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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONALiFOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
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REVIEW OP SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Domestic Politics ; ; | llfl
Tho rocont incapacitation of ita top party andleadera apparently produced no new sense of urgency in the Soviet leadership about succession preparations. Moving with the deliborateness that haaallmark of the Brezhnev regime, the leadership managed to finesse the question of replacing itsyear-old Premier and indicated it was in no hurry toarty congress that coulduccessor to Brezhnev, who markedh year in power in October. emonstration of tho strengths of collectivity, the Politburo functioned for extended periods without the full participation of the top two loaders, probably reaching even its mostcision--tho invasion of Afghanistan--withoufc the active involvement of Kosygin. I I
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Brezhnev's Health
The first blow to strike tho illness-prone leadership came in early October, when JJrczhnov returnedtrenuous three-day visit to East Germany. Suffering from what was variously described asingering cold, and heart trouble, he entered Barvikhr. Sanitorium for observation ar.d
Thie review ia baaed on onalyaia and reaearch work completed by CXA'e National Foreign Aeaeaement Center throughhe oontributione have been reviewed by appropriate individuals within NFAC but have not been formally coordinated. Commente are welooma and may be addreescd to
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canceled his scheduled: participation in the visit of Syrian President al-Asaad. As)rumors of his death swept through Western capitals, I
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later that month. The" pace of his activities picked up during November, when ho participated in ceremonies marking theof the Bolshevik! Revolution,ajor speechentral Committee, plenum, and attended sessions of the Supreme Soviot.n late; December, however, Brezhnev once again canceled his public activities, suffering this time from what was officially described'old.
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Premier Kosygln's illnogs was more serious.
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[nas yet to reappear in
Lyudmila, told Western reporters only that she "hoped" her father would be able to resume his duties, while other Soviet oboorvers expressed serious doubts about his prospects, ^
The Plenum
Despite thc apparent gravity of his condition, no action was taken to remove Kosygin from his posts at thc November Central Committee plenum and Supreme Sovlot sessions. The plonum made only two leadership changes, electing agriculture Secretary Mikhailandidate member of theand promoting First Deputy Premier Nikolayrozhnev protege, from candidato to full membership. Tho promotion ofrincipal deputy enhanced his authority to act in the Premier's absence and ntde him the man best placed to succeed Kosygin. ense,ikhonov succession would be yet another example of decisions deferred: he could be little more than an interim Premier.
Succcssion_
The plonum shod little light on the standings of potential Brozhnev succossors. Tho candidate whoso interests appeared most directly affected, however, was Kirilenko. Brezhnev's harsh criticism of heavy-industry ministers and enterprise managers seemed to reflect badly on Kirilenko, who has principal
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responsibility for that sector. Brezhnev alao revealed0 was toear of "active preparation" forh Party Congress, suggesting that the congress itself would not be held Before the plenum, Kirilenko appeared to be pushing for an earlier date, probpbiy reasoning that time
Was working against his Icandidacy*.!
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" Other developments, however, seemed to be in Kirilenko's favor. In mid-October heolo trip to Hungary that received unusually heavy play in the media. (He reportedly was invited to Budapestjby Hungarian party chief Janos Kadar, who wanted to reach an understanding with the man he considered Brezhnev's-most likely successor.; This media splash was followed by another in November, when he was selected to deliver the speech marking the anniversary of the October Kirilenko, who had previously given the addressas chosen over other1 Moscow-based PolitburoUstinov, Andropov, andhave yet to be tapped for the honor. Another favorable sign came with the December nominations to republic:supreme Soviets, when Kirilenko was once again characterizedprominent party and staten honor he failed to receive during nominations to the USSR Supreme Soviet
1; Chernenko, the other frontrunner for Brezhnev's post, also fared relatively well. When he accompanied Brezhnev to East Germany in October, he was singled out for special honors by East German party chief Honecker, who presented him with the Karl Marx Award and described him, according to Neues Deutschland, as among Brezhnev's closecharacterization that Pravda upgraded to Brezhnev's "closest" comrade-in-arms. Chernenko received yet another honor in December, when he traveled to Bulgaria to receive the_Order of Georgi Dimitrov from party chief Todor Zhivkov.
