Introduction_and Surmary
1. Pakistan is strongly motivated to develop atotential nuclear capability, in part for orestiee purpose but more strongly because it genuinely believes its national security could ultimately be threatened by India. ecision made by any subsequent Pakistani leader touclear capability will be strongly suppor'by the ailitary sector, tho most important power center in Pakistan, and by the populace in general. But at present there is no visible sense of urcency about the matterecision to proceed eay be postponed for many years.
2. Pakistan has already undertaken cerrain actions which could giveuclear option.
--it negotiated the purchase from Pranceacility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuel into plutonium suitable for weapons. Were this facility, as originally planned, to be completed (and this becoming increasingnd wore Pakistan willing to violate safeguards, this would enable it to obtain the plutonium neededumber of nuclear device*;.
r
It hasuclear device design organization within the Atomic Energy Coitanission specifically charged with ensuring that Pakistan will beosition toeviceinal decision is made to do so.
3. Delivery of the reprocessing plants components has been delayed and may well be altered or even cancelled. If it is built, the plant can begin to produce plutonium from irradiated fuel of the KANUPP rector, Pakistan's only operating nuclear power unit, at some tine in the, possibly as early As ofegotiations with France over this plant were continuing and may do so for some -ime. If the plant is not built, laksitan -nay be able to use manual methods to produce sufficient plutoniumingle device in roughly the same time scale, but is unlikely to do so. It might also try tomali, crudefacility on its own which, when completed, could quickly produce enough plutonium for several devices. But tho technical skills of tho Pakistanis on probably still too rudimentary to permitrly success inenture over at least the next five years and possibly much longer.
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4. akistani nuclear design group now appears to be operatingelatively low priority. Even so, it can probablyrsignimple low-yield fission device by the time plutonium becomes available. Thus, If the option is pursued, Pakistan coulduclear device in hand cor-ceivably as early as tho first part of, tarring an unexpected wirdfall of fissionableevice earlier than that is unlikely.
5. There are various foms of penalties Pakistan sightwere it touclear. One would be the reduction in nuclear assistanco from Western supplier countries, which woulr1 further cripple IslamaDad's lagging power program.
robably more important, were Pakistan toevice without being able to erctoarkeapons program, such could well leaddoes have thatto develop nuclear weapons on its own--thereby tilting tho military balance oven more strongly against Pakistan. Acquisition of an effective reprocessing capability is thus critical in Islamabad's decision making and is likely to determine whether it goes nuclear or not.
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Pakistan has announced an asoitious but inflated nuclear power program with an ultimate goal of self-sufficiency in electric power. For tho foreseeable future, however, it will be dependent on foreign suppliers even for the operation of ita present, minimal program, let alone its expansion. Thus for many years to come Pakistan willhoice between forego its nuclear device option or foregoing much of its projected nuclear power plans.
t supplies of fuel for the KAN1JPP reactor near Karachi, will be exhausted by the suraner Fakistan was dependent on Canada for re-supply cf fuel for this reactor
and also for the spare parts and heavy water which it will require. These have now ail been cutoff by the Canadian government. The Pakistanis have discovered uranium in the Western Punjab and apparently canuel fabrication plant in operation by ons of uranium were reported mined and refined there. Islamabad also approached Niger in an attempt to obtain uranium. It has asked the People's Republic of China to assist in the fabrication of the fuel rods and to supplant Canadaupplier of heavy water and spare parts. Whether China will be both able and
willing to ccnply with this request is not known. Even if it does provide support for the KAJJOPP reactor the PRC cannot fulfill Pakistan's long-range nuclear power plans.
9. If Pakistan doeseprocessing plant, it could then proceed touclear device ortockpile of weapons. There is ofreat difference between the development and testingimple nuclear device and the developmentuclear weapons system, which wouldboth relatively sophisticated nuclear designs and an appropriate delivery system. The price of the former in terns of financial costs and drain on technical resources would be minimal; the price of the latter would be great by Pakistaniprobe">ly manageable, particularly with outside help. The simplestarge aircraft bomb design, would probably require atears from the date of the demonstration dovice. In terms of delivery systems presently available to Pakistaneapons could beonly by the obsolescent, highlyakistan has no capability for Indigenous production or either aircraft or missiles. Aircraft it might acquire from abroad .or missiles it might ultimately develop on its own would entail
development of more sophisticated bortos or warheads which, while not necessarily beyond Pakistan's capabilities, would entail great investments in time, technical resources,ney.
10. If Pakistan acquires significant reprocessing facilities, and if it can keep the KANUPP reactor operating, it would eventually be able to produce an ample number of nuclear devices for its limited purposes.
The backlog of reactor-grade plutonium already produced by KAMI;;SSBffi^BPSfi^BB
-will also be availableeprocessing facility were acquired. (Reactor-grade plutonium is undesirable for weapons but could be used.J
the available data pointsudgment thatery crude Pakistani nuclear dovice is probably many years away. ix of shortcomings in scientific know how, likely difficulty in acquiring orcritical reprocessing facilities capable of producing usable plutoniura, domestic financial problems, fear of an active Indian response, concern over adverse reactions of major foreign powers, ontinued uncertain political
atmosphere all increase the odds against Pakistan goingfor the next decade or even longer- But acquisitionignificant reprocessing capability would change this assessment sharply.
Introduction
12. That the Pakistanis are almost unanimous in their desire to develop atuclear weapons capabilityruism. India hasuclear device andatent capability to develop an arsenal of weapons. Indian Prime Minister Desai's renunciations of further testing and of any weapons program whatsoever havo, along with continued domestic uncertainty and financial, strictures, taken muchense of urgency out of Pakistani's nuclear efforts. But that country remains essentially both fearful and emulative of India and, sooner or later, will probably work to equalize their nuclear programs.
A nuclear explosives program is not the onlyfor countering an India that hasuclear device. The Pakistanis have considered alternatives ranging from major changes in their conventional forces toguarantees. None of these alternatives appear very promising, however.
On various occasions Pakistanis have stated that an Indian nuclear advantage could be offset by strongerforces. 7 Bhutto wrote that an effective militia including all Pakistanis would be an even better deterrent than Pakistani nuclear weapons. Although some
attempts hove been irade to build up the railita organizations and military reserves since Bhutto came to power, nothing has been tried on the scale he earlier advocated. The Pakistanis do not seem interested in pursuing this alternative now.
16. Another alternative would be an increase in thend quality of Pakistan's regular military establishment. Islamabad is actively seeking military equipmentariety of sources to modernize and improve its arms inventories. Principal arms suppliers in recent years have been China, France, the US and the UK. Domestic arms production still accountsmall proportion of total military procurement, and the Pakistanis are dependent on external sources for the bulk of tneir armaments. Pakistan has drawn up an extensive shopping list, but even if it were able to obtain most of these items, they would be insufficient to alter the military balance in Pakistan's favor. Financial constraints and sales policies restrictions, in any case, are likely to hamper large-scale Pakistani acquisitions. Moreover, whatever gains Pakistan is able to make are likely to be offset by the ongoingof India's military forces.
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if
17. Nonmilitary alternativesuclsar weapons capability have also been considered, ',, Pakistanlan in the US General Assecfclyouih Asian Nuclear Weipons Free Zone. The various Pakistani drafts of this plan called for verification procedures to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but allowed for peaceful nuclear explosions. The Pakistani proposal was passed by the General Assembly but with all the nuclear power abstaining, and the resolution, wnich was reintroduced with minor changes56 and again pasted, has not been implemented. In any case, India would not likely agree to any strict verif cation procedures.
13. The major purposo of theo erabavrass India. Nevertheless, it probably represents about what the Pakistanis think they need to counter India. akistani "peaceful"the right to have such an explcsion even the right to have such anput Pakistanore nearly equal footing with India internationally, strict verification would prevent India from going anyrther toward nuclear weapons.
19. Pakistan has also sought nuclear guarantees from the great powers collectively, and individually from the US and China- Given Pakistan's disappointment with such support in past critical situations, however, any great power guarantees offered now would have to be ironclad in order to be an acceptable alternativeuclear capability. The Pakistanis have already made it clear that currentguarantees such as UN security Councilhich called for immediate action by the nuclear-weapon members of the Security Counciluclear stateonuclear state, are inadequate. Islir.abad has attempted, without success thus far, to strengthsn this guaranteeN resolution which would call or. nuclear weapons states to give assurances that they would not use their weapons against nonnuclear states.
The Technical Base: Pakistan's Nuclear Prograr.
20. Pakistan's nuclear program had its beginning with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Under the Pakistan Ministry of Science and Technoligy, the commission was geared to basic nuclear research, the use of radioisotopes, and the eventualof nuclear power. In the PAEC was placed
directly under the then President Bhutto. When Bhuttobecame Prime Minister, the commission wasto his new office. It is now under Ceneral Jia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLAJ . The PAEC is svade up of four full-time members under the chairmanship of Hunir Khan.
21. The principal research center of PAEC activities is the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology <PINSTECHJ at Islamabad, constructed in the. The central element of this research Centeregawatt (thermal) pool type reactor of American design, similar to ones in Iran, Israel and the US. It is fueled with highly enriched uranium supplied by the US under safeguards. The reactor is used for Isotope production, neutron physics experiments and for training reactor technicians. It has the capability toxinunrams of plutonium per year.
22- Tho only operating power reactor--and the only source of sizable quantities ofat the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KAI1UPP). This plantASOW-type, heavy water moderated, natural uranium fueled reactor built by Canadian General Electric. All of the fuel and thoons of heavy water for this reactor were supplied by Canada. It went into full commercial operation ln2 and now providesegawatts of electric power, aboutercent of the power needs of the city of Karachi. There have been problems involving corrosion of heat exchangers resulting inloss of heavy water, and the replenishment of the heavy water inventory hasatter of some concern.
23. Operated at normal ratings, the KANUP? reactor should produce aboutilograms of reactor-grado plutonium per year. If it were operatedode optimized for production of weapons grade plutonium--to the detriment of power production and at the cost of greatly increased fuelcould produce betweenilograms of reactor-grade plutonium are now in the spent fuel rods that are. awaiting disposition in KANUPP's cooling pond. None
of this plutoniua will be available for useevice until fuel reprocessing facilities are available.*
24. New fuel for the KANUPP reactor will be required by the summer The fuel was to have been supplied by Canada but in late6 Canada terminated its nuclear cooperation program with Pakistan. At about the same time. Pakistan announced that negotiations had begun with Niger for the purchase of uranium which is to be fabricated into fuel possibly by hird country. Niger has told other
prospective uranium buyers that initial shipments could not
begin before lyLH
If early delivery is possible, and if fabrication into fuel assemblies can be arranged, Pakistan will have an immediate alternative to Canadian-supplied uranium for fuel.
25. When Canada cutoff its aid, the major nuclearin Pakistan had all been turnkeyand commissioned by foreign personnel with little domestic Pakistan had depended on Canada for heavy water, fuel, spare parts and emergency repairs for tho KANUPP reactor.
* Reactor-grade plutonium"is "dirty'plutoniumith highontent) producedower reactor in normal operation. It can be used in weapons, but is not ideally suited to that purpose.
PAKISTAN AND THE CAN DO* REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
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Milling
Uranium Ccrtcentraifi
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Feed
Material
Production
Uranium
abrication!
Fuel
As^orb^Cs
Reactor
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) Facilities Operational
Facilities Planned
Facilities Planned,
Purchase iJegotiations.Begun
Weapons ? ; Component
SO? CCCPXT,
and safeguards will be much stricter than in the past. All major facilities acquired henceforth by Pakistan will almost certainly entail safeguard agreements forbidding use of thei: products in any nuclear explosive device.
The French Fuel Reprocessing Plant and Alternative Sources of Plutonium
An agreement vas finally reached with France in6 toafeguarded plantesign capacityons of fuel per year using the solvent extraction process. If built, it would be capable of reprocessing natural uranium (CANDU-type fuel and also the slightly enriched uranium fuel used in the types of power reactors planned for future construction. The plant was originally scheduled to go into operation in the,
Both countries originally approved the sale of tho coprocessing plant and obtained the sanction of the IAEA.
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the odds appear to be sharplythe riant will not be completed^ at least accordingspecifications, in the foreseeable future. of France has shown an increasing reluctancethe plant as it was originally designed. Parissuggestedcoprocessing" or "apparent technique which would produce
mixture of plutonium and uranium which is not suitable for weapons use. But the Pakistanis might, in time, be able to develop an additional (and unsafeguarded) facility which could separate the plutonium and make it available for nuclear explosions.
present Pakistani martial lawstrongly resisted these French suggestions forit does have some limited leverage over the French. plant is partarger package of FrenchPakistan including, besides the reprocessing plant, military aircraft, the Chasma nuclear power project,plantolor TV system. On the one hand, originally insisted that Islamabad take theon the other, the Pakistanis threaten toof everything if the denl for the reprocessingnot go through.
Pakistani military rulers would almostto give up the prospect of getting Frenchbut could well sacrifice sucholor TVa luxury the country cannot now afford, other French
items would probably be bought or not bought on their individual merits. And if the French do renege on their reprocessing plant agreement, they are not likely to be in muchosition to object to selective elimination of other items in the package.
economic justification for acquiring ahas always been questionable even were the reactorsChasma nuclear power project to be built. The reasonacquiring the plant is that it will bo needed in theand that it is cheaper to build it now. ThePakistan will be unable to meet its ambitious goals for
nuclear power reactors indds to the argument against
embarkingeprocessing venture at this time.
the capacity of the proposed plantlarger than would be required to process KANUPPnormal power operation, it is of an appropriate size
to handle the KANUPP output if the reactor should be opertedanncr'to maximize the production of weapons grade plutonium. This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the reprocessing plant is intended for weapons use but it is certainly suggestive fo such use.
built, the reprocessing plant is to betrilateral (IAEA-France-Pakistan) safeguardthe use of the product in making nuclearor the transfer of French technology to When negotiations beganrance hadthat little or no safeguarding would be requiredsale but, influenced by the Indian nuclear explosion
and the increased concern on the part of all suppliers about the spread of nuclear weapons, Paris ro-evaluated its stand and decided wore stringent safeguards were necessary. Pakistan originally resisted but France held firm on its decision.
of Pakistan's currently operatingsafeguarded by the IAEA, as is the enriched uraniumfabrication into booster rods for the Pakistani reactor and the enriched uranium used in the reactor. There are, however, loopholes indefining the end use of supplied materials for Specifically, the agreements only prohibitand do not prohibit all nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan could seise on this, as India did, to"peaceful'1 nuclear explosion using safeguarded material.
The agreement me French and Pakistanis have concluded for the reprocessing plant, on the other hand, includes language prohibiting the use of reprocessed material in any nuclear
explosive device It alsorohibition on the
replication of the of. the reprocessing facility or any of its equipment or technology forears.
18. There are major difficulties, however, inany reprocessing facility. Unlike power or research reactors, the design of each reprocessing plant Is unique, which necessitates the determination of safeguards specific co thattime-consuming process that requires extensive personal inspection. In addition, the IAEA has never before been called upon toeprocessing plant. Compounding the problem of the plant's design, is the IAEA's general lack of experience in the area of reprocessing safeguards. Short.of round-the-clock physical inspectioneprocessing plant it is questionable whether safeguardlnoacility is really offective. Because the time between diversion of plutonium and its conversion into nuclear weapons could be sharply roducodountry were determined toolicy of diversion, nuclear weapons could already be assembled before an effectivereaction could be mustered.
39. If Pakistan opts toeries nuclear weapon program, it will need the French reprocessing plant or somo equivalent. The French believe that the Pakistanis have
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the know-how and enough of the plans and drawings to complete and operate the plant on their own. Other experts, including American area, do not think that this is the case, and that dependence on the French will continue for many years.
a plant is not the only conceivable source
of plutoniumingle nuclear device test, however. The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology probablyaboratory-scale fuel reprocessing facility. Pakistan might thusthis is unlikely (see belowjto produce sufficient plutonium using manual methods in chis or some similar installation. The facility in question was designed to produce only grains per day, but with modifications might serve to produce sufficient plutoniumingle nuclear device In roughly the same time scale considered for the reprocessing plant; at sometime in the first half of . Should this occur, however, Pakistan would still be many years from developing the reprocessing ability enabling it to stocxpile woa;<ons.
tho authorities in Islamabad aroaware thatingle device withoutfurther stockpilo of fissionable material would bestep. However much it would enhance
Pakistan's prestige in the eyes of. Pakistanis, it would also
he Indians and--in theirsooe kind of
response. By the earlyndia will have large quantities
of unsafeguarded plutoniumroven ability to set off
a nuclear explosion. This is not to say that India would
if
automatically embarkeapons program, largoor small, but the odds .in favor of its doing so would be greatly enhancedakistani test. And were India to do so, Islamabad could not counterrogram of itsthereby enhancing India's strategic superiority even further.
43. Thus the acquisition of facilities Whleh would enable Islamabad quickly to respond to an Ind.in weapons program with one of its own becomes an inesca able corollary of any nuclear explosive plan. As of April 1 rench-Pakistani negotiations as the matter were cor.ning, and could well do so far some time. Were Pakist: e unable to get the reprocessing plant froa France, t: oddsiy sort of explosive program on its part would sharply diminish.
43. For this reason, Islamabad could conceivably apt tomall crude reprocessing facility on its own. There have been descriptions in the open literature of such "quick and dirty" installations. Host if not all the needed materials
arc available on the open market. Under optimum conditions the facility could be builtew months and could then produce several kilograms ofay--enough for several weapons--in an extre-nely brief period. But the technical skills of the Pakistanis are probably still too rudimentary to permit any such early success. For at least the next five years, and possibly much longer, acility will likely remain beyond their reach.
Pakistanis nuclear Weapon Potential
44. If Pakistan does acquire an ample reprocessing facility and develops an explosive device, it will probably undertake eventually to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. Howemonstration nuclear device could be translated into militarily useful weapons would dependost of variables, including the nature of constraints imposed by available delivery systems- The simplest case,ow-yield bomb designed for internal carriage in an aircraft, would probably require at least two years from the dato of adevice- If it were designed with both simplicity and reasonably high nuclear efficiency in mind,omb would be quite large, probably weighing thousands of kilograms. In terms of existing delivery systems it could be delivered only by Pakistan's relatively slow and-
45. Pakistan will be extremely limited in delivery capabUitiss for many years to come. It presently has no capability ndigenous production of either aircraft or icraft It might acquire from abroad or missiles it might ultimately develop on its own would entailOf more sophisticated bombs or warheads which, while not necessarily beyond Pakistan's capabilities, would entail great investments in time and money and place great strains
or. technical rcsourc
but it may be reasonably assumed that Pakistan could notuclear warhead suitable for deliveryallistic missile in less than fivv years from the dateesonstration device.
46. If fuel reprocessing facilities are acquired and if the KANUPP reactor can be kept in operation, Pakistan should be able eventually to produce enough Weapons for its limited purposesit proves it has the technological capability to do so. If the KANUPP reactor were operatedode to optimize production of weapons-grade plutonium it could produce betweenilograms per year.
likely to materialize io the near future. If the reactor continues to be operated primarily for power production, theeu= yearly production would be aboutilograms of reactor-grade plutonium. This material, as well asr so kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium alreadyfor lso be used but at the cost ofdesign complexity ondof yield in the resultant weapons.
For the foreseeable future Pakistan will be dependent on foreign suppliers even for the operation of its present minimal program, let alone for it3 expansion. As noted above, China may or may not be able and will to supply sufficient aid to keep theJPP reactor in Operation. China cannot, in any case, fulfill Pakistan's long-range nuclear power plans. Thus, for many years to comehoice between foregoing its nuclear device option and foregoing auch, if not all, of its projected nuclear powor plans.
Original document.
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