Tun Smii i
Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
uit,
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN
VolumeJudgments
miiion iviil.bfe ii oli! tnWa Fjlii
SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate prcscnls tlie results of an intensive review by the US Intelligence Community of all available evidence on chemical warfare activities in Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan It alsorief sifitiul lixik -it intelligence holdingsie7 Yemeni civil war and at tin* Soviet chemical-biological warfare program. The Estimate does not consider the arms con)ml and disarmament aspects of the problem, nor does it examine in any depth the threat implications flowing from the employment of chemical weapons in local conflicts.
While the Intelligence Community is confident of the keywhich follow, many uncertainties remain concerning the full scope of Soviet activities in the chemical-biological warfare sphere, particularly the USSR's research and development program.
This volume presents the basic Estimate. Volume If. published separately,arge amount of supporting data 3nd analysis on the subjects covered in volume i. Volume II alsocries of technical annexes that provide tabulations of reported attacks, details on the sampleechnical description of trichothccencibliography of Soviet publications on these toxins, and other supporting dociuneiiK
I
KfY JUDGMENTS
loos
Lao and Vietnamese forces, assisted by Soviet logistics andhave used lollial chemical agents against H'Mong resistance forces and villages, causing thousands of deaths since atricholhc-cene toxins have been positively identified as one of the classes of agents used, but medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitanls. and nerve agents also have been employed.
Kampuchea
Vietnamese forces have used lethal trichothecene toxins onKampuchean troops and Khmer villages since atgain, medical symptoms indicate thai irritants, ineapacilanis. and nerve agents also have been used.
The Soviet Role in Southeast Asia
The one hypothesis lhat best fits all the evidence is thai Ihe trichothecene toxins were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and Vietnamese either directly or through transfer ol technical know-how. and weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos. Vietnam, and Kampuchea. There is no intelligence at hand to support alternative explanations, such as completely independent manufacture and use bv the Vietnamese. Il is highly probable lhat the USSR also provided other chemical warfare agents. While the evidence on the Soviel role does not constitute proof in the scientific sense, the Intelligence Comnitinily finds the case to be ihoroughly convincing.
Afghanistan
Soviet forces in Afghanislan have used lethal andagents on Mujalicdiri resistance forces and Alghan viilai;cs since (he9 invasion There is some evidence (hat Afghan Govern-mem forces may have used chemical weapons provided by tin- USSH against Ihe Mujahedin even before the invasion No agenis have been identified through sample analysis, but we conclude from analysis of al! the evidence lhat attacks have been conducted wilh irritants, incapaci-
3
tants, nerve agents, phosgene oxiine, and perhaps tricholheceue toxins, mustard, lewisite, and unidentified toxic smokes.
Implications
Our review of the chemical warfare evidence has yielded three findings with serious implications thai need to be reflected in future threathe Soviet Unionell-developed program for the employment of chemical and toxinhe Soviet military consider the employment of chemical weapons by their forces and those of their allies lo be an acceptable and effective means of suppressingeven in localhererowing sense of alarm in countries like Thailand. Pakistan, and China in contemplating conflict wilh Soviet client stales, and there is international concern lhat lethal chemical weapons may become an accepted method of warfare in limited conflicts ihioughoul the Third World
DISCUSSION
ground
n September ISHI the US Ctwernmenlublic dcclaralioii raised the probability lhat the trichotlieccnc class ofpoisonous chemical substances cxkacicd from biological material (specificthe mysterious lethal agent liut bad been used (or many vei'S in Laos and Kampuchea. This significant statement was precipitated by theof high levels of trichoihecenc toiins in asample collected shortly1 Vietnamese chemical attack in Kampuchea Thatdeclaration, however, resteduch broader base of evidence than the analysis of thai sample.
2 In0 the Intelligence Community had already concluded (see >olume II. annea F) lhat lethal agents had almost certainly bceti used against H'Mong tribespcoplc in Lam There was less reliable evidence about tlse use of lethal agcnls in Kampuchea, mainly because of suspiemm aboutropaganda campaign of Pol Pol's-he UK claims were lulncqiH-iitlv shown lo be valid II was also concluded lhat chancesabout even that lethal agenls had beenin Afghanistan There was little doubt by this HUM lhat not control assents and some form ol incaiuotants had been used in all three countries,ot specifically mentioned in Ihe0 assessment Sinceuflicientevidence haiuch firmer InlehY geace Coaimumti iwLinmi than that Staled in the April assessment There is now no doubt lhat deaths and casualties have ri-suhed from chemical atlacks in all ihice countries
pound, dni-rrll maiciiil Fflr puiixm ol ihn Kwimilr. toiimdurncterucdtur mnlsi-evw.into liUlv uic place Intoaifare faciliiia. even 11 viilk'Hcallv
3 Analysis nf .nl.liintul umnlct from Ijos aitdut revratd al Iran four IrtclwKheccnes. lurllier supporting our conclusion thai laiins wereeview of ill lhe repont indicates lint use of many different chemical agents, means ofnd types of chemical attacks In some cases, the symptoms are lypacal of those caused by Irtchothe-ccnes, bul in many cases the symptoms suggest other agenls. which we have nol been able lo identify through sample analysis. Significant differences as well as similarities have surfaced in ihe reports from ihe three countries The evidence from each country, thciefore. is dcserllied separately, with attention drawn to similarities whereection onivil war in Yemen is included (see volume II. chapter VI) because of lhe strikingbelween the chemical waiiare activities reported duiing that conflict and what has been observed in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
Methodology
4 The intelligence nidmnt-nls ul ibis sludi wore arrived al through the following analytic process
Every reVrant 1ol mfoi mation on reported chemical warfare incident)reviewed, ie-corded.ed (sec volume II.umbers of attacks and deaths were screened for potential duplication The process includednot only on Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, bul oil Yemen>An extensive data base on lhe Soviel chemical and biological waiiare pio-gcjm was also searched
All lhe phi steal evidence available to lhe US
-including environmental samples and backgroundreviewed (seeII. anne* II)
scientifie report on tot ins was prepated.the analysis leading to lhe conclusion
rw woo flj
lhal trie hot hcccncs were probably among the agents used hi Southeast Asia The ivixnt also documents the extensive toxin researchin ihc USSR (see volume II.01
An analysis of the medical evidence wasii.all available information Irnm Suntheasi Asia and Afghanistan (sec volume II,his incorporated the findings ul ihe Department ol Defense medical leatti (see vul-ume II.hich concluded lhat ai leas) three types ol agents were used in Laov
Extensive consultations were held with govern-menl and nongovernment scientists and medical authorities, many of whom were asked to review our evidence. Experts from other countries were also consulted.
lter the data base was organized to permit comparative analysis, the Study focused on threequestions:
Have lei ha) and other casually-producing agents been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan?
What are these agents and how and bv whom an ihey employed?
Where du ibese agents originate enddo they find llveir way to lhe field'1
It Although the evidential base differs for each counti y. Ihe analytic approach usedthe same, live testimony of eyeplate, and type "Imatched agaimt informal inn fromlournalisls, and international orga muttons anil sensitive information dial often pinpointed lhe linn-and place of chemical attacks In addition, thefiles on military operations in the areas where chemical attacks had been leporlcd weic wMrched to establish whether air or artillery strikes look pLcc or whether there was fighting in the areas whereagents were reportedly used tn .ill ihrce countries, wcuirilir'r of instances in whichaccounts could be correlated with information from oihci sources.
here is no evidence of any systematiccampaign having been mounted by the If Moiik or the Afghan resistance forces lo promote the altirna-
tion thai chemical agents have been used on Iheir people. Hat her it was the US Government, oilier Governments, and private individuals from many countries lhal publicized lhe use uf chemical agents and thai provided the evidence to internationalOn the other hand, there were earlylhal Colemocratic Kamttucheandid engage in an organized propaganda campaign on chemical agentTliese indications made us very cautious about accepting DK allegations, which increased markedly after the chemical attacks in Laos were publicized. For Kampuchea, therefore, wc were particularly insistent in our efforts to confirm allegations made with sources of information that in no way could be partropaganda or deception campaign.
Loos
8 Reports of chemical attacks in Laos dale Irom lhe summer5 to the present. These reportseparate attacks in which aleaths were cited as having resulted directly from ciposure to chemical agents.
he actual number of deaths is almost certainly much higher, because Ihe figure above does not lake account of deaths in attacks for which no specific casually numbers were reportedgrcalcsl conccn (ration of reported use of chemical agents occurredlhe area where the three provinces ol Vientiane. Xiangkhoang. and Louangphrabang adjoin Iscc map. figuie t) This Iribordcr region accounted forercent ol ihe reported attacks andercent of the chemical-associated deaths. Most of the reportedlook place8n the pad two van. reporting hasow level of chemical activity bul rontimiiug high death talcs amongand untreatedseven chemical attacks were repotted in the fallor example,eath* were associated withncidents
10 Willi very few exceptions, these repoiis are
3;
c
One execution is
an attack that tool place at live village of Na Nhao. i" Vientiane Province, on1 Accordingao People'. Liberation Army (LPLA) icporl to pro vmciat head-qua rlcis in Vientiane oni. ihe local people iud rcponed ihal aIko-mci lad lUn over lh* village and dropped poisons onay Onayeport to Vientiane confirmed lhat an unidentified aiicraft had dispersedchemicals in Ihe village area, "poisoning large numbers of" The villagers were Slill sicl <istin- Him- ol thai report It is alvi clear tliato field units were not aware llial clicniical attacks were beingInroup ot ethnic Lao refugees from Na Nhao reportedd-copter from Vientiane had dropped "potion" into ihe stream near their village.
II. One possible explanation for lhe difficulty in obtaining coiroborative dala for Laos may simply be the nature of the lighting there There have been few major operations Rather, the reports reflect numerous minor engagements between the opposing forces, and results of these encounters are raidy reported This is consistent with the observation ihal the resistance forces arc splintered, operating in small, discrete units Ihal emphasize sabotage and uneonvenltonal warfare Finally, in nearly all cases, lhe chemical use reported has been directed against villages, in the absence of obvious combat operations Thisao pilot's claim lhat the Vietnamese and Laolinn military commands were engagedM'Mong riiermina-tion" campaign
t particular interest aie the circumstance* surrounding the collection of iwo physical samples lhat were found to contain lethal tonus The first sample was collected31 attackillage between the villages of Muonynd Phakhao in the Phou (lla icgiuu. In thisarge two-engine plane reportedlyistoist,ticky substance, two villagers and all village animals died The second sample is fimn Ban Thonghak another village in lhe Phou Bra i. gun Thai samplr was collected1 attack inet aircraft reportedlyellow substance,lillagers died Seven separate chemical attacks, resulting in 7IS deaths, were reported to have occurred in this ictt'on in the spring of lilt
t is significant that these attacks took place followeriod ol escalation in overall resistance activities in lhe Phou Bia area in the winteruiingm* sunivcssion operations hv LPLA and Vietnaniese Army (I'AVNf forces had achieved only limited success, pcrhapa spurring both forces on lo greater effort. Tin" nmre intense use of chemical weapons may have been pari of this effort
El-civ riualificd iuienngator who ivslematicallv inlctviewed the ll'Mong refugees concluded that the latter had bren subiected lo chemical attacks For example, lhe US Government medical team teturned from Thailand9 convinced dial severalchemical warfare agents had produced the symptoms described by the refugees It wasao pilot who flew the chemical warfare missions thai helped dispel any lingering suspicions that the relugees had fabricated or embellhJved the stories His detailed description of lhe Iand Soviet program lo defeat tlie H'Mong resist ance with cheirucal agents appears in volume II. chapter I
o pilot described the chemical rocket he had fired asore loosely filling warheadonventional rocket'Mongleaderiich rocketodified Soviet wari>rad thai fits this description In furthereliable Thai source reporled thaiS-inch rockets -ere filled with lethal ehetlHCal warheads bv Sovarl and Vietnamese techni clans al facilities in Vientiane as well as in Xiang-fchouaug and Savannakhcl Provinces
(The I'hoiigsavan airfield piobabU-naior Siaging area for chemical al* lacks
Kampuchea
ot Kampuclica we have reports ol Hi km-rale attacks,8 lo tlie present, in which lethal chemicals caused lhe deathsM individuals. Here again, (he moilahtv figureinimum because some reporis stale ooly thai there were deaths and do noiumber Tlie earliest reports cite attacks in Ratatiakiii Province, in the noiihcaslcrn comer ol ihc country (sec map,tepo'ls9 to the present show tlie use of lethal chemicals primarily in lhe provinces bordering on Thailand The Rica lest use of chemical agenis appaienily has been in Battambangeportedursat Province has suffered thehighest frequency, witheported incidents These numbers are consistent with the overall high level of mittlary activity repoted in Ihe border provinces
eview of iittellicence rcoorts fromrovides direct and specific wptKMt forf these attacks Tlieic n, in addition, some ciicumstan ,'ial evidence lhat in all reported instances some form of attack look place Tim evidence includes repo.ts of troop irHi.eiiwtiiv supply transfers, operalional plans, postopcialion repot ling, and air activiiy repoits- It
^indicates lhal military activity look placel* fiine and place of every incident reporlcd lo involve lethal chemical agents In Some easel, it provides strong ciieun^tinliallhal lIk action involved chemicalfor eaamiie. 'he movemww of ehcnMcah, ami personal prntsxlKMt equipment in llie mi
nhai intelligence Coficltidcd thai the Vietnamese were condiKlmg illacl wilh nvwiart.i-Jlaunchers as well as wilh aitoali
1
C
f particular interest are those incidents from which have come theevidence A
collected vegetation and water samples from an area south of Phnom Maiillage In the Thailandm bang Province border area liter receiving rc-poiti ol lethal agents being used Iiumo1 Not only were lhe samples collected wdhin hours after the attack, but paramedics performed field Jul optics on the bodies of DK soldiers^
^The aulopsy desc'ip-lioin of (be condition ol Ihe internal Organs arc comment with iitrhol heccne punoauiig
4iine>
PI
S analysts of contaminaled vcgclatinn samples (rum the1 attack showed high levels of ihiee Iriehollieeene loainsomlMiution thai we would noto be foundatural outlweak in this environment These three Ukhoihecenes al lhe levels found on ihe vegetation would produce ihc vomiting, sicn liiltation and ilehing. and bleeding symptoms. Water samples taken from the area of the same attack alto eonlainedloini* Cnn-liol samplet (mm neaiby areasihii ilntr Iosiii. lie mil iniligeiHMiS lo lhe locale (Details on llie sample analysis appeal in volume II.in: meilical analysism volume It
22 Tlwrc is also ample evidence ol mllilarviht* place and Imie ofJ ii-tPAVNJjiis Imswirs'p oifialHins lo Ih; tuodiiclcd alum;in nudhsvcsleiii llii! i
ilic end nf iIk dry season m Actual lighting.
iIuMicd lo he dutatlcored In'Hi liotli ,tinird11if. In mi<:
PAVN defector, "staging ambushes. laying minefields, and use ofndeed. DK forces wereto avoid large-scale operations, to limit combat operations to scattered sapper attacks. Suchis consistent wilh UK and Thai reports of PAVN forces spreading toxic chemicals alone streams and roadsides and around villages, and firing toxic gas shells against enemy positions
he chemicals used in theeptember Ta-kong attack were dispersed (according lo lhe DK soldiers affected)as or powder, andoison lo water. The gas or powder was released fromby tripwires in tlie area of the rear forces. This description is consistent with tlie other reporting lor this area and time.
n Kampuchea as in Laos, the period of0 through1 was one of intensified Vietnamese operations to suppress the resistance, and the Vietnamese may have considered the use of loilns an effective means of breaking the will of the opposing forces.
dditional supporting evidence was derived from blood samples drawn from victims of I'AVN chemical use that reportedly occurredl in the Takong area. (Blood analysis appears in volume II.akong is in the same general aiea as Phnom MakIs, the central region of the Baltambarig Province-Thailand border. Again, there is no independent confirmation of the accounts of the attacks, but US medical personnel visiting the DK field hospital examined the victims and obtained blood samples. Analysis of these samplese use of tricot hcccncs
3
sum, substantial evidence on theof chemical weapons existed before thetrie hot heccne toxins in vegetation and waterThe Thai haveubstantial datathe chemical attacks.^
^Tlte Thai's concerns altoul chemical attacks against their own people haveespecially after one Thai died and othcis became ill from Vietnamese poisoning In1 Ihe Thai captured two Vietnamese in the act of poisoning water with cyanidehai relocation cam p.
Afghonisran
with chemical weapons againsl theIn Afghanistan were reported as early asbefore the Soviet invasionive separate chemical attaeks inpcnnd were reported in eastern Afghanistan.evidence for ibis period is inconclusivespecify only lhatr.iftisilh no clear idcnlific.ltion of Soviel .irOf of the specific agents usedf"
muiitwi Afghandefectors waled, nevertheless. lhe Soviet*.
piuvidcd the Afghan mililaiy wilh chemical warfare training ai well as supplies ol lethal and incapacitating agenls The Afghan reference to "microbesneiplained-
or the period from the summer9 lo lhe present, we have reports oleparateattacks wilh moreliemical-associalcd deaths (see map. figureen separate chemical attacks, killing ce-uadeiabl* numbers of persons, were reported in lhe first three monthsll of the reports came from northeastern Afghanistan andllie highest percentage of reported deatlu By the spring and summerhemical attacks were reportedave occurred in all areas of concentrated resistance activity. Reports of chemical weapon use! essentially0 reporting wilh respect to frequency and location of attack Of lhehemical attack reports.ave come Irom human sources, including Afghan Army deserters. Muiahedinlighten, rouenalbis. and US physicians Forf the reportedttacks we have additionalevidence supporting allegations of chemicalIn seven instances we have additional human reporting For easmple. an Afghan insurgent provided an eyewitness accou.it0 attackillageilometers east of Darae Jtlga in Vardak Province The insurgent reportedovielelicopter gunshipomb thai, upon eaplo-sion,ethaleparate reporteliable source confirmed that Soviet aerial bombing attacks were taking place during this period on villages in Vardak las well asand farvan Provinces)
most cases the eonnecllons are riKOiiiistaiiiial. as when SwmI or Afghan Ainii com bit operations are describnl ai being planned or are m- in areas ai limes app tori mating thoseepotted chemical allaek.ew cases, reporting Is more nieclic.r
early all reports state thai chemicals were delivered by aircraft or helicopters,ew reports describing chemical artillery rounds
?
These operations frcouenlly time and place as reported
acks.
he evidence lhat Soviet forces arc using lethal chemical agenls comes from HUMINT reporting-
3
support
lhe use of irritants lo drive lhe insurgents Inlo lhe open lo expose them lo attack with conventional weapons and incapacilants to render them tractable (orand capture
ictims of Soviel attacks, conducted lo Mushm caves, describe symptoms that cannot be associated with riot control agenls bfce CN and CS orAdarnuir Medical examinations of some of the victims include reports of paralnis, other neurulogical clfeeis. blisters, bleeding, and sometimes death While none ol the agents being used in Afghanistan have been positively identified through sample analysis, it seems clear ihal ihe ag^ntt being used are la> mini-toa.tr than lhe irritants riled above
eliable source hasnl of ihr Soviet agenls stockpiled in Afghanistan and described wlieri- and when wmr of them have been used Thr lial mi In.lei nerve agenls. phosgene, phosgene ntnni;
15
sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewisite The agents used, plus the lime and location ol lhe attacks, generally correspond lo the refugee reports andmilitary operations. Afghan military defectorslso described llie agenls being used by the Soviets and pinpointed where Ihey are stored.
n net de
^operalionaldcconla mi nation Rations at two locations in Afghanistanhemical deconiarrarution field um'. deployedweep operation of the Konar Valley0 In addition, Soviet personnel have been observed wearing chemical protectiveAtSecontamination units were deployedlassical operational
This
suggests that the chemical battalions have an operational role in Afghanistan connected with offensive chemicaloviet chemical officer told an American news cortesporideiit lhat his mission was lo eumine villageshemical atrack lowhether it was safe to enter ot requiredAn Afghan pathologis'. who defectedhow he accompanied Soviet chemical warfare personnel Inlo contaminated aieas lo collect soiLand water samples afler Soviel chemicalThcte are at leasl tome fiisthand reports from former Soviet chemical personnel lhat it is not Soviet practice lo require decontamination equipment lo be stationed tn an area where chemical bombs are stored or loaded on aircraft If this Is correct, it suggests thai the operational deployment of (hi* equipment in Afghanistan ts associated with lhe active employment of casually-producing chemical agents
3ft* In sum. the eyewitness testimony olchemical warfare activi-
o poor ted by del cct oil. asthe caseampuchealhat
chemical agentiueea inert.oesihe Ivne
on Afghan and Sovh-1
doubt thai fighting tool placealmost every aiea where we havennu ui chrtmcal attacks
What Chemical Agenlt Are Being Used?
he specific chemical agents being used in Laos. Kampuchea, and Afghanistan cannot bewithout collection and analysis of at least one of the following: environmental samples contaminated with agent, the munitions used lo deliver agents, or biological specimens from victims of antudy by medical-toiicologicaI experts of symptoms exhibited by individuals eiposed to loiic agents doesood indication of lhe general class of chemical agenl used Thus, lhe range of clinical manifestations from chemical agents as reportedS Army investigative learn resulted in lhethat nerve agenls, irritants such as CS.ighly (oak hemorrhaging chemical or mixture of chemicals weie used in Laos. Other medical-loaicolog-icat personnel arrived at the same determination and further indicated (hat loalns such as the Iriehothcccncsrobable cause of Ihe lethal hemorrhaging effect seen in Kampuchea as well as Laos Symptoms reported by the DK in Kampuchea and the Miuahedin in Afghanistan were in many cases similar to those reported by the H'Mong In Laos In addition.repotted from Afghanistan andighly potenl, raptd-aclingnockout" chemical also was being used. Musahedin victims and witnesses to chemical attacks reported Other unusual symptoms.lackening of the skin, severe skin liritallon with multiple small blisters and severe itching, scveie eye Irritation, and difficulty in breathingthatimilar substance was used
ollecting samples possibly contaminatedoaic agent during oi'hemical assaull is difficult under all circumstances but particularly when the iss.iiill it against ill prepared pcuple without gas masks and other protective equipment Obtaining contaminated samples thai will yield posrlive traces of specific chemicalepeodenlumber of factors Theselln iieivniencr of the chemical, the ambient leinneralurc. rainfall, wind conditions, thep chemical was deposited, and the lime. care, and packaging ol the sample from enlleclio" Inon ManyI warlare agenls are nonprriiilenl and disap pear fioui lln- environment,ew minutes lo
several Iiouis afler being dispersed. These include, for example, the nerve agents sarin and tabun; the blood agents hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride; the choking agents phosgene and diphosgene; and the urticant phosgene oxime. Other standard CWsuch as the nerve agents VX and thickened soman and (he blistering agents sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, andpersist lor several days lo weeks depending on weather conditions. The trichothecenc toxins have good persistency but may be diluted to below detectable concentrations by adverse weather conditions. To maximize the chances of detection, sample collections should be made as rapidlyhemical assault as possible, and with many agents this means minutes to hours. Under the circumstances of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan this has simplyen possible. While numerous samples werefew of them held any realistic prospect of yielding positive results. It is fortunale that trichothcccncs are sufficiently persistent to allow detection several months after lhe attack.
amples have been collected from Southeast Asia sincend from Afghanistan since0 To date aboutndividualgreatly varying types and usefulness for analyticalhave been collected and analyzed for the presence of traditional CW agents, none of which have been delected. On the basis of recommendations by medical and loxicotogical experts and of findings by the CSL. many of the samples have been analyzed for the trichothecenc group of mycoioxiits. Four samples, two from Kampuchea and Iwo from Laos, were found to contain high levels of Irichotheccoc tonus.results of several additional Samples indicate the prewnci- nf tiheir mctaliohlev butt ifon of iheir levelsiudiug Uelailsthe sainiifos. Including the circumstances of their collection, lhe analysis, and ihe results, arc prnvided in volume II. annex II.
Degrees of Confidence In Identification of Specific Classes of Chemicals Used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan1
Confirmed
Prcbabht
Probable
Suspected
Pcobat*
PraUbfe
Prab.bk
Probable
l-*o* Kampuchea Alabama an
Tricho>.bec*ne toxiniProbable
Probable
Veticanti tad unicornSuipectccl
Probable
The confidence Leveb ibowa refer lo the identification of specific ehemkib used, mal lo ibe probabdily lhal tome foem ol lethalai toed. We MOtlder theertainty.
Soviet Chemical Warfare Activities
vidence accumulalcd since World War II clearly shorn lhal lhe Soviets have been extensively involved in preparations for large-scale offensive and defensive chemical warfare. We haveie chemical warfare agents and delivery systems ihey have developed, probable production and storage areas within the USSR, and continuing research,and testing activities at ihe major Soviet chemical proving grounds. None of Ihe evidence indicates any abatement in this program. The Soviets havetrong interest in improving ortheir standard agents for giealer reltabilily and effect. Theii large chemical and biological research and development effort has led them to investigate olhei kinds of CW agents, particularly theibliographs nu Soviet research in the toxin field is included in volume II. annex D
lie Soviets have su|tplird selected chemical jei-nlS. deli-els Systems, and training inclienni.il,inn:m. Afghanistan, and Egypt. In all cases tvlicrc chemical warfare has beenLaos. Kampuchea, and ads'ise't and lechineians
wait: facility or oigsniialion foi lite manufacture of chemical and biological material! Not are tliey- ixJuccd even small quantities of chemical warfare icerus o> munitions The technical problems of arge quantities ol "ciixmsiji ade utiiii, in no) so giejl as to prevent any ol lhe four COuniries from learning lo manufactwe. purify, and wear-Mine these maiCfiab. Il is highly unlikely, how ever, (hat ihey could masterunction* without acquiring iHitsidc technical know. The only connwn to be ptovidme chenncjl warfare to ihescite Soviel Union
4Ij Hse Soviets Imvc hid adviscis and technician*nd Kampuchea for many years, but not until9 did evidence connect lhe Soviet military diicctly with chemical warfare activities. The evidence is quite conclusive^
^clandestinehich provided more detail on the rnid-Febtuar* visit and on another
Soviet inspectionclurmical wailarc experts in |une ISM
47lhat lhe ctiemlcal section
in Xiangkhoanc prepared Soviet manufactureditems for inspectionoviet military teameven-man team of Soviel chemical artillery experts, accompanied bv Laotian chemical officers, inspected chemical supplies and artillery lounds al the Xeno storage facilityne report staled lhat the Soviet team would be impeding the same chemical explosives used loihe H'Mtmc leaxstancc in the Phoua. In
-1
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude from all llie evidence that selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under direct Soviet supervision, have employed lethal trichothecenc toxins and other combinations of chemical accnts against the rl'Mong resistance forces, including their villages, since athousands have died, have been severely injured, or were driven from their homeland bv tlse use of these agents.
Kampuchea. The evidence strongly supports the conclusion thai tlie Vietnamese have similarly been using lethal Irichofhecene toxins and other corobina-lions of chemical warfare agents on Democratic Kain-puchcan forces and other resistance groups since at
Afghoniitan. Wc conclude thai Soviet forces in Afghanistan haveide variety of lethal and-nonlclhal chemical agenls on Mujahedin resistance forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion Infghan Government forces probably used chemical weapons before lhe Soviel invasion, but we cannol identify lhe types of agenls used. Il has nol been possible to identify the agents used by the Soviets through sample analysis,umber of reliable sources have named the agents brought into the country and have described where and when thev were used. That information has been correlated with all other evidence, including (he reported symptoms VVc conclude that nerve agents, phosgene oiimc. and various incapacilanls. and irritants probably have been used Other agents and loilc smokes arc abr> availably in counlrt.wc cjnnol Stale cniifidenlly thai ib'i have been used Some ol the reported symptoms arc consistent with tliosc produced by lethal or sublethal doses ol trichothecenc toxins, but nnr evidence is nol conclusive
The Soviet Role. We conclude lhat the Soviels Cillvcr provided tin: lo.in weapons directly or provided lhe loiins lor wcaponixalinii in Vietnam amiommon practice in the Soviels' own military forces is
lo store agents in bulk and move Ihcm lo the field for munitions fill as needed. Our assumption that (his practice is also followed in Indochina and Afghanistan is supported bvl
(specify that Soviet technicians supervise the shipment, storage, filling, and loading on aircraft of lhe chemical munitions The dissemination techriQucs repotted and observed arc evidently drawn from years of Soviet chemical warfare testing andNo intelligence is at hand to supporl anyexplanation, bul ive cannot completely rule oul the possibility thai Soviet technical assistance has enabled al least lhe Vietnamese to conducl antoxin production program.
