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THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN VIETNAM
CONCLUSIONS
pacification programhole hasignificantto the pfotccutioo ol the war and strengthened theof the Government of South Vietnam (CVN)is theThus far die CVN's principal success has been Inpresence into the countryside. Providing permanent security*gains has been more difficult. Security conditions continuewith the intensity of combat. Iajw level terrorism,and propaganda eflorls by Uie Viet Cong (VC) continueprogiess,ince no moreronibingbeen made in reducing the effectiveness of the VClarge part of the countryside is still contested and subject tocontrol of neither side.
for gaiiing the allegiance of the people, this Is almostto measure. The turnout in7 elections and thethe Communists to gain popular support at Tct suggestover the settlement of the war and the firmness ofcommitment tends to reduce popular confidence. Theattitude among the peasants, however, continues to bewar-weariness and apathy.
now seems finally to have accepted the need forpacification effort. However, progress may still bethe political situation In Saigon, continuing inefficiency,the parochial concerns of the CVN.
major uncertainty is bow much time is left topast deficiencies and consolidate current gams. Over the nestmonths, further progress in pacification will almost certainlythe CVN much more able to cope with the VC. given peacetime
conditions, than it would beignificant advance in this ie-spccl would probably lequire atear.
E. Finally. Acre ii the question ol how the Communists wfl] react to tlic growing pressures on them. Despite improvement! in thtsecurity situation, gains in pacification are (till vulnerable tomilitary developments. The chances are good that thewill attempt to make an Intensified effort to counter th; gains in pacification and they will probably have some success. Thus,of gains is blely to coctiiiue toery slow and uncertain process".
DISCUSSION I. EACKOROUNO
I Since ataeiaVaUon program of aotne kind Las beea tn erdsTcoce to South Vietnam. Under tying philosopbies, relative priorities, ipeciBe programs, and the allocation of resourcesebbed and dowkI; the tlUmite objecthea, however, have remained fairly constant As mart recently defined by tbe Government of South Vietnam (GVN) these are: to improve security in tbe rural areas and prgtrct them from enemy military activity,ngage tlicand loyal'tes cl the pwmt andiable cwutrywide admlnLitra-ooa. and to neutralize the eflectiveixai and appeal of tbe Communist politkal apparatul-
be padficatiuo eSori was overshadowed by an overall strategy which pWed primary emphasb on drft*ting the eneroy'i conventional forces. CVN and Allied effiils to secure die countryside were clearly subordinate to tbe Luge-unit war; ta> part this ofollowed fromharacter of the war, gs more and largo unit* from North Vietnam were committed to battle.y event, by the end6 the goals of pacification werelemote.
ant changes were made ia the doctrinal and ergaiuTJOooal aspects of paclaVatian. It was anally rwojruied in pr'ctka that there was oosolution lo frtcnVation, and that. In fact,osebetween aD asprcti of tbe nulilary and political tluggl) tn (he fiistumber* cf specific Army of the RepublicVietnam (ARVN; uaiU wereefined roles tn support of pnrilication.argo Allied Opera-tinns were coordinated with follow-on pacification efforts. Ihe RcgroncI and Popular Force*P) were expandedritical compoiii-it of territorial defense, helping to III an unsnenselans were laid and- ted to expand tbe Revolutionary Development teams, to intensify, aad mote clearly tohru securityystematico alteck tbe Viet Cong, (VC) political fa* f: as tinctureeadership andas worked out andccepted by the Saigon authorities Finally, v
of evaluatingcta of pacification was (rated inc*valuation
4esult of all offforU. progress was nude duringhe priiKhul thru* waa in eipar.dmg tht pine ikt of th* govanmcnt and mil in* ill MlMM Ml In terms of crctriry. however, progrcudeceptive. Overall raluigt ba-iwl onapid eipaiuioo of CVS present* thioiiptiCHil die CWMtrjr. Some of this ptogicss, how ever,he result of eh-nges fat llx accounting ryilcm. More, important, the detailedhowed (hit VC militaryiti al activity In hamlets classified as "relativelyallv litcn-.nlng in themonths before die Tct oflcnslve of January IKS.hiy fragile pature of CVN control vu, of course, d, arn.ocalJy dcrionMratcd by the Td attack; not only was thepresence In tl* countryside acvceiy contracted for several oootlis, but the confidence of po1ra< tial go.eminent supportm there must have been badly shut-en.
r eflctt. it looV mostS lo regain lost ground, and some residuepolitical damage probably remains. Nevolheleit, wove progicu was otadc even though Communis forces were engaged fa, continuing mllilarydirourh Auguil Progiess has been much more rapid doling the reliovtbat since thee,nother atuiifestaUoo of the fart that pidar-tsoa cannot be separated bom tbe tou! rmLiny ptution.
ovember, aa Accelerated ParfScatioo Camptga (AI*C) has beenlw ptorlalmed goal of adding byamlets tobeady clarified as Vbtively secure" Simuliaiveously. the attack on tl* VC faifravuuctuie (the Pbornu, or fnwg Hoang program] has also been accelerated, aftrrpromising
a programs, certain bide qucstioos remain, what eon.
ibniin "progress, andermanent is H? In the neat section we deal with these questions In terms of tin-bjectives mmtimtd at tbe outset: security, tl* allegiance of the people, and the eBectivenea el dw enemy's poltlkal-arfinluliuitivc apparatus
II. tFftCIIVENESS AND VULNcKABIllTlfS A. Security
ft. ll has long been rrcngniwd thatust oftieitiooWnlinait ton tinning protection agalns! Cocninunut iniiiiiry andthere Is little (banc* ofover an apathetic, war wearytheol tbe CVN Umil recently, the prevailing concep- hud Itcd toaieat and gradually espand the perimeter of protection. New, toPC lie CVN appear* willing to Spread its resourcesoraVr to
eilrod lu ptnriMr Into more and more areas al as mereaangiy rapid pare.artly because the more favorable military pori-Joo jfka har rr.ade an eapanded ef art aaara feasible. Equally ioiport-nt, the CVN has fek Staary io reipoad tofer.siSed VC efloru to estabhsb Liberation Cnruaitteut
throughout the country. In effect, both ddcs want toosition taclaims of controlide areaigh percentage ofshould (here be ao early end to tbe fighting. The HESu.of the entire popuK'tiCwi falls in tbe "iclitively secuie*percent under VC domination, and tbe remaindery7 showedercent of the total population
inecure* areas andercent In Ibosc controlled by the VC.
hese statistics must be regarded with consJdcrable reserve. For example, wbile tbeclaims that aboutercent of tbe rural populationver balf of these Sve in hamlets wbcre there are varying degrees of VC activity.s possible to argue that some could be considered aso which ease tbe overall evaluation would change. Moreover, progress In security as measured by the HES systemum total of reportingide variety of activities related to security, mcluding the level of VC military and pobo'cal operations. If these latter indicators were con* siduvd in isolation, one could conclude tbat very httic progress has been made in tbe past two years.
o doubt that since tbe toOoductioD of5 the overall trend in security bas been basically favorable toMoreover, tbe Allied side isetter position to protectthan itear ago. The forces involved to security (RF, PF,Development teams) have liscreased to numbers andbalance of conventional forces Is much more favorableesult ofCommunist leases at Tet and In tbe following months. Especiallythere bas alsoedine in tbe quality of the Communistprincipal instrument for attacking tbe pacification effort. Atre almost certainly incapable of mounting an offensive on awouldii' nil) reverie overall trends, In selected areas,military operations wiD abnost certainly damage the pacificationand set il back; terrorism Initch/ to increase.
E. Revolutionary Development
the positive support of tbe peasant for the government ismatter, Many people bs tbe rural areas have been subjected to aprograms and false starts over the years and, no doubt, are inuredfrom Saigon. In any case, the political and psychological attitudes ofdwellers are not susceptible to statistics] measure. There are,general indicators of progress In this pltase of pacification First,an impressive timout of voters in the national electionsfor some coercion and dUbonesty. this suggestsuge partrural population is at least partially responsive to the GVN. Second,and urban masses conspicuously failed to rise up and support thethe Vet offensive. Finally, there was some popular revulsion toexcesses at Tst, and this was reflected in the large number of people
vbo have sine* been willing to erJlrt la the AHVK aod In People's Self-Defease Corps.
Ilcmmrr. nor imcerlaljjbfs have arbcB* bo-sad lo have ao Impact eeDevelopment- With the beginning ofnd ih* end of lb* bombing of North Vtotnam, (betarowingar least among Informed Vietnamese--that tbe war is coming lo an end,her thanAmong these people, there Is growing apprehension over the ship*inal settlement aed ihe firmness of the American commitment. To the extent that this uncertainty may be reflected In the countrj'SJce. it would tend to undcrr.ilne the gains of Revolutionary Development. Moreover, any weakening of the central government, whether real or imagined, would magnify the unrertaintJVs of ofltdah involved In Revolutionary Development programs and tiusrowing tbrcal to this aspect of pai-ificaUon.
lea.lng aiidr such generalif.es, propesi In tbe fieldbudding"t-orubonary* Deseloprneot ii Lit cry lo be painfullyseveral basse reasons As noted, security is an indupcruabt* pierojulttc.where ibneevUne ia security- condiliom,emporanly.damage lo confidence and respect for the government mere thingains bom developmental projects. Even if security condition* remainadministrative capability of Vietnamese officials Is weal. Revolutionaryis heavily dependent on American advice, assistance, andcomptiononstant threat to the entire system.
C. Neutralizing tha Viet Cong tnfrostruetura
Of all tbr atpecti of pacification, the most neglected and until Quite recently thebeen tlic error! lo eliminate the pervasive polit'-cal infrarfj-oture of the VC Untilbe CVN gave no more tbaosupport lo tbe effort. In part this has been (he legacyong era of political SDsecu-lty. during which intelligence, security, and police activities Were ofteo diredrd against ncm-Cornmunis; groups rather thanbe VC Another reasoo was the rctuetance of the army and other governmental groups, especially the police, to worl effectively together. Ia any case,8 the only organized counter efforts woe tlie Cbieu Hoi program to rally VC lo the governmentmalt, American-iponsored guerrilla effort, now calledReconna list nee Units.
Because of the presence of large US forces st has become more difficult for the VC mbutruerure lo operate, and Hs effcctivcoBSi baa decliried. Elimmat-iup tbe infrastn. etiire Itself, br-evrr, is anotherormidable bog tcini problem Importantto remedy tbe situation were rnVetj In. with the trsttujmmountrywide effort, called PhocnU. to collect infartna-tson oo tbe VCi srdrnatructurr and to plan various oprrationi against H. Tbe record of the new program t* fably promlving thus far. Better inteUigncr, rut>oelcd fasto rhitrivt and ptovrncial centers, has meant lhat both conventional and pjiamlli*ar, operations can be targeted against blown VC leaders.
Pboeolx program it one additional pressure, and is directed againstof tlte system which tbe VC have long considered crucial. However, Itbe credited with an appreciable countrywide impact on the Integrity oreffectiveness of the VC infrastructure.0 members of thearc daimcd to have beea killed, captured, or Induced tototal may include individuals improperly identified as members ofit certainly Includes large numbers of low level cadres whoreplaced fairly easily The numbers of ley cadre eb'rninalcd If quitethey are the most difficult to find. Mwcovcr, it is not at aU clearto thoseecent check suggestsarge Dumberinto tlic quagmire of the GVN acKurustrative-judicial systemare probably returning to tlielr formering, patient effortrequired before the VC infrastructure can be crippled.
III. PROSPECTS
Is far too complex, covers too many Individual programs,geographically too diverse to permit dear prognoses. All thingsprogramhole basignificant contribution to thethe war and to the political struggle. It has been most successful Inth?f the CVN in the countryside; it has been lessestablishing permanent security or stimulating genuine loyalty andtbe Saigon government. And it has been laggard in coping with theposedcD-organJ7cd and disciplined Communistbasignificant weakness, threatening end undermining other gains.
A. The GVN ond Poeifkolion
IS. Much will depend oo (lie attitude of the CVN It cannot be said that the various Saigon governments have shared the American enthusiasm ortoResults obtained07 were largely because of constant American pressures. Tba skills, funds, and motivation have been overwhelmingly American; the CVN has provided manpower and occasional high level endorsements, but bas been far from committed to the programs. Too often CVN officials have participated or cooperated simply to please their American counterparts, or to share in the spoils of the" inevitable corruption.
aigon now seems to have accepted the needigorous pacification effort Thlcu's preference would probably be to move more deliberately,CVN controlected areas rather thaness firmly based presenceroader range. However, he is fnctea*ragly concerned over how mucheft to tire CVN before the fighting ends. Fear that peare will come before thetrong position to compete with the VC bas caused Thieu to support the APC Moreover, Thieu isew interest In the possibilities of using aspects of the pacification program, such as the People's Self-Defense Corps, as the basbountrywide political organiratioa
ITI The CVN nJI doc* oo* have the iliDj and resources totig-tttWanlJ) greater rot*he muu>gcmco(of ta effectiveoo effort9 I'Still viral lo success, but gaining popular acceptance will depend finallyrowing eCrdiveoejs of the CVNa per-forniante In the program.
P ii.fol Condition!
ajcwow much tarnr la left to mile up part deiVkodei aad lOnioLdate cunent galni Pacincstioa has already fUtcgtheocd tbe CVS pntitMais the Cc-nmor,Utv Overt several rr-antba, furtbe. poetess tn psciSeaiioo will almost certainly not mate the CVN much more able to cope with lite VC in peacetime than it would beignificant advance lo this respect would probably require atear. And the termsetUcrnent could undo virtually- all that hai heen iceomnlishcd, especially since progress hatn minimal In reducing the political threat.
C. Commvniit CounlartrTorts
econd area ofV response of the Comrnunlvls We believe the overall situation In Vietnam is such that pacification is less vulnerable to Coenmonul countrr efforts thanrincipal conclusion about the entire pacification progrum, however. Is tha: iu gains are tentative and can be adversely affected by militaryhis ll especially true of the gains registered during the APC. It Is abo true, of course, that Cermmunirt nubtary rftbaekj or reduced rrveb of operations would fucflital* gates in rorlficataon
i i < Sua-.
rJVat the aibnwar dura mot support the cnUt that the pact&aaoa aituattontrw wliwtbkKe>i-aDy atW,
UVlk
hereumber of way* the Communists could attack the pi,Scat ion program If they are willing to pay the price in casualties and caraabutnes, they can avouot attacks brge enough to inflict considerable damage on the pactfica-tsoo effort, al least tcmrvoraruy. Sirnilarly, they could concentrate their effortsthe paciScalion security foices (HK, tV, and thendenorUmaginda in the hamleU. The VConcerted propaganda campaign against the APC. abnost tamvcdiatery uponImplementation. The chances are good tlsat they will alio attempt to countrr tbe gains in paeiBi atkso in othernd they will probably have aome auocen, rucfa anf fighting -ouU, in an, case. ae< back tbe pacuVitjon progTBra Thus, eontolidatioo ofiely to cmrtioue toery ilow and unccTtatn process.
Original document.
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