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OF INTELLIGENCE
Soviet Policy in Indonesia5
Special Report
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SOVIET POLICY IN INDONESIAS
The USSR hasilemma as regards its policy toward Indonesia over the past three years, and the prospects that it will be able to resolve the situation satisfactorily are not good. On the one hand, Moscow cannot afford to be too closely identified with athat haa relentlessly persecuted the once power ful Indonesian Communist Party hiletrying to wean the party away from the influence of Peking. On the other, Moscow finds it equallyto give the government of Indonesiay open support of the PKI, to move any further into the Western orbit or to renounce its large debt to the USSR.esult, the Soviets have done just enough to keep their relations with the government alive, while quietly cultivating those groups they hope will ultimately assume power. The Indonesians, for their part, are nervous about Soviet subvoraive capabilities but would still like to have economic and technical aid from the USSR.
During the nighthe Chinese-oriented IndonesianParty attempted to seize control of the government by meansoup ostensibly aimed at protecting Sukarno from aplot against tha government. The PKI hoped to paralyze army counterreactions by murdering several top-ranking army including the army
The army, under theof General Suharto, quickly crushed the attempt. Taking advantage of the PKI'sof the affair, the army moved against the party. The legal Communist organization was
violently dismantled, and surviving cadre were forced underground. It was not until the summer8 that party members in Bast Java felt confident enough toerrorist campaign against the government. This was quickly smashed by army troops, however, and the party lost over half of its top leadership in the process.
Although Soviet-Indonesian relations had deteriorated as Sukarno had strengthened ties with Peking, Indonesia at the time of the coup was still the USSR's second largest military aid client in the free world.
Relations with the Government
Soviet-Indonesian relations have been cool ever since the
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coup attempt, tn tha Immediate aftermath, the USSR suspended its economic and military aid, and cut cultural and informational activity draatically. Soviet officials in Indonesia also avoided contact with Indonesian leftists. Publicly, the USSR was circumspect in its criticism of the new order, while privately, it encouraged the new leaders to believe lt would be moreas soon as Djakarta clearly returned to "traditionalforeign policies of non-alignment and nonassociation."
Sinceelations between the USSR and Indonesia have had their ups and downs. As time went on, about the only source of comfort to Moscow was the dramatic decline in Chinese influence. Inoscow agreed to rescheduleeconomic and military debts5 million. Themade no immediate move, howover, to ratify the accord.
Then intouched another sensitive Soviet nerve by joining with Malaysia, Singapore, theand Thailand to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thewas established only toregional cultursl, economic, and social cooperation, butnevertheless was apprehensive that Indonesian economicwith such staunch allies of the US as Thailand and the
Philippines might ultimately lead to military cooperation and the abandonmentonallgned stance
Other sources of grievance to the USSR were Indonesia's policy of encouraging Western investment, its continued harsh treatment of the PKI, and its failure to condemn US policy in Vietnam. oviet official's comment at the time that "they are even confiscating Dostoevski" illustrated the USSR's gloomy view of its prospects in
By latethere were also signs that the USSR had decided toore activist policy in an effort to stem the drift to the right.eptember of that year, the Soviets finally agreed to provide some sio million in military spare parts to the Indonesian Navy and Air Force. The terms of the agreement wereandthe amount the Soviets agreed to provide wasraction of what the Indonesians estimated they needed.
The following month.Gromyko receivedambassador to thehad been in Moscow forwithout having haddiscussionseputy foreign Gromyko told himlimbingoft-post-
ul uTf^uty Premier Novikov would take place some time after the Bolshevikcelebration in November. The Indonesians reportedly wanted Novikov to negotiate the debtthe two nations had reached
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These slight gestures fed Djakarta's optimism that Che Soviet desirB toresence in Indonesia would scon result in negotiation of further economic and military aid.
Over the past year, thehave continued to use the carrot-and-stick approach. Last March, the Indonesians finally ratified the debt rescheduling agreement. In. June, SovietKosyqin
tne at
attempting to oi'ock Djakarta' candidacyeat on theand Social Council, and the Indonesians reported that the Soviet delegation was extremely hostile to them at every
In mid-December, however, the pendulum began to swing back. At the UN, the Soviets begansocial invitations to Indonesians andore cooperative attitude onissues. I
tO MneTan tgation. The visit was scheduled for August but postponed after Indonesiathe Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In October, the Indonesians again provoked Moscow by announcing their intention to execute several top-ranking PKI members. Podgorny led the long list of Communist individuals and groups protesting. Sovietwarned Indonesians in Moscow and Djakarta that the economic delegation would not arrive in late October, as then scheduled, if the executions were
the Soviets began aiSCUBBlons with the Indonesians about Implementing phase two of the spare parts accord.
Soviet Economic and Military Aid
Soviet-Indonesian economic relations have been clouded by the failure of the two sidea to
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come to tarms on debt Although, the Indonesians ratified the debt rescheduling accord, they are still hoping that the Soviets willillion repayment due next April.
The Indonesians would also Like toesumption of Soviet aid for their new Five Year Plan and for jungleand road building. The only project on which the Soviets are currently involvedinorwaterways project involving the construction of three dredges.
There has been no work on such prestige Soviet-aid projects as the steel mill at Tjilegon or the phosphate plant at Tjilatjap. The Soviets are particularlythat the Indonesians have done nothing to protect thealready sent5 for tha construction of the steel mill. Although BO percent of the equipment forillion project had been delivered prior to the coup, only fivehad been installed. Much of the machinery has since rusted or been pilfered.
When the Indonesians took stock after the events of5 andhey esti-mated they would need
parte anatoalmost totallynavy and air force. larger army had alwaysmost of its equipmentWest. When Moscow cutSeptem-
tne Indonesians used
to maintain the air transport and air defense capability of the air force and to keep operationalew other types of naval vessels. But even here there heve bean problems because many of the items needed are no longer in stock and out ofin the USSR.
The Soviets and the PKI
At the height of itsin the, tho PKI waa the largest nonrulingparty in the world. The Soviets began their campaign to woo the badly decimated PKI away from Pekingear after the coup, but it was only in late7 that their efforts began to bear fruit. ovietimplied for the first time that not all Indonesian Communists were oriented toward Peking. The Soviet commentator referred to documents of the Indonesianthatthe party was examining the disastrous implications of its past alignment with the "Mao Tse-tung group." In November of that year, when the PKI finally succeeded in holding its first plenary session after thero-Soviet "revisionist" faction reportedly tried and failed to wrest control of the party from the more powerful Peking-oriented faction.
Last June, Moscow resumed its public wooing of the party by launching an international campaign protesting theof political prisoners in
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The Soviets werequiet while therounded up those members of the PKI who attempted to launch an insurgency in East and Central Java this summer, but wars quick to point out after it was crushed that the PKI had erred again in following the Maoist line.
Currently, senior PKI cadre are trying to hold another plenary session to formulate future party policy in the light of lastdebacle. These cadreare divided into two factions, one wishes toon rebuilding the party by emphasizing politicaland recruitment; it would defer military action until these goals have been accomplished. The other group wishes toa program of military training to permit the party to challenge tha government in the near future. Moscow no doubt hopes that its recent efforts on behalf of the PKI will strengthen the hand of the more moderate faction.
Relations with Leftist Groups
In the latter halfhereoticeable upswing in the activities of the Soviet diplomatic establishment in Thisurtherthat the Soviets had not given up their efforts tothe Indonesians. ewcultural center was opened in Surabaya innd Soviet cultural and information activity began to climb toward precoup levels. Soviet cultural officials, athletes, and trade
unionists began traveling toonce again, and Indonesian groups once again receivedto visit Moscow.
Soviet officials inbegan renewing oldand cultivating new ties with members of potentially powerful political groups. The principal targets of this overt and covert effort were students, various labor groupa, Moslempro-Sukarno members of the Indonesian Nationalist Partynd other Sukarno-ists. Th* approach wascircumspect, however, and was apparently aimed atthe attitudes of thesetoward the government and quietly encouraging pro-Soviet attitudes.
The Indonesians noticed the
immediately.
recent propaganda on behalf of the PKI also madeleaders conscious of the USSR's troublemaklng One of the government's greatest fears is that Moscow will encourage the Marxists, former PKI members, old-line Sukarnolsta, and variousto unite in opposition.
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Conclusion
In recent years, theUnion haa clearlyigher priority on Itsin Vietnam and its efforts to establish relations withSingapore, and even the Philippines than on itswith Indonesia. Moscow evidently believes that thebenefits fromthe current regime ere not worth the political or economic cost. Judging from its writings on Indonesia and th* statements of itshe USSR does not expect the presentto remain in power
Soviet officials predict that Djakarta will fail to solve the serious socioeconomic problems it faces--largedebts, unemployment,poverty--and willovernment more to Moscow's liking. There is no evidence that the Soviets are as yet offering more than token support to the leftist forces It would like to aee dominate that government.
For the time being, at least, Moscow appears content to let things drag along. estern observer has described Soviet policy toward the government a* "thou shalt not kill but need not strive officiously to keep alive." If the Soviets didto change that policy,their diplomatic andestablishment in Indonesia ia large enough to supportcovert programs.
The Indonesians have not given up hope that the Soviets will ultimately unbend andeconomic and technical aid. Such aid, Djakarta believes, would not only contribute to economic development, but also would tend to balance their imageruly nonaligned Djakarta is not really counting on this aid, however, and is particularly reluctant to give the Soviets anto expand their physical presence in Indonesia to adegree,
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Original document.
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