CHALLENGES TO MEXICO'S SINGLE-PARTY RULE

Created: 1/17/1969

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

weekly summary

Special Report

Challenges to Mexico's Single-Party Rule

CHALLENGES TO MEXICO'S SINGLE-PARTY RULE

The Diaz Ordaz administration's modest: efforts to liberalize the government have intensified the popular cry for reform, and protest against the authoritarian style of Mexico's one-party system is surfacing with increasing frequencyocal level. These efforts have also stiffened theof powerful old-guard political bosses whoiminution of their control. Last summer's student demonstrations provided the largest open manifestation of discontent with the government in three decades.

It is apparent that Mexico's unique political system, which was so effective in governing asociety and which brought prosperity andto many, is now being outgrown by ansophisticated, articulate public. Diaz Ordaz may have loosened the fiber of resistance to change, so that with good leadership the system can remain flexible enough to mature along with the population. Mexico's political course will probably be one of experimentation over the next few years, and theit finally takes could be chosen by Diaz Ordaz' successor.

With his six-year term expiring iniaz Ordaz will be under pressure from all sides seeking to influence him in selecting thecandidate for the0 election, and this pre-election year, promises to be an especially tough one -for Mexico's ruling party.

Mexico's political andprogress in the midst of the political turmoil and fiscal irresponsibility associated with the Latin American region is generally credited to its unique political institution ofRevolutionary Party (PRI). Embodying the myths, and ideals of0 the PRI over the pastears has brought Mexico out of backwardness into its current statusapidly developing nation. Recently, though, the PR! has been strained by ansophisticated

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Beginning inexican university and secondary school studentsew force on the political scene. The fact that this hitherto bothersome but relatively inconsequential and disorganized elementighly structured, generally sophisticatedis attributable almost entirely to the timing of events. Minor disgruntlenent over police interferencechool fight balloonedull-scalemovement against the gov-ernment--less on the merits of the grievances expressed than because the XIX olympiad inCitynique forum for protest.

There is, nevertheless, an authentic context for some of the protests of the students, whose efforts represent still anothereries of warning

signals that Mexico's vaunted progross and genius forhave seen better times. The effect of the studentat the very least is to have intensified the soli-exami-nation already in process among the nation's political leaders.

The Protest

Tough action by riot police and regular police onnduly to put down clashes between students from rival prep schools triggered student charges ofbrutality. Onuly, an authorizedovernment-influenced student federation was joinedmaller group of Communists celebrating the Cuban After the radical students turned the marchiolent looting spree, clashes withintensified student charges of brutality. Further rallies generated violence beyond the control of riot police, and paratroopers were called in to quell the disturbances during which several were killed and hundreds were wounded.

Student demands grew beyond those for disbanding the riot police and now includefor theinjuredand the families of the dead, withdrawal of the army from occupied schools, andof student prisoners. The several large, disciplined marches that were held showed unprecedentedixed issue, but alsoontinuing threat of violence. Despite attempts by

activist minorities of all shades to take over or influence tho student movcment( or to reorient it against the US or Communists, or toward other Mexican problems, tho struggle remninod confined to the original complaint plus those directly related to the developing events. Most of the numerous reports linking tho movement to ideologically or politically motivated subversives have remained unsubstantiated. The protest steadily sharpened its focus on the Diaz Ordazwith attacks on prominent cabinet and cabinet-level officials and even scathing criticism of tho President, who is traditionally inviolate in Mexico.

By October, the movement had achieved world-wide notoriety. The students had caused the worst civil disorders Maxico hadin ovorears and jeopardized tho Olympic Camoo scheduled to begin onctober. Far and away the worst, and for all practical purposes the final, incident camectoberarge rally in the Plaza of Three Cultures in Tlatelolco district eruptedild gun-fight that killod scores ofand injured an. This "Tlatololcoas it was quickly dubbed even by the Mexican press,ended largeand,tudent boycott of classes continued student leaders were unable to organize further manifestations on the scale that had previously characterized the movement.

Tho Government Response

The official handling of the student strike was inept. The government, which hadunaccustomed bad press for lectoral fraud in jm vaniviuia earlier8 and also7 for theof an unpopular governor on tho openly rebelliousof Sonora, became theof criticism around the world bocause of the prosonce of the international press, in Mexico for the Olympics. Tho Diaz Ordaz administration lost considerable face during the prolonged and sometimes violent strike. It was criticized both by those who thought thoshould have taken hold of the situation early, even if by force, ond by those whoonciliatory attitude was in order. While the smooth staging of the Olympic Games did much to redoem the prestige of the government and the nation, it could not erase the internal political damage.

There was apparently no expectation that the student protest wouldrisis. The government's preoccupation with readying for the Olympics had already led it to warn the Communist Party and probably other extremist groups that there would be absolute intolerance for any activity that might oar the games. The authoritiesdiscounted the possibilityroblem not inspired by Official blindness to real dissent or to spontaneous pro' test isense characteristic

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in Mexico, where internalare commonly attributed to "outside agitation." One of the initial responses of theto the studentwas to arrest Communist party leaders. Throughout the subsequent months of crisis,officials laid thovariously at the doors of Cuba, the USSR, Communist China, and US security agencies.

These tactics did loss to discredit the student movement than to discredit the government itself. Moreovor, while force eventually did cause tho collapse of the protestass movement, and students havo returned to classes, some of the legitimate causes espoused by tho youths are now being given attention. New legislation has relaxed thefor releasing political prisonors, and hearings are being held with an eye to reformingf tho criminal coda by which political dissidents are held for the crime of "social dissolution." Almost all students have been released from jail. Educational reform is under study, and the hoad of the PRI haspublicly that tho party hasong time forgottenyouth.

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