' f/owingonlzofiorw pcrtlc'.pci'ed in ylsff prmparafron of
heagency ondOrtzorUnftom of lh* menta of stat* ond Dthni, and the msa. " " .
of irrtenigenc*rdh.
mumv, jr, far tha director of
a"fll f* carroll the director, Wmmmy'.'
afarfaininflii
loiih w. trvcwla, for lhe director, tfahonol
I
41
"Secret.
THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN VIETNAM
CONCLUSIONS
pacification programhole hasignificantto the prosecution of the war and strengthened theof the Government of South Vietnam (GVN)is theThus far the GVN's principal success has been inpresence into the countryside. Froviding permanent securitygains has been more difficult. Security conditions continuewith the intensity of combat. Low level terrorism,and propaganda efforts by the Viet Cong (VC) continueprogress, particularly since no moreromisingbeen made in reducing the effectiveness of the VClarge part of the countryside is still contested and subject tocontrol of neither side.
for gaining the allegiance of the people, this is almostto measure. The turnout in7 elections and thethe Communists to gain popular support at Tet suggestover the settlement of the war and the firmness ofcommitment tends to reduce popular confidence. Theattitude among the peasants, however, continues to bewar-weariness and apathy.
now seems finally to have accepted the need forpacification effort. However, progress may still bethe political situation in Saigon, continuing inefficiency,the parochial concerns of the GVN.
major uncertainty is how much time is left topast deficiencies and consolidate current gains. Over the nextmonths, further progress in pacification will almost certainlythe CVN much more able to cope with the VC. given peacetime
conditions, than it would beignificant advance in thiswould probably require atear.
E. Finally, there is the question of how the Communists will react to the growing pressures on them. Despite improvements in thesecurity situation, gains in pacification are still vulnerable tomilitary developments. The chances are good that thewill attempt to make an intensified effort to counter the gains in pacification and they will probably have some success. Thus,of gains is Likely to continue toery slow and uncertain process.
DISCUSSION I. BACKGROUND
Since atacification program of tome kind has been in existence in South Vietnam. Underlying philosophies, relative priorities, jpecific programs, and the allocation of resources have ebbed and flowed; tbe ultimate objectives, however, have remained fairly constant. As most recently defined by the Government of South Vietnam (CVN) these are: to improve security in the rural areas and protect them from enemy military activity, to engage theand loyalties of the peasant andiable countrywideand to neutralize the effectiveness and appeal of the Communist political apparatus.
he pacific*boo effort was overshadowed by an overall strategy which placed primary emphasis on defeating the enemy's conventional forces. CVN and Allied efforts to secure the countryside were clearly subordinate to tlie large-unit war; in part this necessarily followed from the character of the war, as more and larger units from North Vietnam were committed to battle In any event, by the end8 the goals of pacification were still remote.
ignificant changes werehe doctrinal and orgaiuzarJooal aspects of pacification. It was finally recognized in practice that there was no singlo aolution to pacification, and that, in fact, therelose interdependence between all aspects of the military and political struggle. For the first time, rigruficant numbers of specific Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units were assigned defined roles in support of pacification. More large Alliedwere coordinated with follow-on pacification efforts. The Regional and Popular Forces (RF, PF) were expandedritical component of territorial defense, helping to fill an immense void. Plans were laid and implemented to expand the Revolutionary Development teams, to Intensify their training and more clearly to define their securityystematic plan to attack tbe Viet Cong (VC) political infrastructurec, leadership and organization) was worked out and eventually accepted by the Saigon authorities.ystem
of evaluating various aspects of pacification was tested in practice and accepted {the Hamlet Evaluation
4esult of all of these efforts, progress was madehe principal thrust was in expanding the presence of the government and making its influence felt. In terms of security, however, progress was deceptive. Overall ratings based on HES statisticsapid expansion of CVN presence throughout the country. Some of this progress, however, was the result of changes in the accounting system. More important, the detailed statistics showed that VC military and political activity In hamlets classified as "relatively secure" was actually increasing in the six months before the Tet offensive ofbe highly fragile nature of CVN control was, of course, dramatically demonstrated by the Tet attacks; not only was the government presence in the countryside severely contracted for several months, but the confidence ofgovernment supporters there must have been badly shaken.