Moliualion fo< Chemical Weaaon Use. In volume II,. we consider tlie question of motivation. Isilitary-strategic or tactical rationale for the systematic use of chemical weapons in Laos.Afghanistan, and Yemen? We conclude that tbe mililary problems faced in all lourviewed from live peispcctive of lhe Soviets and theirthe use of chemicalilitarily effective way of breaking lhe will and resistance of stubborn guerrilla forces operating Irons relatively inaccessible protected sanctuaries These weaponssubstantial advantages over conventional weapons In all four countries Ihe resistance was able through conventional means to frustrate Soviel and client-state objectives of caiending and consolidating control over lhe countries attacked Tlie Soviets nrnli-ilily reasoned that atlauiiiii-ulest*(imckli and cheaply as possible- justified use of chemical weapon! andmall risk o' exposure andcondemnation They may welt have calculated thai they and their allies could siicccssliillv counterdeny charges thai chemical .vej|mn had lien used, rccngniiiric that il would be as dilficult In compileidrrnce from Smithes) Asia and Afghanistan as ii was from Yemen ins In addition, tin- Soviet military very likely cmu'dci ihese
'i".': area* t% pi ovi'.i. unior lit)
operational testingalualion of chemical wcap oit! under various tactical condition;
Wc found siippoil lor tins conclusion
^Soviet Military Acade-m> ol Chcnucal Defense in Moscow
3
three types ol chemicalinitial stages" of local wars: "harassing agents (CS. CK.ncapacitanis such as psychnchcmicaU (ft/.) or t On OS (sic diossibiv
nduring the "decisive phase, lethal agents can be employed under certainlocal war, chemical weapons can be used to spoil enemy efforts lo initiate operations, even il the enemy has not used them
etailed descriptions ol the Soviet chemical warfare
[supports lhe conclusion that me Sovietschemical weat>ons an effective andsns of warfare even in local conflicts.
22
IMPtlCAflONS
volume II, chapter IH.consider andumber of alternative explanations for lhe phenomena observed One hypothesis best fits all .he evidence: the Soviet* had benun tooxim by at lean thend have used these weapons tn Lam and Kampuchea, and pouihlu in Yemen and AfehanUtan.
If this hypothesis is sustamed. il means lhal lhe Soviets have Rainedenenre ihioueh operalional use of bioxoxins Ifre correct, lhe United States and its alhese- threat not previously coiriidcred in .nteJIcence estimates and defense nlanninc
Funhetrnofc. lar more pot col toons than lhe triImr classeen eiienuvelv investigated bv institutes in the USSR that are linked to chemical and
b.olog.caI weapons development Indeed, the Soviet military consider the employment of chemical weap-ons by their forces and those of their allies to be an acceplable and effeciive means ol Depressingeven in local wars
esult, countries lile Thailand, Pakistan, and China may develop an even greairr seme of alarm in contemplating eonfl.ct with ihrnion or its allies. Chinese expert* are arWl, rranalvzinc their cdencr on Viilanim use of cftraiiral agents agamy thru fo.ee*9 fWinn.1ersWerilnm. Inert-ct-inc lalfl aU lid MaVIM lhat lethal chemical -eaioos may necome an accepted method of limited warfare in conflict* throughout the Third
n
OiSStAMNAllON NQTICC
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