Soviet Military Forces in the Far East
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SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following inlelligence organizations participated In the preparation of the Estimate:
The Cenlrol Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intdbocncc Aoency, the Nolionol Security Agency, one) lhe intelligence orgonlrolion ol the Deportmenl ol Slerle.
Also Participating;
The Aiiiilonl Chief of Stall lor Intelligence, Deporimeni of lhe Army The Direct oe of No vol Inlelligence, Oeporlmenl ol lhe Novy lhe Auiilont Chief of Staff, Inulllgence, Deportmenr of Ihe Air Force Ihe Direclor olHecelquarleri. Marine Corps
PREFACE
This Estimate describes llie developmenl of Soviel general purpose and theaicr nuclear forces in the Far East, examines lhe status of Soviet and Chinese forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and postulates likely Soviel strategy in ease ofhe Estimate is being published in two pans: Ihe Key Judgments, which begin onf this documentore detailed supporting analysis (volumehe Estimate generallyeriod of five years in its projections. It treats the following elements of Soviel military forces in the Far East:
Cround Forces. Thc ground forces and their organic air defense and tactical nuclear
Air Forces. Tactical aviation. Military Transport Aviation, and medium- and long-range bombers.
Air Defense Forces. The air and ground-based systems of the air defense forces.
Naval Forces. The general purpose submarines, surface ships, aircrafl. auxiliaries, and amphibious forces of thc Pacific Ocean Fleet.
Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces. Those land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles available for use in the Far Eastern theater.
Support Functions. Those activities and organizations that support and integrate Sovicl forces in lhc area, such as command, control, and communicalions systems and logistic
services.
Fo* thU Eaim.te. Sonet centralair, and ,i, defer* force* In the Farre those locaied In theentral Allan. Siberian. TranAail.l. md Far Eair Miliary OutricU aod Moocofla Abo covered in the &Unwt. are So-iel aeoerall lorce, in lhe faeifie Ocean Flo-t, inehidloc ibe Indian Ocean Souadran.ovietlorce* thairriphoil Hnleiml (antra In the Fai East. Moncolian nationalcurrentlyoieen. mm of whom are in noneombal uniti. and iwoeombaiim eontidered in thu EiLmiir
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Determinonls of Soviet Policy in (he Far East
Thc Far East is second only to the European theater in importance for Soviet miliiary policy. lis slrategic value, combined wiih ils remoteness from the heartland of greater Russia, makes regional security an especially difficult problem in Soviet eyes. In conlrast with Europe, the USSR directly borders its major potcnliai enemy.the long, slender supply line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is dangerously closeostilevulnerable to atiack and interruption,
Although the Sovici military position in the Far East is 'now reasonably secure, the Soviets probably see growing challenges. They observe no basic change in China's hostile posture loward thc USSR, and at the same time see intensified US pressure on Japan toreater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political ties inimical to Soviel goals, and an evolving US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically againsi thc USSR. They have alsoeaffirmation by the United Stales of its commitment to maintain sizable forces in South Korea and to strengthen Seoul's political, economic, and military structure.
To meet these perceived challenges during the coming decade, lhe Sovieis will continue to depend on superior military power as the critical instrument of foreign policy. Thus, changes to their miliiary capabilities will be aimed at:
Ensuring Soviet territorial security by deterring potentialaggression orino-Soviet conflict.
Developing further Soviet offensive miliiary capabilities and options in the region lo improve their capability to inflict damage on China's mililary-induslrial capability and seize all or portions of Manchuria.
Countering US naval and air forces in lhc region.
Preventing China from taking any advantage ofar with NATO.
Limiting American. Chinese, and Japanese influence in Asia.
Frustrating and delaying thc emergenceWashincton-Beijing-Tokyo axis" with links lo NATO.
Encouraging the evolutionoviet-sponsored Asiansecurity system.
In the last decade, the Soviets' military policy has leduch stronger military posture in the Far East However, their stationingivision on the Japanese-claimed islands, their invasion of Afghanistan, and their support for Vietnam liave all hampered Soviet regional political obiectives.
he Soviets believe that the security of the USSR can best be guaranteed through thc development of forces capable of decisive offensive operations- Thus, although the Soviets have establishedfortifications in defensive zones along the border with China, they arc not resigned totatic defense. They haveecisive conventional and nuclear miliury capability to give them the .capacity for major offensive operations beyond their own borders. Whether the Far East wouldefensive theater for the Soviets or whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on factors such as their political objectives, the degree of llieir superiority over Chinese forces, and the military situation in other theaters.trictly Sino-Soviet war. the Chinese should expect an offensive to seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the frontier.ATO-Warsaw Pact war the United States would be faced with operations designed to deny maritime areas adjacent to thc USSR and prevent thc use of Japanese bases.
Force Trends
5 The buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East has proceeded through two relatively distinct phases. The first,5 through thc, was characterized by rapid growth of ground and air combat force levels. The second, since the, has been marked by slower growth and emphasis on enhancing existing forces through weapon modernization, improvements in the combat supportand the development of new command structures to better
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Urol and employ the forces. Thc Soviet military has emerged fromyear processubstantial portion of its general purpose forces committed in lhc Far East. The Soviets have established a
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balanced force structure for ihealrr warfare and are capable of an effective defense and strong offensive operations:
hreefold increase in the number of giound force divisionsivefold increase in fixed-wing aircrafl have been accompanied by an expansion of support forces and substantial increases in thc numbers of tanks, artillery, armed helicopters, and air defensesuarter of thc tolal Soviet ground and taclical air forces are now located in the Far Easi.
The Pacific Ocean Fleet (the largest of the four Soviet fleets) has grown modes!Iy and has acquired more capable surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, replenishment ships, and aircrafl.
There has been substantial growth and modernizalion of the theater and strategic nuclear delivery syslems available for use against targets in thc region More than half of theRBM force, for example, can be targeted against China.*
Soviet Strategy and Capabilities
planners in Moscow must consider severalin Ihe Far East, including, forirectChina; actions against US air and naval forces only; andtwo-front war with NATO and China.
With China. Soviet optionstrictlywould bcand and airfrom large-scale raids with limited objectives to aof western and northeastern China supported by nudearmap) Soviet objectives under any option would be conditionedby historical national aspirations, the international politicalthe military situation in other theaters, and thc causes ofWe believe, however, that military as well as polilicalprobably would discourage the Soviets from pursuing thcand surrender of China or attempting the long-Icrmof the Chinese heartland.
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e credit the Soviets with the following capabilities:
couldhinese general ground offensive-awe judge as highlycould quicklyunishing counterattack
could mount ground incursions, supported by tactical air forces, into northern Chinaood chance of initial success. They would have to consider, however, thai anything Iwml sliallnw penetrations couldguerrilla wm fare.
- They could overrun and hold Manchuria (tbc ShenyangRegion and the northernmost portion of the Beijing Military Region) if provided substantial reinforcements from elsewhere in the USSR or with ihe extensive use of nuclear weapons.
Iii most circumstances, however, it is unlikely Moscow would draw down its strategic reserves substantially because of its preoccupation with NATO. Moreover, once deep into China Soviet forces would have toell entrenched enemy in inhospitable terrain at the end of long and tenuous supply lines.
The Sovietsubstantial advantage over China inwarfare capabilities which, in the absenceubstantial Chinese chemical or tactical nuclear retaliatory capability and because of general Chinese vulnerabilities, provides the Sovietsredible option to initiate chemical warfare if the situaUon requires IL
The Sovietsast nuclear superiority and could conduct nuclear strikes throughout China. Nonetheless, wc believe thatov.el counlerforce attack, sufficient Chinese ballistic missiles would survive (because of their concealed and dispersed deployment as well asand hardness) tomall but destructive retaliatory strike. We believe thisonstraint to an unprovoked Soviet nuclear attack.
OperalionsS Forces. Moscowirect threal lo its security from US naval and air forces in the Far East and the modernization of the Pacific Ocean Flee! represents an attempt to counter the US Navy.ATO-Pact war. the most pressing tasks of the Pacific Oceaneneral purpose forces would be lo establish sea conlrol in waters contiguous to the USSR and in Soviet ballistic
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missile submarine patrol areas and to conduct sea denial operations out toautical miles Soviet air force elements would have missions against US bases in the region.
a war wiih NATO we would eipect lhe Sovicls loagainsi US naval forces in the Pacific and believe lhewould not consider such attacks as directly riskingwith China or Japan We believe neither of thosemuch of an offensive threat and neither is likely lo enter awith lhc USSR unprovoked. Additionally, the Sovietspressure the Japanese lo deny the United States the use ofair facililics Failing lliis. however, the Soviets probablythese facilities.
believe Soviet forces would have the following capabilities:
The Soviets wouldubstantial threat lo any surface force thai penetrated their sea denial area. On the other hand, wc do noi believe lhat Soviet ASW forces can effectively detect US submarines in the open ocean. In the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and Ihe approaches to Petropavlovsk, favorable geography and extensive ASW forces would alleviate some of the impact of the limitations of Soviet open-ocean detection capability. Major operalions outside these sea control and sea denial areas probably would be deferred as long as the Sovietserious maritime threat to their homeland or ballistic missile submarine force.
The Soviets probably would expect to make limited use of bases in Vietnam, but we do not anticipate large-scale operations, because of Vietnam's distance from the USSR. Wc areabout the degree of support the Vietnamese would offer.
The Soviets could not mount large-scale ground force attacks fn thc Aleutians or on lhe Alaskan mainland, but US facilities in Alaska could be targets for airstrikes or commando teams. Moscow might anticipate that limited airstrikes or nuisance raids on US territory could pin down US forces needed clscwliere.
imultaneous Wars With NATO and China. Simultaneous wars with China and NATO would represent an extreme situation for thc Soviets, and Soviet planners have been increasingly occupied with this contingency In tlie last decade. Inontingency, the Soviel priority of effort would be against NATO, and we judge thai Moscow
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would avoid operation* in the Far Fast that woulduick victory in Europe
e do not believe the risk of precipitating simultaneous hostilities with China wouldecision by the Soviets to go to war with NATO. Although they would prefer notight wars in Europe and Asia at the same lime, we believe they could sustain concurrent, large-scale combat in both theatersumber of months.ar in both theaters were prolonged, however. Soviet capabilities to suppoil maior offensive operations in Asia would be severely strained by logistic, personnel, and materiel constraints. The Soviels also would consider that an attack on China could developong-terra, large-scale commitment of manpower 3nd materiel which would compete with and ultimately could weaken their European war effort
Otherenewal of fighting between China and Vietnam would lead to increased Soviet support of an important ally. We would expect lhc Soviet reaction to bc similar to lhal after lhe Chinese atlackn initial propaganda campaign and aincrease in material aid to Vietnam. If the conflict were prolonged oi were going badly for Vietnam, limited Soviet miliiary actions against China would be possible.
The Soviet responseenewal of conflict between North and Soulh Korea would depend heavily on the Chinese reaction and the level of US involvement. Thc Soviets wouldapid cessation of hostilities to be in their best interest. The Sovicis probably wouldsome materiel support to the North but probably would conclude that the risks attending direct combat support would far outweigh the possible benefits unless the North were in danger of total collapse.
Future Prospects
e foresee no development over the next several years that would appreciably alter thc current Soviet military strategy in the Far East or modify the USSlVs effort lo maintain and improve the capabilities of its large standing forces in the region. We expect that Moscow's concerns over China's rapprochement with the United Stales and Jar.in will prompt the Soviets to continue to expand some service elements to maintain their military advantage in the region.
he initiationajor Chinese force improvemenl program focused on introducing advanced weapons technology into Chineseunlikely prospect even if supported by the United
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could spark unanticipated changes in the Soviet posture in the region. The Sov,ets initially would most likely respondodest level of St no US md.tarv coopcralKxiombination of diplomatic protest and observable military moves to demonstrate their resolve lo counterrogram. Thc longer term response probably would involve some acceleration of improvement programs already planned.
iven current Chinese modernization priorities, we judge that there is little likelihoodundamental shift toward militaryorubstantial Western-suppoiled pioeram to import high-Icchnology weapon systems in lhe next five years. Consequently, we expect the Soviets to continue their program of gradual but steady force growth and modernization in the Far Fast:
Wc expect the number of Soviet ground force divisions in the Far East to increase by perhaps one to two new active divisions per year in the next five years. The number of fixed-wing combat aircraft also will increase slightly.
We believe lhe Pacific Ocean Fleet will continue to be structured primarily to oppose US naval forces, although tbe Navy also may have lo devote more attention and resources to offset the gradual growth in Japanese naval capabilities.
ver the next five years, we expect lhe Soviets' policy in the Far East will continue to focus on the containment of China. They will avoid military or political extremes, and short-term force improvements will be modest. Over thc longer term, however, the Soviet effort will provide Moscow with improved defensive capabilities against not only Chinese forces but also against US forces in Asiaarge-scale conflict with the Wesl. Additionally, it will provide the USSR with increased'or offensive operations against China.'
' Tho Dirto^r, Otfmtt /nidifyottttet. iht, ihtittyd potnket1o, Seott, foreHll follow ti tfc,
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