In addition to his increased visibility, chere were signs that Chernenko might be broadening his range of responsibilities, In October, tho journal-Party Lifeoost to his authority in cadre matters, one of*kirllenko's main spheres of oversight, by listing works .byrezhnov, and Chernenko asreading on the subject. His appearance on the dais at Militia Day festivities inhe might also be involved in security matters.
Chernenko had only mixed success in improving his protocol standing, however, indicating that his backing by Brezhnev may be meeting with some stubborn resistance. On theof the Bolshevik Revolution, he stood next to last among the Moscow-based Politburo members present for the
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tho same position ho had hold six months earlier on tho May Day reviewing stand. His standing seemed to improve in December, however, when;he rankedBrozhnev, Kosygin, Suslov,andthe gradation of epithets for loaders nominated to[republic supreme Soviets.
The succession picture, in abort, remained as murky as over during this reporting period, with the loaderahlp providing no indications of active preparation fordeparture. Inovosti Press Agency chief Lev Tolkunov counseled against any such speculation, in fact, telling his Japanese counterpart that Brezhnov was still, hiudthv jumuahbe._reelected at the next party congross.
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Economic Affairs
The Soviet economy has suffored one of tho worst years on record with GNP growing lessercent and industrial output rising no moreercent. ajor crop failurehas compounded Moscow's economic woes and willajor impact on food availability through much
Farm Failuresj j
The disappointing harvest of grain and other cropsercent decline in farm output The lateness of thc grain harvest and wet conditions, moreover, have roduced grain quality. An official of the Ministry of the Food Industry confirmed that at least some premature slaughter of cattle and pigs would be necessary. To Keep slaughtering to athe Soviets had purchased close toillion tons of grain, soybeans, and soybean meal for delivery between9 and' The.US embargo on grain shipments, however, will curtail delivery of nearly half these purchases, forcing Moscow to make substantial cuts in livestock feeding and herds.
Energy production9 did not meet plan targets. Oil output averaged7 million barrels per dayarrels per day below plan. Moscow's most immediate energy problem is ensuring fuel supplies for the winter. Because fuel shipmentsack seat to grain transfers last fall, the SoViet press haj complained that winter fuel stockpiles grew too slowly. ;
Brezhnev Reiterates Economic Probicms
In hisovember speech to the pa :ty plonum, Brezhnev gave the standard list of reasons for current economic Among individual sectors of the economy, Brezhnev first cited the poor performance of the transportation sector, especially rail transportation where moro equipment, repair Borvice and more efficient loading and unloading are needed.
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In an unprecedented move, Brezhnev cited eleven ministers by name for mishandling the economy. He stated in no uncertain terms that the partythowouldroater direct rolo in running tho economy and calling govornmont loaders to account. Ho gave unusual emphasis
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to increasing consumer welfare, particularly food quality. Brezhnov warned that unless the flow of desired consumer goods were increased substantially, responsible individuals would be punished. The willingness to spend record amounts of hard currency for grain and other livestock feed and to tolerate the serious rail disruptions arising from moving huge quantities of grain, confirms Moscow's determination to minimi: popular dissatisfaction with food supplies. " |
0 Plan '
problems focus of yoaror this for many targets cement, by fuel
cfferod no real solutions to current economic . Long term policy solutions evidently will be the
B5 plan. In tho interim,0 willrowth far short of rates envisioned in tho original plan. Even the implied GNP growthercent year will be difficult to achieve. The plan goals commodities seem beyond reach, particularly the for oil and gas condensate, steel, chemicals, and Industrial growth0 is likely to be hampered shortagca this winter, owon with mild weather.
output is slated to grow byercent inreezing temperatures since late October, however, have probably damaged fall-sown grain for harvest next summer, particularly in the Southern Ukraine and North Caucasus. Low soil moisture has caused poor germination in much of this area According to Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, state procurements of livestock, poultry, milk, and wool will be planned at less than tho0 goals because0 shortfalls in grain and feed production. Growth in farm output will be further hindorod5 percont reduction in fe-tilizer deliveries.
Office of Economic Research)
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