By agreeing to Prime Minister Jaruselski'sday moratorium on etrikee, the government and Solidarity have taken some positive steps to alleviate prtssuree; both, however, still face formidable obstacles in implementing the agreement, 4seeV
Solidarity reportedly has accepted the moratorium on the condition that it getin return,lso has called Cor an end to local strikes and has threatened to repudiate those who ignore the appeal. The dissideVt organitatina JOR reportedly has pledged to .reduce iteV actiyitleePrsseeT
we believe that some in the regimeoratorium will fail and that the imposition of martial law isatter of time. The keythe high risks of using force, however, and are still reluctant to do so.
In addition, tha regime realizeseriod of calm relieves pressure from the Soviets,reater impression of newly found party control, and haseconomic results. The leadership also maythateriod will help reverse the escalation of demands from otheraswillseful backdrop for res', ring some unity to the party. The greatest disadvantage is that the calm can provide Solidarity the opportunity to consolidate its ranks and fleah out its organizational structure, fff*
Solidarity may view the moratorium as an opportunity to improve its organization and may be convinced that the only alternative is the imposition of martial law. some in the union, however, will argue that Solidarity cannoL deny itself its only affectivestrike.
Approved for Relays* Date Alir,
Evan If both sidestrike moratorium with good Intentions, they will have to overcome formidable obstacles to make it stick. The government and union will need toreater sense of trust and understanding. The burden ia on the government tohow of good faith and do ao guickly. It will alao have to avoidthe unionait accompli, as the unionhappened overhour workweek issue, and be willing to compromise on some issues, ease*
Both sides will have to make concerted efforts to have greater succass than before at reining in thalr respective militants and hardliners. The Solidarity leadership may have tha harder task here. It can, by its example, avoid creating an atmosphere of tension that encourages local grievances.
The governmentto be willing to tolerate
a certain level of Solidarity cannot
control all of itsand local government
and party officialsto make mistakes. Wmm%
In an inaugural speech yesterday that mixed moderation and toughness, Jaruselski Indicated that the government ls prepared to continue using the political process before invoking force. Jaruzelski said that, toialogue, he willermanent joint government-union commission. The commission probably will be headed by new Deputy Premierarty liberal who has boon sensitive to the political limits of reform and who should have credibility with many -ion siaebers. smesp
Although Jaruzelski suggested ln his speech that the government will show some patience, this will be limited, in port because of continuing pressure from Moscow. ffffjt
The Church will have to become more directly and consistently involvedodorating force and to be willing to test the limits of its influence. fee*
The key question is the attitude Moscow will take. The Soviets have strongly endorsedand will probably give Warsaw's newhance. Moscow still appears reluctant to adopt the alternativemilitarily without the collaboration of the Polishduring the period through the end off the Soviet party congress in the first week of March. fMjff
The Soviets, nevertheless, will continue topressure on the regime, eveneriod of relative calm, to limit the activities and influence of dissidents and militants within Solidarity. Should the moratorium break down or require significant regime concessions to Solidarity, the Soviets are likely to demand that the Poliah party implement martial law. flXaw
Soviet military forces in the western USSR and East Buropean countries are engaging MWhtraining activity, enemaOriginal document.