Thus, the recent Incidents, particularly the guerrilla raid in Seoul, seems tourther development of thia aggressive line, and may be related to the internal problems of Kim II Sung.
5. This could he significant in that Rorth Korean reactions might not necessarily follow the course which would seem dictated by prudence and by what we believe to be their basic policy of stopping shortesumption of the Korean War.
HROUGHENIED IN THEIR ENTIRETY UNDER EXECUTIVE,
(Document,IA OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR DTDANUBJECT: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KOREAN SITUATION
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: