Lebanon: The Prospects for Islamic Fundamentalism BM
A Research Taper
Lebanon: The Prospects for
fundamentalism is the newest and most dynamic force on the
W*mmmpolitical scene, b'jt the emergence of an Islamic republic is only a
ulrdrrert
distant possibility. Majcr opposition to an Islamic republic comes from kc> miliiias including moderate 5hias and Sunnis. Christians, and Druze and fromeighbors. Syna and Israel.ull-scale Syrian crackdown, the Islamic fundamentalist movement probably will Succeed only in cementing its hold on si/able parts of South Beirut, the Bckaa Valley around Ba'iahakk, and southernr thetwo years.
An Islamic fundamental's! movement probably would hove developed in Lebanon without outside support, but Iranian aid hasajor stimulant. Thirteen years of civil war, government neglect of rural areas and Shia imcicAis, 3rd repeated Israeli "ntcrventims laid the foundationevolt;.ionar> Islamic ideology Tfce success of the Iranian revolution and the resulting wave of Islamic nv.iilancy throughout the Middle East fostered the spread of fundamentalism in^Lebanor.
Radical Islamicnd political successes have provede potent forces within the largely impoverished Shia community. The 3bsencc of any hope (or early polit.ca! reformatisfactory end to the Lebanese civil war is increasing the appeal of radical ideology amongportions of the Shia and Sunni Muslim communities. The strong Islamic resurgence is evolving into broad-based popular movements with effective networks of followers committed to political and social change. The transformation of the largely impoverished and once apathetic Shiasynamic, albeit divided, community is iikciy to accelerai
The keyhe Islamic fundamentalist mo-cmen; is Sbaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallab, who is considered by most Lebanese as the spiritual euiccost powerful radical group inbe is not himself part or the organization's leadership. Fadfailah, ihe most revered Shia cleric in Lebanon, is determined to maintain an independent Lebanese Islamic movement. His relationship with Iran is ambivalent, and Tehran is wary of bis influence. One key to Fadlallah's power is bis control of the clandestine Da'wa Party of Lebanon, which bas covcrtl} manipulated the radical Shia movement
Ideological differences within the Shia community and between the Shia and the Sunn: communities pose gr;a, obstacles to the establishment of an
Islamic republic ir. Lebanon, Tbe country's Islamic fundamentalistre cxtremc'yondition that undermine* their Krer.glb. The Shia Hizballah and tbe Scnni Islamic Unification Movement Ere both strong supporters of Iran. Other groups like ibe Muslim Brother-hood are ambivalent toward Iran. The largest Shia movement, Arnal,n the defensive, is closely linked to Syria. There appears to be insufficient incentive for these organizations to unite
Lebanon's Christianallied withtbe fretting po*cr of the Sfcias and especially of Hizballah with alarm Christian hardliners are prepared to see Lebanon divided rather than five in to Muslim political demandsore equitable distribution of power ami believe that concessions would be; Muslimsign of weakness Druzt leaders also oppose Islamic fundamentalism and Shia domination bui have chosen to le; others take the lead in fighttn? thextremis*.
Svrian bchaiior, at least In the short term, will be the*ke> determinant of Hizballah's prospects. Syria's intervention in West Beirut inhich was intended to save Amal from defeat by Druzc militiamen
and to bolstereclining credibility in Lebanon, curtailed radical Hizballah activities in West Beirut but did not afTect Hizballah's
stronghold in the southern suburbs.ia decide to move aga:ns: Hizballah, Damascus has the strength to force the movement underground and weaken r butcav> co.tS
Israel will confront an increasingly strong Islamic movement in the south over the next few years. The absence of Syrian troops, tbe provocation of Israel's presence, and the cumulative impact of years of strife make the south tn attractive target for fundamentalists. The Israeli-backed Army of South Lebanon already is lockedonfrontationeveral troups, but primarily with Hizballah
For the United States, radical Shia growth means more terrorism againsi Western and Israelinhanced regional prestige for extremism at tbe expense of the moderate forces, and increasing opportunities for the rzdicah to stage incidents that couldyrian-Israeli conflict. Less likely is tbe chance that the Islamic extremist threat could set the stageimited convergence of US* Syrian, and Israeli intercs
mm
Contents
Sumru7>
nFoice
fot Lebanon! Isiairic Reiurge-cc
Key Role
s Reeiona! Succcsse*
to the Establishf ai Itlamic Republic >
8
Schism
Drute
Cfcruuim
I i
Scenario
Isismic Kaci-ali-'^ ir.
Shia
f ihs
Shia tUriz. Muiaf-.rs: primarily Shia
partiesshicis fil :h
a:icr. ir.i!:iMJllocated ta :he Mu&xs or. :hefcjl'.ty ic :hsan leadenhir tnif :hs poiiLicala: favvred ChrUUar.he ira-JUicsa!kadefirie ir; is*
in; M
The ChrU'.iar-darr.lr.aieJushrr. it.hieNMCted MuUnA civi!I'.cw.fO-Ntllrfle MuHfl:o 9nd Muslirr.-supported Pa'er.iriar, Ssht-cn can: cIjk :athe Bovcmmen: of Ch:ii:iar. President Helu. Both of these IVMU dem-
rfli irfcrrr. and in":
Inr^iu- for Lehinar.'i IsIsriI;
Taea'::t> ofetar.cnilitarycf liethe MK^ccssaait ca" LcbdStM Islarri;Thealttf
f -ni ther.-aiiaaHimra of the IranianLebi^cic > cmuaiet
5X
Lebanor.'s deepening social and economic crisisfur.hsrfor :hs sharp f':sticcsfim. . - h; at i
Lebanese MulIiMIeen joining fvr.darr.in'.a'.ii:
Christian Drtzt
j
Ami,f
rescac- iio the: lien, The -lucccstfvll Irtin ic er.'
jili
il! the imag:
ijsih; displacement of thousands ofes
aston cf Leo:no*2wtthec security ion: areof Lebanon's Muslimof the population in lb* south beir-oiicd fc> both radical Sbus andne*oer religious brad from the south
to sufferficr- ere cntoQCifl" and rower of ihe militant Shi;
FadlaUab's Ke) Role
ir. Lebanonkm 'h"*
Advocates of ihe Islamicthe need to establisheat on a
toublic. somea;
nd Subat il-Tufayli vi of ar. Islamic republic as an imn these clerics, an Islamiccep-.zb!r. alternative.-social chaos tr Lebam
Other clericss Sbaykh Mubsr.rr.ad Husayr.important'.cncf an islamic republic as an evoiutlonSO proccsi In interviews Fadlallahthaisep political and religious cleavages
inherentbjnesc society prevent LM near-ierm establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon Fadiallah has repeaiedls rebuffed Iranian pressure to call openly fur the establishment of an Islamicbecause thu would alarm the majority oficc'.aTiaa grocpt "bo feci threatened byroposal. lie believes that an> such advocacy would only aggravate the deepening split in the Sbiaand coninbuie to its isolation!
Fadla'.tab views Iran's political goals in Lebanon as potentially ta conflict with fcis percepnon of his role as the leader of Lebanon's fragmented Sbia community. He wanu Hizballah to remain free of outsideand under bis direct control. FadlaJUh prevented Hizballah from fallowing Tehran's order to attack
Syrian security farces following;
West Beirut last February.
Radical Ad'ocezes of sr. Islamic Republic
Iniicn regim ailcmaiive tc
r-ier:ck.en to presshiion'sfi/iV (rtr a
msl'S
ebanese Muslim Brotherhood, increasingly tiiv iff the Beirut and SlSan areas, is foreman amon/
Ifproblems irf.uenceejfWt . .- Be'taa. ir the toutk. and in! ts :hc eitzbitshmentrepublic more pressing goals such ec etr-el-
tiffOtti Iflf
and-ichztag ser-lar
m.JHifjirion:!
ii
m
Islamic 'uli'but Syria an* attempt. A'-tr been drastico Sha'bar.ranian-szyle
Sunni proponents of er.epubliclest eloseft associatebut still inTheotfly structuredorganization lid by Sw.ni sch iters andmaintain close ties ta Hizballah.adviser ShayU Muhammadetguterly meet' *ith Muslimtc. coordinate fundamentalist acti-ilits.Brotherhood also hatke
nifiedti-
trtaalroup if iwniL'R:fi" -p
Brotherhood survivors fled to Lebanon following Dameicus's massacre of Brotherhood members in Hamc2 and blended into the middle-andcommunities ini j'jiBgfci
The proponents of en hlami: republic in Lebanon are linkedomplex but loose political, social.
the ILM's military eetfilies have irta-.led. hi leader Shcykh Said to ccllfo' the establishment of an . me republic and seeks to strengthen his ties to I'Credge against theampaign sga-.ns:ther IL'Ms|
izballah maintains close fundamentalist movements In a, South Lebanon, and the Be-
The success of the Islamic Grouping !At Jama'a Alstrongestli theestablishing centers in Beirut end Sidon with Iranian backing indicates that Tehran is likely to continue using such front organizations to advance its goals in
.
the frctta
J the Islcmi; Front headed by
OtherrganizationsssemblySunni and Sell elt-ica!
consultative
olitical
hfaadical She ra-amiUzz'y g'oupstffwroals such as the establishment of er. Islamicie bu: often djc on taci.ca! or operational mailers'.
: "fl'ivi mcluitl Islamic Amel faAmal group headed by militant She operative
Musawi and based ir. tht Btkacke Husayni Suicide Forceselative of Husaynbdallah Musa-ii.he Muslim Stu-dttu' Union{headed by Shaykh Fadla'.lah
Hizballah's structure is gearedrovide intensive politics! and religioustijr. as' diparamilitary training. According ta an Israeli intelligence analysis. Hizballah ha:regions! nrS-ir.izctions withierarchy. Each Hizbollsh regional cer ler ii dividedmlian and military scc.ions
7k< cuilian sections are responsible /or political indoctrination and training and Instill in Hizballahtrong sense of dedication to theThe civilian sections are also responsible lor religious indoctrination.on the Iranianonjlsts of Imensite daily study of Islamic political institutions and thoughton Jihad or holy war. According to Israeliomplex network of mosques, religious meeting ctnte't. and academic centers is used in ike Hizballok-controUtd villages and toons for political and military indoctrination^
Hizballah mobilizes and recruits followersell-developed propaganda program. Theand Indocr,nation Center controls the publication
of Al Ahad and A! Sabil. Both publications focus on Hizballah military operations and achievements and highlight the notion of Islamic martyrdom byphotos and wills of Hizballah fighters killedtion They alsoadicals throughout ikeas oneeader of Egypt's Al Jihad group.ballaKs regional goals,illahadio station in thei'oice of thebroadcasii ami' Christian, ami'lsraeli. and anti-Western propaganda
Hizballah has considerably expanded its military organization in recent months. Israeli intelligence states thai Hizballah's military force includes several units designated aslthough they are probably smaller and less well equipped ihanbrigades The "brigades" containcommando, and civil defense units and are stationed in major regional areas!
AflizbsUah's close relationship with the
iiaria', fttvol-jiicr.cry Guard contingent in ihe Bekaa Valley mirrors Hizballah's ideological affiniiy withhe Shaykh Abdallah barrarks in themost important facility, servingrimary garrison, base, end communication!also the headquarter* for the Revolutionary
banon. Accordingress reports in April. Hizballah leaders say Iranian, penonn^ alsotationed inanoi
n Iran on Syrian [roop depositions in
informed of its positions He lodged suchTehran last February following'.rytroops into West Beirut and short!>the Iranian Embassy resuming thai>
troop deployments in Beirut's southern suburbs. Fad-lalialt visitedn Aprilid hi> Own tolks
Beirut
determination to be independent ofhasource of continuingIt hat prompted Tehranealing directly -through the Iranian embassies in Bciratind thrcujh the IraniancoDttngeet in the Bekaa vallc> Iraninfluence through the Council of Lebanon,body tbat includes the Iranianto Syria and Lebanon, the commander ofGuard conlingenl in Lebanon,Lebanese ShiahreeCouncil of Beirut, the Council of the Bekai,Council of thealso created bystrengthen Tehran's infuence and to reinforceto local Shia leaders The Bwnufc ir.eeiwith
Fadlallah engigea in numerous informal meet.rigsr.it Shia clerics ar.c" security onciatsleans of ci retg Tehran Fadllliah has beer, displeased in the put that Iran: kept htm
Hizballah's KcEional Successes
Hizballah bn established what isadical Islamic carton in the Bekaa Valley, despite Syria's military presence there. Tbe areas under Hizballah control are subject to strict Islamic rules Sale and transport of liquor are prohibited, women arc foefrom interacting -nth men io public and must adheretrict dress code, civil crimes are punished according to the Koran,
lizballah's success in the Dckaa is in "pan related to its links to hey Shian the valley.
Figure :
Ubanon: Estimated Distribution ol Confessional54
TheTufayh. anddi clans have long been ke> figures tn the Beua andliaa Hirtal-lab 'important grassroots support
Hizballah also is gaining gioundja .South Lebanon -
in 3jijjijjbjriif
vcs iq thel
Axal appears to be losing its competition wilbfor the loyalty of the southern Lebanese Shias We believe that Hizballah's success stems from its ability to scoreagainst Israel and the Israeli-backed Army of South Lebanon. To survive. Ansa) is increasingly fcrecd to compete -ua Hizballah on the same level. The AsMl leader la Tyie. Da ud Da'ud, imposed Islamic rule in areas under bisthat Hizballah's drive io establish Islamic fundamentalism in the south is popular among tbeevolt last Marcheader Nabth Barn's former aide Hassao Hi-shem sharpened Barn's differences with twoeaders in the south. Da'ud Da'cd andiqil
Hizballah bas proved to be the mosteirut Theis the mostthe soutbern suburbs,isplaced Shias from Souththe Syrian troop deployment into thecnizballahcenters in the beart of West
Beirut, often rivaling Actal and other mihtias for control of that section cfm
Hub; lost these strongholds following the Syrian entry,a consolidate uaidethe southern .iL'^iMHirbsUah is
Although Hizballah withdrew from West Beiruithe lots of iu main inlerrogalion center aod the killing of ai leastf its followers by Syrian soldiers last February, itlandestine pieacncc. Syria views seriously Hizballah's threatu occupation forces The Syrian security forces in West Beirut ao longer venture into remainingstrongholds Li the capiul such as Pas Anraditionally Sunni neighborhood on the Green Line
Obstacles to tbe Establishment of an Islamic Republic
esult of ihcir fears of Ihc Shias' numericalthe Druze. Christians, and moderaieMus-iims all oppose Shia domination of LeH
Sunnl-Shia SfAijmfgBmSjBtrad/Jonal Sun-ni-Shia schismajor obuaSero thee.'oru to establish an Islamic republic InAlthough Muslim leaders often quote the Koran in exhorting Muslims lo unite, they remainReligious aod political! divisions between the two sects are so deep that they will almost certainly prevent serious discussion of Ihc nature and leadershipebanese Islamic republic
The D'uze. The Pruze would viewhreat to their enclave Druze relations with Hiz-
ballah bare remained cordial only because Dmze leader Junblatt docs not considerear-term threatbe Druze enclave^ "
The proponents o: an Islamic republic ir. Lebanon face LH3Jor in:-msl political and military obstacles
/
Cr anian-dominatcd regime it Lebanon are addingfragmentation and potential radicaUf^or. of In-iovemeot.
AmaL Amal opposes tie establishment of aoeven though leader Nabii Barri continuesfor drastic political reformt the
reater share of the country's politicalpower. Barri continues to challengein Leriaon, while Tehran bis refutedof the Lebanese S'iaand his
(oward the estsblisamenl of an
Barri argues that Islamic fundamentalism is inappro-te in Lebanon because of the country's ur.lc.ue lory and social character. Amal must continue to tisate itsrclatioaship wili the Islamic government of Iran, he states, but at the same time it must strive to avoid emulating the Iranian model inarri argues that the establishment oT an Islamic republic in Iran had its own justifications, since thety of Iranians are Shia Muslims. Lebanon differs drastically from Iran because it i* composed of competing sectarian groups, all possessing legal and historical rights to etcrcise meaningfulre Litcly lo accept the hegemony of one group without^Beetivc guarantees for minority
Other. Secular groups also oppose the growing power of the fundamentalists. The Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social Natioasxst Party, two Syrian-backed factions in Lebanon, have clashed with Hizbalkh several times is the post yea;
.
iij noses ihe greaiest ihrealn IsTaSciurSimerlalLst movement in Lebanon. Syria is not willing to clamp clown oa Hizballah and :he;ehy sacrifice its alliance with Tehran, buts
anough line inward ther.tilliuew wave of kidnaping! ofebanese in West Beirut lait Janua tnd February. Damascus took limited steps to restr Hizballah activities in the Bekaa The kidnaping in rcbruarv of Jeanian former aid;Gemovcl was especially irriuiingccordingss rererj, Symi
iCCVfUs troops de farnilj lo gain thi
rhe entry of SynconfrO toew tab's control
Syrian security forces view Hizballah and iu main militaryIranian RevolutionaryNumerous clashes have taken place between Hizballah and Syrian security officials and other Syrian surrogates in the Bekaa during the past year.
Abdallah barracks has been occassonally harassed by
the Syria
If Syrian'Iranian relations deteriorate. Syria almost certainly wiK lighten its grip oc the Bekaa Valley in anticipationajorh Hizballah If Syria is forced lo choose between accepting the consequences of crushing Hizballah orits policy to the growing fundamentalist influence in neighboring Lebanon.t would decide reluctantly to crush Hizballah If pressed. Damascus would use Ihe same brutal tactics it usedrush the Muslim Brotherhood la Hama. For example, the Syrians would shell Beirut's southern suburbs rather than engage in bouse-lo-house fighting that would result in heavy Syrian caiuiltiesbut limil the loss of among civilian residenu m|
cli enonsd gain Hizballah izc the Shias in rawal from the
Tel Avivruel attack the Shias insldt more supportersanon. Ar
.'Israel is also an important obstacle tosuccess, but it hat few options available to defeat the fundamentalists lliael seeks lo countergrowing military capabilities in southern Leba-matnl) by relying on Ihe Army of South Lebanon.
The determination of Hizballah to strike at US personnel and installations has clearly hampered the conduct of US diplomatic, military, and commercial .representatives in Lebanon. The continued presence of the US Embassy Annei in Easi Beirut spurs Hirbai-lab to increase, its operations against US citizens. Hizballah's links toSunm fundamentalist movements and to the Palestinians will ensurehese oigani-rations will have ample support to carry out terrorist activities against Western interests in Lebanon For Hizballah, ihese operations have helped swell the ranks of the ladicaljjy
If Hizballah succeeds in replacing Anal as theShia organization in Lebanonmerethan the establishment of an Islamicwill Increasingly turn its attentionpro-Western Christians and pro-Israeli Arm>Lebanon. Increased attacks on Israel'sby Hizballah would force Israel toagainst Hizballah's
development thai is certain to aggravate ihe security problems in South Lebanon andiMh^ military and politicalM||KBaaBi@ Israeli retaliation would prolorgTleWesieretov tivity and threaten their physical safety.
Outlook
The Lebanese Islamic fu-icamer.ulists' efforts toan Islamic republic will continue to create serious difficulties for the United States. Htiballah seeks xc
Allhoughbelieve that Deiiher Damascus nor Tel Aviv is eager to engage the other militarily over Lebanoo. -creased Hizballah attacks oa Israel'szone could set the stage for fighting between Israel and Syria. Israel would probably feel compelled ic retaliate with airstrikes agair.st suspectedtargets deep ir.ctupitd lernic-
blyii-'. vst
ttack:
izballah north nf ihc security zone mightlo mobilize ils forces irlcvasoii":c: per^ived threau to Us prescrcc attacks ins'.icaied by Iran andbancse Hizballah relatives of the prisoner
potential existsonvergence of US, Syr.an, and Israeli inieresis in hilling the growth of Shia extremism in Lebanon. The key player is Damascus.
which is reluctant to break with Iran but may bc^
ntc republic cmerget
forced by -vena io do:
cenario
In the unlikely event that an Isl ir.because de forced Damascus to turn inwsrd-ih: failed Stales are more gravi
Establishment of an Ulan: republic wouldL'S interests ir. several moderate Gulf states where the Sbia communities" demographic ar.dir.flucnce isSaudi Arabia's Eastern Province, Bahrain, and Kuwait are mcst vulnerable to pro-IraniangUatica. Kuwait, wherehia
An Islamic fundsmenialist success in Lebanon would provide other Islamic movement* in tbe region with the impetus to challenge existing moderate Arab regimes The fundamentalist trend has been growing in Egypt. Sudan, Tunisia. Jordan, and Turkey since the success of the Iranian revolution Although deep ideological differences hamper Tehran's efforts to unify ibe Islamic fundamentalist movement underH|^K> victory in Lebanon would ericouraKeTBsTrJ^vrrWtl Eastern fundamentalists lo adopt theehicle for social and political change
The creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon wwld stimulate the political activism of Palestinians on the West Bank and contribute lo closer cooperationfunda men ia Iks and Palestinian nstier.ahsu. Should the fundamenuliia winanon. West Bank Palestinians would be likely io turn increasingly
Selected Sayinjis of Fadlallah
oneerious flap, to solve ihe Lebanesell proposals for peace in Lebanon have so far been either confusing or selfoMuslin or Christian, could be viable ic Lebanon These who to turn Lebanonuslim state arc in esience fooling themselves if (hey believe thattale could survive The governing of Lebanon should depend or. people, noteveral people objectbe plan for an Islamic republic and accuse its advocate* of extremism, but they do not object to ih; planarxist state, which oppose* all religions. Islam, in its political plan, does notChumanity, which does not have inolitical plan. Christianity is an act of faith, fo: the kingdom of Chriit is not of this weJfM Q
M> relationship with Iran is one of iodepetsdencc We cor.sult with Tehran but do not take orders from it. The revolutionary circumstances in Iran aredifferent from those in Lebanon Q
We believe, thai war with Israel will necesviiaie the destruction of many Arab cities and towns But we believe thai, the more Israel expands, the deeper it will sink in the mire and the closer it draws to defeattrategytrategy of jihad that insists lhai ihc presence of Israel in Palestine is illegal and ibat it is an imperialist basereat danger to the Arab and Muslim world. Il must, therefore, be removed from the map completely This is what tbe slogan of liberating Jerusalem mejnv K
This Islamic revolution was able to create, in its increasing activity at ihereat deal of
Islamic political awareness boih in thought andThe uprising of the Islamic movement in Iranebanon inspires the Muslim as to how Islam can lead tc freedom and progress. We believe lhat the Islamic revolution has an important role to play in achieving ihis Muslim awareness. The challenges that accompany and confront tbb revolution alsoto thispj
The Syrian presenceuspect, haso with their judging the international climate as conducive to theirecurity solution onyria itself is being usedroxy on behalf of other powers to apply pressure and lo make other things possibleve coihing to do
Whati stake i* ihe freedom and right of the mujahedin to continue their armed struggle agamn the Israelis. AnHmprovement in security in the region is not welcome if it results in restriction! on ihe resistancey re-creating the spirit of jihad we have been able to inflame the urnmapeoples] even in occupied Palestine. We sec Israelegional danger that must be confrontedthe com d'
Original document.
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