Created: 7/15/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CentralAgency Inspector General

Report of Investigation



Frederick P. Hitz Inspector General

A. R. Cinqnegrana Deputy Inspector General for Investigations

i tins are SECRET








What information was available to the ciaend of5 concerning devlne'sdid itailable andashandled? how reliable were thefrom whom the information was


Chronology: Key

Graphic: Key Events and Locations Relating

Graphic Guatemalan Military Structure and

Graphic Guatemalan Directorate of Intelligence

tructure and

What information was available to the cia between5 andoncerning DeVine's

kilijng? When did ft become avaiiable and how was n


handled? how reliable WERE the agency sources

from whom the information was

Graphic: Occupants of Senior CIA

Graphic: Occupants of Senior Guatemalan

What do cia personnel and others recall regarding

the reporting concerning DeVLNE'S

did the cia meet its responsibility for collectionpertaining to the devine killing?of Tins information improperly

is there any evidence that cia employees or agents were directly or indirectly involved in DeVLNE'S

was information regarding devlne'sshared by cia with theCommittees? Did the cia meetfor congressional notification in

was information regarding devine's killing properly shared with ambassadors and other appropriate Embassym cia meet its responsibility for

notification in the DeViNE

Why did the Agency not provide information

regarding the DeVTNE killing to the DeVLNE



Report of Investigation



etter to President Clinton that was simultaneously released to the New York Times, Representative Robert Torricellilleged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in the "murders in Guatemala in the". citizen Michael DeVine and Guatemalan insurgent Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. He further alleged that these two individuals "were murdered under the direction of Colonel Julio Robertouatemalan intelligence officer [who] wasontract with the CIA and remained on its payroll at the time of the murders."

On, the President directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) toovernment-wide review of all allegations surrounding the DeVine killing and the disappearance of Bamaca as well as any related matters. Shortly before this, an investigation that had been initiated by the CIAs Inspector General in5 at the request of then-Acting Director of Central Intelligence Admiral William Studeman regarding the relationship between the CIA and Colonel Alpirez was broadened to include

questions regarding the Bamaca and DeVine cases that were raised by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the IOB, as well as other issues that were raised during the public debate that followed Representative Torricellis allegations.

Report concerns the DeVine killing, the informationAgency received after his killing and whether or not thathandled properly. It deals, among other things, withwhat information was available to CIA on DeVine andthe Agency met its responsibility for the collectionof intelligence pertaining to DeVine; whathad linking Alpirez to DeVine; whether there is any evidenceemployees or assets were directly or indirectly involved inand, whether information regarding DeVine's killingshared with congressional intelligence oversight committees.


Agency record has been found concerning MichaelU.S. citizen who lived and died in Guatemala, prior to his death inAccording to media and Embassy reporting, DeVine was bornraised in lUinois and served in. Navy. His wife,born and raised in California. In the0 s, thethrough Mexico and eventually reached Guatemala. Circapurchased land in The Peten, about three kilometers south ofof Poptun. Embassy reports describe Poptunown ofan eight to ten hour drive from Guatemala City andfrom Flores, the provincial capital. According to an

Poptun has been likened to Dodge City in its lawlessness and Wild West ways. Although there are three national policemen assigned there, they have no telephone, no vehide and no money for taxis or olher expenditures. Scores are settled directly, if at all. Three or foureek are not uncommon; virtually all go unresolved. At any sign of military involvement, the national policemen disappear or become even more ineffective than usual.

The DeVines developed the land they had purchasedarge farm and wilderness area called Ixobel Farm. There theyotel, accommodating as manyuests at night andlientele of adventurers and backpackers. They also operated the La Fonda restaurant in Poptun. The DeVines were apparently well regarded in the community and Michael DeVine's funeral was reportedly the largest public event in Poptun in memory.

DeVine's killing, the involvement of Guatemalan military personnel in his killing and the manner in which the Guatemalan Government handled the investigation of DeVine's killing, haveignificant impactGuatemalan relations. Inoreign Military Funds (FMF) military assistance to Guatemala was suspended, largely because of the DeVine case. The US. Government has made its displeasure known to the Guatemalan Government since then at virtually every opportunity.

On, Congressman Robert Torricelli allegedetter to President Clinton that was simultaneously released to the New York Times that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in the "murders in Guatemala in the" of DeVine and Guatemalan insurgent Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. He further alleged that these two individuals "were murdered under the direction of Colonel Julio Robertouatemalan intelligence officer [who] wasontract with the CIA and remained on its payroll at the time of then, the President directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) toovernment-wide review of all allegations siurounding the DeVine killing and the disappearance of Bamaca, as well as any related matters. Shortly before this, the CIA Inspector General (IG) broadened an investigation into the CIA's relationship with Alpirez, initiated ont the request of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, to include the broad allegations raised by Congressman Torricelli and others.

In5 letter to the CIA IG from Congressman Torricelli reportedormer DEA employee had advised him that the CIA had information indicating that the DeVine killing was "politically motivated" in that DeVine hadrug

operation run byhat Alpirez had DeVine killed to keep this discovery secret; and that the CIA had not shared this information with the Justice Department when the Department was reviewing the reported role of Alpirez in the DeVine killing, thus obstructing justice. These allegations were also included in the CIA IG's investigation.

his Report describes the fmdings of that investigation. Because of the manifold other allegations and issues that have arisen regarding CIA activities in Guatemala, it is included as Volume TVue volume collection of reports relating to these allegations.


nDCI Studeman asked the IG to investigate CIA's relationship with Alpirez and two investigators were assigned to that task. However,esult of additional questions raised by the SSCI, Congressman Torricelli and the IOB, the investigation was expanded. By early April, the investigative team had grown tonvestigators and several research assistants andore group of five investigators was assigned to the DeVine investigation. An5 tasking memorandum from the IG to the Deputy Director for Adrninistration, Deputy Director of Intelligenceeputy Director for Operationseputy Director forechnology, General Counsel, Director of Congressional Affairs, Director of Public Affairs, and the Executive Secretariat requested that all information in the possession of those components that related to the relationship between the Agency and Alpirez, DeVine and Bamaca be made available to the OIG. In lateurther request was made to the DO and DI for any relevant documents produced after the responses to theequest. Several thousand documents relevant to DeVine were reviewed as were the results ofore detailed description of the procedures and resources required for the entire Guatemala-related investigation is included in the overview. Volume I.


The following questions are addressed in this Volume:

What information was available to the CIA before the end of5 concerning DeVine's killing? When did it become available and how was that information handled? How reliable were the Agency sources from whom the information was acquired?

What information was available to the CIA between5 andoncerning DeVine's killing? When did it become available and how was it handled? How reliable were the Agency sources from whom the information was acquired?

What do CIA personnel and others recall regarding the reporting concerning DeVine's killing?

Did the CIA meet its responsibility for collection of information pertaining to the DeVine killing? Was any of this information improperly suppressed?

Is there any evidence that CIA employees or agents were directly or indirectly involved in DeVine's killing?

Was information regarding DeVine's killing properly shared by CIA with the Intelligence Oversight Committees? Did the CIA meet its responsibility for Congressional notification in the DeVine killing?

Was information regarding DeVine's killing properly shared with Ambassadors and other appropriate Embassy officials? Did CIA meet its responsibility for notification in the DeVine killing?


Why did the Agency not provide information regarding the DeVine killing to the DeVine family?


What information was available to the cia before the end of5 concerning DeVine's killing? When did it become available and how was that information handled? how reliable were the agency sources from whom the information was acquired?

earliest mention of DeVine's killing that has been foundfiles appearsS. military Southerndaily intelligence summary that reported:

nhe body. businessman Michael DeVine was found in Poptun. DeVine had been decapitated; his body showed signs of torture. He was the ownermall restaurant and also workedour guide. DeVine was kidnappedsicj June by unidentified men. The incident may have been criminally motivated; however, both the rebel armed forces and narcotraffickers operate in the area. There have been no claims of responsibility.

The next reference to the killing in Agency files appears0 State Department press guidance message reporting that DeVine's body was found near his vehicle on0 at the side of the highway near an area called La Montana Rusa, between Poptun and Guatemala City. According to that message, the Guatemalan death certificate cited knife wounds as the cause of death.

U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City initiated anDeVine's killing. This investigation was led by the Consula State Department officer with responsibility for Guatemala. During the investigation, theho represents the Department of Defenseparticipated in many of the CG's meetings with thelawyer, and interacted with the Guatemalan militarymatter. The Embassy Human Rights Officer, anotherofficer, was also involved. US. Ambassador Thomas

Stroock, the Deputy Chief of Missionnd the Political Counselor made official demarches and led the effort to apply pressure on the Guatemalan Government.

record reflects that the Agency's Chief of Station (COS)H

n in Guatemala City, and other Station personnel, supported

investigation by seeking information from Agency sources about

DeVine's killing, Guatemalan Government efforts to resolve the matter and Guatemalan officials' reactions to the Embassy pressure. The record also reflects that, through its relationships with the intelligence services of the Guatemalan Government, known as "liaisonhe Station also conveyed the message that the US. Government placed major importance on identifying and punishing those who were responsible for DeVine's killing.

mbassy Reports. Anconcerning the investigation suggested that themay have been involved in DeVine's killing and wasits involvement. That report also provided several versionsmotives. According to thatB

ana^lon^vitTitrie DeVine family's lawyer^as the source of much of the information available to thevas describedenacious investigator who worked very closely with Embassy officials, sharing mfonTvahon and providing them with copies of his reports. As of| Reportedly had made five trips to Poptun or Flores in connection with his investigation.

ieveloped significant evidence implicating several menhite Toyota pickup truck in DeVine's death. He also was able to connect the truck to the Guatemalan military, specifically to the Kaibil Base in Poptun and to the Military Zoneeadquarters base at Santa Elena in Flores. He located several individuals who claimed to have seen the truck and its occupants waiting by the entrance to DeVine's farm when DeVine drove in at. on Friday, Junehey reportedly saw DeVine's van and the truck depart the farmew minutes later. At0 pm. on Junet least two individuals reported seeing the two vehicles parked together at the site

where DeVine's van was found. the next morning, Saturday, JuneeVine's body was found on the ground beside the van. He had apparently been beaten. His face was badly bruised and he had been nearly decapitated, apparently by someone standing behind him while he knelt. According 'I 1'ivit all of the physical and forensic evidence pointed to meproDability that DeVine was murdered at the place where his body was found, and the official cause of death was partial decapitation and the near total loss of blood (hipovolemic shock).

tax form featuring the name of an individual, andsaid to be of the type used by the Guatemalan Army, werethe spot by the entrance to DeVine's farmwhere the pickup truckbeen seen waiting on c< eded in locatingnamed on the tax form and another man, both of whom hadby individualswho had seen the men in the pickup truck,Accordingen were reported to'.

ccording to the Embassy reportJ^^Hiad

ist of nine names of individuals whoin DeVinejsloihhg^ouT of the men hadccordinghad been told that the white truck

had been repainted at the Santa Elena military base after DeVine's killing, and that it was now redlack stripe on the side. The white pickup truck had been seen entering and leaving the Poptun Base many times prior to0 but was never seen there again.

to the Embassy report, employees on DeVine'sthat DeVine had been depressed for about two weeks prior toand had referred vaguely to threats and commented that hebe around much longer. DeVine's mother had died recentlyubstantial estate but it was unclear whether anyone incommunity knew of his financial gain. Carole DeVine hadthe day before DeVine's killing from two weeks away from Poptun,

s the designation given to base or local level intelligence omen.s subordinate to the bate or local commander and provides information to the Directorate of Intelligencef the Guatemalan National Defense Staff as welt. See charts depicting structure of Guatemalan military.

and was unaware of any such depression or concern about threats on DeVine's part.

The initial Guatemalan police report concluded that the motive for the killing was robbery, despite the fact that DeVine's van and its contents were found with the body and only DeVine's pocket knife and watch were missing. According to Embassy reports, other conjecture at the time suggested some drug connection or some effort to drive him off his land. There alsoeportoung girl had remarked some eight hours before DeVine's abduction that DeVine was going to be killed because he hadhild and sold it for one million dollars. This allegation was not substantiatecHjy any reportissing

^tiatea^jv a

child in the area, and was discredited byH Minvestigauon.


reporting documents the pressure that was appliedGovernment of Guatemala regarding the DeVine. Ambassador asked Guatemalan Minister(MOD) Bolanos for his assistance in investigating thethe Ambassa^QLJXM, other Embassy officers, and[

rexe in frequent contact with thesar Cabrera, Chief of Guatemalan Military Intelligenceeneral Marroquin, Guatemalan Army Chief of Staffnd others. However, the results were conflicting and unsatisfactory responses regarding the course of the Guatemalan Government's investigation.

of the information collected byH Jwas sharedofficials.eetin^between anand Colonel Cabrera, Mrs. DeVine and her lawyer, Mrs.that the pickup truck had been seen entering the Poptun Basea.m. on Juneo other reporting has been found that tiesto the Poptun Base later than Junehroughout theseEmbassy officials, the Guatemalans maintained they were unableor locate the pickup truck in question.

eeting wi(h| | an Embassy officer on Augusteneralarrant had been issued for the arrest of Jose Vicente Cornelio, an individual DeVine had shot and wounded after catching him stealing chickenseparate Embassy

reporting indicated that DeVine had paid the mans medical expenses, had given him money for the period when he was unable to work, and that there was no apparent residual animosity between the two.

hembassy report concerning the Embassy's investigation of the DeVine killing stated that:

This case gives the (Guatemalan Government! an opportunity to show that it has the resolve to carry out an effective investigation and bring the perpetrators, whoever they may be, to justice. We are seriously disturbed that thus far the military's responses have not indicated anything like the leve^fattention and/or energy we would like to see. Mrs. DeVinei I Bielieve that this indicates the military is trying toieuwoTvement of some of its personnel in DeVine's

murder. That judgment may behope is that the

guilty parries will be apprehended and brought to trial. If this does not happen, and if it appears that the military has failed to take what appear to be relatively easy and logical steps, we may have to condude that the military wishes to conceal what really happened. In that event, it would call into serious question whether we should continue to have any security assistance relationship with the Guatemalan armed forces. Also, in that event, we may deride that. Government should file its own complaint with the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman's office.

0 Intelligence Report The first Station correspondence that has been found concerning the DeVine kiJlint generated on

|on Juneive men fromffice litary Zoneeadquarters had arrived


responsible f

and also the first to indicateilitary cover-up was under way. In

tho August ^ cable to Headquarters,

proposed ways Ambassador Stroock could use the informal

|to apply pressure on the Guatemalans, but also proposec to delay briefing Stroock on the information in order to give some measure of protection to J

Oneadquarters responded, rejecting the COS's proposal and in structH to brief Stroock immediately on the information in view of the high level interest in the DeVine case. Headquarters also directed that theresubmitted in "intelligence format" and marked for possible "memorandumhe Headquarters response alsoesire to provide the information to the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Bernard Aronson, as quickly as possible.

The Station resubmitted the information in "intelligence format"August

The cable also indicated that the only Embassy ol

in Guatemala who had been briefed was Ambassador Stroock.


Onhe Station advised Headquarters that Ambassador Stroock had requested that theassed personally to Deputy Assistant Secretary^tStatc tor Latin America (DAS) Joseph Sullivan because Assistant Secretary Aronson was on vacation. The Station cable stated that Stroock did not wish the cable to be left with anyone other than Sullivan at the State Department, that the Embassy had been in contact with Sullivan, and that Sullivan was expecting the information.

Ongain by Immediate cable to Headquarters, the Station asked that the inf<>ihandcarried to Sullivan immediately,. Washington time, Sullivan had not seen it. The Station cable stated further that the DCM, Philip Taylor, had again asked the Station to ensure that this be done, and that the Embassy was planning to take action with the Guatemalan Government based on the information. Ambassador Stroock planned toersonal demarche to President Cerezo on Augusthat. Government knew who had killed DeVine, knew about the military cover-up, and asking that the Guatemalans see that the culprits were brought to justice. The State Department was described in the cable as aware of the planned action, but not in possession of the intelligence report upon which the action was to be based.

Four hours before this Station cable was sent, before noon Guatemala City time on August^ the Embassy had sent an Immediate telegram to DAS Sullivan in Washington, reciting informationl

explaining Stroocks plan to discuss the matter wit resident Cerezo onhat telegram began with the words, "As you know, we have information that American citizen Michael DeVine was murdered oneam of Guatemalan Army enlisted personnel."

Headquarters converted the intelligencefrom theStation on AugustB into a that same day to:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-Americanssistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, FBI; and Manager, Justice Command Center.

0 Embassy and Station Reports. Ambassador Stroock met with Cerezo onerezo told Stroock he was concerned about DeVine's killing, that he was aware Stroock had requested assistance from MOD Bolanos in mveshgating the crime, and that the military was not conducting the investigation well. Cerezo also attributed the problem toommander Garcia Catalan who Cerezo said had caused serious problems in at least three previous

tate Department messages retrieved from Agency recordslurry of telegrams in preparation for the planned demarche to President Cerezo. State provided talking points for the demarche in an Augustelegram.


2_on the same day,|

i and that Cerezo hadesponse inours. Copies of Embassy reporting at the time in Agency files indicate that, during the Augusteeting with Stroock and the DCM, Cerezo had mentioned three potential motives for DeVine's Hlling-robbery; drug trafficking; or that DeVine hadalil rifle and was trying to buy another.

_ lent cerezo was angry after his AugusteetingStroock and that he had expressed his displeasure toand ordered Bolanos to

proper investigation immediately.

Catalan would be relievedasserious trouble with Armythe

illegal sale of wood from the Peten forests. |

^^Prcsident Cerezo was taking thetl^rlilrl^

probably would be carried out.rumors that

DeVine was involved in some

apparently unfounded and may have been originated as part of the military cover-up.

eports. On

messageumber of keyin the Guatemalan Army, mduding the retirement ofasommander.

DeVine killing may have

influenced the timing since such changes normally would not occur until Octoberlso on Septembern Embassy Country Team message reported that it appeared the Guatemalan Government was not prepared to take satisfactory action on the DeVine case. Although Garcia Catalan had been removed asommander, it was judged that mduding his removal among many other changes served to conceal, rather than illuminate, its relationship to DeVine's killing. Further, the Embassy report continued, this was only one of the three key actions President Cerezo had promised Ambassador Stroock would happen quickly.


QpMand Embassy Reports. _On_, theBJdisseminated mformatioi who claimed DeVine had been killed by four or five soldie Ejena^heMZ^^ieadquarters base at Hores.H

3 section inaddetermme^hatDeVme na^eenprovidmg support to Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) insurgents in the Poptun area, that the murder had not been officially ordered, and that the truth had been discovered only after the investigation was started. The Guatemalan Army command then determined to hide the facts. Those directly involved in the murder would be killed, while those who had been in charge would be

said that former Army COS Marroquin had ffge^MOUBolanosormal court martial but this had beencomments included with the report suggested that protectionol

s the designation of the regional military command offices of. the national intelligence organization offficers are under the command of their respective miliurv zone or base eornmanders but also report directly touatemala Gty. See charts depicting structure o( Guatemalan military.

Guatemalan military institution would be high on the list of possible motivations for such actions, and that elements in the Guatemalan military were capable of such actions.


Over the next few weeks, Embassy and^^reporting

suggested that the DeVine case was moving forward, reported arrest warrants had been issued for eight Guatemalans, several of whom were members of the military, and expressed the Ambassador's hope that the Guatemalans'attituderegarding the case was improving. On

|:ad completehe DeVinecaseandhad stated that six of seven


general Staff had ordered new restrictions on visits by foreignmilitary bases and other sites controlled by the rrulitary.were said to be aimed specifically at US. Embassywere implemented because the General Staff viewed visitsdiplomats, military attaches in particular, as attempts toby the Guatemalan

the immediate cause of the new

restrictions was alleged pressure from the US. Embassy concerning the DeVine killing. According to the report.

The General Staff believes that. wants to convert the casesirnUartothatojthe^ of six Jesuit priests in El SalvadorUS. Embassy offidals had "celebrated" the

tact that they had located an alleged witness to the killing of (DeVine) The witnesson<onurussioned officer in the Guatemalan Army who, according to the General Staff, has been offered moneyesidence in the US. for himself and his family in return for his testimony.

"hat the men

naa not been ordered to kill, but only to surveil, DeVine. This surveillance was based on the belief that DeVine had possession of one or two Galil rifles that had disappeared from

e surveUlants became involved in an altercation wif >eVine and went too far.


u| Embassy reported thatl

Reports. On Octoberhe


knew" from unspecified sources that the DeVine killing had been ordered by then-Peten military zone commander Garcia Catalan and had been condoned by the Chief( Colonel Cabrera. On Octobermbassy reporting indicated that the DeVine case had been turned overilitary court.


d Captain SantcfrMreve7TcTano^^ in charge ofalso have been involved. I

iiiiiiiiHDeVilie mav naye beenroviding togisucal support to the insurgents and was possibly involved in arms smuggling.

I DeVine's killers were not under orders from Garcia Catalan to kill him, and opined that they got into a

fight and killed DeVine.there was insufficient

consistent evidence to convict the five military_

the DeVine family lawyerhe wou Id

try to delay the trial to develop more evidence.



reported that DeVine drank heavily either at his own bar/restaurant in Poptun or at some other local watering place and then practiced his karate on the troopers from Poptun Base and beat themdding that the Station had not verified this.

0 Embassy Reports- According to Embassy reporting, an FBI polygrapher arrived in Guatemala on Octobero examine the six suspects under detention in the DeVinembassador Stroock continued to apply pressure to Cerezo and Decembermbassy reporting indicated that Stroock believed that Cerezo had bed when he told Stroock he had ordered interrogation of all army officers who could possibly have been involved in DeVine's killing

lad received no recent orders to pursue further the investigation into DeVine's killing; I

|that all but one of the suspects being held were innocent and the other might be also; I

* These were the original detainees, not Ihe soldiers who eventually were arrested, tried and convicted of DeVine's killing. The Guatemalan Government did not permit the FBI to polygraph the

who also was allegedly involved, was innocent; that the actual killers were military personnel, but had not been acting

nhe Chargeeeting with President Cerezo but met with Guatemalan Presidential Spokeswoman Claudia Arenas because Cerezo was unavailable. The Charge reportedly reviewed the many demarches and letters that had been sent to the Guatemalan Government. officials, expressed. Government's deep concern over the continued cover-up of the facts regarding DeVine's killing, and stated that the State Department would announce at noon on Decemberhe immediate suspension of. military aid to the Guatemalan armed forces.


jovernment would giveGuatemalan President, who would be elected on Januarytime to resolve the investigation of DeVine's killingGuatemalan^

| that senior Guatemalan officers wereabout the short-term effects of the suspension of militaryfrom other countries,


|and that they believed the suspension of aid was the product of Ambassador Stroock, not the US. Government.

mbassy1 Embassy telegram from Ambassador Stroockide-ranging conversation between Stroock, DCM Taylor and Serrano. Stroock told Serrano that there was still great concern in the United States over human rights violations and that the DeVine caseouchstone. Stroock noted in the message that Taylor had explained details of the DeVine case that Serrano had not known and that Serrano was told that, "We knew that some officer in Flores ordered six army personnel to Poptun to surveil DeVine. When the six arrived in Poptun, they checked in with the Kaibil Base there. Their orders were reaffirmedelephone call between the Kaibil Base and the Flores Zoneerrano also was informed that MOD Bolanos was personally biockinj the investigation.

nhe Embassy reported by telegram that Serrano had told Ambassador Stroock that he would appoint General Luis Enrique Mendoza to replace MOD Bolanos; current Defense Vice Minister General Raul Molina Bedoya to replace General Mata as Army COS; andone Commander Ortega

to replace General GodoylWeaclortrieTicsidential itary Staff. Among the conditions Serrano placed upon Ortega in his new position were that he help in cleaning up the military and have complete respect for human rights. Serrano said that some of the military would view his actions as bowing to US. Government pressure, and that he would need immediate lifting of the suspension of US. security assistance. Stroock indicated that, if the DeVine investigation moved quickly, he would move promptly to lift the suspension.

elegram, Stroock reported on his first meeting with new Guatemalan MOD Mendoza. According to the telegram, in the course of the meeting, Mendoza "launched into" the DeVine case without any prompting and stated that he wanted to get the

case resolved and put behind them as fast as possible. Mendoza expressed skepticism about the value of some of the data being providedrivate investigator, suggesting that one of DeVine's employees might have provided false information in retaliation for troubles he had previously with certain members of the Army. Mendoza also opined that he did not think there had been an "intellectual author" to this killing. Mendoza indicated that he did not want to tie the DeVine case. military aid and that the case would be acted upon without having to use such pressure, because it was their moral obligation to do so.

Stroock was favorably impressed by the meeting. He commented in the telegram that he was thoroughly impressed with Mendoza's frankness; he was struck by Mendoza's positive attitude toward the DeVine case, specifically his view that resolution of the caseoral obligation; and he believed Mendoza intended tolose relationship with. Embassy. The telegram concluded, "Mendoza appears well intentioned, and seems tolear picture of his goals for the institution."

In latehe Embassy provided Serrano with five human rights-related actions it considered to be benchmarks for completion before military aid would be restored. The first was substantial forward movement on the DeVine case. Byeports on the Guatemalan reaction to. Government's demarche were being received by the Stateent J

A1 State Department telegram informed the Embassyeeting between Bernardo Neuman,elf-described advisor to Presidentichardashington attorney; and Assistant Secretary Aronson and DAS Sullivan. According to the telegram, Neuman was sent by Serrano, in part, to discuss the benchmarks demarche Stroock had delivered. Neuman characterized Serrano as disappointed that the United States would doubt his intentions on human rights and civilian control of the armed forces and listed in some detail the reasons Serrano reacted so negatively. One of the non-DeVine related benchmarks was considered an infringement on Guatemala's sovereignty. With respect to the DeVine case, Neuman emphasized that Serrano was on the phone with Mendoza and others in

the military "almost every twenty minutes" and that he understood the importancehorough investigation in this case. According to Neuman, Serrano expected "resolution" within sixty days.

to the telegram, Aronson emphasized that, while the United States had trust in Serrano, it would not be possible to "just turn on [military] assistance based on promises, however well intentioned. What are needed are credibleronson stated that Serrano "in many respects must bear the burden of the Cerezo Administration's lack of follow through on human rights commitments."

1 Intelligence Rcpoi

in earlyo rrulitary officers for his decision to turn down US. military assistance, and the Guatemalan military's anger. policy. I

Serrano's explanation thalnenaa^erv5ea(Uju!s^. Government had presented, in an offensiveist of conditions precedent to resumption of the funds. Serrano stated that he was surprised and offended by the attitude of Ambassador Stroock who in delivering the US. Government message had affronted the respect and dignity owed to the Constitutional Presidentepublic. Serrano emphasized that if he were to have accepted the conditions, he would have felt nothing moreuppet and described the message and Stroock's delivery as insulting and insolent. Serrano was praised by his audience of mid-level and junior officers forirm stand. interference in internal affairs.

Serrano described the conditions as meofferingribe of0 per month and resumption of military assistance in return for prosecution of Garcia Catalan and officers involved in another human rights incident.

truck for Santa Elena, arriving back at the Based on June 8.

n two separate meetings. Ambassador Stroock, DCM Taylor and the DeVine family lawyer apprised Serrano and MOD Mendoza of the sworn statements from the military suspects. According to Embassy reporting, Mendoza was most displeased and took issue with the statements. He suggested that the testimony had been bought with dollars or the promise. visas; stated that the FBI-assisted polygraphing of the original five detainees was an illegal act that constituted interference in the Guatemalan judicial process; commented that former MOD Bolanos had been wrongly accused of trying to cover up the DeVine case; and stated that the Army and the Guatemalan Government would not respond to demands.

that iDeVine] was kUled tan soldiers dispatched from the Military Zoneeadquartersat Santa Elena to lookissing rifle.

soldier assigned toadaIiI rule with him. Because thisilitary crime, the Guatemalan Military Intelligence Service_

was nominallyand recover the rifle. The officers actually charged byith carrying out the operation were Col. Mario Roberto Garcia Catalan, commander ofol. Guillermo Portillo Gomez, second-in-command ofnd It. Hugo Roberto Contreras Alvarado, thessistant intelligence officer at the time.

| the seniorntelligence officer wasvacauon. Contreras, known as "El Maldito"theor an eye defect and also for his bad temper and brusque manner with subordinates, was directly in charge of the operation.

had reachedqs that [DeVinel had purchased the stolen GaUi rifle from the army deserter. Contreras deeded toroup of four non-commissioned officers OJCO's) and eight soldiers to

the Poprun area to question him. No corrunissioned officer was assigned to go with the group. The soldiers located and interrogated rum regarding the missing weapon and location of the deserter. (DeVine] either did not know anything about the case or refused to talk about it. One of the NCO'soldier toachete. The NCO then told [DeVine] that he would kill him if he did not talk. When (DeVine! still refused to answer questions about the case, the NCO killed him with the machete.

J spoketaffMilitary Zone headquartered in Salama, Baja Verapazhere he is currently the military zone intelligencet the invitation of his commanding officer, Contreras told the assembled officers that tne Ub. Government is paying off witnesses to testify against him, ottering them visas and asylum in. He said that sinceovernment had not been able lo get either Garcia Catalan or Portillo, he, Contreras, was now the target

contreras is

extremely womed about the progress ol the case against him. This is compounded by the fact that many army officers consider him to be entirely to blame for the incident. They believe his failure to accompany the men who went to question (DeVine] was an unpardonable lapse in judgement. Further, they believe that Contreras who is well-known for his abuse of soldiers assigned to him, probably frightened the soldiers into taking extreme actions* the

CalifriflO CVereIy PUniShedrecover ,he


advised privately by DCM Taylor of anail" message from DAS Sullivan regarding the DeVine case.ail message said:

Givennvolvement by having one of theirnow, apparently in attempted intimidation, can youor cutting off to make the pointhat

cooperation is also required from them? Depending on yourm prepared to reinforce the point at high levels here. It is totally inconsistent for us to cut off all [military] aid, while maintaining major (assistance program to an offending branch.

ail message also referred to recent reports that the five suspects under detention who had made sworn statements were being pressured to change their testimony. Some of those involved in applying pressure on them were alleged toersonnel.

(told DCM Taylor that

long lectured the Guatemalan high command on human

rights practices, and that, if indeed there werenvolvement, it was likelv to be resolved!

nwas killed,no information to suggest that any attempts tobehest of. Taylor stated that heonin his reply to DAS Sullivan.

eadquarters replied on April^nd stated that this was the first indica^on it had that State was questioning the propriety of continued^Jsupport to eadquartersnatXoi

(point out to Taylor that Congress had reduced


uatemala byercent, thatole^5rae cut, and that,trong messageDeVine case had already beenresponse also

mtimidation allegations

effect o: also asked and tell

to obstructguilty of DeVine's killmgwoiilcUjave ato continue itsbackresponse,

ayior that this message haaTeendeliverecnoM^M

There is no record of any response to this Headquarters message or of any discussionsin this context."

/as aware of (the

DeVines'] presence in Guatemalahenservice requested that they be looked into,they (DeVine and his wife) gave the appearance of

|(undated, but written after (heersonality profile of DeVine, which is generally positive,his sometimes aggressive manner and readiness to denounce tothe authorities those people in the area where he lived who were involved in narcotics trafficking. The report also notes that DeVine had no cnmmal record in Guatemala. The report appears totandardreport.


The report also gives some possible motives for the killing. Among them are claims that DeVine was accused ot being an army informant, that he had denounced drug traffickers, that heictimriminal extortion attempt by the guerrillas or that he was killed by people who wanted to buy his property cheaply. Two army deserters, Frcdy Geovani Perez Archila and Osmali Enrique Morales Archila, are named as people with whom DeVine had had personal problems (significant in view of reports that DeVine's death was in some way related to his involvement with an armynother man is named as having been shot by DeVine some years ago, who may have sought revenge.

)ntains nothing that would directly incnmuiate the army in le crime; this comes as no surprise. I Rronuins little of relevance regarding the ongoing Embassy investigation of the murder.



Serrano had instructed the military tocharge those responsibled<President Serrano had

issued direct orders to the Army to bring charges against those responsible for DeVine's killing; that Serrano had become exasperated and angered with the evasive actions of the Army andn response to his orders to provide him with reports on the killing; and that Serranoirector Cabrera as primarily responsible for blocking the investigation into the murder.

| Cabrera was indirectly responsiDlcTortne death because he ordered the investigation of the deserter who allegedly sold his rifle to DeVine. There was no evidence Cabrera intended that DeVine be harmed, but he was responsible for the cover-up and realized


contreras and rive noncommissioned officers had been arrestedwith the DeVine case. Contreras was identified asorders to stage thenot certain

whether the order was to kill DeVine, or justeachcorriDarrvtije team on the operation.

Htheommander, Colonel Garaa Catalan, was not involved, did not know about the operation, and waseten at the time. In addition, Contreras' immediate superior,hiefMajor Paiz, was not involved.preliminary investigative findings indicated that Deputy Zone Commander Colonel Portillo Gomez had been aware of the operation, but the investigation had not yet determined whether he was more deeply involved.


serious of which was his accusation thatas doing more work for US. intelligence agencies than for the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense. Mendoza reportedly said he was going to replace Cabrera as heador that reason, that he had recently confirmed his suspicions, and thatad been providing information toovernment that had led to the cutoff in US. military aid. In particular Mendoza believed that information that DeVine had been killed by Guatemalan troops had been passed to the United States by.

mbassy telegram reported that

_Jsent an emissary to theErnbassyseelchTea

secret mterv.ewtoteU "the real truth" and to seek relocation for self-preservation. | (claimed, according to the telegram, that he had been asked to actcapegoat, had been offered money to do so, and promised that he would be convicted and released shortly thereafter

when. Government's attention wandered. He was referred to the DeVine family lawyer.

he Embassy telegram also stated that the planned FBI polygraph examination of the "new" suspects had still not been approved. Further, the telegram reported that:

Onilitary court prosecutor Pantaleon informed [the DeVine family attorney] that Col. Julio Roberto Alpirez, former commander of the Poptun "Rangers" training base, wishes toworn declaration confirming that he provided lodging and food toember death squad the nights ofJndf he does, it willremendous breakthrough and in one fell swoop destroy the alibis offered by the five recently-detained specialists.

Hon theerrortsoicolonel Portillo Gomez to prove hevTcrnnrzed to protect Garcia Catalan, who wasommander when DeVine was killed. H

stated that this was the third reported murder cover-up involving Garcia. In the first two, he was protected by former MOD Gramajo, while he was protected in the DeVine case byramajo protegt.


rovided detailseetmgbetween DCM Taylor andof Staff Colonel Francisco Ortega Menaldo

P to discuss the DeVine case. Key points raised by the Trrffiassyomcerswere concern that Captain Contreras was free on provisional liberty in spite of sworn declarations and reports that he had threatened one of his accusers; concern that all key Kaibil Base personnel from the period when DeVine was killed, induding Colonel Alpirez, had been transferred; the absenceLogbook of Occurrences" for the Kaibil Base in which all events such as arrivals, departures, and lodgings for the period0 would be recorded; and concern that the DeVine family lawyer was being pressured to quit the case.

A Junembassy telegram concerning the investigation reported, among other things, thatine-up of fiveitness had identified two additional individuals as partidpants in the crime, bringing to four the total positively identified. The telegram also stated that Colonel Alpirez, reportedly on maneuvers, had not responded to three court summons toedaration.

Aa number of information items concerning the DeVine case:

[the personnel who killed DeVine loading personal gear and rationshite pickup at the Santa Elena base under the supervision of Contreras, on the afternoon of Junend Contreras sending the group off to Poptun.

|immediately after the killing, the chassis and

truck were removed at the Santa Elena base, and the truck wasrownish color. Other alterations were also made, and, about two weeks after the killing, the truck was driven to Guatemala City and turned over to personnelnstallation. Punti reportedly stated that he drove the truck and was accompanied by Captain Jose Santos Bohr Avendano.

id passed by

it entrance onnd observed two men waiting there. One of the meneapon toward the feet of the neighborign he should dear out of thehe following day, men wearing masks came to the neighbor's farm looking for him. The neighbor saw themistance and stayed away until they left. He reportedly has since sold hisproperty and moved away out of fear of reprisal This suggested ,nl hat personnel at Poptun might be involved in the cover-up^cause the team that killed DeVine had returned to Santa Elena by the time the masked men appeared at the neighbor's farm.

