Intelligence
IS0
Oie
The Vie* Freeldent Secretary of State' Secretary ofseletant to the Prealdent for national Security Affairs
n, yt "tm forth our preliminary vievs of Soviet options and constraint* insU following the Invasion of Afghani.tan. It. focua ia on the major actors in the region fron the Soviet-per.peotlvei It does not deal explicitly with poeelble OS-poIiclae or how theee might Influence Soviet poeltion*
Attachemtnt
SCBJEC7: Soviet Onion end Southwest Asia
1. It Is onliXely that.tha Soviet occupation of Afghanistan coaetltetaa the preplanned first etep inrticulated qnod lesign !o* the rapid as-abiiahaatnt. of hageaonlc control oeer ail of South wan Asia, Aether thanha carefully tlaid beginningl ail strategicheaveeluctantly authorized retpaese to what was pereeivad by tha rramlln as an iaaaineat and otherwise Irreversible deterioration of ita_ already established positionoontrf which fall, wall within tha Sovietegltiamte' of lafleence. Bovaver, thara is no reason to" doubt that tha Sovietslargerof influence in Southwest Asia or to aupposo -that their decision to occupy Afghanistan va* aade without reference to broader- rational objectives. On tha contrary, tbeix willingness to incur what they almost certainly anticipated would ba serioustroogly suggest*baiiaf that their occupation of Afghanistan would -jaaproae, their accessoater of extrepeUy lucrative tanjeu of opportunity and eight eventually leadighly favorable and enduring shift ia the regional and par haps even global balance of power,.
The Soviet occopation of Afghanistanprobably predicatedaiiaf that Afghan resistance would prove relatively short lived. Aacngthings, thetr historical experience in their own Cental
their own Central
Asian republics may have persuaded the Soviet*trategy combining ailltary lntlavldation. political conciliation, and economic enticement would qulcUy reduce reals tar ce and enable their puppet regiee to acquire atodlcua of gxaasroota* political authority and adaiinlatratlve control. If thisut todscalculation and Afghan resistance becoaae or reataina peralatant and widespread. tbeld becoeM ao bogged down in guerrilla warfare that they abandon any bopee of further eear-tarm expansion. Bowerver, they are on likaly to withdrew tbairroa Afghanistan and eight well try to alleviateobleavj there by intensifyingura on or expanding the conflict to
-
(fa
1. In tha face of intractable Afghan tea Llkaly to attributeofdirect oc indirect
Pakistani Involvement and to taka what thay dean to ba eeeentla.' eterrent anfl retaliatory msaaare*. Theee aea*ure* could include, net onlyborder raids bylloyal Afghan and/or Sovlatut alaoovlat "auppjbrt Cor antl-Paklatani tribal insurgents and Intimidating demarches on Islamabad by tha (ovists' Indian alllaa. In extremis, tiareovar, .tha Sovlat* mightot-too-raluetanC India to Join tlfam In ah all-out campaign of political subversiononceited Invasion. Although tha inevitable coats ofrastic actio! might glva tha Soviets peu*e. Chair bahawlor In Afghanistan (aa will as tha aarliar aacalatory bahavlor of tha United Stataa inambodia) auggaatt that thay might ba undeterred by- anything shortradibls thraat of.diract. OS military retaliation.
'. A. n Afghanistan impals than to takaanti-Pakietanl llna, tie Soviets ara llkaly to glvatoto thaf Its altuatlon and adopt aapproach toSovlat* ara mora
apaak for themselves than by issuing explicit threat*', moreover, tha Sovlata ara 1
llkalylat thalr praaanca lin and-growing control over Afghanistan.
ara to- undaracora PaXistani vulnerahilltiet IWnila exercising such aalf-restrtflnt, |ly to offar tha Pakiatanle substantial
againat Jeopardlrlng, thalx close ralatlohi Sovlata are llkaly to try to *oof noninterference and offer* of aconomlc laaat limited military assistance and ia to keep Pakistani-Indian relations on various umbrag* aC auchha lass forthcoming line. But thay'would obabllltyarkadlyight ba willing toubstantial rcunulated In Delhi In aider tonion'* grovtpg raglonal lnfluanca.
Inducamant* to distance thamailva* from, tha Unitad Statas and th* PRC. 'Although thay will hava to with India in tha process, Pakistanis not only with pi aid but alao with offararomisas to oa* thalr good off an even kaal. Should India Sovlata might tamporarlly taka alao be mindful of tba'raalignment of Indian policy amount 'of. tha capitalakletani acceptance of tha
war*landlshmanta.i.ti to ancouraoa.graat.wrlepoaal would includ* military .tribal inaurractlon, aa
Inaufficlantly retpcntlve to thalr probablylass aubtla mao try A* already indicated, tha maana atnidation, political subvaraion, and activation of longstanding Afghan *
and Indian claim* on Pakistani territory. Iftactic* alao fall to produce Che desiredha Soviet* might eventually conclude thntU*_we* advlaable to allow Pakistan an interlude in which to,-ark out it* own destiny. ecision to this affect would seem particularly appropriate if attempts to escalate, tha pressure on Islamabad seemed likely to increase US Involvement in Pakistan and to limit Soviet oppertanities elsewhere in.the region. Such an interlude would not necessarily b* long-lasting, however, and could coma to an abrupt halt if subeeguant development* expose additional Paklatani vulnerabilities.
Of all of the objectives that their occupation of Afghanistan may hava placed within easier Sovietro-Soviet Iran is almosttha moat tantalising. Although the Soviet.occupation of anand strengthened--the-anti- -Onmauiitse sentiment*-of- rrjin'* Jtarvently rellgiointjxullng-elite, it
alaoSovlat.forca* oo-Iran'ss veil as ita northern.and haa createdlarge-scaleidBaluchi-a*u ttzarl end Kurdish aerwratlsx-mqvemanta.
: t
Furthermore, tt haaime when-Iran Is;goingaroxysm -of anti-American hysteria and may. be on tha brink- of political,and-economic chaos. SiBca thla isime whan tha Soviets are .about to encounter significant shortfalls in domeatict aprobable that tha expansien of it* Influence over ran willatear the top of tha Kremlin's hierarchy of regional riorltlaa. ^
If 7. Although tha possibility cannot be excluded, it does not seen .likely that the. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will turn out to hava
ress rehearsal for an Impending gala performance in Iran. fghanistan. Iran la clearly too important to tha beat to make the riska counterlnterwentlon seem negligible, end the axercleed American * reaction ta tha Sovlat occupation of Afghanistan has probably convinced even thaoat unrecon*trueted hawksrontal attack on-could leadull-fledged military showdown with thetate*. However, fear ofhowdown will not lead the Kremlin to forsake it* ambition* or prevent it from pursuing them by mora circuitous mean*. At tha margin. apprehension that any Important Soviet breakthrough In Iran wouldetermined DS mllltery-reection may exerciee a' 'restraining Influence, but tha Sovlata. win probably etill have extenalve room for maneuver in aIn which,Am*rican option* are severely circumecrlbed and Iranian Tulnerabllrtlee are vary large.
for the .isnadlateha Soviet* ara likely toassiduous af fores* to improve their relations with tha Khomeini regie*. Among othar things, thay will probably signal cheii willingness to ba supportive diplomatically and to provide Tehran with economic and military aid. Such overture* will not prevent tha Soviets froa entrenching,onrghan border, cultivating their contacta withersian nationalistand supporting' the Tudeh'a efforts to buildup lta organisational Infrastructure and penetrate tha country'saa. instead of flaunting theae activities, however, tha Kremlin will probably try to keep -the* inconaplcuoua and take apaclal precautions to -neutxaltie-thalr-potentially provocative effects.
9. Although the Soviets can have fewabout the possibilityof ej*axxzer*xha frmnaaanf slly. anti Qjmmujilst Ideological Bl aSftS nf leae
Khomeinihay probably dooasibllfty of growingorrent govarnaenral -policy aan.ofnri->in"ai1 "nm-jrniilim" prut OlSmadaJyaaargence and aatoothlis at ion of-on-Cowmist hut Cossnunlat-tlnged regime probably -represents the Soviets' preferred outceee to thaKhomeini aucceaalon, since they could thento thef MOh-sKere -intimatere-let ions wttieh It would -be extremal difficult for the United States or othar foreign countries to disrupt. Outaide powsra would be hard preaaed for an excuse ta interfere with a
-at* aad viable Iranian reglae, and any credible threat ofoo chair part-could provide the Sovietselcoeaextend protectionriendly neighboring country which also sharedborder with the Soviets' Afghan allies. While tha experienceAmln, atould doubtless make aen'y Iranian leader*wladoe ofreaty of Friendship and Hotual Assistance withthe external (and/or Internal) praesure* upon thee eight sakeaaee too precarious to allow thaa any .
10. Clean the- extremely'remote pzoepect of an early proof Iranian policy, tha Soviets would probably notoverthrow orost-Khomeini reglae which denied thato position of influence power. ftheyegime was developing real durability and becoming
sntl-Cowaunist that their potential leverage la Tehran was ln jeopardyesultredible threat to crush thehe Soviet* would probably sot hesitate to take strong counteraction. Unless it were firmly convinced that auch behavior would doomrang, tha Kremlin eight all resort not only to stern diplomatic protases but also to military
/
latixidaxJon: and "
by; eh ti-Persian'r.
. totem*. So-'leng-as theythemselves stepped short of directJitarrerrctonTTtha-Soviets would probably discount theS military action to save* thambei *a If, ashey were highly,*kaptical ebout the likelihood, and/or.effacacy of OSnonailitaryossible requdst by Tehran.'.
for help, the Soviet* eight well risk the posetbility that Tehran- could
successfully resist .thalr pressure and becoas) militantly anti-Sow let
for tha _aaka_-of th* probability that it would bow to their
or be. replacedjore accommodating f>.
Onles* they becose convinced that Iran waa otherwise almost certain- toS "client or was caught In the-throes of. .
endot egretthe--Soviets tountrydi
athnonstlortarut-r. Independence Tscverients_*were . towever, the Soviets would probably Jettison Tehran with
a* an icy-and encourage the formation of" Soviet-backed provisional
genrerrssant* in Iranian Axnrbey)en. Kordeatnn. Beluchesten, Khuresf n, Kremlin would- recogniseatent effort- tareatabllsh Soviet controlled mini-states couldtary Intervention (presumably to try to preserve the integrity of Iranossible de facto and ad hoc allianceeverely chastenedsimply occupy Khar ent might well try to deter .'such en Intervention by aIntervention of its own. Moreover, If they felt that their only other real choice, was acquiescence tn what they would almost certainly envisionr lass permanent OS military presence -on or doe* to their southern _ order, the Soviets might not.be averee to confronting the Onlted
Tbi*
States in an area in which the local populationstronglymerican and the. USSR could benefit fron many logistical advantages.
rendia* i* classified Secret Soforn.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: