Created: 7/15/1995

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Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

Report of Investigation


Frederick P. Hitz Inspector General

A. R. Cinquegrana Deputy Inspector General for Investigations

porfioriyare classifie^TSECRET








What was CIA '$ relationship with

Graphic Guatemalan Military Structure and

Graphic: Guatemalan Directorate ofStructure and

What information or allegations did CIA acquire

concerning alpirez's knowledge of or participation

in human rights abuses? when was the information

acquired? how was it handled? how reliable were

the sources of this


Map: Key Alpirez Assignments and



regard to Alpirez, did the Agency comply with regulations concerning the need to keep

ib as sad ors informed?

What other derogatory information did cia acquire

concerning alpirez and how was this information handled? what information is available concerning allegationsormer employee of the drug

enforcement Agency (dea) regarding cia knowledgeplrez having DeVine killed for discovering a

drug operation run by

Deo cia's failure to notify Do] of reports implicating alpirez in narcotics trafficking hinder the attorney General's ability to determine whether the DeVine

murder was politically motivated? SHOULDTHE

reports have been provided to doj under existing

crimes reporting

did cia comply with the relevantand procedures concerningissues that were in effect when theinformation was


What and when was Congress told about ihe1 report that Alpdxez had been presentatDeVine'sation


procedures in effect regarding notification

Would current statutes, regulations andhuman rights reportingnotification save requiredlt they had been tn place at the

How was the1 information handled

vvtthin the Executive branch? Was it used as the basis

emarcheto the governmentof

Is there any information en Alpirez's agency |

records to indicate that theor should have known, that he mightacts of this

how dld alpirez perform when he attendedand General Staff course at FortAre there any written evaluationsDid either the Agency or the Army havethat Alpirez was the sort of personcommit ATROcmES? If so, didtake any action? if eitherconcerns, did lt share them with the

was the information regarding alplrez's involvement in the devine case fully reported to the Department of Justiceimely basis? Why dld ft take cia fromntil1 to report the information to doj? why dld lt take doj fromo2 to determine that it had no pjrisdiction fn this case? dld the cia follow up with doj during that four-month period? if not, why not? isritten record of



Report of Iiwestigation




n, an intelligence report was chsseminated by the Central biteUigence Agency (CIA) stating that Guatemalan insurgent commander Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, the reported husband. citizen, was killed by Guatemalan Army officer Julio Roberto AlpirezJ

[information was acquired by CIA that he was present during the interrogation when VS. citizen Michael DeVine was killed in

n, then-Acting Director of Central Intelligence (ADO) William O. Studeman asked the Inspector General to investigate the nature and extent of the relationshii between the CIA and Alpirez.


uatemala City Station came into regular contact with Alpirez beginning7 as the result of his position as head of the Security Department in the Presidential General Staff.

hortly after receiving information in1 alleging that Alpirez had been present at the interrogation. citizen Michael DeVine, who was killed inhe Station decided to


. Department of Justiceo which le allegations nad'been referred inetennined whether it had an interest in pursuing prosecution of AlDirez.


the1 allegations about Alpirez were includedompilation of ten reports that were shown to the SSCI staff inhere is no evidence that


or the referral to DoJ were reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress at that time.

nhe Station obtained information alleging that Bamaca was killed by Alpirez. Bamaca was reportedly captured innd Alpirez's alleged involvement in his death could have occurred


The National Security CounciloJ and apartment ot State were advised of this information shortly after its receipt in

he intelligence oversight comrnittees were informed on5 of thellegation that Bamaca was killed by Alpirez. At the same time, the1 allegation that Alpirez was present at the interrogation of DeVine was reported to the committees and the committees were advised


hen the ADO asked the IG to investigate OA's relationship with Alpirez on, two investigators were assigned to the task- These investigators reviewed relevant files in the Latin America (LA) Division,

| of the Directorate of Operationsn th^Ornceo! Congressional Affairsnd in the Office of General Counselnowledgeable members of these components were interviewed, mduding former Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Guatemala City Station and Station officers who had dealt with Alpirez. Regulations and guidance for handling information relating to human rights abuses and to requirements for reporting to Congress were reviewed. When new facets were added to the investigation after public allegations by Congressman Robert Torricelli on, additional resources were applied and the scope of the file reviews and interviews was expanded. See the Procedures and Resources section ofor additional details.


ased on correspondence from the ADO and the SSCI, and other issues developed in the course of the investigation, this Report addresses the foUowing questions:

What was CIA's relationship with Alpirez

What information or allegations did CIA acquire concerning Alpirez's knowledge of or participation in human rights abuses? When was the information acquired? How was it handled? How reliable were the sources of this information?

With regard to Alpirez, did the Agency comply with regulations concerning the need to keep ambassadors informed?

What other derogatory information did CIA acquire concerning Alpirez and how was this information handled? What information is available concerning allegationsormer employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regarding CIA knowledge that Alpirez had DeVine killed forrug operation run by Alpirez?

Did CIA's failure to notify DoJ of reports implicating Alpirez in narcotics trafficking hinder the Attorney General's ability to determine whether the DeVine murder was politically motivated? Should the reports have been provided to DoJ under existing crimes reporting procedures?

Did CIA comply with the relevant statutes, regulations, and procedures concerning human rights issues that


were in effect when the1 information was received?

and when was Congress told about the1 report that Alpirez had been present at DeVine's interrogation I

I Were tne statutes, regulations ana procedures li^necTregardmg notification of Congress followed?

current statutes, regulations and procedures regarding human rights reporting and Congressional notification have required different action if they had been in place at the time?

How was the1 information handled within the Executive branch? Was it used as the basisemarche to the Government of Guatemala?

Is there any information in Alpirez's Agencyl

| records to indicate that the CIA Knew, or should have known, that he might commit criminal acts of this sort?

How did Alpirez perform when he attended the Command and General Staff Course at Fort Benning, Georgia? Are there any written evaluations on record? Did either the Agency or the Army have any indications that Alpirez was the sort of person who might commit atrocities? If so, did either organization take any action? If either organization had concerns, did it share them with the other?

Was the information regarding Alpirez's involvement in the DeVine case fully reported to the Department of Justice (DoJ)imely basis? Why did it take the CIA fromntilo report the information to DoJ? Why did it take DoJ from

oo determine that it had no jurisdiction in this case? Did the CIA follow up with DoJ during that four-month period? If not, why not? Isritten record of DoJ's determination or of any CIA/DoJ contact during that time?

FINDINGS What was CIA '$ relationship with Alpirez I


2 cia files do not contain extensive reporting on the Department of Presidential Security and its predecessors.lpirez explained that this Department, which he called the "Office ofas staffedmployees "and was responsible for the securiryof the President and his family; providing the Presidentaily intelligence briefing covering worldwide as well as domestic developments; monitoring the activities of leading political opposition figures; Investigating charges of corruption against cabinet members; conducting public opinion polls; monitoring the level of domestic criminal activity; reporting on national police activities; reporting on domestic narcotics trafficking; investigating selected kidnapping cases; and reporting Incidents of human rights abuse. The Department appears to have evolved from the General Archives and Supporting Services of the Presidential General Start. This organization was commonly referred to as "Archivos" andeputation for violence. According to an

tpirez was tnen an Army Major and head of the Department of Presidential Security in the Guatemalan Presidential General Staff commonly referred to ase had

3 inteDigence report ofArchival" was to have been disbanded in

after the military forced Cuaiemalan President Efrain Rios Mont to resign. In tact, it was not disbanded at that timeuatemalan National Security Directive prohibited it from engaging in activities other than pthering political intelligence- According

intelligence report "Archivos" had renewed counterintelligence operations against Guatemalan subversive organizations inhere is no dear explanation in CIA files concerning how the unit evolved4 until it appears7 as the Department of Presidential Security, which continues to be referred to as "Arcfuvos."

* "Uaison" isworking relationship or contactIA officer

and an organization, official, or employeeoreign service or government that has been authorized by the DDO and by one or more iwponsible officials of the foreign service or government concerned and that is conducted by the CIA and foreign representath

that an

innocent tall guy has been located. This is an individual who had had falling out with DeVine several years ago and they had fired weapons at

each other, thus this individualonvenient fall

the vehicle in question probably has been aestroyet getncloreviaence.

til]ugust, toeasure of Id Ambassador that we have trim at that time and he has accepted will surest to the Ambassador he end the exploring the

As Headquarters is aware this issueery pressing one here. While some of the above information is known to the Embassyrivate investigator hired by DeVine's wife (such as the identities of some of the enlisted personnel who were in the Toyotanformation is the first to finger the MZommander as author of the murder, and outline the military cover-up. This embassy has pushed the Guatemalan military hard to find and charge the culprits in this case, thus far without success.

information obtained from protection to

information wrucn we wiu pass on the need for source protection, then present theover-up and punish the MZo;

idea ofnext week (somewhat

sunultaneously^vTlWne^ffloissador's meetingthe

Embassy has the full details on how and on whose orders the murder was committed. Our thoughts are that we would "suggest"!

since the Embassy has the detailstheUuaTemaSn Arm^wouicrDestoe served by charging Colonel Garda Catalan thereby "polishing" its human rights credentials. We would further suggest that while this may be painful and embarrassing it would be much better than having the Embassy make known publidy the information that it has available and thereby cause the Guatemalan Army to be further damaged


in the eyes of. Government and those who brack humanfortsould be designed so that hewhom helose relationship, that it is time for

rt of the Armvommand.

Astiqs knows, the militarys are not an integral part of the Intelligence Directorateut rather act under orders of the military zone commanders. Thus, we feel confident thatas not involved in the murder and thatomplied with its directive to carry out the investigation.

While the above proposed actions seem like the logical way for Station and Embassy to proceed, it is hard for us to predict howl will react. Embassy/Station involvement could beoesn't particularly like. anyway) and the fallout to US./Guatemalan relations could be heavy.

neadquarters sent an immediate cable totheStation, praising the Station for the information providedaring:

Because of the high level interest in the DeVine case, request Station

rnimecuatelybriefAmbassador on the irtformationl

Totation can request that the ArnTSassacloT^vair a. days before corurontirig tation should also immecUateli resubmitintelligence report] formatl

qs willemo dissem. We wish to get this uu'orrnation as quickly as possible to the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America.

he Station resubmitted the information that same dayby Headquarters. The report was disseminatedonensitive memorandum,LA Divisionthen-DDO Richard Stolz, to:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DLA);

Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, FBI; Manager, DoJ Command Center;. Ambassador to Guatemala.



at the interrogation of DeVine by Captain Hugo Contreras. Areported that


behaving erraticaJly. (See paragraphsof this Volume andhich discuss serious questions regarding the validity and accuracy of this information.)

he Station submitted the information to Headquarters for

he information alleging that Alpirez was connected to DeVine's death was chsseminatedensitive memorandum onigned by then-DDO Thomas Twetten, to:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Researchirector, Defense Intelligence Agencyirector, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Manager. DoJ Command Center;. Ambassador to Guatemala.

n, officers from LA Division and OGC, mcluding then-Agency General Counsel Elizabeth Rindskopf, met inffice with Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the DoJ's Criminal Division. In addition to discussing other topics, the CIA officers informed Richarduatemalan officer h

admittedthat he had been present during the

interrogation of DeVine. Accordingemorandummeeting prepared OGC attorney assigned

to LA Division, Richard expressedcloubt as to whether DoJ had jurisdiction over the case but agreed to have the matterormal reportotential violation of cruninal law containing details of the1 allegations regarding Alpirez was signed by Rindskopf and was sent to Richard at DoJ onetailed discussion of the Agency's interaction with DoJ, seef this Volume.)

ntimately, ii appears that f was inforrnedoJ attorney that DoJ planned to take no action in the matter. No documents have been found recording this discussion or DoJ's decision that no jurisdiction existed in this case. Agency officers recall that OGC was notified of DoJ's decision by telephone or in person. In any event, on, Headquartersable informing the Station that the situation had been resolvedH


Guaiemalan Directorate of Intelligencetructure and Leadership



luisn ORTEGAIMS? .

Cc-jr CABRERA Aid IVHhn't}


hrtRIVASApt I'JvJr>fCM

Zone Commanders

Military Zones)

Base and local



(CD Division

Automated Oata Processing (ADP) Division


h Military

Division h Division

rnarroiki Investiptioni Security Airport

Ciuwn Pro*Kt>on/ Coordinwion

Four ('oupi oealme with;Rebel Armed Forcu





CuenilU Army of Mw PoorfEGP)

URNCAivilian sectors



Command and Search Division

Administrative Division

Intelligence School Training Division

s explained earlier, CIA and US. Government file reviews were conducted in connection.

maintain b'aison contact with Alpirez in

| Those reviews did not resultmany ^naicatiorUhk^Mp^ezwas involved in human rights abuses.

found in CIA records that Alpirez may havein human rights abuses were submitted to HeadquartersStation on


maea allegations that Alpirez had been present at DeVine's interrogation and that he was violent, had killed guerrilla prisoners and was behaving erratically. It was disseminated j

ensitive memorandum ono:

he1 allegations regarding Alpirez were at odds with prior reporting about him^

Bup to that time. Station officers who dealt with Alpirez are consistent in describing him as one of the best Guatemalan officers they knew; talented and well thought of by senior military officers; one of the pro-American officers; and more friendly and outgoing than most Guatemalan officers. One former Station officer comments that the Station was stunned by the report of Alpirez's bizarre behavior and that it was in conflict with everything Station officers thought they knew about the man. This Station officer notes that

Alpirez would not have been put in command of the Special Forces School if he had notood officer and that he was definitely not

viewed by the Guatemalan military as an officer with ahe

had no involvement in criminal activities or serious human rights


[The information provided follows:

Guatemalan soldiers from the Military Intelligence Officef Military Zone, Headquarters in Santa Elena, Peten Department, were ordered to arrest and interrogate [DeVine) on suspicion of having in histolen Guatemalan army rifle, allegedly sold to him by an army deserter. MZommander Colonel Mario Roberto Garcia Catalan ordered Captain Hugo Cbntreras, an officer attached to, toumber of enlisted men to the area of Poptun, Peten Department, locate (DeVine] and recover the Galil rifle.

Mcomment: Garcia had earlier been blamed for the loss of other weapons under similarerious black mark in hisontreras arrested [DeVine] and took him to the Guatemalan military base in Poptun. The base at Poptun is the training base of the elite "KaibiT troops, and at that time it was under the command of Lt. Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez.

UlDeVUiel was inlerrogated by Contreras with Alpirez presentiolent man with an explosive temper, well-known for his brutality,oncho around [DeVine's] head, allowing him to breathe from time to time. Although Contreras had apparently not been ordered to killhe individual died either from suffocation or heart failure. After he died, the body was takenruck backighway near his home, where it was placed in the road. The rifle, allegedly in [DeVine's] possession, was notield.Comment: The wound on the neck of [DeVine] may have been inflicted to hide evidence of earlier suffocation.)

he ctisseminated version contained one substantive change in the text. As noted above, the intelligence report submitted by the Station contained as the first sentence in paragrapheVine] was interrogated by Contreras with Alpirezn the cUsseminated version, the sentence was altered to read, "Alpirez, among others, was present when Contreras interrogatedo information has been found to indicate what Headquarters was trying to achieve by reversing the order of the sentence and inserting "among others" into the orisinal ret>ort.


Li. Colonel Alpirez, now posted atith headquarters at San Marcos, is an extremely violent man who has murdered guerrilla prisoners in the past, and who recendy has been observed engaging in bizarre behavior, such as walking through the town where he is currently stationed, exposing himself and firing weapons in the air. Colonel Garcia, the officer who ordered Captain Contreras to arrestersonality similar to that of Alpirez. Garcia also has murdered guerrilla prisoners. Colonel Guillenno (Portillo) Gomez, the second in command of MZt the time of the killing oflsoiolent person.

| Following the murder oflpireztatement in which he admitted certain aspects of the crime, carefully shielding his own participation. (Field comment: The contents of Alpirez's statement are notinister of Defense General Luis Enrique Mendoza Garcia, incensed by the statement made by Alpirez, which, if accurate, at least pointed to army involvement in the killing, ordered Alpirez to retract it. Alpirez refused to do so unlessritten order. Mendoza then removed Alpirez from command and sent himangerous remote post

in San Marcos Department. Alpirez thought better of his defiancepermission to retract the statement As of this date, however,posteds.ui Marcos Department

Minister ofhas blocked

all efforts to investigate the [DeVineJ killing, believing that he is defending the Army as an institution.


Samaca's relatively high rank within the Organization of People in Anns (ORPA).

litary intelligence officers fromook

information was disseminated electronically on

bamaca away shortly after his capture and that was the last time Isaw Bamaca or heard anything about his status.l

Director, White House Situation Room; Assistant Secretary of State for INR; Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury for

National Security; Director, DIA;

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Director of Naval Intelligence; Marine Corps Director of Intelligence; Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence; Director of the Nationa Security Aeencvnd

4 testimony of former Guatemalan insurgent Santiago Cabrera Lopez. Onormer Guatemalan insurgent Santiago Cabrera provided informationotary public in the law offices of Jose Pertierra in. According to the written account of Cabrera's testimony, Bamaca had commanded the insurgent front to which Cabrera had belongedear and nine months untilhen Cabrera was captured by the Guatemalan military. In his lengthy testimony, Cabrera claimed to have seen Bamaca at various times during his captivity, beginning ont the Santa Ana Berlin base at Cpatepeque in Quezaltenango Department. Cabrera said Bamaca was taken away from Santa Ana Berlin on.

Cabrera said he next saw Bamaca at the Military Zonease in San Marcos Department on approximately. Cabrera stated that Alpirez arrived that afternoon and ordered that Bamaca was not to remain in the company of the other prisoners of war. Cabrera claims that he was ordered that night to take care of Bamaca, who was handcuffed and tied by his feetetal bunk bed. The next day, Alpirez returned and cautioned him against talking about what he had seen. Cabrera said he was ordered that evening toypewriter into the room where Bamaca was being kept and interrogated. Cabrera said Bamaca sounded as though he were sleepy or drugged, his body was severely swollen, his right arm and left leg were completely bandaged, his eyes were bandaged as well,reen gas tank with valvesressure gauge was by the bed. According to Cabrera, Alpirez was there and again warned him against talking about what he had seen, saying he did not want to hear comments about Bamaca in that condition-tiedthat Cabrera knew what would happen to him if he talked.

Cabrera says he saw Bamaca for the last time one or two days later. He could not see Bamaca's arms and legs because he was dressedoldier's uniform, but he was no longer swollen and he


spokeormal voice. Cabrera said he left the baseew days and Bamaca was gone when he returned.

Alpirez had taken chargeoffle

interrogation of Bamaca as the theft-Third CommanderSan"

Station sent the information to

4 and it was disseminatedl on4 to:


House Situation Room;



Department of the Army;

Naval Operations;

Marine Corps;

Air Force;




U.S. Southern Command;

tation Report. On, the Station submitted to Headquarters an operational cable statins

Alpirez, Major Kaul uiiva ?rmeno, ana colonel fcagar Leonel Godoy all worked with Bamaca after his capture in the San Marcos area. I

|did not know whether Bamaca wassnljajTveoraeao^ut Bamaca was not killed in San Marcos.


White House Situation Room; Assistant Secretary of State for INR; Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security; Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Director of Naval Intelligence; Marine Corps Director of Intelligence; Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence; Director, NS A; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury for National Securil

perational cable from the Station proviciing details to the DO at Headquarters concerning the manner in which the information was obtained

eputy Chief LA Division


any discussion within LA Division of attempting to corifirminthe

S Meejmes with NSC Staff Four meetings were held at the National Security Council (NSC) between Januaryo discuss the Januaryeport and how it could be usedemarche to the Guatemalan Government. Those meetings included representatives from the NSC, CIA, State, and the Office of the Vice President. DoJ representatives attended three of the meetings

The first of these meetings was held onnd, accordingemorandum regarding the meetine that was prepared

^was attended by

. embers Richard Feinberg, George

Lenet, and Chat Blakeman, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Central American Affairs Anne Patterson, Colonel Richard Wilhelm from the Office of the Vice President, and an unidentified DoJ official. At this meeting, the CIA representatives expressed concern about the requirement to provide early notification regarding the information to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. The NSC members asked CIA to defer temporarily any notification of the oversight committees to permit policy-makers to complete their strategy andemarche for Ambassador Marilyn McAfee to present to the Guatemalan Government. After the fourth meeting onemarche mentioning Alpirez by name was prepared, sent to the Embassy and presented by

Ambassador McAfee to Guatemalan President Ramiro de Leon Carpio on February 6.

now Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,the reasons the NSC members asked the CIA representativesnotifying Congress were:

- o have time to stmctufe the demarche;

To ensure that the National Security Advisor andresident were informed; .

To allow time to respond to an undefined problem that Patterson said the Embassy had with the Januaryeport.

Based on the NSC request, CIA delayed advising the intelligence oversight committees untilfter the fourth meeting. The committees were told onf the Januaryntelligence report that Alpirez had killedhe1 allegations that Alpirez had been present at the interrogation of DeVine.

Agency PI Analysis. At the first meeting with NSC officials, Feinberg asked, among other things, for an analysis of all

We have no firsthand accounts of Bamaca's fate, but haveumber of reports indicating that he was captured alive and killed while

reported the comments of-" said

Alpirez, Oliva and Godoy had worked with Bamaca after hishad assuredthat Bamaca was not killed in San


t the second meeting with NSC members, onnd Chief of: the analysis and other information concerning Bamaca and Alpirez to NSC members Feinberg and Blakeman, DAS Patterson, and Colonel Wilhelm. Accordingemorandum concerning this meeting that was preparecUjy^M |DoJ did notepresentative to this meeting. | Jnoted the judgment in the DI analysis that there was "significant circumstantial evidence to suggest that Alpirez was at least the intellectual author of Bamaca'she memorandum contains no indication that there was any discussion of seeking additional information concerning whether or not Alpirez actually was involved in, or who else might have been responsible for, Bamaca's death.

he third meeting was held on Januarynd attendedeinberg, Blakeman, Bruce Pease of the NSC, Director ot State Department's Office of Central American Affairs John Hamilton, Wilhelm, and Mary Ellen (Molly) Warlow of DoJ. At this meeting, accordingemorandum prepared by

| Hamilton provided copiesessage fromAmbassador McAfee raising concerns about the circumstantial nature of the evidence that was being relied upon in linking Alpirez to Bamaca's disappearance.

written comment on

FeinbergI briefing ai McAfee's message.

n her message, Ambassador McAfee pointed out that the information in the Januaryeport regarding Alpirez and Bamaca was second-hand and possibly no more than rumor. She stressed the need for corroboration before acting on it, asked that past reporting

concerning Bamaca be taken into account and questionedin the JanuaryI analysis. The message alsoreview of earlier reporting concerning Bamaca and,Alpirez's negative reputation, questioned whetherbe condemned for having killed Bamaca solely on the basisreport. McAfee also pointed out that Alpirez wasthe Army and noted the possibility that he was being set upscapegoat. She expressed concern about<

and about damage to meissued She askedconsulted as to how a

demarche would affect him ancRequestedtnat the allegations be investigatedemarche was made.

n response to Feinberg's request that the DIomment regarding McAfee's message,^HB?roducec*ollowing analysis on

4 [sic]

[McAfee!lpirez, who was the San Marcos base third cornrnander. took part in the interrogation of Bamaca. The extent of his involvement is not known. One [CIA] report says Alpirez was in charge of theIA repoit slates J

(DI) Comment:

STS took part. The reports generally agree that Army intel took charge of Bamaca's interrogation and whereabouts, standard operating procedures (SOP) for captured guerrillas."

1 McAfee]hird cornrnander, Alpirez would not normally have been 'in charge' of the interrogation. This would have been left to. Nonetheless, Alpirez had frequent intel assignments and, as such, it is plausible he was involved, but we would feel more comfortable having the opportunity of corroborating this."

[McAfee]ut can we say he killed Bamaca On the basis primarily of one intel report reporting rumors circulating in thegain, no report quotes an eyewitness who saw Bamaca's actual death."

[DI] Comment:

[McAfee]s not out of the realm of reason he is being set up

on thecapegoat is later

prepared the written analysis Feinberg had requested and were able to satisfy NSC and State representatives that theretrong

circumstantial case against Alpirez. Participants in this meeting were the same individuals who attended the Januaryeeting.

nterview of Alpirez bv the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor. On, Alpirez was interviewed at the Public Prosecutor's Office in Guatemala City in connection with the Guatemalan special investigation into Bamaca's disappearance Accordingranscript of the interview I

was asked when hee repueenhathenadworked ins Chief of Acurunistration1n response to specific questions, Alpirez said that he was named Third Commander of MZSan Marcos) on2 and was transferred to another post one said he served in San Marcos foronths and his duties consisted of assisting the Second Commander of MZn coordmating the activities of the General Staff, monitoring die upkeep of the base facilities, and supervising the mechanical services and enlisted men's trairiing.

here is conflicting information concerning exactly when Alpirez left the position as head of (he Special Forces School and when he arrived in San Marcos as Thirdnessage described Alpirez as "former commander of the Poptun rangers' trainingtation cable described Alpirez as "ex-commander of the Special Forces (Kaibtles)tation cable states that Alpirez recently has been reassignedew post. Thentelligence report states that Alpirez was posted to Malacatan, which is about an hour drive from the town of San Marcos in San Marcos Department


lpirez specified that, as Third Commander, he was in command of no units and had no troops under hise took part in no missions because his work was done at command headquarters, although he occasionally oversaw adrninistrative aspects of the detachments. He denied knowledge of military operations conducted against insurgents in Quezaltenango Department and Military Zonend pointed out that, jurisdictionally, Quezaltenango Department is independent of

Military ZoneSane stated that he was not aware of any capture of insurgents while he was Third Commander of Militarye denied knowing anything about the capture of Santiago Cabrera, said he had not spoken with Cabrera, and claimed that mterrogating prisoners was not among his duties. Alpirez denied knowledge of Bamaca's capture, interrogation, or being moved among various military units.

ndependent Analysis. Anof the Alpirez case was produced ony


one of the DI analysts who had participated inroup that produced background informationCI Studeman in connection with the5 SSCI hearing on Agency activities in Guatemala.emorandum addressed to the DDI, DDO and Executive Director. The memorandum went no further than the DDI, however. In his questions regarding the validity of thentelligence report and referredundamental failure to do the basic homework that was needed in this case.

Analysis points out the contradictions between17reportand earlier Embassy and CIA reportsdeath. The analysis identifies other informationStation and Embassy that shows that Alpirez was one ofprominent members of the Guatemalan officer corpsto resist the cover-up of the military's involvementkillinj

oncerningnalysis states that theeport seems to provide strong circumstantial evidence concerning Alpirez's involvement in the death of Bamaca.

However, once the extent to which Alpirez had become an outcastmilitary circles as the result of his stance onis recognized, the "table-talk" of two officers staring thatin Bamaca's death was known in the military takes on aPer( f the Guatemalan rnilitary wanted to identifyfor thedeath of Bamaca, Alpirez would be aThe | Analysis does not assert that Alpirez isthe question of Bamaca's fate, but suggests keeping an openthe

tate Department Telegram. Ontate Departmentelegrameeting the day before between Guatemalan Ambassador to. Edmond Mulet and ARA Director of Central American Affairs Hamilton. According to the telegram, Mulet said during this meeting that he had spoken with Alpirez during his visit to Guatemala and Alpirez had admitted to participatingassive, centrally organized cover-up of military involvement in DeVine's killing. This cover-up had been organized t"

interview withl unsustainable andl under orders froml DeVine case.

Alpirez hadape of an

'hich Alpirez protested the cover-up as [pointed out that both he and Alpirez werelimit damage to the military in the


| that Alpirez and former MZatalan, who were suspended from the military onending investigation into allegations about their involvement in DeVine's death, are scapegoats being offered by the Ministry of Defense in an effort to protect retired senior officers.


believe that Alpirez did not know about DeVine's killing until afterward and only assisted in the cover-up of the murder on orders from more senior officers.

The Station originally submitted this informationayBcable. Headquarters asked the Station to resubmiton aon MayB

and it was disseminatedMay5 to:

he5 operational cable that had originally beet submitted by the Station explained

i the Defense

[Lnistry was searchingacrificial lamb in an effort to resolvecase and thatsserex^ Garciabeing offered upContreras

lad not killed DeVine, but that one ot the enlisted men who captured and interrogated DeVine had killed him.




who was feeling extremely pressuredarid nervous and believed that the brunt oftheaccusaHcmsinth^ case were being leveled against him.h


Alpirez was thinking ofr^arl^0dshc5ngjusace

in the trial of the Guatemalan military personnel accused of killino-DeVine. This would permit Alpirez to reveal all he knows about the killing and clear himself of accusations that he was involved. He would implicate in the cover-up many Guatemalan military officers, mduding some still on active duty.

_|that Alpirez had made an offer to Defense Minister General Mario Rene Enriquez Morales to take responsibility for "the Bamaca situation" to save the Army's image, but Enriquez did not accept.

he Station submitted the information to Headquarters ont was disseminatedo:

maintained thatkilling.when the

establishment, the team's inten

team of enlisted men arrived, he refused roachnittnern to the Special Forces fraining base and the team then wentocal ciririkine

Jhe had no prior knowledge of apprehend and interrogate DeVine.

Guatemala: Key Alpirez Assignments and Locations

FL Bennlnfc Gaorpa aWOw 1M9

Occupants of Senior Guatemalan Positions



of Defense

Hector Alejandro GRAMAJO'.

Edgar GOOOY Cailan

Army Head

Luis FranOswORTEGJlMenaido


of Center (orrchivosT and predessor organlrations

Ju'io Roberto ALPIREZ


Morris Eugenlo DEf fiMMlitf Sr


Chronology: Key Events Pertaining to Julio Roberto Alpirez


Auguslreports information alleging AJpirez is involved in narcotics

trafficking and says additional information would be provided. No follow-up report

Januaryenters Command and General Staff Course.

OctoberStroock becomes Ambassador to Guatemala.

returns to Guatemala

Januaryassigned as Commandant of Special Forces School in Poptun.

ugust I

citizen Michael DeVine is found deadoad near his

m Junenlisted men came to his >ase before surveiling DeVine. Military cover-up underway and Alpirez being pressured to retract his statement.

November 13

Auistant Attorney General Richard is briefed.


crimes report is sent to DoJ.

is reportedly involvedirelight and captured in or near San Marcos Dept.

report lists AJpirez among officers who may be involved in narcotics trafficking because heome beyond his meansilitary officer.


' as

Col. Ochoj, arrr'strd inn narcotics trafficking.

by Defense Minister Mendoxa toalse statement about the DeVine case, had refused, and had been sent to San Marcos Dept. as punishment

reports tlx enlisted men each sentenced to JO years for DeVine killing. Contreras absolved.

sentenced loears in prison.


military intelligence officers had picked up Bamaca and taken him away shortly after he was captured.

Intelligence report disseminated stating that Alpirez took charge of Bamaca's interrogation in San Marcos, Bamaca collaborated and provided information on his former column and Bamaca is now dead.


Januaryebruary 3

February 6

February IS March 22

"the senior ranks of thenow

ipirez -:

Four meetings at NSC to. Government reaction; OA is asked to delay congressional notification.

ADO asks IG to investigate QA relationship with Alpirez.

SSO and HPSCI staff briefed on information connecting Alpirez to DeVine and Bamaca I

Demarche is presented to Guatemalan President by I' -Ambassador.

SSO sends additional questions to IG for investigation.

Rep. Torricelli makes public allegations that OA knew and covered up Alpirez' involvement in DeVine and Bamaca killings.

mbassador McAfee arrived in Guatemala in3 to replace Stroock. By that time, the trial in the DeVine case had ended and Captain Contreras had been convicted, sentenced and had escaped one month

7 agreement between CIA and the Department of State concerning relations between the two agencies, as transmitted in antate Department message,rovides that:

he only other derogatory information about| at :ars in Agency files consists of several reported allegations that

Hwas involved in narcotics trafficking. One of these reports

cameEA source, three from Agency assets and one from the

addrdon^wjepornvas found in DEA Headquartersthathad counterfeit cashiers checks and

had ordered anassassmanonuatemalan. No record has been found in Agency or DEA files that these allegations were acted on by. Government.

8 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Memorandum^taUon files8 memorandumt was prepared by then-DEA Special Agentntitled "NarcoticsTrafficking of


only in tne tirst two paragraphs of the memorandum^vhich read:

the month ofn several occasions,(source] in regard to the narcotics

trafficking ofnternational Organization.

(source] stated that he/she haspast severalhe CI. has identifiedembersecurity force for the Presidential Palace (El Arcfuvo^fe was alsoof the "BIEN" The National Police Investigative Unit under(

At theroup supervisor of the Supervisor has been ideritjiied

CI. claims that

(Emphasis added)

memorandum carries no indication ofagencies outside DEA. Thenameofthe head of the DEA officeCountry Attache I lappears below |

name on the bottom of the first^age^ltnough neither of themcovering note


rarTOnnWEKepor^ subject matter we discussed. Please destroy it or return it when you are finished withhere is no indication when or how the Stationopy.

his memorandum, DEA 5A| oand mterrrtingted informationirig severaland activities. With regard tc

. Customs Service apprised CIA th visiting Guatemala hadssistance to Customso^Lnterriarcrinr^onp

one of its sources who offered

inn 1

eadquarters subsequently confirmed some aspects of what the Station had heard from Alpirez. It also informed the Station that Customs had no authority to conduct the kind of maritime operation the Customs source had described, but was not always aware of all its field office operations because of the decentralized nature of the Customs structure. It further stated that Customs had discussed the case with DBA.

le person

contain only

formation mdicating possibly of Guatemalan nationality, was invoivea in transtemng cocaine and marijuana from Cuba to. via Guatemala by aircraftAprin^


work in the

chief and in8 was alleged to have been invoi narcotics trafficking.

EA Memorandum. As the result ofsearch requested by OIG, in late5 DEAanother relevant document in its files. An Augusts,prepared by then-DEA Special AgentH Ion informationprovided by the same DEA sourceastneinformation. There is no indication that the Augustwas previously shared withClA^leadguarters orThe memorandum refers

This memorandum.

in four places in the

The [source] stated that on Saturday,was suppose fsic] to meet


arrived and stared that

] [sic-orijrinal


Ithat he [source] knewolombian that wanted to transfer cocaine from Colombia to the US by aircraft, refueling in

he second mention ol


he (source) stated that Guatemalanl has in his possession several thousand Bank of Amenca casruers uiew. that are couterfeit [sic] and were offered to the [source] for distribution. The (source) refused the cashiers

mentionedhird time as follows:

[source] further related that he had been told at by orders o

hadormer member of there [sic]ENCIAL) by the name of |




ite fourth mention of Section" ofH Mmemorandum:

Alpirez had instructed one of his suoordinates,

|to become involvedarcotics network; disrupt the network; obtain the cocaine; and run the operation for personal profit. The Station reported the information to Headquarters on Augusf and added that it was mvestigating the allegation.

The Stationthat


not provide follow-up information. The Agency file|

nothing further concerning this allegation.

he StationbeUeves that the Station would have tried to obtain corufirmation of the allegation that Alpirez was involved in narcotics trafficking, but was very busy

imciucung Alpirez, allegedly involved in narcotics trafficking.

The Station originally submitted the information to Headquartersoperationaloting that it was notas an intelligence report because of its inconclusivenature anc^jecauseo^xjssible biases byfromobtained me information.

Alpirezouse in the

uranjas banon Justo that he could not afford on his military salary and that he may have gotten rich through narcotics trafficking or other illegal activity.

that Alpirez was suspected of narcotics tjaffickini he,



expensive home in the Colonia San Lazaro in Zonef Guatemala City.







Coast Guard;

White House Situation Room; Southern Command; and

nterrogation had been reported|

I Itinglewith Ochoa in narcotics

trafficking is Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez desic)

he Station submitted the information to Headquarters. Ont was disseminated to:








Coast Guard;


White House Situation Room; Southern Command; and

ccordingographic data nn Alpirez, Alpirez served int theStall

Alpirez has having served inut contain no dates for when he did so,5 interview by the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor's Office. Alpirez stated that he had served in. Thus, it appears he wasfficer in0 when DeVine was killed.

Did CIA's failure to notify DoJ of reports implicating Alpirez in

narcotics trafficking hinder THE attorney general's abhfty to determine whether the DeVLNE murder was politically motivated? should the reports have been provided to DOj under existing crimes reporting procedures?

he5 letter to the CIA Inspector GeneralRobert Torricelli statedformerAdministration employee" alleged that thewas politically motivated, and that DeVine washe hadrug operation being runletter also suggested that CIA of justice" if they concealedwhen the1

present at the interrogation of DeVine wereepartment of Justice.

It appears that2 of Titlef the US. Code is the statute referred to in this letter as granting the United States the ability to prosecute foreign nationals for crimes against American citizens abroad when such crimespolitical" element. That provision, appearing inB ofs part of the codification of the Antiterrorism Act2 provides criminal penalties for. national who is outside the United States. However, the murderS. national overseas onlyiolation of that statute and confers criminal jurisdiction. District Courts in cases where the Attorney General certifies that the murder was intended to coerce, mtimidate, or retaliateovernmentivilian population.

If CIA officials had information relating to the DeVine case that would have assisted the Attorney General inetermination that DeVine's murder was intended to coerce.


mtimidate, or retaliateovernment or civilian population, such information should have been provided to DoJ with or following the referral. However, there is no indication that Agency officials either had or withheld any such information from DoJ and therefore there could be no obstruction of justice on that basis.

Six reports have been identified that contain mforrnation alleging that Alpirez might have had knowledge of, or have been involved in, narcotics trafficking. None of the reports constitutes direct evidence of such involvement. (These reports are summarized in2 of Volumet the time of the referral to DoJ of the1 allegation that Alpirez was present at DeVine's interrogation, the Agency had two and possibly three of these reports in its possession. One was from DEA, one from the DAO, and one was acquired by the Stationhe latter was not disseminated outside the Agency, apparently becauseack of corroborating information.

None of the six reports suggests that the DeVine murder was linked in any way to drug trafficking, or, more importantly, had as its purpose coercion, mtimidation, or retaliationovernment or civilian population. No evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA official intentionaUy withheld these reports from DoJ in order to prevent or hinder the Attorney General from certifying that the DeVine murder was politically motivated or for any other reason. Finally, DEA reports that it has located no additional information in its files to indicate th;it| Bvas involved in narcotics trafficking.

Federal law,, requires any information, allegation, or complaint received by Federal departments or agencies that relatesiolation of Tidefode by Government officers or employees to be reported to the Attorney General. In addition, Executiveoverning United States intelligence activities requires the heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community to report to the Attorney General possible violations of any federal criminal law by employees and to likewise report violations of specified federal criminal laws by any other person. This responsibility is required to be carried out as provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department or agency concerned.

Pursuant to these requirements, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General agreed upon crimes reporting procedures for CIA that have been in effecthose procedures do not specifically require the reporting to the Department of Justice of possible drug trafficking offenses committed by non-employees. However,ontemporaneous exchange of letters between the Attorney General and the DCI, the Attorney General stated that the question had been raised about the need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable non-employee crimes. The Attorney General noted that, in view of the clear authority of the Agency to collect information concerning narcotics matters and to disseminate such intelligence to law enforcement agencies, inducting the DoJ, as well as the excellent cooperation DEA has received from CIA on these matters, no formal requirement to report such offenses was added to the procedures. Despite the lackormal requirement to do so, however, CIA has regarded narcotics offenses by non-employees to be reportable under the crimes reporting procedures.

In orderossible non-employee crime to be reportable under the crimes reporting procedures, the Agency must receive an allegation, complaint, or information tending to show that the non-employee may haveederal criminal statute. This meansertain degree of specificity must be contained in the information, allegation, or complaint that is received by the Agency.


These detennina lions are made by the Agency's OGC regarding potential offenses by non-employees except for matters investigated by OIG. If the reports that mentioned Alpirez (discussed in) were shared with OGC, it appears unlikely, with one exception, that OGC would have considered them to relateiolation. law or to be sufficiently specific toormal crimes report to DoJ. Furthermore, the procedures for crimes reporting to DoJ have not been interpreted to require CIA to report information concerning possible violations. law obtained. law ertforcemeni^gency. The one report that could be interpreted to connect I ossible violation. lawemorandum DEflWrrjwfed to OIG in late


The firstEA memorandum dated8 contains the statement thatj |vas aware of another individual's illegal activities. This memorandum contains no allegation or information to indicate that H Hvas involvediolation. law. Thus, it would notWreportable.

AnEA memorandum was provided to OIG by DEA in latehe information in the memorandum regarding narcotics trafficking is fragmentary and difficult understand. It states that the source expected to meetInstead Guatemalan Major Carlos CIoral ordershe memorandum goesontosa^nat the source wished tothe source knewolombian who wanted to seno^ocaineto. through Guatemala. This information clearly relates to an intended violation. law and,ther information the memorandum contains that I ad thousands of counterfeit Bank of America casruer^necKsne offered to the source for distribution, could be interpreted to also "linkH

o the potential narcotics trafficking offense rHowever^xtereis no indication this information was shared with CIA at the time. Furthermore, the crimes reporting procedures have not been interpreted to require CIA to report to DoJ information concerning


possible violations of VS. law received by CIA. law enforcement agency.

ntation report stated that Alpirez hadubordinate to become involvedarcotics network, disrupt the network, obtain the cocaine, and run the operation for personal profit. The Station reportedly attempted to acquire additional information, but was unsuccessful. This information was not reportable under the crimes reporting guidelines because it does not clearlyossible violation. law. While the Agency could have chosen to disseminate the report in intelligence channels to. law enforcement agencies, the Station officer who received the information from the source recalls that the sourceot of rumor,ot of intelligence, and did not provide follow-up information.

perhaps meeting standards tor dissemination as intelligence, also did notossible violation. law and thus was not specific enough torimes report under the crimes reporting procedures. Furthermore, because the report originated in another department, it is not clear that CIA would have had the responsibility torimes report based upon it.

n A

including Alpirez, who were allegedly involved in narcotics trafficking. This report was originally submitted by the Station as an operational cable because of its inconclusive and circumstantial


nature and because of possible bias by the individuals from whom (obtained the information. _

| that Alpirez

ouse that'he could not afford on his military salary and may have gotten rich through narcotics riaffidcing. .fhis report also did notiolation. law and was not specific enough torimes report, but was disseminated to. Customs Service and the FBI, among others, for intelligence purposes.

did cia comply with the relevant statutes, regulations, and procedures concerning human rights issues that were in effect when the1 information was received?

xecutive, of1 states inhat intelligence activities are to be conductedresponsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded."

n dealing with Alpirez inuatemala City Station acted in a'manner that was consistent with the guidance

n the other side of the coin, it does not appear that much effort was put into detenruning the veracity of the allegations against Alpirez. However, no requirement to verify such information was formally imposed on Agency Stations untilen months after the1 report had been received. I

btation could have sought additional letaiis concerning tne allegations against Alpirez from other sources. There is no indication that any thought was given to doing so, however, despite the apparent inconsistencies between these allegations and all other then-available information concerning Alpirez and regarding the DeVine killings

What and when was Congress told about the1

report that alpirez had been present at DeVINE 's interrogation

MWeRE theof

congress followed?

here are specific statutory and Agency policy requirements for notifying Congress of Agency activities. (Seehese requirementseneral statutory requirement to keep the intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" regarding the Agency's activities

tne extent to whit is shared.

In addition, Agency policies formation regarding intelligence sources

April andespectively, CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) prepared written responses from the Agency to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and SSCI regarding the question, "What contribution has CIA made to the investigation of the murder. citizen Michael DeVine inhe Agency responses cited the information providedin0 that linked the Guatemalan militaryeath andilitary cover-up. They were prepared five months before the1 report alleging Alpirez's involvement in the DeVine killing and it appears that at least the HPSCI may have been provided this information in the formesponseuestion for the Record

A Division considered briefing the HPSCI and SSCI concerning the1 allegations that Alpirez had been present at the interrogation of DeVine almost immediately after the information was received from

the Station.

receipt of the


1 report.


notifyirig all the appropriate entities and, while he does not recallmeeting concerning notification ofit

Director regardingthat Alpirez was present at the interrogation ofThe intention was that the briefingthe intelligence report and the

HPSCI briefing, both of which occurred on

n response to the question, "fWhat is] CIAps] contribution to the investigation of the murder of Michael DeVine inage updated information provided earlier related to DeVine and commented on the prosecution of Guatemalan military personnel who had been accused of having participated in the killinghen addressed the allegations about Alpirez as follows:

(FYI: The following has not been briefed to HPSCI, or HPSCI staff, as ofctober. We are attempting toriefing for the Staff Director before thectober HPSCIEmphasis added.)

Recentthat Julio


at the killing of by Captainfficer of the Peten military region. This reporting conflicts with other information on the case. We have forwarded to the Station additional questions to attempt to clarify the information. We will then brief the Department of Justice. (We anticipate having the report to the Intelligence Community and briefing Justice prior toctober.)

t is not known whetherage was approvedDivisiont was

included in the DO

DDO Twetten and for Kerr, who acnraTJ^estirieoidurPSCIopy ofage was also included in the Briefing Book prepared for Kerr in the SSCI hearing on,

lthoughage was included in the Briefing Book that was used by Kerr, it is not clear whetheras discussed

at his Octoberre-briefing by the DO. No LA Division pers0nnei were present, according to Kerr's calendar. Kerr does not recall any discussion of the issue. He says that, if he had focused on it, he would not have wanted to raise the information about Alpirezearing without having first informed the HPSCI chairman and


age was significant in several respects. It specifically identified Alpirez and provided key irufonnation concerning his alleged presence at theied.

mentioned that the allegations differed from earlier reportinj presumably referring to the(

It also stated that

additional questions were being sent to the Station to clarify these differences.age also mentioned that the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice were to be advised by the scheduled date of the HPSCI hearing.

s far as can be determined from Agency records, representatives of neither the HPSCI nor SSCI were briefed on th< substance ofage

not come upo!urTn^the hearings and the

question addressed inage was not raised. Key committee staff at the

)irector George Tenet

io not recall being briefed

on the Alpirez informationeither then-DDO Twetten nor


LA Division ChielH Becall partidpating in or being advised ofriefing.

No evidence has been found in Agency records to indicate that the committees were briefed1 regarding the allegation that Alpirez was present at DeVine's interrogation. Cable traffic between Headquarters and the Station contains several direct and mdirect references to providing information to Do] and to an ongoing criminal investigation, but no reference to notifying Congress.

Why the intended briefings of the HPSCI and SSCI did not take place is not known, but current and former Agency officers do not recall partidpating in or knowing of any conversation regarding not briefing the committees or any decision not to do so. None of the DO officers most likely to have been involved in preparing


recalls why the committees were not briefed.

number ot otticers indicate thatage has all the earmarks

of having been prepared bywho was often involved in

preparing responses tongress because of her skill and

experience. Others point out that the language inage

referring to DoJ was not something that would normally have been

included by LA Division officers, suggesting that I Hat least

coordinated on the page. | embers concemrating on "the

DoJthe preparationrimes report to the

Department-and vaguely understanding that LA Division intended

to brief the committees "early on" about the1 information.

indication inage that thewas current "as ofuggests that it wasat the pre-briefing of HPSCI staff members two daysthat it may have been addedesult of discussionsduring or after thatumber of LApoint out that the information inageommitment to the DDO, if not the Acting DO,the HPSCI.ommitment would not have beenBriefing Book for DDO Twetten without an expectation thatbe accomplished. Moreover, some officers point out that the



committees did not like to learn about significant information for the first timeearing, so theretrong incentive to brief the staff members before such sessions.

he responsibility for ensuring that the committeeswould have been shared by the three componentsOCA.-JJmlor proc^dua's in effect at

the time, DO officers were not aumorized to contact me.corrLmittees directly but were supposed to do so through OCA. Although many officers acknowledge that therereat deal of direct informal contact with the committees, face-to-face briefings were supposed to be scheduled by OCA and the DO generally relied on OCA to make such arrangements. Thus, LA Division probably would have had to take the initiative and proceed with OCA directly or through

thatriefing was his and LA Division's responsibility, at least initially.

ormer DDO Twetten, then-ADDO Ted Price, and Kerr agree that the committees should have been briefed on the1 information about Alpirez. Price is incredulous that the committees were not briefed, because he believes that the DO had no incentive not to do so. In his view, the storyood one because the Ai

| As soon as the information was acquired alleging he was present at DeVine's interrogation, the information was chsseminated to the State Department and other Executive recipients, (

and the information was turned over to DoJ for investigation and possible prosecution. However, Price has no specific recollection of knowing about the report until4 and says that,nown about the Alpirezould have done something about it."

err remembers the1 information about Alpirez but notage, and he acknowledges he was responsible as well to ensure the briefing took place. Kerr recalls that Agency policy at the time was to provide significant intelligence required by the committees, but not to identify sensitive intelligence



sources unless such assets were engaged in illegal or improper conduct and their activities were relevant to committee oversight. In this case, the allegations against Alpirez arguably brought him within the scope of that exception.

umber of possible explanations were advanced by those involved as to why the intention to brief the committees was not carried out. One is that attempts to schedule meetings with Staff Directors before the quarterly reviews by the committees may have been to no avail because of the short time between receipt of the1 information and the dates of the quarterly reviews. The Staff Directors were very busy and it was not unusual to have difficulty setting up such meetings. Once the Committee hearings were completed and questions about the DeVine case were not asked, the Division's attention may have been drawn to other issues. Another theory is that the Agency would have been hesitant to brief the committees before the information was clisseminated to other agencies and DoJ. Althoughage states an intention to brief DoJ byhat briefing did not take place untily that time, the Division's intent to brief the committees may have climinished significantly in the face of other pressures.

lear that he did not make any decision not to brief the committees and believes the issue simply "fell between the cracks" after the Octobernd Novemberommittee briefings due to mtervening events. After the briefings, he moved onarge number of other priority issues affecting the Division, simply overlooking the Alpirez issue and not being reminded of it. He says that he "recognizes he made the mistake of not adding to his current 'tickler list' the need to ensure that the process of scheduling meetings with the Staff Directors continued and was in fact culminated."

heorized that OGC might have advised LA Division not to report the information to the committees because of Po)'s interest, but he no longer believes this to have been the case.

(agrees and says that she had substantial experience with crimes reporting and would not haveongressional briefing

ase. Both( (and then-Deputy Chief,mdicate that the Division was very large and very busy at tne time and this may have contributed to the failure to inform thealso said that] (and heistake in assuming that their very capable subordinates would take care of the response, says that "suborclinares do not take care of briefings of Congress unless told to do so by either the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Division.

: tents Reports, iresponded to the

2 SSCI Review of Human Between June, questions raised by Tenet after reviewing I

visiting HeadquLrrers ioroup oi selected intelligence reports that had been assembled pursuant to the SSCI's request. Relevant OCA officers do not recall being asked to arrange this by the^ the OCA officer responsible at that time forsays that if he had receivedequest, he would have asked

assemble the selectedun Juneompilation of documents, entitled 'Ten Reports on Guatemalan Human Rights for Review by SSCI StaffersH

H'hroughwetten to^^MBArouting sheet on the compilation indicates that:

Per their request to review reports concerning Guatemalan humanfollowing ten reports have been proposed (by the desk) andreview by SSCI staffers



Kpts. tor

his compilation of ten reports apparently remained largely intact while it was sent through ADDO Price and DDO Twetten to OCA, shown to the staffers and members, and returned to the DO. Four separate copies of the compilation have been found.

Ifiles. The second, marked "Guatemalan

The first was inl

Human Rights Kpts. tor Review by SSCI Staffers" was initialed by Twetten and Price on Junerior to the SSCI staff review. The third was in OCA's files and indicates that the original was returned by OCA to the DDO's office, and the fourth, in DO records, indicates the compilation was received by the DDO's office. The1 report of allegations about Alpirez appears in each package.10

CA memorandum fromthat Tenet had asked to meet with Price to discuss"which was reviewed by the SSCI staff last week."be accompaniedwho have readasEmphasisespite the implicationhad seen the package "as well" asis

confident that he did not see the package when he askedeeting with Price.

he OCA memorandum further explained Tenet's interests:

Specifically, his interests relate to the use and utility of this reporting and how it impacts on the Agency's continued support for the

When good intelligence is developed concerning possible human rights violations in Guatemala what is done to warn those in danger? Iseneral policy? If reporting is developed which identifies specific individuals as responsible for or planning human rights violations, what is the Agency policy of making that information available to proper law enforcement agencies? The reporting indicates that there continue to be right wing elements within thehich violate human rights.

i made to

eliminate such aouses?he Agencyonstrained from using the information on human rights abuses with the proper authorities in Guatemala, what is the utility of collecting it?

from this JuneCA memorandum, nohas been found regarding what transpired when

_revie*ved the reports. I coming to CIA Headquarters toreadthe compilation of Guatemala reports. Agency policy at the time was that the committees generally were not provided with copies of DO intelligence reports, but committee staff could come to CIA and read suchoes not remember how many reports were in thesays he probably read them but was not familiar with their substance. He believes that the report of the allegations about Alpirez would have stood out as different from the rest, but he does not specifically remember seeing the report in the compilation. He probably counted the reports but would not have checked the reports against the list on the cover sheet since he would have relied on the DO to provide the reports and sanitize them properly.

available evidence indicates that the SSCIwere provided with access to the1 report ofabout Alpirez as part of their review of thehat he probably did see the

1 report in2 and, after recently reviewing that report, says that at least part of the contents was familiar. He says that "the guy shooting the firearm off doesemorandum for the Record cSribing the review of the ten reports at the Agency. That memorandum notes

thattheaeportshereviewed showed that

| and "there are still an Umber of extremely bad hombres {in the Guatemalanhealso says that:

The reportingumber of references to senior officers described as violent-oneertain Colonel's notorious temper and proclivity for violence, and then notes that he has recently been walking through town exposing himself and firing guns into the air.

lemorandum concluded by asking three questions:

How much value does the information collected have?

What would the impact be if it was known that CIA was still providing assistance?

What if it were known that CIA had information on human rights abuses it was not acting on?

n addition to noting that he probably saw theeport of the allegations about Alpirez in the compilation,

Acknowledges that he may not have attributed any particular significance to it at the time. He says that the "significance of the report might not have jumped out at [me] so that [I] did not recoejuze its relationship to the DeVine case

n addition toeview of the compilation of

ten human rightsrecaljTthat the compilation was


brought, possibly by I (to the committee offices for Tenet toubsequenffeview by Tenet would explain the reference to

the package "as well" in I (Juneemorandum. | (however, does not recall sticrwlreview and, as previously stated, Tenet does not believe it occurred at all.

arly Tune Cover Note. Before the compilation of ten reports was sent to the ADDO and DDO, it was sent prior to June2 lc>^Bin| n undated cover sheet from^^B

in LA Division. For the cover sheet, |rovided the following note:

Attachedatch of [intelligence reports! on human rights issues in Guatemala that we have selected as meeting the criteria we understand the SSCI staffers want to see.

The one on top (the1 report of the allegations about Alpirez) is one which we consider still sensitive because of the detail provided.

(explains that her reference toist" meantritten summary should be prepared and shown to the staff members instead of the actual report. However, the compilation remained intact throughout the process, no gist has been found, and bothseeing the report. Thus,suggestionabou^asimTmary was not implemented. N'oneofthe relevant Agency officers recalls discussing the issue.

The LA Division cover sheet also noted that the compilation was seen by two staff officers in( ore it was sent on toheays she sent Ihe package to the seconcTTor review because she had concerns that original, rather


than sanitized, copies of the reports were being provided to the SSCI staff members. She wanted the second officer's views. The cover sheet does not indicate the second officer's response.

The second officer does not remember the compilation but says that, if there hadecision toist it would likely have been prepared in her unit. The unit log for that time period indicates that all ten of the reports in the compilation had been cleared for release to the SSCI staff members.

Tuneenet-Price MPPting, On, Tenet met witl^DDO Price in Price's office at Headquarters.

(accompanied Tenet LA Division Chiel leastCA's | (and an officer1

'ere also present. The purpose of _.

meeting was todjscuss the concerns expressed earlier by Tenet and described in (Juneemorandum advising Price that Tenet desirecl^^ieeung.

record has been found in the Agency regardingThe only written record of what occurred in thishas been foundotes, according to which thewith an explanation by the^^officer regarding therights guidance.fiicer had been invited topersonally by Price to deal with human rightsThe^Bofficer, according to | (notes, said:

The content of these remarks can be read to indicate an expectation that the1 report about Alpirez would be discussed. However, none of the Agency participants recalls discussing the1 allegations about Alpirez before or during theO officer who wasarticipant remembers LA Division colleagues returningeeting complaining that they had been prepared to brief congressional staff on the DeVine

case is:

reference in

to the

iving in Peten,aliL Captain leading the team, DefVjine died innvestigation stonewalled MOD remanded, Contreras, Mendoza. Captain Contreras being tried, The President is taking steps. (Emphasis added.)

Trie reference to DeVine dying while under interrogationthat, at that time, was unique to thehe allegations about Alpirez. It is not clear who was beingidentified earlier in the notes. It also is possible that the

statements were made by

with Tenet and Price

_|but he does not

rememoer whether it occurred onays it is quite possible that he attended the Price-Tenetune.

uring the Juneeeting, there was an exchangend Price regarding, whether

_ recollection strongly disputed by Tenet and is not supported by the others who were


s far as can be determined, however, there was no probing during the meeting regarding the1 AJpirez report and no discussion of that report between J (and Price after the meeting. Price does not recall learning anything about Alpirez until

here appear to have been no further briefings of the committee staffs regarding the DeVine case during the summer

nPSCI and SSCI staff members were briefed by LA Division managers about the allegation that Alpirez was responsible for Bamaca's death. It was not until that time, it appears, that they were told that AIpircz(

allegedly been present when

Would olrrent statutes, regulations and procedures regarding human rights reporting and congressional notification have required different action lt they had been in place at the time?

he following Headquarters cables to all LA stations and bases reflect revised guidance concerning human rights reporting since the1 allegations about Alpirez were reported:

o significant revision of the regulations and procedures concerning congressional notification have beenreater effort to make DO personnel more aware of the need to be forthcoming with the oversight committees has been underway in recent years, however. This effort appears to have borne fruit in the

immediate recognition by LA Division officers in5 that the committees should be advised when the report alleging that Alpirez killed Bamaca was received.

how was the1 information handled within the Executive branch? Was it used as the basisemarche to the government of guatemala?

he information provided toAugust

as the first information available to theuls^overnment from within the Guatemalan military implicating the Guatemalan military in DeVine's killing. The only reporting concerning military

involvement in DeVine's killing from the Embassy at that time was

based on information generated byH

hired by DeVine's widow to determm^wrTy^ewasTcifledTtvvas^^

used as the basisemarche by Ambassador Stroock to the President of Guatemala calling for action to be taken against those Guatemalan military officers who were responsible for DeVine's Icilling. Together with additional CIA reporting in0 indicating that the Guatemalan Defense Minister was blocking the investigation into the military's role in DeVine's death, the information0ey role in. decision to suspendnuttary assistance to Guatemala.

s explained earlier, the1 allegation that Alpirez was "present" during the interrogation of DeVine was disseminated to:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State, INR; Director, DIA; Director, FBI;

Manager, DoJ Command Center;. Ambassador, Guatemala.

. The Agency does not determine the basis for demarches or become involved in making them, and no record has been found in

Agency hUes that the1 allegations about Alpirezused in any demarche regarding DeVine'saccordingable the Station sentthen-DCM Phillip Taylor-who was acting, inof Ambassador Stroock,COS

il that day with GuatemaianDotcTseMinister Garciao let him know that the Embassy was still interested in the DeVine case, knew what had happened, and was asking the Government of Guatemala to move forwardpeedylso, accordingmessage, theH

^fcnd Consul General on2eVine family lawyer to brief Chief of the National Defense General Staff Perrussina on the DeVine case. One of the actions that Perrussina was told would help to bring the case to closure was to instruct Alpirez lo give an honest and complete declaration about what he knew of the case.



IA records include no information, prior to the1 report, to indicate that Alpirez was involved in, or had any tendencies towards, human rights abuses. Further, the1 report represents an allegation that Alpirez was present when DeVine was interrogated, and perhaps when he died, but not that he actually killed DeVine. The5 report that Bamaca was killed by Alpirez was based on "talk" within the Guatemalan military and is only oneariety of accounts of what happened to Bamaca.

How old Alpirez perform whenhe attended the Command and General Staff course at Fort Benning, Georgia? Are there any written evaluations on record? dld either the agency or the army have any indications that alpirez was the sort of person who might commit atrocities? if so, did either organization take any action? if either organization had concerns, did it share them with the other?

he US. military annuallyumber of training positions at sites inducling Fort Benning, to the Guatemalan military. The Guatemalans typically send only their best officers to these courses. The officers are selected from the top graduates of the Guatemalan Staff School, and attendance is regardedrerequisite for promotion to Colonel. The Guatemalan military selected Alpirez to attend the Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) at Fort Benning

participation in the CGSC9ist of students that indicates that Alpirez partidpated in the CGSC from Januaryo

s stated earlier, the Agency had no indication9 when he was selected to attend training at Fort Benning that Alpirez had any tendency to engage in atrodties, nor is there any information in Agency files to suggest that. Army had any such information. At that time, information available to the Agency indicated that Alpirez stood out as one of the Guatemalan officers who was most cooperative and supportive of.

ecision to Report. Consultation with the Department(DoJ) was considered by DO management almostHeadquarters received, onthat Alpirez had been present at DeVine'snformation came to the attention ofin LA Division,directh

iclof^XDi vision'

and II recommended consultation with DoJ, and their advice apparently was accepted quickly by LA Division management.

The attached intel is d

n, Chief, LA, noted that the allegations about AlpirezimpressiorioriLA Division management.ote to Chief, LA Division, |

stc. until they speak with FBI and Justice and figure out

how to approach this case. This could well spell the end to all aid toof Guatemala,

hen-LA Divisionsays that he probably

was involved in the decision to go to DoJ. He also believes that the issue may have been discussed with DDO Twetten onn thatPSCI staff pre-brief was hek


However, none of

lem r


s explainedage prepared for that hearing contains commentary specifically addressing theeport. The commentary noted that the information had not yet been briefed to the HPSCI and stated an intention, as ofo brief the HPSCI Staff Director, disseminate the information and brief DoJ by.age also indicated that additional questions had been forwarded to the Station in order to clarify the information conrerrung Alpirez before it would be disseminated.age was most likely prepared W| |oi| hief,ith input from ig on it.

onsiderations Prior to Pol Consultation. Despite LA Division's stated intention as early as Octobero discuss the matter with DoJ, contact with the Department apparently did not take place until November. This delay appears to have been due to (a) efforts to assess the veracity and reliability of thenformation; (b) consideration of issues relating toand (c) the process of converting informationorrnfOT dissemination.

(a) Veracityjind Reliability, Headquarters recognized that the1 information was not consistent with the mm^mm^mm^m^ provided in0 and that had been disseminated to DoJ, the FBI and other recipients. The0 report indicated the Guatemalan military had been responsible for the DeVine killing and was engagedover-up, but it did not mention Alpirezs presence during an interrogation of DeVine.

Ireport into memorandum

The conversion of the format and the full coordination process could easily have taken an additional week once the questions of veracity and source protection were resolved.

In any event, onemorandum signed by then-DDO Twetten and containing the information received from the Station on Octobergarding Alpirez's alleged presence during DeVine's interrogation, was completed and disseminated to:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;

Assistant Secretary of State, INR;

Director of DIA;

Director of the FBI; and

Manager of the DoJ Command Center

rimes Report. Following Headquarters-Station agreement regarding the wording of the disseminated form of thenformation, probably on October

copy of the draft of that disseminationroposed crimes report to DoJ to Agency General Counsel Elizabethote indicating that:

. Meeting with DoJ. According

for LA. Division Chief Rindskopfinffice at CIA Heaaquarters late inonoumber of issues,Octobereeting was scheduledhat date, and Agency entry/exit records confirm that RichardDoJ representative in fact visited Headquarters thatattended the meeting as well.


that, "new information indica

Guatemalan military and died duringi lit

la dmitted

le had been present during the interroeation."

ccording to the MM|memorandum, Richard wasevine had been arrested by the

| Accordingemorandum,

Richard expressed doubts as to whether DoJ had jurisdiction over the case, for jurisdiction would be predicatedetermination that the murder had been intended "to coerce, mtimidate or retaliateovernment or dvilian population" under the relevant law.E

ccording to the | Jmemorandum, the CIA partidpants in the meeting expamea that there was no information mcUcating that there were any political overtones to the arrest and killing, and Richard indicated that DoJ files would have to be reviewed. Based on Richard's doubts about jurisdiction,memorandum conduded that "it is likely that Justiceursue that matter at this time, unless they have independent evidence indicating that DeVine's death was politicallyone of the partidpants have much recollection of what transpired at the meeting, but the CIA officers remember having the impression that no action would be taken with respect to Alpirez until DoJ hadecision on the matter.

The relevant law is discussed further in.

rimes Reportroposed crimes report, in the formetter from Rindskopf, had been prepared byHior provision to Richard at the Novembereeting. Accorain^o

however, Richard said that he would prefer nottotaxe the letter, and arrangements were made to hand-deliver it to Richard's office onindskopf signed the letter to Richard on Novembernd, accordingote on one of OGC's copies, it was to be hand-carried to DoJ on the morning ofh. DoJ did receive the Rindskopf letter,opy appears in the filesoJ Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section attorney, Stanley Rothstein, to whom the case was assigned by DoJ.

he Novemberetter advised DoJ that the Agency had received new information regarding DeVine's death that varied from information provided to DoJ and the FBI in0 and that _M

| may have witnessed DeVine's

ipirez, me

former commander of the Poplun base near where DeVine was killed,

present when Contreras interrogated DeVine anTnnat^TuTng the interrogation, Contrerasoncho around DeVine'soing so, the letter continued, led to DeVine's death, apparently from heart attack or suffocation. In contrast, stated the letter, the0 intelligence report that had

been disseminated to DoJ contained information!

"did not indicate he had been present at DeVine's ae

he Novemberrimes report letter was unusual in several respects when compared with normal OGC procedures for handling crimes reports. It was signed by the General Counsel instead of the Deputy General Counsel to whom crimes reporting responsibilities had been assigned. It specifically named the individual, Alpirez, who may have engaged in criminal conduct instead of referring only to "an individual" or "asset" and providing

og maintained by the other DoJ representative at this meeting indicates that, onherimes report from CIA and provided it to Mark Richard the following day. No connection between this report and Guatemala has been established.

on or about

specific identification of the individual only in response to follow-up inquiries by DoJ attorneys. It did notrimes log number of the type normally used within OGC for tracking referrals to the Department. Inpecific reference toumber was edited

out of the draft that had been prepared by

In addition, the letter was unusual in that it included sensitive information concerning Agency sources that is not even normally included in intelligence reports and was not included in the0 and1 intelligence disseminations. The letter acknowledged that it contained sensitive source information beyond that provided to the Department and FBI through intelligence channels "because the Agency believes the sources' lives could be at risk were it revealed that they had provided information to. Government which implicated Guatemalan military officers in the death oflso, OGC crimes reports are normally made only in writing. In this case, Richard was briefed personally about the case.

OGC attorneys who were involved explain that these departures from normal crimes reporting practice occurred because OGC wanted to make sure that the report and its significance did not escape that the matter "was purposely not handledormal crimes report. It wasarden variety report, and there were concerns it might disappear off Doj's screen" if processed normally. Thus, says( t was decided to stick the report in front of Doj's noseirect meeting and to have Rindskopf sign the report."


easons for Reporting to Pol. The allegations regarding Alpirez were shared with DoJ because they indicated his possible involvement in DeVine's death,

Isays the matter was reported to DoJ even though the

requirement tor such action under existing guidelines for crimes reporting was "questionable because there was no potential tie to the Unitedhe report in this case, according to| done

nder) of Executive, CIA is required to"'Ir|eport to the Attot Ceneral possible violations of federal criminal law by employees and of specified federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures" approved by the Attorney


more out of caution than basedudgment that the matter met the relevant thresholds.

ol Report and Notice to Congress. No evidence has been found to indicate that the crimes report was usedasis for not reporting the information to the congressional intellij committees.

He initially theorized that Agency lawyers "may have asked us to hold off and not tell Congress" until DoJ considered the matter.

(stresses that he did not specifically recallequest but was extrapolating from the coincidence that the matter was reported to DoJ in1 at roughly the same time the information was being considered for reporting to the intelligence committees. Upon reflection,believes that this theory is not valid since he recalls no discussion of going to DoJ and not telling Congress. Moreover, even if DoJ had not wanted the information reported to the committees for fear that it might be made public and

that concern would have to reporting to the committees in March

General. Those procedures specify that such reports should be made when the conduct in question may violate laws related to international terrorist activity.

hen DoJ advised that it had no interest in pursuing thenow believes that any failure to inform the Congress is because the matter simply fell between the cracks because of intervening events.

None of the other Agency officers who were involved, including OGC attorneys, believes that reporting to DoJ was used to justify not reporting lo the intelligenceuestions whether there would be any additional risk in informing the committees once the information was disseminated outside the Agency and shareclwith DoJ, and "can't conceive of telling DoJ and not the B'-*ys that the Agency did not report the October ^information to DoJretext to avoid reporting it to Congress, the State Department, or the Ambassador.

None of the OGC personnel who were involved, includingdiscussions with anyone in the Agency or DoJ regarding congressional notification.

remembers LA Division intentions "early on" that Congressshould be briefed regarding the1 allegations about Alpirez, but he did not participate in those discussions."

No evidence has been found that Ambassador Stroock or the State Department were advised that theabout Alpirez had been the subjectrimes report to DoJ. Stroock says that "he was not told the first thing about what had been toldhat DoJ was looking into, or what its responsetroock considers it to haveserious error" on the Agency's part not to have advised him of this. However, Stroock thinks that "the mistake may have been made at Headquarters instead of the field."

PpT Consideration of the Crimes Report. No record has been found to indicate that the results of the1 meeting with DoJ were communicated to the Station. Agency officers

"The Oclober Mil legations about Alpirezere not shared with the Inspector General and. in the viewof Rindskopf, probably should have been.

acknowledge that information may have been communicated by telephone or by officers traveling to or from the Station.

say that there

was nothing significant to report to the Station until DoJecision in the case.

initially had to determine whether it wouldin the case. This determination depended, in part, onThe relevant terrorism statute.2 ofmakesederal crime toational of the. national is outside the United States inIn order to prosecute, however, the Attorneycertify that the killing was "intended to intimidate,ivilianuch an Attorneycan be difficult to makease where there is nomotive, and it depends heavily on the facts.

he did not know how long DoJto rnaKeadecision, but his impression was that the Agency

nd, thus, there was noecalls that, following theeeting with >oj, he discussed the status of the DoJ review with Rothsteinmple of Bi* otes on1 that appear to refer to oneonhese conversations:

Stanley Rothstein Dol DeVine

Earlier report0 => Who received -

US. Citizen who hehat he was doing

ole in previous information

I remGmbers that Rothstein had troubleopy of the0 dissemination at DoJ

e these elements.


_ Rothstein had also asked what else the Agency knew about the DeVine killing and the possible involvement of Guatemalan guerrillas. I with LA Division but found little to add to what had already been provided to DoJ regarding the DeVine case. Rothstein was also seeking information from the FBI and recalls some difficulties in communicating with FBI personnel who knew something about FBI activities in the DeVine case.

says that heopy of the NovemberRindskopf crimesreport letter and recalls only onewith | hat conversation, accordingwas mereT^oestablish contact with the Agencyas responsible in the crimes report letter. Rothsteinother telephone conversation with He also recallswith Agency personnel concermn^DoJ's ultimatethe case, although he acknowledges that the subjecteeting he attended at CIA Headquarters at which

have been present.37

Response to the Crimes Report. On Marchmonths after the Alpirez report was brought to Doj'sadvised the Station that:

gency entry/exit records, which are often fragmentary and incomplete, indicate only one visit by Rothstein to CIA Headquarters1 and none1 visit was in September, well before the October report and the November meeting.


ccording to Headquarters' officers, this Headquarters instruction was based upon an oral discussion between ^Hand a

DoJ representative. No record has been found in DoJ or Agency filesritten DoJ response to the crimes report, butremembers an oral discussion with someone at DoJ on this subject and believes that discussion probably formed the basis for the Marchessage. According to | he conversationoJ representative that he recalls may have taken place by telephone oreeting at Headquarters on another case to which Rothstein was invited. Others in OGC and LA Division,he Headquarters officer who sent the Marchessage, recall learning at the time that clearance to act had been received from DoJ.

(does not recall being told that DoJ hadecision or that the case was closed. Instead, I Hat first recalled the DoJ representative saying that the FBI hadTeenconsulted and

: there would be no sequently, (says that it is possible that the DoJ representative did not1 >U' I e impressiorRrunMne^gency coulagoahead and undertake any further action it believed was appropriate. I (says that the discussion most likely was with Rothstein, Dutitcould have been with one of Rothstein's DoJ supervisors. The DoJ supervisor has no recollection ofonversation. Rothstein does not recall discussing DoJ's decision on the case with (and says that he would not have approved Agency actionM

(without discussing the matteT^^uTT^WplrvSorsrNo oncTrHuscnain of command at the time recalls discussing such an issue. I (says that he most likely would have: the Hcadquartersofficer who sent the Marchessage to the Station about his conversation with DoJ, but ( (would not necessarily have reviewed the message before it was sent.

Why Did It Take DoT Four Months to Respond? Thefour month period that elapsed before DoJ responded to the1 crimes report does not appear unduly lengthy to the OGC personnel who were involved. I (does not consider DoJ's response to have been dilatory orsIowTand he says that, "for what [DoJ] had to do, it movedsays that, "in [my] experience with DoJ, four months is not an unusual waitther OGC personnel involved in sending crimes reports to DoJ indicate that four monthselatively good response timease that DoJ does not decide to pursue.

Rindskopf recalls that CIA was eager to report the matter to DoJ as soon as possible, but "there was no great urgency for DoJ to get back to us, and Mark [Richard] probably knew this.'T

Rindskopf says that no one at theeeting expected that DoJ would have to resolve the issue in the near term I


othstein says he had no discussion anyone else at CIA mcUcating that the Aj

'as awaiting an

answer trom DoJ. Rothstein says that if he knew CIA required an early answer, he would have made theigher priority. I

onversation with Rothstein regarding the DeVine case onut its purpose is obscure, [notes of that date include the following:

Stan Rothstein DeVine

Hdoes not believe the notes indicate that the Doj review oHne^Cpue^crimes report had not yet been concluded. Rothstein's noteseference2 visit from an FBI agent, and he believes this visit may have had something to do with therimes report from CIA. If Rothstein's recollection is correct, this meeting would indicate continuing DoJ interest in the1 allegations about Alpirez months after the Agency believed it was told by DoJ) that it planned to take no further action.

Dof Referral Chronology

9 August I

is killed.

CIAissemination to State, Do; and others describing the visit ofmilitary surveillance team to Poptun the day before DeVineGovernment attempts to covcr-up its involvei


Station forwardseVine had been brought to

the Tophin base where he died during interrogation and that Alpirez hadIndescribed Alpirez as an extremely riolent man

who had murdered guernUa prisoners in the past and had recently engaged in birarrej behavior such as walking through the town where he was stationed, exposing himscb and firing weapons into the air.


Octoberctober 24


disseminates October ^legations to DoJ's Command Center, FBI,

[NovemberCounsel Rindskopfrimes report to DoJ.

(DecemberRothstein consults by phone with OGC on the


conclusions set forth below are repeated inrelating to Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca,

Agency Purposes in Guatemala

Complicity in Deaths of DeVine and Bamaca

evidence has been found to indicate that anyhad prior knowledge of, directed, participated in,the interrogation or killing of DeVine. No evidencefound to indicate that any CIA employee had priordirected, participated in, or condoned the reportedor killing of Bamaca.


1 report alleging that Alpirez,present at DeVine's interrogation was seriouslyhave been reviewed more thoroughly at the Stationwith appropriate caveats. Neither theerious effort to verify the allegations contained


in the1 report and Headquarters did not follow-up sufficiently on its initial efforts to have the Station do so.

imilarly, the5 report alleging that Alpirez had killed Bamaca was also based on questionable information and should have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and disseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor Headquarters made serious efforts to verify that report and Headquarters did not encourage the Station to do so.

Congressional Notification

Agency should have notified theoversight cornmittees in1 aboutthat Alpirez had been present at an interrogationin the deathtizenM

The committees should have been briefed, especially in light of tneprompt and serious actions the Agency took on the basis of that

report, in reporting to DoJ

( LA Division officers intended to provide such nofficauornothecorrunittees, but neither those officers nor senior Agency managers ensured that this was done.

he oversight committeesnotified of the only report alleging that Alpirez hadfor the death of Bamaca. While notification wasshould have been made clear that there were competing versionshappened to Bamaca, and that the5 reportthird-hand hearsay, and unconfirmed. Furthermore, whenbecome dear in4 that there wasin Bamaca's fate, formal notification of thelpirez had interviewed Bamaca I

Ishould have occurrj

t should have

fen recognized that the failure to provide this information in connection with the discussion of the DeVine case

be viewed ascommittees. No evidence has been found to indicate thatto mentionthese reports,

hearings and briefings was intended to mislead the committees. Neither has any evidence been found to indicate that the failures to notify the committees4 of information indicating that Alpirez had interviewed Bamaca or

_ 'ere intended to mislead the


Ambassadorial Notification

he Station did not keep the Ambassadors appropriately informed in certain instances. Concerns about source protection and possible threats to Agency equities in its liaison relationships appear to have been the causes of some of these failures.

Stroock was not properly notified in

provided information about the military's involvement and cover-up in the DeVine killing and was preparing toemarche.

Stroock was not properly notified inwhen allegations were of DeVine.

mbassador McAfee was not properly notifiedven after asking in4omplete summary of CIA intelligence relating to Bamaca, that Alpirez had reportedly interviewed Bamaca after his capture in

Collection and Reporting Standards

nformation provided by Agency assets was responsiveand included significant reportingrights issues in Guatemala, including the DeVinefate, and the reactions of

political and military officials. policy initiatives in this regard.


owever, in certain instances, concerns about source protection or possible threats to Agency equities in its liaison relationships appear to have been the cause of failures to report information fully and promptly.I

tation reporting regarding human rightsports from possibly biased sourcesas well as the DeVine and Bamaca cases. The

Station, LA^rvTsTmam the DO should have made stronger efforts to validate the information and place it in the context of other reporting, analyze the biases and motivations of the sources, and ensure that consumers of the information were advised that there were significant questions about its validity and hearsay nature. It also appears that LA Division and the Station gave insufficient attention and consideration to the possibility that Station asset reporting on Bamaca's fate was based upon deliberately false information I

he Station and LA Division failed to meetparticular reference to

the assets who provided key information relating to Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca,!


Relationship with Alpirez

he0 informationa

substantial part of whatuatemalan involvement in DeVine's killing. It also served as part of the basis for at least. Government demarche to the Guatemalans and the partial suspension. military assistance to Guatemala.

Referral to Department of Justice

A Division and OGC acted prudently inrompt referral of the1 allegations about Alpirez to DoJ. However, OGC should have probed more thoroughly to determinereliminary inquiry whether or not there [was] any basis to the allegations. In addition, having made the referral, OGC did not properly record or monitor the matter, or adequately respond to DoJ requests for further information.

Analytical Responsibilities

o factual basis has been identified for the Dll

TJoncIusion in an analysis presented to the NSC in5 pirez was at least "the intellectual author" of Bamaca's death. That analysis was also flawed becauseI

primary responsibility cers of the4 report that

had interviewed

not made


Bamaca or that Alpirez reportedly present at the interrogation of DeVine.onsequence, he was not able to include that information in briefings to senior State officials and HPSCI and SSCI staff members in4 or inBfrnalytic reports that were disseminated to the Ambassador and NSC and State customers prior to

reports have been found that allege that Alpirezof or was involved in narcotics trafficking orunlawful activities. None of these reports establishes any

connection between narcotics trafficking and the DeVine murder, nor does any of them indicate that the murder had as its purpose coercion or intimidation of, or retaliationovernment or civil population. Neither has other evidence been found to indicate that Agency employees were aware ofonnection or purpose. Thus, there is no support for the contention that Agency employees engaged in an obstruction of justice in connection with the1 referral to the Department of Justice.

Dispersal or Destruction of Records

evidence has been found to indicate that anydispersed or destroyed records to prevent them fromby investigators. It appears that this allegation mayits source in an Agency effort to provide copies ofto former DCIs in order that they might be able toto public inquiries relating to Guatemala.

DO Records System


eneral. The following areas have been identified in the course of this investigation as requiring the attention of Agency management and are addressed in this section:

Congressional notification;

Ambassadorial notification;

Selection of Chiefs of Station;

Collection and reportinguman rights reporting;

Analytical functions; and

DO records syslem.

he paragraphs that follow constitute the IG's best judgment as to what should be done in each area, but we recognizeanagement review of the issues involved may develop different and better approaches to improving current practices and policies in each area. The most important message we are conveying is that the identified areas require management's attention and remedial action. Thus, these recommendations should be viewedramework for further deliberation and development of responsive reactions in each area, notrescriptive list of actions that should be taken as stated. However, we strongly believe that the Overview Volume, with Conclusions and all Recommendations except the individual accountability section, should be made available to Agency employees in order that they may be fully informed and apply the lessons of this investigation to their own situations.

ongressional Notification. This investigation has shown that in the DO thereredisposition against sharing information with Congress despite repeated statements by the Agency's leadership that Congress needs information to perform its oversight role and has the right to such information. The DDO should work to replace this biasredisposition that favors sharing information.

The DO should reaffirm that the Agency has an obligation to ensure that the Congress is kept fully and currently informed about Agency activities. The Director should make it clear that each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office is responsible for detenruning,ontinuing basis, which matters within their areas of responsibility should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. Clear procedures should be established to ensure that such matters are reported.

Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office, in conjunction with the General Counsel and the Director of Congressional Affairs, should recommend criteria for the DCI's approval that are applicable to their areas of responsibility to govern which matters will be reported to the intelligence oversight committees.

Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office should require their managers to reviewontinuing basis which matters within their areas of responsibility meet the established criteria for reporting to the intelligence oversight committees. In addition, each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office shouldormal quarterly review of their activities to determine which matters, within or in addition to the established criteria, should be reported to the intelligence oversight cornmittees. As part of this process all employees should be given the opportunity to identify matters that should be considered for such reporting.


ollection and Reporting Responsibilities. Both Headquarters and Stations are responsible for ensuring that the highest possible standards are maintained in CIA's collection anc reporting efforts. ^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

Analytical Functions. DI analysts responsible for producing finished intelligence and conducting briefings of government policymakers should be givenertains to their areas of responsibiUty.TieuUisnoulo^staDu standards that ensure that DI analysts consider all relevanl information so that inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete statements are not incorporated into DI intelligence products or briefings.

DO Records System. The DO should intensify its efforts to ensure that Headquarters and Station personnel are supportedecords and information management system that will provide thorough, dependable and timely access to all information of relevancearticular individual or

ccountability. This investigation has established that there is no basis for several of the most significant allegations that have been made against the Agency and its employees relating to its activities in Guatemala. Unfortunately, the investigative and political furor that was launched with these allegations and that has consumed much of. Government's valuable time and energy for the past several months could have been avoided or reduced if Agency employees had performed more capably in reporting the events in question.

A review of Agency activities relating to the Alpirez,eneral failure to adhere to the professional standards in collecting, reporting and analysis that the Agency expects from its personnel. The causes of this are puzzling. It may be that closer scrutiny or higher standards are now being imposed on the workforce. There are many possible explanations which we will not venture here.

Whatever the reason, from recruitment to reporting; from corroboration to processing; from validation to analysis; from

congressional notification to crimes referral, the facts demonstrate performance that is not as professional or competent or sound in its judgments as the Agency and the US. Governmentight to expect. It is not that anyone engaged in intentional wrongdoing, but that so many errors were committed along the way. Agency management also must be faulted for the failures of Agency personnel that are identified in this Report of Investigation.

any officers contributed to the problems and shortcomings described in this Report, but certain officers had special responsibilities and played significant roles that separate them from the rest. Although there is no evidence to indicate that they were involved in the specific events under review here, the level of professionalism that prevailed in the Agency must ultimately be laid at the feet of the most senior Agency managers, DCIs and DDCIs during this period. In addition, the names of individual officers who should be held responsible for specific deficiencies have been provided to the Director for his consideration and action.

Frederick P. Hitz

Inspector General


Original document.