No further information has been found regarding what happened to the police report. |

State officers would have obtained the report on their own, the FBI was involved, I

_^olonel Portillo had

not oeen in temporary command ofn0 at the time of the DeVine killing, as had been daimed earlier. Army Orderthat Portillo was instead appointed Acting Commander1 while Garda Catalan was onhe enlisted men who wereartidpating in the killingao^een^ut off to pressure them to testify exactly as ordered.

it was common

mon8,nerhatthere had existed some kind of personal or business relaiionship between (DeVine) and zone commander Garda Catalan. Garcia had visited (DeVine] on numerous occasions and knew [DeVine's]o mm em: It is rumored that one of the two parties owed money to the otheresultusiness deal.)

l Intelligence Report.

DeVine case was damaging theelationship withGovernment and was causing increasingome Army : tnatill'"g

was the result of the enhsteclperscmru?lcarrymg out their mission inhostile manner and there was no evidence thatinvolved in any serious illegal activity. When word of themilitarycourse of

action to be takenofficers

believed it would"stonewall"

any investigation. They reasoned that, if the military admitted the involvement of its personnel,. Government would react angrily to the knling, which would hurt the Army's image, provide propaganda to the insurgents, and jeopardize military aid. All the events predicted to justify the cover-up came to pass because of it.l

was innocent and knew nothing until after the killing TnWuegation that. Government was trying to buy perjured testimony by offering asylum in the United States outraged officers in general.

omment aurmg tne process ol coordinating the report within the Embassy, stating that the allegations. Government efforts to buy testimony raised the specter that the Guatemalan army was engagedisinformation campaign for its own internal consumption.

1 Embassy Report Septembermbassy reporting, attributed to the DeVine family lawyer, statedilitary court had ordered the release of Contreras onnd that Colonels Portillo Gomez and Garcia Catalan had been questioned but not detained due to insufficient evidence. It was also noted that the attorney hired by the MOD to represent the officers had delayed the proceedings by insisting that Carole DeVine prove she was DeVine's widow, by requesting that she be required towo million quetzalond to indicate that she was serious about pursuing the case, and by introducing false declarations by the manager of the case in Peten to the effect that the DeVine family lawyer and private investigator had tried to bribe him and other witnesses into giving false testimony.

Headquarters onthe following Embassy commentf

Defense Minister Mendoza's belief that his role is to oppose"induct

uncritical defense of all its members, are likelv tol consequences of their acts.

1 Embassy Report, Octobermbassy reporting stated that the DeVine family lawyer was informed onhat the military court hadormal request that Captain Bohr Avendano and Major Paiz Hernandez be summoned to declare what they knew about the white pickup used by DeVine'sitness, Benjamin Punti Perux, had claimed that Bohr had accompanied him when Punti took the truck to Guatemala City after it had been painted and altered at Santa Elena. Paiz was in charge of the Military Intelligencenit in Santa Elena at the time.



Ipirez had been at the scene^>TOeVme^TiJlin According to the version sent to Headquarters on


Accordingid-level Guatemalan military officerdirect knowledge of events surrounding the deathuatemalan soldiers from the Military Intelligenceof Military Zoneeadquartered in Santa Elena.were ordered to arrest and interrogate [DeVinelof having in histolen Guatemalan armysold to him by an army deserter.ommanderRoberto Garcia Catalan ordered Captain Hugo Contreras,attached to, toumber of enlisted men to thePoptun, Peten Department, locate [DeVineJ and recover theGarcia had earlier been blamed for

the lcSs^rcitnerweapons under similarerious black mark on hisontreras arrested [DeVine] and took him to the Guatemalan military base of the elite "Kaibil" troops, and at that time it was under the command of Lt. Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez.

[DeVinel was interrogated by Contreras with Alpirez present.iolent man with an explosive temper, well-known for his brutality,oncho around [DeVine's] head, allowing him to breathe from time to time. Although Contreras had apparently not been ordered to killDeVine) died either from suffocation or heart failure. After he died, the body was takenruck backighway near his home, where it was placed in the road. The rifle, allegedly in [DeVine's] possession, was nottation] comment: The wound on [DeVine's) neck may have been inflicted to hide evidence of the earlier suffocation.)

Colonel Alpirez, now posted ateadquartered at Malacatan in San Marcos Department, is an extremely violent man who has murdered guerrilla prisoners in the past. He recently has been observed engaging in bizarre behavior, such as walking through the town where he is currently stationed, exposing himself, and firing weapons in the air. Colonel Garda, the officer who ordered Captian Contreras to arrest DeVine,ersonality similar to that of Alpirez and also has murdered guerrilla prisoners. Colonel Guillermo Portillo Gomez, the second in command oft the time of the murder, alsoiolent person.

Following DeVine's murder, Alpirez made an official statement in which he admitted certain aspects of the crime but carefully shielded his own partidpation. Minister of Defense General Luis Enrique

Mendoza Garcia, incensed by Alpirez'* statement which, ifto army involvement in the killing, ordered Alpirez toAlpirez refused to do so unlessritten order.removed Alpirez from his command of the training baseangerous, remote post in San Marcos. Alpirez thenof his defiance and requested permission to retract theas ofemained posted to San Marcos.Defense Mendoza is responsible for blocking all efforts tolulling, believing that he is responsible for defending the armv

he disseminated version contained one substantivethe text. As noted above, the intelligence report submitted bycontained as the first sentence ineVine]by Contreras with Alpirezn thethe sentence was altered to read, "Alpirez, among otherswhen Contreras interrogatedo informationfound to indicate what Headquarters was trying to achievethe order of the sentence and inserting "among others" into

both the OrtoberHintelligence report and thethe Station noted that two different versions of theDeVine's killing had been disseminated earlier by thendntelligence reports. Thecopy of the0 report for

': described the killing ofolcuerf cuspatcned by Contreras to question himissing rifle.]

the following days. Headquarters and thehow tothe OctoberMiniormaiiun and

other points. Also, Headquarters advised the Station that thereeparate legal obligation to "report the facts of the case to the appropriately cleared individuals at the Department of Justice."

1 Embassy and DAO Rppnlff, Theon1 that Serrano had announced6 that MOD Mendoza was being replaced by Gen.Antonio Garcia Samayoa and Army COS Godoy wasby Gen. Jorge Roberto Perussina Rivera. The Embassyby Guatemalan standards, the new MOD was progressive andhope thattheDeVme case would moveith the new appointees shortly

thereafter, reported that they were saying the right things regarding the DeVine case, and expressed renewed encouragement. Later in December, the Charge dAffaires and( |net MOD Garcia and )rted that Garcia affirmed his strong mterest in resolving the case.

>errano had dismissed mud Mendoza due" to his continued DJocking oi

investigations of several human rights cases, including those of DeVine

and D'ana Qrtiz'an American nun who allegedly had been tortured and raped.

Serrano hopes that Mendoza's dismissal eventually will helppressure on Guatemala regarding the military andissues. Serrano further hopes that the new Minister ofSamayoa will be more responsive to his wishes andthat Serrano runs the country and the Army.already has promised Serrano that he willthe invesdgationsunjunding [DeVineJ perGarcia was selected

prindpally based on berrano's trust in him and his outstanding military credentials within the Guatemalan Army.)

tate, INR; DIA; Treasury;

White House Situation Room; USCDMCSO;

Embassy, Guatemala; and


Serrano relieved him ror Wing to resolve Hie UevW case^aunig to improve the military justice system, and because of pressure put Guatemala by the US. Government.


meo brief new MOD Garcia Samayoa on the DeVine case. The COS noted that the meeting was cordial, and that Garcia had emphasized he wished to bring the perpetrators to justice to prevent the "institution" from receiving further unjustified blame.

2 FfmhaSsvmbassy telegram stated that press reports indicated that the Fourth Appellate Court had ordered the re-detention of Captain Contreras, and expressed the view that thisositive sign. The telegram noted that, in addition to the new MOD's apparent willingness to resolve the DeVine case, the military tribunal alsoew president, replacing the previous president who was an academy classmate of Colonel Garcia Catalan.eparate cable to Headquarters, the Station also reported the re-arrest of Contreras.

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney visited Guatemala innd the DeVine case was among the issues he discussed with Serrano, the MOD and the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiroebruarymbassy telegram provided summary comments on those contacts and some detailed justification for maintaining an active International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Among other points, the telegram noted that, although progress had been very slow in the DeVine case, the overall improvement in the military's human rights performance was attributable to the IMET program training; that continued withholding of IMET funds wouldew sanction imposedime when the Guatemalan human rights situation was moving in the right direction; and that it was considered essential to maintain an open channel with the Guatemalan military.

The Embassy reported on2 that thend DeVine family lawyer had met with Army COS Perussina tobnef him on the DeVine case. They highlighted to him actions the Ministry of Defense could take to resolve the DeVine case promptly:rovide theull and accurate report of the Army's investigation of the murder;nstruct Colonel Alpirez lo give an honest and complete declaration about what he knew of the case;nstruct the military judge to obtain declarations from other active duty and former military members who had been identified as having relevant knowledge;rder Army assistance in locating and arresting the two discharged military members who allegedly formed part of the death squad;ecure the release of the four members of the first group who were innocent; andnstruct the attorney hired by the Army to represent the second group not to delay the process with frivolous appeals. The DeVine family lawyer stressed that neither he nor Mrs. DeVine had any interest in damaging the Army as an institution, nor did they plan any additional judicial action against those involved in the cover-up. This promise was stated to be particularly pertinent to Alpirez, as his candid declaration could provide all the evidence necessary to convict the guilty parties. The interview was viewed as very positive and progress was anticipated.

2 Embassy2 human rights summary from the Embassy stated that political officers hadruck driver on Januaryho said he was working near the crime scene on the day of the murder. The truck driver claimed to know nothing of the murder, but said heeareten jail after police found an old receipt bearing his name near where DeVine's body was found.

he Embassy reported on Marchhat Ambassador Stroock, accompanied by the CG andB Hhad met with MOD Garcia who told them he hadew Internal investigation into the DeVine case, that he had personally listened to Colonel Alpirez's version of events, and that other Army personnel also had been questioned. The MOD said that the results of this investigation would be provided to the Staff Judge Advocate. The CG invited the MOD to visit the DeVine tourist ranch and Garcia said he would be pleased to visit. Heeto help coordinate the visit with his staff.

with Mon r a edAprilhat DAS* met Mnn^ SumVan'S t0 Guat^ala. In that meeting, MOD Garaa told Sullivan that he was convinced after personally speaking with Captain Contreras, Colonel Garcia Catalan and Colonel Portillo Gomez that the DeVine killing was not ordered.



officials implicated in 'less significant" human rights cases to be prosecuted in order to eliminate the Army'sof facts and Drotectineits own.

uman rights summary for July and August the Embassy reported that Rafael Tiul Cucul testified on Augustn the trial that Contreras and three other soldiers had ordered the capture and murder of DeVine. Also on Septemberhe Embassy reported on an Augusteeting between MOD Garcia and Ambassador Stroock the Consul General and DATT. Stroock raised several concerns about the trial,eport that Contreras hadhreatening comment to the DeVine family lawyer in front of two witnesses. The meeting was described as cordial, but it was noted that the trial outcome was awaited with unease. After the meeting, Stroock told Garcia the Embassy was fully aware of the extent of Contreras' involvement in the murder, and it would be unfortunate if he went unpunished. According to the Embassy summary, Garaa "indirectly suggested" that other officers had not acted correctly, and named Alpirez and Garcia Catalan.

nhe Embassy indicatederdict was expected on Septembernd that, if Contreras were to be found innocent or let off lightly, the Embassy would ask the MOD to support an appeal by Mrs. DeVine. If Contreras were to be convicted and receive an appropnate sentence, the Embassy askedrompt decision on reopening the military aid pipeline.

mbassy Report. On, the Embassy reported on the Guatemalan court's reconstruction of the killing, and other developments. One pertinent part read as follows:

Despite the fact that the post log book covering the0 period had disappeared and was not presented at an earlier legal inquiry last year, miraculously in its place this tune appeared some loose leaf sheets of paper purporting to cover that time period. Cose questioning of former base commander Col- Alpirez revealed he had no knowledge of how such reports might have been prepared and typed, and Alpirezool of himself in front of Judge Advocate Pantaleon. Not surprisingly, these loose sheets indicated there was no Toyota truck entering or leaving the base, and no room and board provided to the accused enlisted men. Nonetheless, Rafael Tiul Cucul (the member of the first group of detainees who we believe was part of the death squad and the nearest thingtate's witness in this case) indicated with manynowledge of the base from his0 trip, including where they had been housed and fed. Additionally, Tiul Cucul was recognized by one of the waitresses at the mess hall.

ccording to the Septembermbassy report, in the re-enactment of the killing, two witnesses recognized two of the defendants as having been at the farm with the white pickup on Juneut two other witnesses failed to provide hoped-for testimony, probably out of fear. The Embassy report also described Captain Figueroa, the Santa Elena representative of the Judge Advocate's office, as extremely biased in the case, and said that Figueroa counseled Contreras and the five accused enlisted men not to cooperate in the two-day reconstruction of the crime. When Figueroa asked Pantaleon why he was present and was told it was on direct orders of the MOD, Figueroa responded that he did not care what the MOD ordered. The Embassy report also stated:

ontinuation of the evidentiary process, on Sepllpirez was summoned lo make his sworn dedaratkm at the judge advocate's office in the capital. In conformance with MOD Garcia Samayoa's instructions, he appeared on time. However, once again he lied about what he knows, claiming the accused were never on his base, nor was the famous white Toyota.

2 Embassy Reports. The Embassy reported on Septemberhat the DeVine family lawyer hadurprise witness on the last day of the evidentiary period, and that the witness's testimony was so maim ma ting that he was immediately removed from Guatemala to protect his life after testifying and would be resettled in the United States with his family. The witness, Mario Batz Peruch, was an enlisted man who had been assigned to the Kaibil Base for over three years. His testimony placed the white pickup and seven men from the Santa Elena base, four of whom he knew personally, at the Kaibil Base on Junewo key paragraphs of the Embassy report stated:

Cmthe day of the murder). Batz Peruch saw theleave the Poptun Base being driven by Daniel Tolon Rodriguez (one of thearrying the same group of people he had seen over lunch the previous day. The pick-up returned to the base. with the same group aboard, and left again. Aboutinutes later Batz Peruch saw the pick-up parked in the town of Poptun. At that moment he noticed Mike DeVine, whom he knew personally, driving his van towards the pick-up. As DeVine passed the pick-up, the pick-up started following DeVine's van. The two vehicles were then lost from the witness's sight. However, Batz Peruch saw the pick-up, with the same driver and occupants, re-enter the base atoad up some overnight bagsgallon blue plastic container. He didn't see the pick-up after that, but remembered these incidents in such detail because the following day he learned of murder. Throughout this time, the occupants of the pick-up were dressed in civilian clothes.

Batz Peruch's testimony also states that Col. Alpirez was on die base during those days and that because of normal base reporting procedures Alpirez must have known about the presence of the truck and men from the Santa Elena Base. Furthermore, as Batz Peruch himself left and re-entered the base several times during that time period and the guards at the front gate wrote down his cornings and goings as usual, he believes the comings and goings of the white Toyota pick-up from the Santa Elena base would similarly have been recorded in the log book.


he Embassy reported onhat Ambassador Stroock had told Attorney General Acisclo Valladareseptembereeting that it was important that Alpirez be prosecuted for having been at the forefront of the cover-up effort. Valladares called Stroock the next day,o tell him Contreras had "gotten off but that he would appeal that verdict as well as the conviction of one enlisted man who had turned state's evidence. That man, Tiul Cucul, and five other enlisted men were sentenced to tnirty years.

I.2 Station Report.

Iares' anb-Arm^tanceon corruption. Valladares hadreat annoyance to the military in his pursuit of military corruption and the DeVine case.


Figueroa, theanta Elena Judge Advocate's Office representative, who had interfered with the reconstruction of the lulling, had been removeclfrom the Army by the MOD for his interference in the case.

(also stated that there waseview process regarding ' and that two new charges- failure torime and coveruprime-weretobe considered against him. As for Alpirez and Garcia Catalan, the| (message said:


_|any reason to reel confident that the Armytm&^opjlsMpirez or Garaa. If in fact such chargesthen suspect that both Alpirez

and Garaa did nobty higher authorities at the rime (read-MOD General Bolanos) about DeVine's murder at the hands of Army specialists, and that higher authority also ordered them to do no more and to keep their mouths shut. Regardless, the office of the Attorney General and Mrs. DeVine's attorney both intend to request of the appellate court that it instruct the lower court-the military tribunal-to initiate coverup charges specifically against Alpirez.

, thel

2 DAO andeported'

There were also rumblingsossible

agamst bernno DCOUSC much of the military was beginning to losehe democratic process.

nhe Embassy reported that Attorney General Acisclo Valladares, described as Guatemala's most effective Attorney General in recent memory, had been toppled by powerful

enemies who accused him of covering up his brother's purported efforts to defraud two wealthy aunts. The Embassy listed among those enemies the military leadership that was angered by Valladares' pursuit of military suspects in the DeVine and other human rights cases.

he^^commented onn recent changes in the Guatemalan Army, including Garcia Catalan and Porullo Gomez. The MOD had told Ambassador Stroock that the careers of all officers connected with the DeVine case would not prosper. Nonetheless, Garcia Catalan was restored to commanduitary zone lessonth after Stroock's departure. Porullo Gomez, however, was moved from command of one military zone of little importance to another, indicating that his career had stagnated.

Wl- Februarv-Marfh iqq^the

Embassy and] (reported on the DeVine prosecution appeal process in February andhe prosecution was seeking confirmation ofyear sentences for all but one of those convicted. The exception was the one individual who had turned state's evidence,hose sentence was to be sought. Conviction of Captain Contreras, who had been acquitted, was also sought. The court's decision was expected to be available in April.


_|accused byeath-BBconfident that the Guatemalan iupremeCourtwould deny any SoTBnto reopen the investigationmKMmm denied any knowledge of or participation inWii-mmy expected however, to be mvesagatedonurdssion of the Past/Truth Commission, and Mt could not drscount the possibilityntelligencent be accused of bemg thevarious and


assorted crimes that the URNG (The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, the umbrella insurgent organization) might attempt to attribute

i| |j| Mi i

April andhe Embassy ar^^Bsent several meWes updating developments in the DeVine trial. Onhe court confirmed the convictionsyear sentences of the six Army enlisted men. It also convicted Contreras and sentenced him toears, but' Contreras escaped from custody the same day the sentence was' announced. The Embassy commented that the convictionsandmark for the Guatemalan justice system but that, if Contreras were not recaptured, his escape would undo any benefits that might have accrued to the Armyesult of the resolution of the DeVine case in court.

and other officers might be accusedtry to

ayJmimeMi^ceJkp^ Inhe

of the Contreras escape, thesgauilitary over Contreras' treatment.

Jthat icking up

DeVine ine advised the military General Staff "through channels" that he had DeVine in custody and asked for instructions. Contreras said he had received an order in response stating that he should "do whateverituation."


^to recover the missing rifle, that "through channels" meant he had received the orderhannels, and that, sinceirector Colonel Cabrera would not have had the authority to issue the order, it must have come from the General Staff.

May-Tune Embassy Reports. In lateresident Serrano suspended constitutional guarantees, saying that narcotics traffickers and others had succeeded in infutrating major institutions of the state and he was taking exceptional measures to deal with this threat to national security. This effort failed, however, elections were held, and former Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro De Leon Carpio was elected President. OnOD Garcia Samayoa retired and was replaced by Major General Perussinaew US. Ambassador, Marilyn McAfee, arrived in Guatemala City. As. relationship with the new Guatemalan Government was developing, it was made clear to the Guatemalan Government that recapture of Contreras and final resolution of the DeVine caseasic requirement for any consideration of restoration of military aid. OnOD Perussina was retired and replaced by General Mario Enriquez.

3 Station Report. Inhe Station advised Headquarters that the DeVine/Contreras case wasajor Embassy issue, withn particular, and that Ambassador McAfee had suggested that, if action on the Contreras case were not

^gjarlesmadebyMOD Enriquez Morales

continued investigation into DeVine's killing. I ai dl 1hadormal letter froL, v ma,

^umost demanded" to know what was being done to resolve thetold the officers that he considered the case closed, andwere unanimous in voicing their disapproval of this Uin Guatemi

>assy or. Governmentso hard tor the Guatemalan Government to find andwhen tJieGuatemalan^vernment had alreadyview was that the guilty verdict

alone should have appeased. Government, and that the evidence upon which Contreras was convicted would never haveuilty verdict. court, or any court free to judge the evidence without having political pressure applied.

he Embassy attached the foUowing comment to the cable during the coordmation process:

Sincehere have been two relatives of DeVine witnesses murdered (one civilian and one soldier) and anotherolcher) shot in the leg Additionally, two other relatives with previous army expenence have been targets of mtimidation. One of these relatives and his family liveaiehouse provided by the Archbishop's human rights office. We believe that the timing of these events, which have occurred during the ongoing appeal by the convicted DeVine killers, the number of instances aid, in one murder Je degree of torture inflicted (tongue cut off, hands butchered, Tiro '

fbufnmLw ,hfLd)"nown (but probably related to the military) who are not pleased with

Government role in the DeVine matterhreat to the witness relatives still in Guatemala.)


Chronology: Key Events


une 9


June 13

June 13

June 22

July 19

Auguilugust 21

and Carol DeVine arrive in Guatemala. DeVinesaim In Peten, near Poptun.

FaroVvf ildemess area established-DeVinesotel and0

DeVine seen in company of Individualshile Toyota pickup truck.

DeVine's body found on road near his farm-beaten and nearly decapitated.

Initial police report states possible motives for death were robbery, drug related, or because someone wanted DeVine's property.

Ambassador Stroock asks Guatemalan Minister of Defense for assistance In investigating killing.

National Police report alleges DeVine killedocal whorior altercation with DeVine.

reports Guatemalan Army denies Involvement in murderrime is being investigated.

Meeting with Embassy officer, DeVine la*

and Chief of MilitaryrcserT&tti* investigation


Embassy reports that military may be involved in DeVine's deathovet-up of that involvement.

tat Guatemalan Military was involved in DeVine's killing andover-up was in process. Menn Santa Hena had been dispatched to surveil DeVine.

L*lc August

September 9

Septembereptember 21



pressures President Cerezo to resolve DeVine case. Cerezo's anger over meeting Is reported by Station.

Embassy reports that Cerezo admitted that members of security forces may have killed De Vine-promises investigation.

(eports DeVine was killed by personnel from Santa Elena.

Guatemalan judgearrant for arrest of suspects in DeVine's killing.

Stationthat men had been sent to

Surveil DeVine, to recover two rifles stolen by deserters, the issue got out of hand and resulted in DeVine's killing.

DeVine case is turned over lo military court.

instructions to punuc investigation and that MOD was an obstacle. State Department prepares to act against Government of Guatemala for inaction.

meets wilh presidential spokesman to express concerns over

lack of progress and cover-up. Qurge' mentions that State Department would announcr an immediate suspension of assistance to Guatemalan armed forces.


Late January

Serrano elected President. Streoiidiscus

DeVine case with Serrano and tell him the Military was involved in the killing and the MOD is blocking the investigation. Serrano is told DeVine case is an important human rights issue.

Stroock gives Serrano five human rights-related benchmarks to complete before military aid can becondition Is substantia) movement on the DeVine case.

reports military detainees issued sworn statements implicating

Colonel Gomez and Captain Contreras as ordering DeVine's kidnapping and death. Swom statements indicated personnel left Santa Elena on Juneodged at Kaibil base; June 7th surveilled DeVine farm; June 8th picked- up DeVine; killed DeVine approximately 5JOeturned to Santa Elenam. June 8.


reportssought to obtain

rifles stolen by aeserter^Coh. Carcia and Portillo were higher officers in charge of the operation and Contreras was directly in charge. NCOs and soldiers were assigned to locate and interrogate DeVine and to return the weapons. DeVine refused to answer questions and was killed by an NCO. Military believed the situation had gotten out of hand.


Lite May May 31

une 25





DeVine's killing, would incriminate the Military.

Contreras and five NCOs are arrested.

Embassy reports the military prosecutor stated that Alpirez wished to declare the seven member death squad were given food and lodging on.

eports that Contreras was acquitted.

0 reported

'ing personnel, the pickup truck, surveillance of DeVine, threats to witnesses.

copy of the

police/forensic report on DeVine case.

Station reports informationeVine was killed

by enlisted personnel who camed^uttneiToussion in an inappropriately hostile manner. Senior military officers feared the USC would react angrily and thought it would be best to "stonewall."

Embassy reports Contreras released, Portillo and Card* not detained.

I MOD Mendoza considers defending the

irmy as an institution as his main mission.

Station reportsthat Alpirez was

present at the InletrogationTtDevIne^na^hatDeVine died of suffocation or heart failure during interrogation. Report also I

I who commented derogate rily on


Mid-Lateand Hqs discuss inconsistencies in accounts of DeVine's death

December 21


discussed with DoJ and crimes report sent

by General Cotmsi^oIJoj!

I Serrano relieved MOD Mendoza for tailing to resolve the DeVine case and for blocking investigation of cases. citizens.

w,lh MOD Stmayoa-state that United Staleswants justice


March 4

newspaper reports that Court of Appeals ruled there was sufficient evidence to order the arrest of Contreras.

Embassy reports Consul General andHHmrt with Army COS and discussed what would resolve case, ineluding Alpirez's testimony.

March 25

| that DeVine case is

lose "less significant" to Guatemalan military interests and military should allow prosecution.


ling but

Iunf26 1

$SC1 men with Agency officers. OLA explains DeVine died un3ertonewalled, and military personnel are being tried.


reports Stroock told Attorney General it is important Alpirezprosecuted for the cover-up. Attorney Ceneral indicates Contreras was acquitted and six enlisted men were found guilty.


court confirms the convictions of Contreras and six enlisted men. Contreras escapes.


Mid- Much

th H Ba; up

DeVine, the General Staff were qucricdTKesponse: "Do what it takes to resolve the situation."

President Serrano coup fails.

Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon elected4

| MOD stated to military officers that he considered DeVine case closed.


January 25


Report trigger! NSC meetings where Agency report

I1 allegations of his presence at 'cvine interrogation.

Agency briefs SSCJ and HPSCI concerning Alpirez, DeVine. Bamaca.

Station reports Ambassador McAfee had approached Stationthat had circulated in State DepartmerajhaUiTikejlAlpirezThe next

day, Hqsresence at DeVine killing for Station to share with McAfee.

April5 March/April

reports rumors that Contreras is In Guatemala andas ordered him killed. McAfee has|HneetIth mJnd relay the consequences shouldhinghappen. ^

Hqs sends cable regarding NSC directive to preserve records relevant to DeVine and Bamaca.

ADCJ testifies to SSCI on Guatemala in open session.

zpress concern over their safety and question the of meeting with Station officers.


having ordered the killing 'Ine and shows Alpirez as protesting, but ultimately going along with the cover-up.

Stationthat mid-level of hern believe

Alpirez and Carcia will be sacrificed by the MOD.

guatemalan directorate of intelligencetructure and leadership


What information was available to the cia between5 andoncerning DeVine's killing? When did it become

available and how was it handled? how reliable were the agency

Myma Mack was killed on.

nhe Station sent an Immediate cable to Headquarters asking for assistance inemorandum regarding the DeVine case. Ambassador McAfee had come to the Station and said that anIA "memo" was circulating in the State Department that somehow linked Alpirez to DeVine's killing According to the Station, McAfee said she was unaware of the existence of the document

othcer was uncertain what this document might be and told McAfee that, if it1 document, it was likely that the Station had heldear or two and then destroyed it due to space constraints. On February^Headquarters responded,opy of theissemination in question-the report that Alpirez had been present at the interrogation when DeVine was killed-to the Station and stated that it could be shared with McAfee, "just as it was with her predecessor."

Venezuela, and thatad put out an order to ha-were found. Ambassador

lat under no

cances wouldrder him killed, and that thewould welcome Contreras' return in order toand resolution of the DeVine murder case to theall

APrJlMj9JJnstrucHon to Preserve Stationhe Agency's DOa

National Security Council directive that"

In light of the Acuiunistration's ongoing review of the events surrounding the deaths of Michael DeVine and Efrain Bamaca in Guatemala, as well as any related matters, your Agency, and all relevant subordinate components, are directed to preserve any Agency records that may contain any information relevant to this review.


-te Guatemalan Army was preparing to suspend Colonels Alpirez and Garcia Catalanudicial mvestigation either cleared their names in connection with the DeVine killing or found proof againstn which case they would be disaplined.decision would cause strong discontent among Army officers and could further destablize the

P6 ?unrisis resulting

from the Devme/Bamaca; AJpirez affair, combined with the confrontation between De Leon and the private sector over tax reforms,

mbassy Report. Antate Department telegram informed the Embassy in Guatemalaeeting that day between Guatemalan Ambassador Mulet and ARA/Central Director John Hamilton, who had called the meeting to ask Ambassador Mulet why Guatemalan Army COS Gonzalez Taracena had earlier sought an appointment with Assistant Secretary Alex Watson. The telegram reported comments Mulet made relevant to the DeVine case. Mulet stated that he had spoken with Alpirez during Mulet's last visit to Guatemala, and that Alpirez had freely admitted that he participatedassive cover-up of military involvement in the DeVine killing that had been centrallv organized b

The telegram further stated, in part:

lpirez's key interview wibeen held

ecure interviewing booth or^KmaryTm^nigenceat thein January orhen the case against theand Captain Contreras was about toeototriaL Alpirez hadtape of the interview, apparentlynsent. Alpireztape still, played it for Mulet, has playeciitiorPresident De LeonThe tape apparently puts Alpirezelatively favorablethe coverup as unsustainable. Reportedlyhe anrJAipirez are bothlimit the damage to the Military

from the DevTnecas^^MAile^acuQonally said that Alpirez told him that he, Alpfrez, is receiving anonymous threats to remain silent; said he would be willing to make his information available to the USG if the US. would grant "asylum" or otherwise assure his safety.ulet said President De Leon and his advisers are working nowpeech tentatively scheduled for the evening of Apriln which the President will announce steps he is taking on the Bamaca and DeVine cases. As of now, the key step is the adirrinistrative suspension of Colonels Alpirez and Garcia Catalan while new investigations are underway.idebar, Mulet said scuttlebutt in military drdes in Guatemala is that the order came directly from then Chief of Military Intelligence Colonel "Nito"s presently drafted, De Leon's speech reportedly will hew lo the {Guatemalan Govenunent'sl position on the Bamacahat the case should be investigated by the Historical Clarification Commission.

ulet further said thai Army COS Gonzalez Taracena heads sentiment within the Military for full disclosure of the DeVine coverup. MOD Enriquez reportedly opposes disclosure and the issue is not yet resolved. Mulet mentioned Colonels Otto Noak [sic) of the Presidential Military Staff and Letona (his Militarys among those favoring disclosure. They in rum reportedly feel that there is substantial sentiment within the Army for full disclosure in the DeVine case. The Army position on the Bamaca case, in contrast, is reportedly solidly in favor of referring it to the Historical Clarification Commission.

. State Department telegram

onormed the Embassy that Assistant Secretary Watson had contacted President De Leon by telephone that evening to urge De Leon to "wince even more dramatic and bold action [than planned] in his speech to theoncerning the DeVine case, Watson's points

Makeour speech your belief that thereailure to assign higher level responsibility in the DeVme case and your determination both to disclose

that failure fully and to take appropriate legal action against those who perjured themselves or otherwise sought to obstruct justice;

make it clear that legal action will also be taken against any individuals found to have responsibility for ordering the murder of DeVine; and

reiterate your government's commitment to the reapprehension of Captain Contreras and his return to prison.


legation to Washington to conductwith. administration officials andhumail nghts cases

fDe Leon believed that an in-depth investigation and punishment of the individuals involved in DeVine's killing could be carried out at some future date, possibly after the Deace agreement is signed, but it was not possible al

provided rep< alleged existence of

a tape or tapes recorded by Alpirez concerning the cover-up of military involvement in Devine's killing. The reports varied about who was involved in the killing and who ordered the cover-up, but the overall theme was that Alpirez had sent copies of the tapes out of the country, to Washington, Los Angeles and elsewhere for his own protection.

A Division Report. AccordingayReport" prepared by the Agency's LA Division, several reportsreceived-from State,"

^-alluding to theape that appeared to exonerate AJpirez of the DeVine killing but implicated him in the subsequent cover-up. It was believed, according to this LA Division report, that Alpirezeeting in1 conductedegal counsel Monroy Espana, in which Monroy orchestrated the cover-up by coaching somermy officers on what to tell mvestigators in the DeVine case. Monroy was reportedly acting on orders of then-MOD Mendoza. The tape was believed to indicate that Alpirez protested the cover-up as unsustainable, but in the end grudgingly acceded to it. Garcia Catalan was allegedly identified as having ordered the killing.

J that Contreras did not kill tat one of the soldiers under his command did.

that Alpirez did not know about the killing or uevine until alter the fact, and that he was ordered by senior officersto assist in the cover-i

[said that it is his belief

that the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense is

searchingacrifidal lamb in an effort to resolve the human debts case of Michaelbelieve that Colonel Juno Roberto Alpirez, andesser extent Colonel Mario Roberto Garda Catalan are the scapegoats that are being offered up by the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense in an effort to protect retired senior officers, and bring an end to the currentelieve that Alpirez did not know about the kmingofflivmeiixJtii^ after the fact, and that Alpirez only assisted in the cover-up of the murder on orders from more senior officers.

Hwhile many officers have mixed feelings^o'rSa'^Se'Tino^^

extremely upset by the accusations levied against him. Officers are not divided on their view that Alpirez is beingcapegoat, and only want the truth to be revealed.

Ilnlated but Captain Contreras did not killonrxeras tolo^MJjj^Mhar one

ot the Army specialists had performed the killing.

been killed

sep lum from revealing which senior officers were responsible for0 Devine killing.

|Contreras had been given the resrortfibility to

retrieve two Guatemalan Army Galil assault rifles that had beensold, one of them supposedly to DeVine. After the detentionContreras had requested instructions on how to"Staff Channels" and was told to "do whatever it takesthe

J believe that the order to proceed with the interrogation went ray up the cham-of-command to include former Minister of Defense General Juan Leonel Bolanos Chavez, former Chief of the Directorate of Intelligenceolonel Cesar Augusto "Nito" Cabrera Mejia, and former Chief of the Presidential Staff General FnW AugustoHHHBBI Contreras' later threats to former Chief of the National Defense Staff General Joree Roberto Perussina Rivera to reveal this information if he had to serve time in pnson may have forced senior officers (to) dispose of Contreras permanently.

eve mat senior officers are stilUtt^rnpt^

reared officers that are truly responsible for ordering the interrogation of DeVine. While feelings among officers are mixed towards Alpirez, they believe that he is being offered upacrificial lamb to protect others.

|As you are probably aware, Alpirez is

accused of participation in the murder ofontrerasof the crime inut fled fromoh.ting of Contreras inead on Contreras in

Venezuela. The Embassy here is anxious to see Contreras captured and _returned to Guatemala, where his case is still pending appeals.'

lation in addition to that provided by the

regarding the tape that Alpirez allegedly had

ilitaryad been tasked withndhadthus far been unable to do so. Guatemala City Stationummarizing briefly what the tapes supposedly contain regarding Alpirezs reluctant acquiescence to the cover-up Monroy was orch^traang, and that the cover-up was organized from the start by MOD Mendoza. The Station stated that it was not aware of any copies of the tape being in Embassy hands.

on tne current US.-Guatemalasituational one of the measures that could help get things Guatemalan Government progress on resolving the Bamaca/DeVine cases, such as finding and recapturing Contreras.

lescnbed Alpirez as leeung extremely pressured and nervous, and believing that the brunt of the accusations on the DeVine murder were bemg levied against him. Regarding Alpirez, the DAO cable stated:

lCoLflunking of rainung

in and confessing to committing perjury and obstructingthe trial of the Army personnel who were convicted inmurder. He could then tell all he knows about theand dear himself of the accusations that he ordered ordirectly involved in the actual murder of Michaelwould also then implicate many Army officers, some retiredstill on active duty, in the cover-up asmaximum penalty under Guatemalanin prison, which is commutable. Col. Alpirez believed aforperjurynughtbe worth dearing his name ofAlpirezreat deal in his

thinkingcms prooiem, and he may not actually takeadical course of action.

lat Carria Patalnn haH rmly oioht

months remaining until retirement. The Army would support himand other unspecified assistance until he retired, but thathe would be on his own.the Army was

providing Garcia and Alpirez wlthfourlawy^rseach and was assisting in arranging testimony from pertinent witnei

le bamaca case was

ken up by the Historical Clarification Commissioninal peace agreement is signed with the Guatemalan

Occupants of Senior Guatemalan Positions


. j| I

Minister ot Defense



MENDOZA Garcia Cesar CABRERA MeJIa tto PEREZ Molina

r-Jose Manuel RIVAS Rfos

Aimy Head

Luis Francisco ORTEGA Menaldo

Antonio GONZALEZ Taracena

Mario MER1DA Gonzalez

Augusto DIAZ Barrios


ol Cantor (ornd prodessor organizations

Julio Roberto ALPIREZ | Juan VALENCIA Osorlo

Morris Eugonlo DE LEONEdgar Rlcardo 8USTAMANTE Flgueroa

Tlxof ItrittMnoal SacwKfPitWMiruI SUIT Ceftti lot KmlyUxIn euoinimc* itw>

mpntjMM warn

lat in

iruary iwi he mdividua^vho

was suspected ofmeKjmn^tjhg time.him that his fellow pi-

Hthat he had been presentonversation between Alpirez and Joaquin Alfaro Avelar ont the Kaibil Base. Alfaro was the senior enlisted man in charge of the group that was ultimately convicted of DeVine's killing. Alpirez told Alfaro not to kill DeVine because helfaro informed Alpirez that he had his orders, to which Alpirez replied something to the effect, "Okay, but if you are going to do it, don't bring him hereon't want to have your problems."

iull me Report. By placingat the Kaibil Use, with both Alpirez and Contreras at thewas significantly at odds with the bulk of evidence ^Headquarters raised questions about the report whenby (heThe Station's

trong condemnarroTrorAipirez, is puzzling in several ways. First of all, no "documented fact" has been found that Alpirez hid his


involvement in the DeVine killing

le scene and states that he was responsible for DeVine's death. All other accounts that involve Contreras in the killing Pjaceluininf^res, having sent the team to Poptun.

J spoke of Alpirez's "erratic and bi2arre*diaracter and TWrrnarrryTTOT there is neither documentation nor prior reporting to support this statement

Neither the Station nor

leacUquartfirsappears to have considered the obvious question ofif his intention were to shield his ownthat the military was uWolvHTiri

ig ana would have later been the only military member to step forward and offer toimilar swom statement to the military court rather than to participate in the cover-up. His subsequent refusal to say anything may reasonably be attributed to his being subject to direct orders not to testify or risk losing his military career and, perhaps, his life.

inally, the official death certificate ancfl investigation reports provide strong support to thelleorytnatDeVine had died because of the neck wound, not by suffocation. According to an OMS physician, the near-total loss of blood (hipovolemic shock) reported in the death certificate would not have occurred if DeVine had not been alive when his neck was nearly severed.


here is no statute, executive order or Agency regulation that requires the Agency to collect and report on human rights violations such as the DeVine killing

J The extPnt tnesponsibilities for coUecting information regarding the DeVine killing can be assessed by reviewing Station reporting through the four major phases of the case; (i) Pre-Killing, (ii) Post-Killing, (iii) Investigation and Trial, and (iv) Post-Trial.

re-Killing. No evidence has been found to indicate that the Station or Agency had any information pertaining to DeVine, his activities, or any human rights abuses threatened or planned to be directed against him prior to his killing in

ost-Killing. Station reporting began in0

vents relating toStation reported to HeadquartersGuatemalan militarykilling and the military

eadquarters overrode theinstructed the Station to bri<

Stroock promptl^mTrieiriTorma

concerning the DeVine killing and coviSipTieadquarters also instructed the Station to resubmit the reportifferent format and noted its desire to provide the information to the Assistant Secretary for State for Latin America as quickly as possible. This dearly indicated eadquarters's recognition of the importance of the DeVine case. Oneadquarters informed the Station that the information had been disseminated and that DAS for Latin America Sullivan had beenopy.

rimarily due to the human rights issue raised by the possible Guatemalan military connection to DeVine's killing. Station officers were tasked to obtain additional details about the killing and the Guatemalan Government's investigation into it

nequest for information

nti-US. sen rim enthis time forward, of DeVine's killing and re officials.

the Guatemalans hi

increased restrictions. Embassy officials" access to facilities.

he Station reported thal_

personnel had been^rresTed forthat the perpetrators had acted without

ecame involvedight, and then killed DeVine. B


DeVine's death. This information provided part of the justification for. Governments termination of military aid to Guatemala in

uring this period, between0 andhe Station acquired significant information concerning the DeVine killing and Guatemalan Government efforts to manage the resulting pressure from the US. Government. This information was appropriately disseminated and served as part of the basis for the US. Government's action against the Guatemalan military.

nstigationrial This phase. Station reporting1 indicates that additional details were obtained by the Station regarding:he circumstances of DeVine's killing;he Guatemalan Government's investigation; andhe "cover-up."

interrogationng:jnu^report also included information from


On, Headquarters requested the Station's evaluation of the conflicting reporting regarding DeVine's killing and stressed the continued importance of reporting on human rights violations. Although the Station indicated its intent to pursue further questions idm>.[ allegations about Alpirez, it appears that no such effort was made. Similarly, it appears that the Station did not further explore the validity of the derogatory comments madi ( (regarding Alpirez's character and behavior. The reasonsfor these lapses have not been determined.

he Station continued to ' nformation pertaining to DeVine's killing as wellasGuaternalan Government efforts to investigate and prosecute those responsible. The Station also collected information regarding the Guatemalan Government's reaction. pressure to resolve the DeVine case. __

| to obtain information on the statusDeVine case.Guatemalan Attorney

General had stated that the Military should allow prosecution in cases of lesser military significance, such as the DeVine killing.

accused of DeVine's decline in the importance of the DeVine case within

n sum,, Headquarters and me Station made sustained efforts to obtain information related to DeVine's killing, information that was collected regarding the DeVine killing was promptly reported and, if considered significant and relevant, was

disseminatecl to additional intelligence consumers. Information alleging that Alpirez was present at DeVine's interrogation was referred directly to the FBI and the DoJ.

Intelligence collected by the Station during this period contributed to. Government'srding the DeVine killing and the Guatemalan Government's efforts to resolve the case. However, the Station failed to collect additional information regarding the accuracy of the allegations that Alpirez had been involved in DeVine's interrogation and about Alpirez's character despite direction from Headquarters to do so and the inconsistency between these allegations and prior information.

Post-Trial,, the Station continued its efforts to acquire information on the DeVine case. Many versions of the details regarding DeVine's killing had been learned by this time and the initial Guatemalan judicial proceedings had been completed. The Station's efforts resulted in added information regarding the appeal, the Guatemalan Government's reaction to the case, Contreras' escape and the search for him, and other case developments.

tation reporting4 continued to includeto the Guatemalan Government's reactions to DeVinethat the MOD

considered the caseclcesedHn^ugustHn^ reported that Noack, the Human Rights Advisor to De Leon, questioned the validity of the claims of death threats to witnesses and their relatives.

he Station reported the commenl

eference to the existence ofAmpSers^pexecordLng. ay, LA Divisionpot Report that discussed the details of the Alpirez tape, deluding portions that identify Garcia Catalan as ordering the killing and Alpirez at first protesting the cover-up and then rejuctantlycoor^ In May, the Station also reported

that Alpirez and Garcia Catalan may be scapegoats and that Contreras might be dead. Recently, Station management informed Guatemalan officials that the DeVine case would not be forgotten and. cooperation partly depended upon the Guatemalan Government's resolution of the DeVine case, particularly the return of Contreras to justice.

he Agency Suppress Information to Protect Sources and Methods? No evidence has been found to indicate that the Agency improperly suppressed relevant information to protect "sources and methods" or for other inappropriate reasons. Inhe Station promptly reported the informationB|

regarding military involvementup. This information was disseminated to the appropriate intelligence consumers,

oUowing the0 report.the Station tasked its assets to collect additional information on the DeVine killing and the Guatemalan Governments reactions to the case. Inhe Station collected information that alleged Alpirez had been present at DeVine's interrogation. This was reported to Headquarters and disseminated to other appropriate agencies through standard channels. The dialogue between Headquarters and the Station through the end of October clearly indicates that the Agency almost immediately recognized an obligation to report the allegations to DoJ.


o evidence has been found to indicate that any Agency employees were directly or indirectly involved in DeVine's killing or that any Agency employees had any advance knowledge of that event. No

evidence has been found to indicate that DeVine was the subject of Agency interest prior to his killing.

Was information regarding DeVine's Killing properly shared by CIA with the Intelligence Oversight Committees? Dtd the CIA meet

its RESPONSntlLTTY FOR CONGRESSIONAL notification in the DEVINE killing?

here is no specific statutory or policy requirement that the CIA provide intelligence information to Congress concerning the deaths of American citizens. However,atter of practice, the Agency does provide information to Congress in response to specific inquiries or if circumstances warrant. In the case of DeVine's killing, information was provided to Congress because the case became an important element of Agency reporting on the human rights situation in Guatemala and assumed significance in termsGuatemalan relations.

he Agency appears to have informed the Congress about the DeVine killing prior to any congressional mquiry about the matter and continued to provide information about basic developments in the case as such information became available. Specifically, information was provided through finished mtelligenceeriodic briefings, and testimorr

hile Agency infonnation about the DeVine killing had been provided to Executive branch agencies beginning in0

first available record that the CIA made information available to Congress about the DeVine killingational Intelligence Dailyrticle on human rights abuses in Guatemala. The articletatement that the Army High Command continued to drag its feet on the investigation of the killing. citizen by Guatemalan militaryID article on


he next record of the Agency providing information to ra* about the DeVine case Ls an1

1 >eganeneral discussion ot the DeVine killing cm,,

onrights violation

terms the intelli

had led. Government, ino suspend military assistance tothat this suspension was due to theailure to investigate satisfactorily Guatemalan military mvolvement in the DeVine killing. so discussed in general

he first recordongressional mquiry about the DeVine kuhngjhat has been found is in1

the HPSCI seTtthTAgenr^thTmUowing'

aesuon ror tHe Kecord-'Wiat contribution has CIA made toof the murder. citizen Michael DeVineThe Agency provided the following response,reference to the

m AugUst IWJ By Brooding iiuormation indicaiing that DeVine was murdered by Guatemalan militaryhad been urgedrovide this key information


[indicating that the Guatemalan Minister of Defensewas igTfie investigation into the Guatemalan military's role in DeVine's murder. The CIA reportey role in the United States Government's decision to suspend military assistance to Guatemala.

he Agency continued to provide information to the

intelligence committees in the form of finished intelligence

fnd periodic briefings from the spring1

rough2 when six Guatemalan Army specialists were convicted of DeVine's killing. The essential issues covered included, who may have been responsible for the killing; the extent of the military effort to cover up involvement of military personnel and the attendant responses of Guatemalan political leaders; the impact of the case. relationswith Guatemala; and the implications for the

inished intelligence about the DeVine case provided to CongressID article in September1

latter two reports came after, but djdrtotnumtion, the1 report that Alpirez had been present at DeVine's interrogation, the referral to

Jtion, the DeVine case was discussed in SSCI

ings on, late2

-. No record has been found of

congressional inquiries about the DeVine case or briefings about it from2 untilhroughout this period, there appears to

have been no reference to the1or the DoJ referral.

he1 allegation that Alpirez had been presentinterrogation had been includedompilation ofwas shown to SSCI staff members in

le tune, the committees were told of the5 report alleging that Alpirez killed Bamaca.

Was information regarding DeVine's killing properly shared with Ambassadors and other appropriate Embassy officials? Dm CIA

meet its responsibility for notification in the devine killing ?

j^^lptgili^cnj^^rl On August WW Station reported to TTeadquartersB

about Guatemalan military mvolveTrumt^TDevmesKnnng and the cover-up that was in progress. The Station alsoelay in briefing Ambassador Stroock toeasure of protection forOneadquarters rejected the

roposal and instructed the Station to brief Stroock promptlyinformation that had beenthe

DeVine killing and cover-up. Headquarrersalsou^stJiicted the Station to resubmit the report and expressed its desire to provide the information to the Assistant Secretary for State for Latin America as quickly as possible. This was clearly an indication of Headquarters's recognition of the importance of the DeVine case. An AugustH immediate Headquarters cable informed the Station that the information had been disseminated and that the DAS had beenopy.

ithat, among other things, rines killers were not unaer orders from Garcia Catalan to kill him and opined that they gotight and killed DeVine. reported this to Headquarters as well as reporting from unnamt "others" that DeVine drank heavily and beat local soldiersJ


omments on the subject are somewhat ambivalent. Stroock recalls being advised in the Ambassador's "charm school" that "COS's screwe also recalls that he understood that,ong-standing agreement worked out between State and CIA, Ambassadorsight to know about the identities of the Agency's contactsneed-to-know" basis and could also ask the COS for such information in specific cases.

ased on long-standing agreements between the AgencyState Department, Agency Stations are expected to share virtuallywith the Ambassador. (Seefexception is based upon7 National Securitythat the Agency protect "intelligence sourcesfhus, there is some room fordiscretion on the part of the COS when "sources and methods"According to Agency guidance toOS mayor methods information, in

enhaI.^foAmi^on- typically, the COS mustalanceassador formed and protecting sources and methods. Presumably, in deciding whether and what the

^6Xerdseson the basisA*between the

Station and the Ambassador, and the nature of the information.

Why did the Agency not provide information regarding the DeVine killing to the DeVine family?

nformation available to me Aeencvindicated that Mrs. DeVinerivate deicctivefl |to investigate the circumstances of her husband'seveloped considerable information about the DeVine case tha^vrasKnown by the Agency to have been shared with the Embassy and the Guatemalan Government.arge volume of information regarding DeVine's killing eventually became public and was known to be available to Mrs. DeVine.

dditional information was acquired by the Agency from its clandestine sources. This was consistent with the Agency's mission to collect information relating to foreign. foreign policy and other official interests abroad. This information was analyzed and provided to official consumers. Generally, apart from its basic charter to

collect information concerning terrorism and events that impact upon. policy or other interestsoreign country, there is no requirement that the Agency seek to collect information regarding threats or harm. citizens abroad. Also, there is no statute, Executive order, or Agency regulation or policy that provides for disclosing clandestinely collected information to families. citizens who may have been murdered, captured, imprisoned, or are missingoreign country.

This said, the Agency is expected to warn targets of assassination plans that may come to its attention. Also, Agency information can be and is mdirectly conveyed to concerned family members for humanitarian reasons. Warnings and compassionate conveying of information generally are the responsibility of the State Department. Typically, State Department personnel at the Embassy whoequest for such information would work through the State Department in Washington and the Station to query Agency Headquarters for pertinent information. If the Agency concurred with the release, pertinent information would be sanitized to protect sources and methods and then the information would be provided to the State Department for release to the family members.

The Station appears to have kept Ambassadors Stroock and McAfee generally informed of information regarding the DeVine case through private discussions^Station cables, and Country Team meetings. In rum. Embassy, Stateffiaalsheh^everaH^

Mrs. DeVine, the DeVine family lawyerM

Mrs. DeVine's lawyer, in the companyassyomaafe^lsomet^^

with representatives of the Guatemalan Government..

evidence has been found to indicate that requestsfor the release of Agency information to the DeVineto the DeVine killing. Both Ambassadors Stroock andstated that they did not approach the Station to request releaseinformation to the DeVine family, nor are there indicationsAmbassadors unilaterally released Agency information. Inasmuchpersonnel were not involved in the discussions with Mrs.her representatives, the exact information provided Mrs. DeVine and


her lawyer is unknown. However, Agency-derived and reported classified information presumably was not released, but served as background and to verify facts for these discussions.

nother means by which. citizens, such as members of the DeVine family, may obtain unclassified Agency information is through the filingreedom of Information Act (FOIA)earch of Agency. FOIA records indicates that not until5 did an individual, "on behalf of Carolequest information from the Agency "related to the murder of her husband, Michael Vernonhe Agency currently is processing that request according to standard procedures.


conclusions set forth below are repealed in theto Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca|

Agency Purposes in Guatemala

programs in Guatemala during the period inin furtherance of duly approved 1

were duly authorized by the President, reviewed by the National Security Council and reviewed and funded

Alleged Complicity in Deaths of DeVine and Bamaca

o evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employee had prior knowledge of, directed, participated in, or condoned the interrogation or killing of DeVine. No evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employee had prior knowledge of, directed.

participated in, or condoned the reported interrogation, torture, or killing of Bamaca.

. The1 report alleging that Alpirezl

(was present at DeVine's interrogation was seriously flawed and should have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and disseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor Headquarterserious effort to verify the allegations contained in the1 report and Headquarters did not follow-up sufficiently on its initial efforts to have the Station do so.

imilarly, the5 report alleging that Alpirez had killed Bamaca was also based on questionable information and should have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and disseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor Headquarters made serious efforts to verify that report and Headquarters did not encourage the Station to do so.

Congressional Notification

he Agency should have notified theoversight committees in1 about theAlpirez had been present at an interrogation that resulted. citizen

committees should have^eenbneferl7es^cially in light of theserious actions the Agency took on the basis of that report,to DoJ and

LA Division oHicers intended to provide such notification to the committees, but neither those officers nor senior Agency managers ensured that this was done.

nhe oversight committees were expeditiously notified of the only report alleging that Alpirez had been responsible for the death of Bamaca. While notification was laudable, it should have been made clear that there were competing versions of what happened to Bamaca, and that the5 report was sketchy, third-hand hearsay, and unconfirmed. Furthermore, when it had become clear in4 that there was congressional interest in

Bamaca's fate, formal notification of the4 r<

had interviewed Bamaca

Hihould have occurred.

that Alpirez

t properly notified in October |when allegations were received


e interrogation of DeVine.

mbassador Stroock was

mbassador McAfee was not properly notified4 even after asking in4omplete summary of CIA intelligence relating to Bamaca, that Alpirez had reportedly interviewed Bamaca after his capture inaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaamaa


Collection and Reporting Standards

h)rmatioriprovided by Agency assets was responsive!

| and included significant reportingrights issues in Guatemala, lnchodih^heDeVinefate, and the reactions of

political and military officialsmhatives in this regard.

owever, in certain instances, concerns about source protection or possible threats to Agency equities in its liaison relationships appear to have been the cause information fully and promptly.

tation reporting regarding human rights issuesunsubstantiatedjjep^ from possibly biased sourceswell as the DeVine and Bamaca cases. The

Station, LA Division and the DO should have made stronger efforts to validate the information and place it in the context of other reporting, analyze the biases and motivations of the sources, and ensure that consumers of the information were advised that there were significant questions about its validity and hearsay nature. It also appears that LA Division and the Station gave insufficient attention and consideration to the possibility that Station asset reporting on Bamaca's fate was ba; UDon deliberately false informatioi '

heShationanc^^IDivision failed to meet Agencywith particular reference to the assets

d key information relating to Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca, _M_

t the time the CIA first encountered Alpirez in a


engaged in human rights abusi

he0ormed a

substantial part of what. Goverru*.Stk55w^ Guatemalan involvement in DeVine's killing. It also served as part of theor at least one US. Government demarche to the Guatemalans and the partial suspension. military assistance to Guatemala.

Referral to Department of Justice

Division and OGC acted prudently in ensuring aof the1 aUegations about Alpirez to DoJshould have probed more thoroughly to determine throughinquiry whether or not there [was] any basis toIn addition, having made the referral, OGC did notor monitor the matter, or adequately respond to DoJinformation.

Analytical Responsibilities

factual basis has been identified for thein an analysis presented to the NSC inas at least "the intellectual author" of Bamaca's death.was also flawed

The DIprimary responsibility

of the4 report that Alpirez id interviewed Bamaca was reportedly present at ine.onsequence, he was not able to mfonnationbriefings to senior State officials and HPSCI andtaff members in4 or in thcManalyric reports that were oUsseminated to the Ambassador and NSC and State customers prior to

ix reports have been found that allege that Alpirez had knowledge of or was involved in narcotics trafficking or other potentially unlawful activities. None of these reports establishes any connection between narcotics trafficking and the DeVine murder, nor does any of them indicate that the murder had as its purpose coercion or intimidation of, or retaliationovernment or civil population. Neither has other evidence been found to indicate that Agency employees were aware ofonnection or purpose. Thus, there is no support for the contention that Agency employees engaged in an obstruction of justice in connection with the1 referral to the Department of justice.

Dispersal or Destruction of Records

evidence has been found to indicate that anydispersed or destroyed records to prevent them fromby investigators. It appears that this allegation may havesource in an Agency effort to provide copies of selected documentsDC Is in order that they might be able to respondpublic inquiries relating to Guatemala.

DO Records System

in the DO records system ledailurerelevant allegations regarding human rights abuses|

hese weaknesses continue to cause problems for the Agency.

The DCI should reaffirm that the Agency has an obligation to ensure that the Congress is kept fully and currently informed about Agency activities. The Director should make it clear that each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office is responsible for detennirung,ontinuing basis, which matters within their areas of responsibility should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. Clear procedures should be established to ensure that such matters are reported.

Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office, in conjunction with the General Counsel and the Director of Congressional Affairs, should recommend criteria for the DCI's approval that are applicable to their areas of responsibility to govern which matters will be reported to the intelligence oversight committees.

Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office should require their managers to reviewontinuing basis which matters within their areas of responsibility meet the established criteria for reporting to the intelligence oversight committees. In addition, each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office shouldormal quarterly review of their activities to determine which matters, within or in addition to the established criteria, should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees. As part of this process all employees should be given the oprx>rtunity to identify matters that should be considered for such rerx>rting.

nalytical Functions. DI analysts responsible for producing finished intelligence and conducting briefings of government policymakers should be given accessthat


pertains to their areas of responsibility. The DDI should establish standards that ensure that DI analysts consider all relevant information so that inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete statements are not incorporated into DI intelligence products or briefings.

O Records System. The DO should intensify its efforts to ensure that Headquarters and Station personnel are supportedecords and information management system that will provide thorough, dependable and timely access to all information of relevancearticular individual or subject.

iccountability. This investigation has established that there is no basis for several of the most significant allegations that have been made against the Agency and its employees relating to its activities in Guatemala. Unfortunately, the investigative and political furor that was launched with these allegations and that has consumed much of. Government's valuable time and energy for the past several months could have been avoided or reduced if Agency employees had performed more capably in rerx)rting the events in question.

eview of Agency activities relating to theerseneral failure to adhere to

the professionalstanaaras in collecting, reporting and analysis that the Agency expects from its personnel. The causes of this are puzzling. It may be that closer scrutiny or higher standards are now being imposed on the workforce. There are many possible explanations which we will not venture here.

hatever the reason, from recruitment to reporting; from corroboration to processing; from validation to analysis; from congressional notification to crimes referral, the facts demonstrate performance that is not as professional or competent or sound in its judgments as the Agency and the US. Governmentight to expect. It is not that anyone engaged in intentional wrongdoing, but that so many errors were committed along the way. Agency management

also must be faulted for the failures of Agency personnel that are identified in this Report of Investigation.

any officers contributed to the problems and shortcomings described in this Report, but certain officers had special responsibilities and played significant roles that separate them from the rest. Although there is no evidence to indicate that they were involved in the specific events under review here, the level of professionalism that prevailed in the Agency must ultimately be laid at the feet of the most senior Agency managers, DCIs and DDCIs during this period. In addition, the names of individual officers who should be held responsible for specific deficiencies have been provided to the Director for his consideration and


Original document.