WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Soviet Policy in Indonesia5
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SOVIET POLICY IN INDONESIA5
The USSR haailenma as regards its policy toward Indonesia over tha past threa years, and the prospect* that lt will be able to resolve tho situation satisfactorily are not good. On the one hand, Moscow cannot afford to bs too closely identified with athat has relentlessly persecuted the onceIndonesian communist Partyhiletrying to wean tha party away from the influence of Peking. On the other, Moscow finds it equallyto give the governcent of Indonesiay open support of the PKI, to move any further into the Western orbit or to renounce its large debt to the USSR.esult, tha Soviets have done just enough to keep their relations with the government alive, while quietly cultivating those groups they hope will ultimately assume power. Tha Indonesians, for their part, are nervous about Soviet subversive capabilities but would still like to have economic and technical aid from tha USSR.
During the nighthe Chinese-oriented IndonesianParty attempted to seise control of the government by meansoup ostensibly aimed at protecting Sukarno from aplot against the government. The PKI hoped to paralyse army counterreactions by murdering severalrmy including the amy
The army, under theof General Suharto, quickly crushed the attempt. Taking advantage of tha PKI'a leader-ahip of the affair, the army moved against the party. The logal Communist organization was
violently dismantled, and surviving cadre were forced underground, It was not until the summer6 that party members in East Java felt confident enough toerrorist campaign against tha government. This was quickly smashed by army troops, however, and the party lost over half of its top leadership In the process.
Although Soviet-Indoneeian relations had deteriorated as Sukarno had strengthened ties with Peking, Indonesia at the time of the coup was still the USSR's second largest military aid client in the free world.
Relations with the Govarnmant
Soviet-Indonesian relations have been cool ever since tha
coup attempt. In the ianediate aftarmath, the USSR suspended ItM economic and military aid, ana cut cultural and informational activity drastically. Soviet officials in Indonesia alao avoided contact with Indonesian leftists. Publicly, the USSR was circumspect in its criticism of the new order.
Sine*C, ralatlons between tha USSR and Indonesia have had their ups and downs. Aa tii* went on, about the only source of contort to Moscow was the dramatic decline in Chinese influence. Inoscow agreed to rescheduleeconomic and military debts5 million. Th*mad* no immediate move, however, to ratify the accord.
Then intouched another sensitive Soviet nerv* by Joining with Malaysia, Singapore, theand Thailand to form the Aasociation of southeast Allan Nations (ASEAN). Thewas established only toregional cultural, economic, and social cooperation, batrvoverthelass waaslv* that Indonesian economicwith such staunch allies of the US as Thailand and the Philippines might ultimately lead to military cooperation and the abandonmentonaligned stance
Other sources of grievance to the USSR wore Indonesia's policy of encouraging Western lnvestar-ent, its continued harsh treatment of tha PKI, and its failure to condemn US policy in
Vietnam. oviet official's comment at the time that "they are oven confiscating Dostoevski illustrated the USSR's gloomy view of ita prospects In
By late summer,there wer* also signs that the USSR had decided toore activist policy in an effort to stem the drift to tho right.eptember of that year, th* Soviets finally agreed to provideillion In military spare parts to the Indonesian Navy and Air Force. The terms of the agreement were stiff--cash and carry--and the amount the Soviets agreed to provide wasraction of whet the Indonesians estimated they needed.
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Over the past year, thehave continued to use the carrot-and-stick aporoach. Last March the Indonesians finally ratified the debt rescheduling agreement. Further developments were forestalled when Indonesia condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, in October, moreover, Djakarta again provoked Moscow by announcing itsto executo severalPKI members. President Podgorny lad the long list of Communist individuals and groups protesting. After the executions, the USSR's propaganda organsolley of protests.
InJul up besaa to swir.;
|/tha aovietecoitions with the Indonesians about implementing phase two of the soars parte accord.
Soviet Economic and Military Aid
Soviet-Indonesian economic relations have been clouded by the failure of the two sides to come to terms on debt Although, the Indonesians rstifiod the debt rescheduling accord, they are still hoping
that the Soviets will defermillion repayment due next April.
The Indonesians would also like toesumption of Soviet aid for their new Five rear Plan and for jungleand road building. The only project on which the Soviets are currently involvedinorwaterways project involving the construction of three dredges.
There has bean no work on such prestige Soviet-aid projects as the steel mill at Tjllegon or the phosphate plsnt at TJilstjap. The Soviets are particularlythat tha Indonesians hava done nothing to protect thealready sent5 for the construction of the steel mill. Althoughercent of the equipment forillion project had been delivered prior to the coup, only fivehad been installed. Much of the machinery has since rusted or been pilfered.
When the Indonesiansafter the evanta ofandheythey would need
request
Npare parts' IbawM-rWtence toalmost totallynavy and air force. larger army had alwaysmost of its equipmentcow cut this
Septem-
wih iimuntis'ians used
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to keep operational sorao cub-marinesew other types of naval vessels. But even here thoro have been problems because many of the items needed axe no longer in stock and out ofin the USSR.
The Soviets and the PKI
At the height of itsin the, the PKI was the largest nonrulingparty in the world. The Soviets began their campaign to woo the badly decimated PKI away from Pekingaar after the coup, but it was only in late7 that their efforts began to bear fruit. ovietimplied for the first time that not all Indonesian Communists were oriented toward Peking. The Soviet commentator referred to documents of the Indonesian"underground" thatthe party was examining the disastrous implications of its past alignment with the "Mao Tse-tung group." In November of that year, when the PKI finally succeeded in holding its firat plenary session after thero-Soviot "revisionist" faction reportedly tried and failed to wrest control of the party from the more powerfulriontod faction.
Last June, Moscow resumed its public wooing of the party by launching an international campaign protesting theof political prisoners in Indonesia. The Soviets werequiet while therounded up those members of
the PKI who attempted to launch an insurgency in Bait and Central Java this summer, but were quick to point out aftar it was crushed that the PKI had erred again in following the Maoist line.
Currently, senior PKI cadre axe trying to hold another plenary session to formulate future party policy in the light of laatdebacle. Theae cadreare divided into two factions, one wishes toon rebuilding the party by emphasising politicaland recruitmentj lt would defer military aotlon until these goals have been accomplished. The other group wishes toa program of military training to permit the party to challenge the government in the near future. Moscow no doubt hopes that its recent efforts on behalf of the PKI will strengthen the hand of the more moderate faction.
Relations with Leftist Groups
In the latter halfhereoticeable upswing in the activities of the Soviet diplomatic establishment in Thisurtherthat the Soviets had not given up their efforts tothe Indonesians. ewcultural center was opened in Surabaya innd Soviet cultural and information activity began to climb toward proccup levels. Soviet cultural officials, athletes, snd trade unionists began traveling toonce again, and Indonesian groups once again receivedto visit Moscow.
SECRET
Soviet officials inbagan renewing oldand cultivating now ties with members of potentially powerful political groups. The principal targets of this overt and covert effort were students, various labor groups, MoslemprO-Sukarno members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party nd other Sukarno-lsts. The approach waacircumspect, however, and was apparently aimed atche attitudes of thesetoward the government end quietly encouraging pro-Soviet attitudes.
- The Indonoalana noticed the lncreaaed Soviet activity almost irtimedlately.
The recent propaganda on behalf of the PXX also madeleaders conscious of the USSR's troublemaklng One of the government's greatest fears is that Moscow will encourage the Marxists, former PKI members, old-line Sukarnoiats, and various to unite in opposition.
Conclusion
In recent years, theUnion has clearlyigher priority on itsin Vietnam and Ita efforts to establish relations with Ma-layaia, Singapore, and even the Philippines than on itswith Indonesia. Moacow evidently believes that thebenefits frostthe current regime are not worth the political or economic cost, judging from its writings on Indonesia and the statements of its diplomats, the USSR does not expect the presentto remain in power
Soviet officials predict that Djakarta will fail to solve the serious socioeconomic problems itdebts, unemployment,willovernment more to Moscow's liking. There is no evidence that the Soviets are as yet offering more than token support to the leftist forces it would like to see dominate that government.
Tor the tin* being, at least, Moscow appears content to let things drag along. estern observer haa describe'! Soviet policy toward tha government as "thou shalt not kill but need not strive officiously to keep alive." if the Soviets did
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decide to change that policy, how ever, their diplomatic andestablishment in Indonesia ls large enough to supportcovert programs.
The Indonesians have not given up hope that the Soviets will ultimately unbend andeconomic and technical aid. such aid, Djakarta believes,
would not only contribute to economic development, but also would tend to balance their imageruly nonallgned Djakarta is not really counting on this aid, however, and is particularly reluctant to give the Soviets anto expand their physical presonce in Indonesialia-jiificant degree. I
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Original document.
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