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The Soviet Approach to the UN Special Session 'on Disarmament
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Natkmal Forrltn Anomrnt Cmler
May IB7S
; Key Judgment* US-Soviet diplomatic exchanges on agenda matters for the coming UN Special Session on Disarmaments well as recent speeches by Soviet President Brezhnev and Party Secretary Ponomarev, Indicate that the USSR has revised both the tone and content of its approach to the SSOD. Ponomarev'spril address before the Socialist International Conference on Disarmament was notable for its emphatic justification of Soviet military and arms control policies in contrast to those of the United States and China. Brezhnev's speech onpril indicates that the Soviets will put forward two new proposals concerning conventional arms In addition to those submitted last September to thc.UN Preparatory Committee for the Special Session. Brezhnev's speech also suggests that the Soviets might be rethinking their position on security assurances to nonnuclear states.
The twoogether with the Instructions ofpril to the Soviet delegation to thc Preparatory Committee to withdraw from the drafting of Joint nuclear texts with the US and the UK for submission to the SSOD, suggest that Moscow has opted In favorore assertive approach to the SSOD, one that Is calculated to generate International support for Soviet disarmament policies and put pressure on the US to make concessions on SovietInitiatives. The likelihoodS-Soviet confrontation at the SSOD will be limited, however, by the Soviet desire to enlist US support on disarmament machinery Issues and to defend the US-Soviet record on arms control negotiations. .
The Soviet Approach to the UN Special Session
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The UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) will meet In New; York fromay untilune.
iFoflowing the Initiative by the nonaligned nations at the Colombo Conferenceormal decision to hold tbe SSOD was taken by the General Assembly Innation preparatory committee was established to draw up the terms of reference.
The call by nonaligned countries for tbe SSOD reflected both frustration over the pace of nuclear arms control negotiations to dateeneral consensus that the existing machinery for multilateral disarmament talks, both at the UN Itself and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) In Geneva, Is dominated by US and Soviet interests and is unresponsive to the concerns of the nonaligned, nonnuclear states,
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The Initial Soviet attitude toward the SSOD was relatively reserved. The Soviets did not wish toonfrontation between nuclear and nonaligned states at the SSOD, nor did they wish to see the fundamental structure of the CCD. where the United States and the USSR are cochairmen, radically altered. It was equally important to Moscow to prevent the SSOD from adopting any concrete measures, such as time limits for the resolution of particular issues, that might restrict Its freedom of action. The USSR wanted to limit the SSODiscussion of broad Issues and general guidelines for future disarmamentkeeping with the universalis! character of Soviet disarmament pronouncements.
The Soviet working papers submitted to the SSOD Preparatorylast Septemberonglomeration of Soviet disarmament proposals presented over the past several years. The draft documents were cosponsored by all of the Warsaw Pact countries except Romania.
The basic Soviet proposals for Incorporation Into the Program of Action to be drafted at the SSOD called for:
An end to the production of nuclear weapons.
Bilateral and multilateral measures to help prevent nuclear war.
Complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.
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to strengthen the non proliferation "regime."
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Regional duarmaraent measures. Including mutual reductions of armed forces and the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones, j: .,
Maintenance of the exlslting structure of International disarmament machinery. I
A World Disarmament Conference.
The Soviets and their allies alsoeparate draft declaration on disarmament that noted the existence of previous Eastern proposalsbasis for negotiations andncluding the prohibition of mass destruction weapons, no first use of nuclear weapons, and renunciation of the threat of force among states.
Soviet representatives at the United Nations subsequently made It clearroposed ban on thc neutron bomb was subsumed under thc call to end production of nuclear weapons. But, Soviet delegates assured US interlocutors, Moscow did not wish to engageonfrontation on this issue; rather, it wished "to cooperate" with thc US during the SSOD.
The professed Soviet desire for cooperation waseflection of Moscow's perception that the US and the USSRommon Interest inonfrontation at thc SSOD between nuclear and nonaligncd states. To this end. the Soviets agreed with the US and the UK to the drafting of Joint texts on nuclear disarmament issues for submission to Ihe SSOD. The most Important Issue addressed by the texts was that of negative security assurances in which thc nuclear states would pledge not to use nuclear weapons, except In self-defense, against nonnuclear states. The precise formulation of such an assurance is significant because of Western desires for flexible nuclear defense options In Western Europe and the Far East.
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The Joint texts were substantially agreed upon with thc US and the UK when, onpril, Mcecow iralructed Its delegation to lhe SSOD Preparatory Committee to withdraw from the drafting exercise. Thc sudden Soviet decision to withdraw so late In the game may have been Inactical reaction to the defectionpril of UN Under Secretary General Arkadiy Shcvchenko, who had been Involved In SSOD matters and therefore probably aware of planned Soviet tactics. It seems more likely, however, that the Shcvchenko defection served, at most,atalystecision already In the making In Moscow to revise thc Soviet approach to the SSOD.
A number of factors probably led the Soviets to revise their approach to the Special Session:
concern that the SSOD might evolveonfrontation between the nuclear haocs and haoe-noti and that the Soviets tvould be tied too clotety with the Western havev On several occasions Soviet
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y, delegates to the SSOD preparatory talks alluded to this concern, emphasizing that the Program of Action to be adopted at the SSODmust focus on conventional as well as nuclear disarmament Issues. Soviet UN Ambassador Troyanovsky, for example, told USthat tbe USSR has been urging nonaligned states tomore realistic approach'* to both the Program of Action and disarmament machinery Issues. In light of such concerns, tbe Soviets may have" reasoned that il would be wiser to put some distance between themselves and the US on nuclear issues so not to contributeonfrontation between nuclear and nonaligned states while at the same time unilaterally underscoring Soviet support for conventionalmeasures., j
An opportunistic assessment that the US has been put on the defensive on the issue of nuclearrimarilyesult of the Soviet campaign against the neutron bomb. The Soviets will undoubtedly continue their vehement campaign against the neutron bomb at the SSOD and are reportedly working behind the scenes to orchestrate World Peace Council demonstrations during the SSOD to protest US production of neutron weapons. The lure of propaganda and tactical diplomatic gain therefore may have contributedoviet judgment that the nuclear dlsarmpmcnt issue could be manipulated to Soviet advantage,
A perception that the SSOD might be used to. emphasize the legitimacy of the USSR's military policies in light of the dual nuclear and conventional threat to its Western and Eastern frontiers, and to castigate Peking for its refusal to engage in internationaltalks. This point was underscored by Politburo candidate and party secretary Boris Ponomarev in his Helsinki speech onpril before the Socially International Conference on Disarmament.hetorical response to Western critics of Soviet military strength. Ponomarev stated, "Do they take into account that we have to ensure the security of'the whole territory, not only of the European, but also the Asiatic part of then an unusually explicit reference to
the existencehinese threat to the USSR, Ponomarev attackedPeking for Its weapons buildup, "Including nuclearnd condemned China for Its continued atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons "in spite of protests from many countries."
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Ponomarev was harshly critical of the US and alleged that the world was on the precarious thresholdew arms race because of the instability generated by American military-lechnologlcal developments. Ponomarev specifically accused the USpolicy" of new weapons development "which blurs the boundary between nuclear and conventionaln addition
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Its implication! for SovietSOD, thit line mayew Soviet international campaign against the deployment of US cruise missiles In Europe, as well as the neutroneport has been received that, prior to the convening of the Helsinkioviet spokesman contacted Socialist International President Willy Brandt, on instructions from Moscow, and urged him to use his personal prestige and Influence to oppose lhe production of new weapons of mass destruction, particularly the neutron bomb and thc cruise missile, j
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Speaking in Moscow, one day after the Ponomarev address, Brezhnev publiclyisarmament "program" that will undoubtedly become lhe basis for Soviet diplomacy at thc SSOD. He reiterated thc Soviet callalt to the manufacture of nuclear weaponsan on all other mass destruction weapons (MDW) and advanced two new proposals, bothconventional arms:
A halt in the development of new types of highly destructivearms.
Renunciation of any increases In the size of armies and in conventional armaments by the permanent members of thc UN Security Council and countries associated with them through mililary agreements.
In reiterating theoposal while simultaneously callingan on highly destructive conventional weapons, Brezhnev, like Ponomarev, may have been taking aim at the cruise missile. During lhe recent Soviet-American dlKUSsions in Moscow, Ihe Soviets pushed for discussion of an omnibus trealy prohibiting all new MDW. Similar overtures were made previously by Ihe Soviets at the CCD,
Brezhnev's proposalreeze on conventional arms and armaments of Security Council permanent members and their allies appears to be directly linkedimilar Soviet freeze proposal offered repeatedly at the mutual and balanced force reductions talkst may be designed to enlist International sympathy through the SSOD for Ihe Soviet negotiating position at the Vienna talks.
Several other statements by Brezhnev rclale directly to the coming SSOD. He announced that:
The USSR would forgo production of neutron weapons as long as the United States docs likewise.
The USSR wouldarty lo llu- Latin American nuclear-free zone established by Ihe Treaty of Tlateloco.
The USSR would use nuclear weapons only In the event of "aggression" against the Soviet Union or its allies "by another nuclear power."
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Onndpril US and Soviet representatives met in Moscow to discuss Issues related to the SSOD. The Soviet delegation was headed by Viktor Israelyan, chief of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israelyanikely candidate for the principal Soviet representative to the SSOD, although Foreign Minister Gromyko will probably deliver the major Sovietaddress early In the session.
During the Moscow talks the Soviets reiterated their desire for US-Soviet cooperation at the SSOD but focused primarily on the issue of disarmament machinery. While they might, If necessary, agree to enlarge the CCD and possibly even to relinquishing the US-Soviet cochairmanshlp, the Soviets made It clear that they are not prepared to see any fundamental change in the structure of the CCD or its relationship to the UN.
On other issues, however, the Soviets stakedore independent position. Israelyan stated that the USSR would push hard on Brezhnevs proposalalt on the production of nuclear weapons. He added that the Soviets will seek agreement In principle at the SSOD to start negotiations on this matter among the nuclear powers and other militarily significant states. In answeruery by the US side, Israelyan stated that Chinese participation wasrecondition for the initiation of such talks.
Referring to Brezhnev's statement on the neutron weapon in hispril speech, Israelyan somewhat cryptically noted that, In the Soviets' opinion, the enhanced-radlation weapons issue was not fully resolved. Heuggestion that the Soviets withdraw reference to this issue in their draft Program of Actloa j
Regarding the USSR's adherence to the Tlateloco Treaty, Israelyan stated hat the USSR would append several reservations to its signature of Protocol II, including continued opposition to the transit of nuclear weapons through the territorial limits of'the member states.eservation is at oddsS stipulation that transit rights are not affected by US adherence to the treaty. The Soviet reservation may be directed specifically at the transit of the Panama Canal by US ships carrying nuclear weapons, thus laying the diplomatic and propaganda basis for exacerbating an already delicate US foreign policy Issue, it
On the subject of negative security assurances for nonnuclear states, Israelyan pointed out that Brezhnevspril formulation of "aggression" against the USSR or Its allies "by another nuclear power" washile this suggests that the Soviets mayimilar proposal at the SSOD, it Is possible that Brezhnev may have been floating the conceptrial balloon to gauge nonaligned reactions. Neither Israelyan nor the Soviet media have amplified Brezhnev's statement on this issue.
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On the related issue of no first use of nuclear weapons. Brezhnev, in an interview givenest German weekly and published In Pravdaay. reiterated the formulation Moscow had advanced at the Belgrade CSCE
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So far as the Soviet Union Isepeat.ot thinking "of striking the firstn the ccatrary. wellur official proposal to all parUdpanb in tbe all-EuropeanIncluding the US. to conclude an agreement on not being the first to use nuclear weapons against one another.
During his recent visit lo West Germany, Brezhnev on several occasions drew attention lo hispril proposals, specifically his callan on MDW and mutual renunciation of the neutron bomb.
Outlook tor the SSOO .
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The potentialoviet-American confrontation at the SSOD will be limited by the Soviel desire lo enlist US support on the issue of disarmament machinery and In defending the US-Soviet record on arms control. The US and USSR are also likely to find common ground on the twin issues of promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation while restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.
The Soviets are likely to resist any nonaligned effort to compel lhe major nuclear powers to commit themselves to specific disarmament obligations or deadlines. Soviet diplomacy will probably attempt lo channel nonaligned sentimenteneral condemnation of Peking's policy on arms control and US policy on enhanced-radlatfon weapons.
The principal Soviet proposals for incorporation Into Ihe Program of Action will undoubtedly encompass the Brezhnev "program" ofpril, probably focusing on thc callan on nuclear weapons productionorresponding bat. on MDW. In addition, Ihe Soviets willorld Disarmament Conference as an alternativeecond UN SpecialSession,
Apart from these Issues lhe Soviets will emphasize negative security guarantees for nonnuclear states and peaceful nuclear cooperation because of ihcir importance to the nonaligned bloc. The negative security Issue presents Ihe possibility of serious East-West disagreement should the Soviets, supported by pressure from the nonnuclear states for some sort of agreed language among the principal nuclear powers, press lhe adoptionormulation unacceptable lo the US and NATO. Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky (old US officials onay that Brezhnev'spril formulation on negative security assurances could lead some of Ihe nonaligned nations lo ask lhe US for comparable assurances. In like fashion the Soviets will reportedly attempt lo manipulate Ihe peaceful nuclear cooperation issue In an attt npt to force South African accession to thc Non-proliferation Treaty.
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Original document.
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