USSR MONTHLY REVIEW (U)"IMPACT OF SUSLOV'S DEATH"

Created: 2/1/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Impact of Suslov's Death (u)

dcalh of Mikhail Suslov. the senior memberSoviet Polilbuio and Secretariat in termswill enhance Brezhnev's authority in thebul will increase Ihe chancesowerBrezhnev leaves. Suslov was Ihe "highf

purity within ihe world Communiti move-

ment. Iliallook was not unajue. bul his moral authority within the CPSU was His death will not produce sudden shifts, bul ii removes an obstacle lo the possible adoption over time of more flexible domestic andilK-esiJM

Standlnt It'irAi*txitnkip

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Suslovpecial place wiihin ihe Soviet leadership. In protocol, he ranked second in Ihe Secretarial (behind Brezhnev) and third in the(ochind Brezhnev and Premier TiUnocvk bait his influence was aseflection of his reputation and history as of hi* official ranking andarly veteran whose service went back lo the Soviet Civil War in ibe, be was anwho supervised Ihe Baltic purges after World War II and led Ihe crusades against Mao and Tito. Heolitician more interested in the substance than the trappings of poweruardian of leadership collectivity who workedrevcni the establishment of personal dictatorship under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Many younger partymay have consideredelic with ouimoded ideas, bul be commanded respect and wielded in flu-cr.eehe cncffl

WStricture of Power

Premier Kosygin't deathuslov's has

been the only independent voice on ihe Politburo other than Brezhnev's. Has departure will givereer hand in personnel appointments

Suslov himself need not be replaced atere is no rued number of Politburo members or secretaries, and Suslov's functional responsibililies can beby other secretaries. In recent years, Suslov

increasingly delegated authority lo the ihree junior secretaries whose work he supervised Mikhail Zim-yaninoris Ponomarcv (relations wilh non-ruling Communisind Konslanlin Rusakovwith Communist parlies in Bloc countries! If one of them it elevated to Suslov's supervisory rose, it will probably be Ponomarcv. ihe only one who isandidate member of [he Politburo.has spent his entire career, much of it under Suslov's guidance, directing ihe iniernalionalmovement. Bolh his and Zimyanin's outlooks have appeared lo be similar lo Suslov's. Rusakov has been more closely identiOed wilh Brezhnev, for whom he previously worked as an aU

It is probable, however, Ihai all or part of Suslov's portfolio will be assumed by senior secretaryChernenko. who itull member of the Politburo. Chernenko has been more prominem in the general area of propaganda Ihon has AndreyChernenko't chief rival within ihe Secretarial, and heogical candidate to lake on Suslov's domestic policy responsibilities. Kirilcnko has had more experience ihun Chernenko in dealing with foreign Communisi parties, but Chernenko has been increasingly prominent in foreign affairs over the last year. For example, he atiended the FrenchParly congress ihe week afler Suslov's deal)

Suslov probably resisted Brezhnev's effortsush Chernenko forward, and Brezhnev may takeof his absence to expand Chcrnenko's roleat the expense of Kirilcnko. In all bul one of the leadership appearances al Suslov's funeral. Cheincn-ko'i position was more prominent lhan that ofwho had previously appeared ahead of him in leadership lineups Chernenko usually appeared lo occupy (he spot Suslov had held. Vladimirunior secretary closely associated with Kirilcnko,o slighted in prowcol terms at the funeralf-

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leader who may profit from Suslov's death is Viktorull member of the Politburo and head of the Moscow city patty organization. Although Grishin has had limited experience in foreign affairs, he was selected to represent Ihe leadership at Ihe Polish party congress lastroleenior secretary. Grishin also delivered the major eulogy foruly sometimes performed by the person intended to tike over the job of the deceased. If Grishin is moved into the Secretarial, it could mean thai he is slated to assume some of Suslov's responsibilities

The Future Succession

Suslov's departuretrong force for stability during the success Km that will occur when Brezhnev dies or leaves office. Suslov apparently did not aspire to the top party post, and his personal inclinations, age. and lack of experience in economic management and party organization virtually disqualified himuccessor. He would have actedower broker, however, exercising his considerable influence lo place restraints on the power of the new General Secretary, while promoting the leadership's common interest in maintaining unityime of transition, gaajj

The departureey member of the Politburo's "old guard" may increase the weight of younger leaders in succession maneuvering and policy debate. Some leaders associated withexample, agriculture secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the >oun-gesl full member of theof course, suffer

Prospects for Policy C'huuge

Suslov's extraordinary concern for the maintenance of internal security and bis doctrinaire perspectivehim lo oppose economic reform and "populist" programs al home. His consistent response toand labor rcsliveness was to urge increased reliance on indoctrination ande evidentlyagainst greater invcslmcni in the consumer sector, which Chernenko and Brezhnev haveand against increased use of wage incentives io spur labor productivity

Suslovcentralizer" who regarded anyof power from Moscow lo live national republics with consternation. He had recently urged increased attention to ihe economic interests of ihe Russian Republicerhaps in an effort to bolster Russian nationalismrop lo Ihe regime. His departure may bring some relief to non-Russianopposing ihe priority development of Ibe RSFSR and alienuaie the till toward Russianin cultural policy

Suslov probably saw Brezhnev's detente policieseans of creating opportunities for the Soviet Union to improve its strategic position and extend itsin ihe world. However, his fundamentaltoward the West, minimal contact with non-Communists, and suspicion of Western motives made bim skeptical of ihe benefits of negotiating with the West. He defined the limits of deiente narrowly, and there were indications that he was less lhanabout2 US-Soviet summit, trade and arms control agreements between Moscow andand Brezhnev's irip to West Germanye was particularly concerned io limit the flow of Western ideas into Ihe Soviei Union and consequently loathake concessions in the area of human contacts IJJJ

Suslov was probably (he foremost Soviet advocate of doctrinal orthodoxy within Fast andropean Communist parties. Heeading role in crushing6 Hungarian revolt and earned the lasiing enmity of Ihe Yugoslavs by his earlywith Com informentiment. Although he evidently was more inclined lhan some leaders topolitical solution" to the Czechoslovak crisisis position on the question of "proletarian internationalism" appeared to have becomeinlransigcni since thai lime. Over the last year, he was one of Ihe most outspoken critics ofin Poland and an advocateoreline against Solidarity. He very likelyajor role in (he recent CPSU offensive against the Italian Communist Party as well.

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lav's altitude toward "national libcrolion"wasix of two conflicting beliefs, stronger in him than in most leaders On Ihc one hand, he seemed more willing to confroniin the Third World; on the other, he was more worried by the tendency of indigenouson movements to be ideologically impure andfrom Moscow's control, lor ciample. al times he seemed lo be less enthusiastic than some leaders in support of the Palestinians Yet hewas in the forefront of those urging Soviet intervention in (he Angolan civil war in the mid-^nOsfafJJJ

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Suslov's power and influence waned int Brezhnev's grew. His departure therefore will notignificant impact on policy toward ihc West, of which Brezhnev has long been ihe chief architect. It may be felt, however, in areas where hearticular interest. notabl> io relations with foreign Communist parties In domestic policy, conic rvairvcs and opponent* of "consumerism' have lost their most forceful and articulate champion, although ihcir voices will still carry great weight in ihc formulation of policy. Finally, in an age dominated by bureaucrats who would not understand Marx's Kupttal even if they read it. Suslov's passing leaves the Sovietwithout an authentic defender of the failU.

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