In effect, it took most8 to regain lost ground, and some residue of psychological aod political damage probably remains. Nevertheless, some progress was made even though Communist forces were engaged in continuing military "offensives" through August Progress has been much more rapid during the relative lull in combat since then; this is another manifestation of the fact boat pacification cannot be separated horn tbe total military situation.
ovember, an Accelerated Pacification Campaign (AFC)en underway with the proclaimed goal of adding, by0 hamlets to0 already classified as "relativelyimultaneously, the attack on the VC infrastructure (the Phoenix, or Phung Hoang program) has also been accelerated,romising start
In evaluating these programs, certain basic questions remain:nd how permanent is it? In the next section we deal with these questions hi terms of the three objectives mentioned at the outset: security, the allegiance of the people, and the effectiveness of the enemy's political-administrative apparatus.
II. EFFECTIVENESS AND VULNERABILITIES A. Security
has long been recognized that pacification is first ofuestionWithout continuing protection against Communist military andthere is little chance of winning over an apathetic, war wearythe side of the GVN. Until recently, the prevailing concept bad been toareas and gradually expand the perimeter of protection. Now, Inthe GVN appears willing to spread its resources more thinly in orderits presence into more and more areas at an increasingly rapid pace.partly because the more favorable military position of the Allies hasexpanded effort more feasible. Equally important, the GVN has felt itto respond to the intensified VC efforts to establish Liberation Committees
"scenn.
throughout the country. In effect, both sides want to beosition to make maximum claims of controlide areaigh percentage of tbe population, should there be an early end to the fighting. The: HES currently shows3 percent of the entire population falls in the "relatively secure"3 percent under VC domination, and ths remaindery1 way of comparison, statistics for7 showedercent of the total population in "relatively secure" areas endercent in those controlled by tbe VC
statistics must be regarded with considerable reserve. Forthe CVN claims that aboutercent of the rural populationver half of these live in hamlets where there are varyingVC activity. Thus it is possible to argue that some could be consideredin which case the overall evaluation would change.In security as measured by the HES systemumide variety of activities related to security. Including theVC military and political operations. Ii these latter indicators werein isolation, one could conclude that very Utile progress has beenthe past two years.
there is no doubt that since the introduction of5 the overall trend in security bas been basically favorable toMoreover, the Allied side isetter position to protectthan itear ago. The forces tavolved in security (RF, PF,Development teams) have Increased in numbers andbalance of conventional forces is much more favorableesult ofCommunist losses at Tet and In the following months. Especiallythere has alsoecline in the quality of lhe Communistprincipal instrument for attacking the pacification effort. At present.forces are almost certainly incapable of mounting an offensive on awould permanently reverse overall trends. In selected areas,military operations will almost certainly damage the pacificationand set it back; terrorism in particular is likely to Increase.
B. Revolutionary Development
the positive support of the peasant for the government ismatter, Many people in the rural areas have been subjected to aprograms and false starts over the years and, no doubt, are Inured tofrom Saigon. In any case, the political and psychological attitudes ofdwellers are not susceptible to statistical measure. There are,general indicators of progress In this phase of pacification. First,an impressive turnout of voters In the national electionsfor some coercion and dishonesty, this suggestsarge partrural population is at least partially responsive to the CVN. Second,and urban masses conspicuously failed to rise up and support thethe Tet offensive. Finally, there was some popular revulsion toexcesses at Tet. and this was reflected in tho large number of people
who have since been willing to enlist in the ARVN and in die People's Self-Defense Corps.
owever, new uncertainties have arisen which are bound to have an impact on Revolutionary Development. With the begimung ofand the end of the bombing of North Vietnam, thererowingat least among informedthe war is coming to an end, sooner rather than later. Among these people, there is growing apprehension over the shapeinal settlement and the firmness of the American commitment To the extent that this uncertainty may be reflected in the countryside, it would tend to undermine the gains of Revolutionary Development. Moreover, any weakening of the central government, whether real or imagined, would magnify the uncertainties of officials involved in Revolutionary Development programs and thusrowing threat to this aspect of pacification.
Even leaving aside such general uncertainties, progress in the field of "nation building" or Revolutionary Development is likely to be painfully slow for several basic reasons. As noted, security is an indispensable prerequisite. In areas where thereecline in security conditions, even temporarily, the resulting damage to confidence and respect for the government more thangalas from developmental projects. Even if security conditions remain good, the administrative capability of Vietnamese officials is weak; Revolutionaryis heavily dependent on American advice, assistance, and inspiration. Pervasive corruptiononstant threat to the entire system.
C. Neutralizing the Viet Cong Infrastructure
Of all the aspects of pacification, the mostuntil quite recently the leastbeen the effort to eliminate the pervasiveinfrastructure of the VC. Untilhe CVN gave no more thansupport to the effort. In part this has been the legacyong era of political insecurity, during which intelligence, security, and police activities were often directed against non-Communist groups rather than against the VC Another reason was the reluctance of the army and other governmental groups, especially the police, to work effectively together. In any case,8 the only organized counter efforts were the Chieu Hoi program to rally VC to the governmentmall, American-sponsored guenilla effort, now calledReconnaissance Units.
Because of the presence of large US forces it has become more difficult for the VC infrastructure to operate, and its effectiveness has declined.the infrastructure Itself, however, is another matter andormidable long term problem. Important steps to remedy the situation were takenith the initiationountrywide effort, called Phoenix, to collecton the VCs infrastructure and to plan various operations against it. The record of the new program is fairly promising thus far. Betterunneled into district and provincial centers, has meant that both conventional and paramilitary operations can be targeted against known VC leaders,
Phoenix program is one additional pressure, and is directed againstof the system which the VC have long considered crucial. However, itbe credited with an appreciable countrywide impact on the integrity oreffectiveness of tbe VC infrastructure.0 members of theare claimed to have been killed, captured, or induced "tototal may include individuals Improperly identified as members ofit certainly includes large numbers of low level cadres whoreplaced fairly easily. The numbers of key cadre eliminated is quitethey arc the most difficult to find. Moreover, it is not at al! clearto thoseecent check suggestsarge numberinto the quagmire of the GVN administrative-judicial systemare probably returning to their formerong, patient effortrequired before the VC infrastructure can be crippled.
III. PROSPECTS
is far too complex, covers too many individual programs,geographically too diverse to permit clear prognoses. All thingsprogramhole hasignificant contribution to thethe wax and to the pohtical struggle. It has been most successful inthe presence of the CVN in the countryside; it has been lessestablishing permanent security or stimulating genuine loyalty andthe Saigon government. And it has been laggard in coping with theposedell-organized and disciplined Communisthasignificant weakness, threatening and undermining other gains.
A. The GVN and Pacification
Much will depend on the attitude of the GVN. It cannot be said that the various Saigon governments have shared tho American enthusiasm orto pacification. Results obtained67 were largely because of constant American pressures. Tbe skills, funds, and motivation have been overwhelmingly American; the GVN has provided manpower and occasional high level endorsements, but has been far from committed to the programs. Too often GVN officials have participated or cooperated simply to please their American counterparts, or to share in the spoils of the inevitable corruption.
Saigon now seems to have accepted the needigorous pacification effort Tbieu's preference would probably be to move more deliberately,CVN control in selected areas rather thaness firmly based presenceroader range. However, he Is increasingly concerned over how much time is left to the GVN before the fighting ends. Fear that peace will come before the GVN istrong position to compete with the VC has caused Thieu to support the APC. Moreover, Thieu isew interest in the possibilities of using aspects of the pacification program, such as the Peoples Self-Defense Corps, as the basisountrywide political organization.
GVN still does not have the skills and resources to assume agreater role in the management and execution of an effectiveeffortS assistance is still vital to success, but gainingwill depend finallyrowing effectiveness of the GVN'sin the
Conditions
major uncertainty is how much time is left to make up pastconsolidate current gains. Pacification has already strengthenedis the Communists. Over the next several months, furtherpacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able tothe VC in peacetime than it would beignificant advance inwould probably require atear. And the terms of aundo virtually all that has been accomplished, especially sincebeen minimal in reducing the political threat.
CountaretTorts
1 Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Direcior of Intelligence and Research. Department of State, believes lhal the estimate doc* oot support lhe conclusion lhal the pacificationess vulnerable than it wasut ralher that It Is essentially as vulnerable now as it was then.
A second area of uncertainty is the response of the Communists. We believe the overall situation in Vietnam is such that pacification is less vulnerable to Communist counterefforts thanrincipal conclusion about the entire pacification program, however, is that its gains are tentative and can be adversely affected by military setbacks; this Is especially true of the gains registered during the APC. It is also true, of course, that Communist military setbacks or reduced levels of operations would facilitate gains in pacification.
Thereumber of ways the Communists could attack tbe pacification program. If they are vrilling to pay the price in casualties and capabilities, they can mount attacks large enough to inflict considerable damage on theeffort, at least temporarily. Similarly, they could concentrate their efforts against the pacification securityF, PF, and thend increase terrorism and propaganda io the hamlets. The VConcerted propaganda campaign against the APC, almost immediately upon its implementation. The chances are good that they will also attempt to counter the gains in pacification in other ways and they will probably have some success; such an mtensification of fighting would. In any case, set back the pacification program. Thus, consolidation of gains is likely to continue toery slow and uncertain process.
i f wo* dUwi-inolad byC*nrro1
b lo* tho IriromKjlion ond mi ol it* recipient ondora onoW hbn on Obails. Addrtionol disMfnlrwrrkM Way be authorii-id by
following offidah within rh*ir mpective
drvOor of Intelligence- and Research, for The Cor^ortraent ef State ' b. Director, DVfwtM IrrHlUg.oc* Agency, lor sto'OAco ofSoa-OMry -of -
. tM-MiM end tho orgonUatton of tho Joint Quaff: . Asabtarrt Chief of Jlaff torOafjottiaaot of tho Array.,
d Atslrtorr) Chief of Nu mlo' 'ha Otportmirt of thi *
-". Aubfont ChMtf of SioftUSAf. for the Daportmertf.ofJUf
j-t Direcior of Intelligence, AEC. for the Atomic Energy Aulilonl Director, FBI, for tha rodorol Bureau ofyJ^'.
h. Director of NSA for tha Notional Soaifrry Agency
L Director of Control Boffrcrice Sorvloa, OA, for cry otheror
X Thli doToteoQtmcry 'be rotolnod, or1 ebMre-yod try bom Ing in actortsonc* arhfi. opplkobUii. or raturned to tha Control Intelligence Agency by ort-erngaraont whh the CortfroT^OrerarioB Service,c'
honUwrrunota^aa-ijrjoai, the overseas -rodpientikorted not in oxcou of on*ond of this period,ihovld aHharioyed, roturnod toorthou id be requested of tho forwarding ogancy lon vil'^'V'
The title of (hb docomenl often usodtronlaxt rKould baTOI OFWCWaI i'l X i^fc
a Houm Notional Security Council Dapartmenl of State *Va# Departirent of DefvnM 9tnstnjy Cornmbston
3*^
atwm
'
wis
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: