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The Technical Base: Pakistan's Nuclear Prograa
20. Pakistan's nuclear program had its beginning with tho establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Comraisslcn <PAEC) Under th* Pakistan Ministry of Science and Technoligy, the commission was geared to basic nuclear research, the use of radioisotopes, and the eventualof nuclear power. In the PAEC was placed
directly under the then President Bhutto. When Bhuttobecame Prime Minister, the commission wasto bis new office. It is now under General Zia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). The PAEC is made up of four full-time members under the chairmanship of Munir Khan.
The principal research center of PAEC activities
the-Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology
at Islamabad, constructed in..the. The central element of this research centeregawatt (thermal) pool type reactor of American design, similar to
in Iran, Israel and the OS. It is fueled with highly enriched uranium supplied by the OS under safeguards. The reactor is used for isotopa production, neutron physics experiments and for training reactor.
tha capability toaximumrams' of plutonlumi per year. PIHSTBCH alsoumber of pilot facilities which reportedlyaboratory-scale facilityeprocessing irradiated reactor fuel.
22. The only operating powerthe only ioutcb of sizable quantities ofat the Karachi Nuclear.Power.Plant (KAT1UPP). This plantauaDO-type, heavy water moderated, natural uranium fueled %reactor built by Canadian General Electric. All of the fuel and theons of heavy water foreactor were supplied by Canada. It went into full commercial operation in2 and nowegawatts "ofr, aboutercent of the power needs of the city of Karachi. There have been'problems involving corrosion of heat exchangers resulting inloss of heavy water, and the replenishment of
tha heavy water inventory hasof some concern.
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perated at normal ratings, the RANUPPreactor should produce_aboutcilogrumu of reactor-grade plutonlum per year. If it were operatedode optimized for production of weapons gradethe detriment of power production and'at'the cost of greatly increased fuelcould produce betweenilograms of reactor-grade plutonlum are now in the spent fuel rods
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that arc awaiting disposition in KANUPP's cooling pond. None
of this Plutonium will bo available for useevice until
fuel'reprocessing facilities are.
*dT3fr-cme' r ct Hew fuel for the KANUPP reactor will be required
by the summer The fuel waa to have been supplied by
Canada but in late6 Canada terminated its nuclear
cooperation program with Pakistan. At about the same time,
Pakistan announced that negotiations had begun with Niger
for the purchase of uranium which is to be fabricated into
fuel possibly bya third country. Niger has told other -
prospective uranium buyers that initial shipments could not
begin|
-.If cirly delivery is possible, and
if fabrication into :Xuel-assemblies can be arranged, .Pakistan will.have an immediate alternative to Caxiadian-supplied uracil
for r?-
25. When Canada cutoff its aid, the major nuclear facili-
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ties in Pakistan had all beon turnkeyand *
commissioned by foreign personnel with little domestic Pakistan had depended on Canada for heavy water, fuel, spare parts and emergency repairs' for the KANUPP reactor,'
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Reactor-grade plutonium is "dirty plutoniumith high ontent) -producedower. reactor In normal operation. It can be used in weapons, but is not Ideally suited to that..
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on the OS for enriched uranium for the PINS TECH research reactor, and mainly-on the OS and Western Europe for the advanced1 training-of nucleari th/continued nuclear aid from western suppliers"in jeopardy, Pakistan turned to China for aid. In latat asked China for fuel, technology and spare parts to keep the KANOPP reactor operating and for nuclear material (plutoniuxa)
in the event.the reprocessing plant were not built.
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It "is unlikely that China will agree to furnish plutonlum/ but we cannot rule out the possibility that it will help Pakistan to keep tbe KANOPP reactor operating. China hasperience^inperation^of heavy water reactors and would not beosition to provide CAN DO- type equipmentefuelingf
the need arose. The Pakistani need for heavy water and fuel
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rods probably could be mat by the Chineao, but tbe fuel rods
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would call for some research and development work beforehand.
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Bat the exact status of current Chinese-Pakistani nuclear
collaboration remains unknown.
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The Pakistanis'haveT longrsought'anT'Indigin"ou3 ' -
7
supply of uranium'.'- -'Their'efforts have apparently"ucc.ss>lAbuWW
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the DaaV
Ghazi Kian"District in western Punjab, were reportedons of uraniun ore. Though this nay be ofcommercial value, it could be sufficient toreactor. Xn addition the Pakistanis haveprogress in fuel fabrication and couldlantby late-:
Pakistan has also undertaken negotiations with various foreign countries for purchase and installation of facilities for nuclear fuel fabrication and heavy water production, as well as for fuel reprocessing. If these plants arend this isif Pakistaneliable source of uranium, it would have attained the complete nuclear fuel cycle for natural uranium power reactors such as the one .mow at Karachi. (See the figure) .
The ability of developing countries to purchase full fuel cycles without arousing concern among supplier countries, however, has greatly diminished since the Indian nuclear test. Time and effort expended on negotiation will be greatly increased
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Pakistan.
f che 4coun tryThe' ono-ncar-'prNSTECH-ls -mi I
cllffe"the-design" stage'Awhile <irou.id has been-broken
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and safeguards will be much stricter than in the past. All major facilities acquired henceforth by Pakistan will almost certainly entail safeguard agreements forbidding use of their products in any nuclear explosive device.
The French Fuel Reprocessing Plant and Alternative Sources of Plutonium
Pakistani'-efforts'toeprocessing facility began shortly after completion-of the KANUPP reactor and were- intensifiedfollowing the Indian nuclear explosion. An agreement was finally reached with France in5 toafeguarded plantesign capacityons of fuel per yoar Wing the solvent extraction process. If built, it would bo capable of reprocessing natural uranium (CANOU-type fuel and also the slightly enriched
uranium fuel used in the types of power reactors planned for
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future construction. The plant was originally scheduled to
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go into operation in the, and construction based
on drawings already transferred has begun on the main processing
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buildingite near the Chasma dam in the north West Frontier Province. Both countries originally approved the sale of the reprocessing plant and obtained the sanction of the IAEA.
31. However, the odds appear to be sharply increasing that the plant will not be completed^ at least according to original specification,_in_the:.foreseeeble future. -The-governaent-of'France has shown an increasing reluctance to build the plant as it was originallyaris has since suggestedJ cop recessing" or "apparentprocessing"'technique which would produce-
*r ixture of plutoniua and uraniua which Is not suitable for weapons use. But the Pakistanis might, in time, be able to develop an additional (and unsafeguarded) facility which could separate tho plutonium
and make it available for nuclear explosions.
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The present Pakistani martial law administration has strongly resisted these iFr en ch suggestions fornd it does have some limited-leverage over tho French. The reprocessing plant is partarger package of French sales to Pakistan including, besides the reprocessing plant, civilian and military aircraft, tbe Chasraa nuclear powerruck plantolor TV system. On the one hand, the French originally insisted that Islamabad take the entire package; on the other, the Pakistanis threaten to cutoff purchase of everything if the deal for the reprocessing plant does not go through.
Pakistani military rulers would alnostto give up the prospect of getting Frenchbut could well-sacrificeolor'TVa luxury the country-cannot now'afford. Other French
Items would probably be bought or not bought on their individual merits; And if the French do-renege-on theirlant agreement, they are not likely to be in much'of'apposition to oh ject to selective elimination off other iteres" in' the package.
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economic justification foreprocessing
plant has always been questionable even were the reactors for the Chasma nuclear power project to be built. The reason given for acquiring the-plant is that-it will be needed in thend that it-is :cheaper to build it now. The certainty that Pakistan will be unable to meet its ambitious goals for nuclear power'reactorsdds to the argument against embarkingeprocessing venture at this time. -'
the.capacity of the proposed plantlarger than would be required to process KANOPPnormal power operation, it is of an appropriate size
to handle the KAP3PP output If the reactor should be opertedanner to maximize the production of weapons grade Plutonium. This does not necessarily lead to tho conclusion that the reprocessing plant is intended for weapons use but it is certainly suggestive fo such use.
36. If built, the reprocessing; plant is tf berilateral (IAEA-France-Pakistan) safeguardt-forbidding the use oi tho product in making nuclearlosives or the transfer of French technology to unsafeguarded facilities.' When negotiations" beganrance haded that little or no safeguarding would be required on the sale but, influenced by the Indian nuclear explosion and 'the increased concern" on tbe part of all suppliers about the spread of nuclear weapons, Paris're-evaluated its stand and decided more stringent'safeguards were necessary. Pakistan originally resisted but France held firm on its decision.
.Both of Pakistan's currently operating reactors are safeguarded by the IAEA, as is the enriched uranium used for fabrication into booster rods for tho Pakistani KANUPP (power) reactor and the enriched uranium used in the PIMSTECH (research) reactor. There are, however, loopholes in the language defining the end use of supplied materials for these reactors. Specifically, the agreements only prohibit military uses and do not prohibit all nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan could seize on this, as India did, topeaceful- nuclear explosion using safeguarded material. The agreement the French and Pakistanis have concluded for the reprocessing plant, on the other hand, includes language prohibiting the use of roproccssed material in any nuclear
explosive device", "itrohibition on tho
replication of the of. the reprocessing facility or any of its equipment or technology forears.
are major difficulties, however, inany reprocessing facility, unlike power orthe'design of each reprocessing plant isnecessitates tho determination of safeguardsthattime-consuming process thatpersonal inspection. n addition, the IAEAbefore been called upon to safeguard Compounding the problem "of the"plant's design,is the IAEA's general lack of experience in the area
of reprocessing eafeguards. Short;of round-the-clockphysical inspectioneprocessing plant it is questionable whether safeguardingacility is really effective. Because the time between diversion of plutonium and its conversion into nuclear*weapons"could be sharply reducedountry were determined toolicy of diversion, nuclear weapons could already be assembled before an effectivereaction could be mustered.
Pakistan opts to'pursue'a series nuclearit will need the Prench reprocessing plant or The Prench believe that the Pakistanis have
the know-bow end enough of the plans and drawings to complete and operate the plant on their own. Other experts. Including Aneriean area, do not think that this is the case, and that dependence on the French will continue for many years.
a plant is not the only conceivable source
of plutoniumingle nuclear device test,he Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology probablyaboratory-scale fuel reprocessing facility. Pakistan might thusthis is unlikely (see below)o produce sufficient plutonium using manual methods In this or some similar installation. The facility in question was designed to produce only grass per day, but with modifications might serve to produce sufficient plutoniumingle nuclear device in roughly the same time scale considered for the reprocessingt sometime in ths first half of. Should this occur, however, Pakistan would still bo many years from developing tho reprocessing ability enabling lt to stockpile weapons.
the authorities in Islamabad areaware thatingle device withoutfurther stockpile of fissionable material would bedangerous step. However much it would enhance
Pakistan's prestige, in the eyes of Pakistanis, it would also alarm the Indianstheirsome kind of response. By thendia will have large quantities of unsafeguarded plutoniumroven ability to setuclear explosion. This is not to say that India would automatically embarkeapons program, largeor small, but the odds in favor of-its doing so would be greatly enhancedakistani test. And were India to do so, Islamabad could not counterrogram of itsthereby enhancing India's strategic superiority even further.
43. Thus the acquisition of facilities which would enable Islamabad quickly to respond to an Indian weapons program with one of its own becomes an inescapable corollary of any nuclear explosive plan. As ofTench-Paklstani negotiations as the matter were continuing, and could well do so far some time. Were Pakistan to be unable to get the reprocessing olant from Prance, the odds favoring any sort of explosive program on its part would sharply diminish.
43. For this reason, Islamabad could conceivably Opt tomall crude reprocessing facility on its own. There have been descriptions In the open literature of such "quick and dirty" installations. Most if not all-the" needed materials
are available on the open market. Dnder optimum conditions the facility could be builtew months and could then produce several^kilocrams of.plutonium afor severalan extremely brief period. But the technical skills of the Pakistanis are probably.still too rudimentary.to permit any such early success. For at least the next.five years,-and possibly much longer,acility will-likely remain beyond their reach.
The Pakist*ni Nuclear Outlook
Despite the absence of detailed and specificcurrent reporting appears to reflect not merely an absenceense of urgencyakistani willingness to give its- total nuclearelatively lower priority than did its predecessor.
General Zia's Martial Law Administration has declared it will continue allects begun by its predecessor; it affirms it wants the French to honor its original agreement
toeprocessing plant. But it insists itemporary government and will not make any new or longer term commitments. This may even extend to the Chasma nuclear power plant, whose estimated costs have skyrocketed, possibly to the point that thethe whole ambitiousear powerbo scrapped.
too may its efforts touclearor even to setingle, non-repeatablefinds that it can no longer expect to acquireof processing more than token amounts of plutonium.
The Incentives for Pakistan to "go nuclear" remain as potent as ever, but its capabilities to do so have been put much more in doubt thanear ago.
sum, and despite our unawareness of sane facets
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of the Pakistani nuclear program, the available data pointsudgment thatery crude Pakistani nuclear device is probably many years away. ix of lack of scientific know how, likely absence of and inability to acquire critical reprocessing facilities capable of producing usable plutonium, severe financial problems, fearery active Indian response,ontinued uncertain political atsosphare all increase the odds against Pakistan goingfor the next decade or longer.
a change in the above adversePakistan can acquire more than token amounts ofgreatly enhance the likelihood of Islamabad's seekinga nuclear option.
Original document.
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