the soviet defense industry: coping with the military-technological challenge
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The Soviet Defense Industry Coping With the Military-Technological Challenge
A Reaenn* Paper
patter wu preparedof Soviet Analyst)-
Contribution* were provided by analyiu from SOVA, lhe Office of Scientific and Weapons
Commcnu and queries are welcome and may be
directed lo lhe Chief
SOVAo
SOVVtOOIlDX
The Soviet Dcfcme Industry: Coping Wiih Ibe
werebecomiog
-omul about tbe growing mitiury-lecj^logical challenge
by tbe United(he defense
leadership was persuaded that its traditional approach of relyingnumbers of weapons to offset Wcatem texhnokjyical advanlagea not meet ibis cbaJktige. Soviet mlliury
indicate that key defense planners believed if tbe USSRwsa to compete fectivcly wiib (be miliury power of the United States, tbe weapons industries icquiced extensive and sustained Dvodenuzatioa
Before, Ibe Soviets had paid neater attentionxpanding production capacity (ban to improving manufacturing technology. Throughout, roughly two-thirds of capital investment in industryhole was devoted to construction, leaving oa average leas than one-third for the acquisition of machinery and equipment. Soviet literaturej of Soviet weapons suggest that tbe defense industry applied iu investmenT fundsimilar manner This policy, together with low replacement ratesolete machinery and equipment and (be fact (bat even new defense plants werequipped with machinery designed years earlier, resultedargely outdated manufacturing capability.
Tbt IVfenst-lndiwlilal Moderahatlon Program
In tbe, the SovietsornprebcDirve modern;rationdefensemajor capital irrrpeovwnonts in
tbe aircraft,esseraad shipbuilding industries. Our analysis of the Soviet machineryfor tbt production of consumer durables, investment goods, and militarythai between the early aadhe share of investment in the defense-industrial ministriea Increased substantially.
The USSR abo embarked on programs designed to support this upgrading of the defense industries:
Theretep-up in tbe development of advanced machine tools,nd microelectronicneeded so produce advanced weapons and improve productivity. Mack of this work was
undertaken within the defense industry itself
7
Ai legal import! of Western plant and equipment soared in the, tbe Soviets quickened (he pace of their ambitious covert acquiti-(ion programs. Access to Western manufacturing equipment, pecccaaca, and know-how has enabled Soviet defense plaats to introduce some advanced weapons into production cp lo five years earlier than would have been possible with indigenous capabilities.
The Soviets improved the coordination between weapon designers and producers and tried lo involve more than one ministry or plant in theproductioniven weapon system, measures which have helpedecessary duplications of effort
This commitment to defense-industrial modernization appears to have beta helped by the rise of Dmitriy Ustinov, who had been gaining favor, position, and power since the. He bad long advocated Western-style management technlquca, and the policies he implemented dearly indicate that be believed general economic growth and modernization lo be the bedrock of ibe USSR's defease potential. His appointment to ibe position of Minister of Defense6 and (be subsequent appca'nlrnent of like-minded subordinates probablyoalescence of views on the broad guidelines of defense-industrial moderniutlon policies
Results of the Program
The pace and scope of Ibe defense-industrial modernization effort to dale have been uneven. Much of the effort has been in the form of new plant and equipment rather (ban major retooling of existing facilities, suggesting that considerable renovation still needs to be done in older facilities. Moreover, the level of techno logy even in new production facilities often lags well behind (he overall kvel in ihe Weal. Nevertheless, the expansion of manufacturing facilities and selected improvements in production technology have given the defense industries Ibe plant and equipment needed to produceer^nt of the hardware that tbe Intelligence Community is projecting will be deployed by the end of tbe decade, as well as (he advanced weapons that we expect lo be fielded through the. Attesting to Ihe progress the Soviets have made in modernizing their defense industries is the number of new systems already in production that demand relatively advanced manufacturing technology and equipment
to (tied requirements for miniaturized componentry, new materials, and complex surface geometries. These0 tanks;ndnterceptors;nd Akula-class attack submarines; andurface-to-air missiles
Tbe introduction and widespread application of more costly equipment sets and integrated production lines require more time than modern rone with the less sophisticated technology used in manufacturing earlier weapon systems. This probably accounts in part for tbe factharp increase in the expansion of floors pace in tbeashad been the case in earlier periods of accelerated floorspaccby an upturn in the growth rate of military hardwarearger number of defense-industrial facilities were producing at lower rates or not producing at all
The rising dependence of the defense industries on materials andproduced by civil industry probably provided added impetus to Soviet efforts, begun in the, to upgrade the increasingly antiquated civilian production base. Leonid Brezhnev introduced measures to share defense management expertise with tbe civilian sector, to apply the mililary model to spur scientific and technological progress, and to reorient the Academy of Sciences and universities to applied research. At tbe same time, growth in investment in the defense hardware ministries was scaled back and investment in civilian machine building accelerated.ikhail Gorbachev not only endorsed these measures but also further stepped up the provision of resources lo civilian machine buildingplanned for civilian machine-building ministriessercent higher than tbe actual investmentis program singles out advanced machine tools, robotics, microelectronics, computers,management systems, and telecommunications for greater funding. In each of these areas, he bas initiated technology development programs withertse-industrial participation
Outlook for Defense Industry
Over the next decade, Soviet defense industrialists will have to dealixture of old and new challenges:
We estimate that the costs of Soviet weapon systems have increased appreciably with the introduction of each new. more capable systemiven weapon class. Although modernization has helped tbe Soviets to increase productivity in the defense-Industrial sector and to limit cost increases, the growing costs of technological development and exploitation will continue to drive up weapon costs, confronting designers and producers with pressures to economize.
hi seal
More capable weapon systems probably will allow replacement ol certain older military equipmenteu than one-for-one basis, easing tbe production burden but increaaing the need for exacting tolerances and itriet quality control.
Retrofits of older equipment, now under wayarge portion of lhe Soviet arsenal, case demands on weapon assembly planls; but suppliers of radioelcctronic components and subsystems, computers, and advanced materials will be hard hit as Ihey must support both new and retrofit programs.
The USSR probably will produce and deploy larger numbers of less capable weapons than ibe United Slates when doing so compensates for technological shortcomingsore cost effective way to meet military requirements. Moreover, the Sovieu have often succeeded In translating technological achievements into weapon systems more rapidly than the West does. Thus, the technotogical levdi of deployed Soviet and Western systems are more comparable than arc lhe general levels of technology. Over the longer term, however, the SovicU are almost certain to place even greater cmpbasu on the development and manufacture of sophisticated weapons that require upgraded industrial technology
This willall order. Gorbachev must contend with increasing resourceovernment hobbled by organization and systemic barriers to quick progress, and an incentive system that still retards industrial innovation. He also faces an increasingly sophisticated and reinvigoraiod military challenge from tbe West, iocUding the Strategic DefenseAnd hb civil-industrial nsodernizatioa program will compete for machinery and equipment resources with Ibe ongoing rnodcniization of the defense industries. Many defease plants, for example, need fartherwiih more precise and flexible computer -con trolled machine voces, special equipment to process new structural materials, and sophisticated, nondestructive testing equipment
Gorbachevs strategy seems directed in part at providing ibe requisite breathing space to give his investmenthance to work.he apparently has convinced most of lheleast forthat tbe modernization of civil industry ultimately will benefit lhe defense industries and the military. In foreign policy, his recent arms control initiatives, summit diplomacy, and efToru to mend fences with Western Europe, Japan, and China are reminiscent of Soviet foreign policy leading up to tbe detente period of. An improved Fast-Westif formalized by an arms controlbuy
Gorbachev more time to implement bis domestic economic agenda. Even so. tbe competition between defense and those components of civilnot directly supporting military-related productioa is likely to grow in thends the Soviets begin to tool op for production of tbe next generation of weapons. If tbe performance of the civilian machine-building sector has not improved sufficiently by then, the Soviets will have lo choose between delaying continued retooling of the defense industry or cutting back the ambitious goals for upgrading civil industry.
Cos
b
ttrrtfii Bltnk
paper analyzes Soviet efforts, which began in the, to
prepare the defense industry and its support base for the military-technological competition in. It also assesses the political, miliury. and economic implications of this rnoderrtizarion pro-
gram
Our analysis is based on evidence from Soviet policy statements,trends, and weapon programs and draws from substantial research on the Soviet military-industrial complex undertaken over the last few years in the Office of Soviet Analysis and other offices of the Directorate of Intelligence C
Th* Soviet DefeeaeiiisVVlihUwMiliu,,.
orTscJ their lower level of technological sophutica boaecoaocaJc perforins rice, tbe Soviets (and Ibe Russians) historically have reliedore*-track strategy In their military rivalry with mote techno-togieally and economically advanced Westernirst, they have devoted very lane amounts of bigh-Quality material and human resources to the miUury-industrial complex and its programs, often at the expense of other economic sectors. Second, they haverogram for weapons research,and production that plays to the strengths of their industrial base. Third, theyscorted Western notary-tc<3uxdog>cal advances
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Sclet rVtiaistrtes FTisaarOy Eaawed ta DefesH^-Udverial Proeaclio.
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Mifltary-tndaatria] Cesopkx
By sheer politkaJ sriD ud enormons ajloeatwoi of investment and msuspower. the Soviets have creased the worlds largest weaponsitse rndwitrial rnir.istries--iadadmg the leaden ia most industrialmost of their tfloru to lha provision of nulittry materiel bee tablet any one time, moreevelopmeot and test fadlitsea are engaged in the developmento ZOO new weapon and military support systems or majorof existing systems. Coocurreotly,sajor assembly plants, supported by thousand, of component and material productioare engaged In tbe productioa ofajor weapon systems. These combined efforts have allowed the Soviets to field, on average,najor new systemsajor upgraded ivsterns daring each of tbe past two decades
Agiag Praaaettoa TeckMtotj
Soviet leaders hate teat relied cat massive lafasiona of plant aad eooipmen: to irni/wm ibe economy aad spur economic devclopmetiL la every ininiitry ihey bare created large staffi and institutes charged with promoting advances in production technology. They have developed massive tyaleana for lechaical tafor-mauoa lo lafcrm anaaagen aad workers of new prod action technology TWy have tried varSoaaly to induce or require inch advancea by manipulating plan targets aad incentives, including adopting "certifiea-lion" prooodarca to force machinery and equipment prodaoen to meet "world standards."
Tbeae approaches have yielded incrementalthroughout tbe cocnoeny, withvirtue of its favoreda more rapid pace cjfrooderni ration.i that each aew
defease psaat has been equipped with at least some of Use best available machinery aad tooling. The rood-entuation of productioa technology for new weapon protrama hasgh priority; the decreeeach program specifies ia detail the obligations of all coo tn baton, uachsdiog machinery and equipmentefease ladastry has abo bad priority loot to suppliers, including not only foreign and elomealk civil industry but abo its own io-housebate. Indeed, Jie realisation inhat future weapon systcmi would require newprobably led the Soviets ia thendogie development of solid-rocket productioa technology. advanced metallurgy,materials,odern senuconducto" industry directly under tbe control of one or mote of the miniatriea principally engaged in defense production of military hardware
Nevertheless, most Soviet weapons -tared by an industrial bate that was antiquated by Westernhe expansion ofample, in the aerospaceaccorded higher priority than mea-lure* designed to eocoaragennovation and increase prodoctmty The Ii mi ted lechaicalimposed on the ma miing base by the
weapons of Ihat eraelatively plentiful Labor supplyat least permitolicy Theeaigboal, the Soviets devoted little more than one third of their capital investment in industry lo ibe acqaisiiioo of nuehii-ery.ecawparisoa, in theearly ihrce-fiftha of US industrial nrvesanseol was directedreequipping and moJerrurlng Useesale, the level of technological sophist! -catioa of Soviet machinery hrrentorics grew ilowly. Indeed, the average service life of Soviet iadaatrial equipment haa been caiinasted aiean, compared with average bvea ofean ia France. Germany, and Italy, aadears ia the United States
Fragmentary evidence from Soviet literatureIbai this tawits negativeprevailedd canes Signs of high-ledlagging efficiency fa Ihe defense indasiryappear in, and} then FirstNlkita Khrushchev complained that"the defense induiiry Is copingcreating god producing modemtasks could have been carried out moreandower cost
Soviet rtatensenis indicate that defense mansgcrs preferred to retain old, yei reliable equipment and to bslld new plants rather than to suffer downtime associated with the startup of new equirxneat and plant reasovalioa. la addition. Soviet developers of production technology and equipment vrartcd inisolation from weapon designers and producers, frustrsting efforts lo coordinate the advances iatechnology needed for some new weapon systems la contrast. US defease industry since at least thaypically has planned on replacing eqaipment every eight toears.
Functional Weapon Deekga aad Ptttnrnsaace
Taking into locovnt this production base, ihe Sovietsragmatic approach lo weapons development.
si renins predicubk, low-risk developmentweapon* that could be readily produced iaDeaignen cceisciously avoided ibe dmunproveo matenalt and OTponents. tlyie*
indxaieot) weapon* could be tnaaa factored wiih general purpose aaachiacrr aad cowipmcot cjer-aied by ajeiniikilled work force. For caaunple, a
t
Qesliauied thaiercent of lhe fabrica-ia the Soviet turfite-to-air missile industry had been done with manual labor, and thai aboalerceni of lhe manual labor requirements had been for semiskilled or onikilledlthough ihii design approach limit* the pace of technologicalthe Soviet* were able toombination of large-scale deployment and (ufBcicnt overallperformance to mitigate tbe technical deficiencies of individual subsystem* and components, whiteeasy operation and maintenance ba the heldonscript force with minimal technical skills
Moreover, daring lhead. Ibe Sovieu made considerable progTca* in Developing and proving new weapon leeJwiotegica while esploiiing the positive aspects of their weapon* acqu isitioo process. In particular, the Sovieu emphaitied technical area* inch as electronics and commanications thatmany of the advances ia weapon* performance that took place ia. Sunaluneousty, weremium placed on those fcaisrea of their aoquiiitiop process that encouraged program liability and pee-dicta bility. Tbcsc longsUnding practice* were set forth in the Unified Military-Technical Policy (UMTPk which lit appeared publicly in4 edition Of Marshal Orecbko* book Thf Armed Forres of ihe Soviei Siaie. It Is casentislly the codificationumber of practice* lhai date back tond callssystematic approach" io weaponincluding:
Selective bat preferential dtvcJopcnent of those technologic* that have the greatest potential for enhancing future military capabilities
Weapon development criteria that seek both the highest ucticaI-technical characteristic* and the lowest possible cost.
Monitoring tbe lystematic improvement of lheof all branches of Soviet forces, using systems analysis and forecasting, andlose eye on Western achievemenu la icieocc and technology.
of weapons aad equipment that are easy to operate or thai can permit redactions bt mfliury labor, especially through automation and
mechsniratiaa.
in rommand. control, and coenmuu-
esult of the design philosophy, the weaker technology base, and ihe industrial constraintsabove. Soviet neapoo* generally have been inferior to US weapon* in term* of performance and mission capabilities. Tocompensate for thesethe USSR ha* relied on numerical superiority, strong management of the weapons acquisition and assimilation process, crash programs, and access to Western technology:
military writings Indicate that quantitative superiority, panlcularty In land arms, has often been judged to be Ihe most feasible way lotbe generally higher level of performance and reliability of USoviet eiperieoce in World War II aad Soviet military witlings have indicated that the USSR eipeels even heavier kascsockar conflict Thus, the Sennets havelarge number* of oocoparativety aasopfaisti-catcd. speciabrcd systems to counter the moreasultirnisaion weapons of the West Indeed, even ia the, when US force eipanslon and modernization peaked in many areas, Soviet produc-lioo of major type* of weapons almost invariably eiceeded US production (sea table 2k
To help ipeed ihe production and deployment of new weaponbe Sovieu haveen trail ted weapon* forecasting and planningmanagedowerful governmenttbe MUilary-lnduilrial Cominisston (VPKk The
Table*
US aad Kiimahd Soilti Production of Major Weapon
Where possible, (he Soviets have acquired and exploited cost-saving Western technology totheir research, development, and production base.
Soviets attempt to minimize the lime for theof requirements and for developmentmaintain stable design teams, and strictlyto program schedules.
Analyses of weapons indicate that the Soviets move quickly to incorporate newly proven technologies even if behind Western research and development (RAD)deployed rysterna. In most weapon areas, programs lo develop new ormodifled systems have heed authorized aboej every five toears. The Soviets haveed forces by steadily upgrading proven weapons when newas fireavailable and can be adapted
The
This approach worked well for most of the postwar period. The USSR was able to field enough weapons o( suiPoient quality to erode or eliminate the US lead in key strategic and general purpose mission areas.
n US Technology
Fvcn by tbe, however, the Soviets bad become hacreosingiy concerned about the ability of the Umled Slates to shift Ike military balancela the West's favor by csfdorling its superior
technology.unclassified military
writings during tbeong liit of future US weapons that worried the Soviet military leadership. We bctievefC
, .JSha.
lhe SovieU viewed Ihe eventual deployraetsf of thcac systems, then slated for.irect threat to their hard-woe military gains daring the first three postwar decades:
When revolutionary military technology advances have been necessary, tbe USSR has spent lavishly and esUWished high-level oversight bodies todevelJ op fundamentally newas ICBMs. nuclear weapons, and possibly, more recently,devices.
al
Improving Weapon CasmMllileK The Seed fee Adrameed Malarials
Tke increasing use af scahsstlcated mew materials Is nanporttng aaremeei Im Ike teckntcal cnerocterisilet of NtNt
J-
Titanium heralded as ike asgsaj age rmataiestus* af Iu htgk strength la weight ratio, cxectlems ductility, and high heat eml eorrorlcmis used In aircraft, submarines, and missiles, with secondary uses Im spacecraft, surface ships,vehicles, and body <
CcvnpOJlX materials ore widely applied Im Western aerospace systems. Like ttlentum.generally formedombination of resin and boron, graphlle. or aromidlighter, stronger, and more resistant to corrosion than conventional structures and are Ideal for Increasing the perfcrmance of aircraft.
Manufacture of these materials requires cleanesrvirommiemts and relatively Ugh production sochistlcoitoti Production niacMmry must therefore have increased tolerances, and tnanufaciurers must use cenmputers extenstveiy
Although tkr StMetS have esswrimtmed with these advanced materials since thend used titanium successfully on theoxbet in the, widespread application was delayed until the. Titanium Is stood widely In submarine production, and composites are used in theransport,9 Fulcrum, and several other aircraft In developtmml
Th. routeJ Syriia-lirMli sir eUrfm.vtaeh the
SymiuerantnlX lo tbtne. dtimmHi.iaJltsUea. of Se-WlnaUOeatM trends confronted the defense leadership with amanpower pool from which to recruit tbe necessary personnel to operate and maintain anarsenal
The USSR therefore poshed harder on the weapons mcdermxatiori front in. Overall, the system adapted fairly well to those new deronnds.times for tome new advanced systems did not Increase significantly:
- New-ra-ptiisciple systems, incorporating advanced technologyumber of subsystems, haveoouiioucd to take nine toears.
Moderniied systems, incorporating advances insubsystems.continued to take fire to nine years.
Other minoran improved component or subsystem is developed andin an existing weapon in production, orla thestill required less (ban five yean
Nonetheless, tbe adjustinent in design approach to emphasize increasing technological sophistication did begin to lengthen development times for someacw systems, particularly in the final stages when the weapon undergoes tests and scriesfacilities ere readied. These instances appeared to increase in frequency through, culminatingumber of unusually drawn-out programs for major systems:
ndroup, were in testing roughly two years longer than earlier, less advanced fighters.
0anks were in testing about two years longer than the average for previous main battle tanks.
Thendruise missile*will require about five years in testingwith the four-year average for earlier cruise missiles .
Problems began to arise in theseehese difficulties persisted through, as the Soviets sought to produce advanced systems in plants that we believe were not ejiensrvelj modcrnircd:
' Thehich incorporates phase shifters,controls, computers, and digitalAnalysis
geats that many cTinesethe rrumlenot be fabricated in Urge quantities with the tabor-intensive approaches used for the earlierndhis probably has contributed to the slow deployment of tbea pace well below that of thendnd weD below our ratimatcs of production capacity.
Thehich uses similar advancedThe Soviets have suffered setbacks in the production of the irussileC
3.
1 The MIG-il Foxhound, which is the USSR's first true lookdown/sbootdown interceptor andulse-doppler radar, comrmters, and automated datahese subsystems require high-tolerancewith reliable performanceide range of severe environmental conditions. The slowloo rate C
believe.esult mainly of delays in manufacturing tbe radar and perhaps one or more other electronics-based subsystems.
hich employs advanced enginesubstantially upgraded avionics package. Afterredesign efforts, the Flanker entered productionyowever, onlC
the Soviets also began to face dilricul-ties in moving advanced systems Into produeiion. as the wcapoos-driven retirements for advancedtechnology were leviedelativelyproduction base. Traditional Sovietmore labor, materials, and general purposenot compensate entirely for tbe lack of sophisticated production equipment.
test problems in engine and radar development or outfitting.
fi
Sir. liag ikt Limits affraduetian Technology:l Ttak
ihtro-
duction itchnologyin iht Sftln lank Industry had noi advanced beyond iht level II attained at the dote of World War II. Although tht Soviets employed tome advanced fabrication and welding tecntdgues.
4 was slow and often concanenl with produc-Indeed. sattttfoesttttes wen pressed Into produc-wtth Utile iavestnmmtfutpmem Thau, ike of Industrial tcoMtricetion was below that to properly geodatt tbento the tank
edium battlt lank, whieh entered serial production la the, was considerably more advanced than earlier Soviet tanks. Itadically different engint and powerestern iutpension lystem, lominaltd armor, end anammunition loader
As problems *rltk the new subsystems and power train grew more pronounctd. the Soviets undertook an investigation of4 program, lhe rtrulis of which probably led Moscow toew variant ofo return to the2 engine for2
as plagued, however, by poor perfcemance andbelieve In part because It was produced largely by an aging manufacturing base
advanced naval platforms, which wen Beat to tea Inon radioes* The Kirov battlec and ihe UcUsor deauoye.ea trie*heir targetradar* for Ihethe navalof thekcuius, is producing at least some portion of their electronics packages. The Scwremennyycua* destroyer began sea trials in0 without iu majorand some electronic equipmenl.Indicating that fall operational caoablliiydelayed by manufacturing problem*
Tbe problems exemplified inave typically ceaiered on devel reliable advanced subsystems called for by tbebypass tarbofanAasnd-array radars, ad-snced .erasers.gwdanoe and navigation systems, onboard computers for several functions,ariety crfcoenpk* pans made from advanced composite* and other materials Prediction of these lubaystema required bagb-croalityspecially electronica- iI ir.know-how and eejuipenem equivalent to that in gat in US industry fat theo ,
of advanced Western weapon systems in. Tbe modernization also offered tbe benefit of enhanced production efficiency. Weapon production facilities were expandeda lesserwith new. more sophisticated equipment, and the management and organization of defense industry were upgraded
Although we have no direct evidence of any sweeping Politburo decision, we believe the drive to modernize defense industries gathered momentum in the. We base this judgment primarily on the rise In influence and eventual accession to powerew cadre of Mirdstry of Defease leaders that advocated rationalization of weapon acquisition and industrial modernization and on evidence of intensiveefforts
L
Defense leadership
Inmitriy Ustinov was appointedof Defenseet) We beheve bb appointment signaledonsensus bad been reached at the highest levels of the political leadership on the broad guidelines of weapon acquititioo and defense-Industrial modernization policjgs. In this connection,
abdicates thai Ustinov was less inclined than Orechko to look at militaryfor hardwareilitary perspective. Hut background as an economic manager and the policies he implemented indicate Ustinov believed general economic growth and modernization provided the bedrock of the USSR's defense potential. This position waswith bis recognition that the military competition with the United States wasualitative ratheruantitative one, and that tbe USSR hid to upgrade its military and industrial technology.
rear-ludn* trial Mc-Jcrniiatlou
We believe tbe Soviets woo stretching tbe limiu of existing production technology. Becauie oi this, ibry embarked on an intensified aad systematicof their defense industry aimed primarily at ensuring that defense plants could produce newof weapons designed to meet tbe qualitative
Ustinov "aconsolidatingof weapon acquisition policy and defense-industrialwas meant In part to ensure the smoother implementation of these policies. Indeed, Ustinov had long pushed for unprovedand performance in the defense sector, and
fragmentary evsdenccthat he sad his views
6 at patty secretary forat ten, theae is evidence suggesting that Ryabo* still reported lo Ustiaov. Moreover, after Ryabo* was transferred to ibe State Planning Committee (Gosplaa) in9 Ustinov probably svas assigned nominal rearxMsibilily fas that area, whack normally is aot the respraasubihty of tbe Soviet Defease Mia Bier. Thai,9 until io* l, when Grigorry Romanov became partyfor defense matters. Ustinov was the only astcra-ber of tbe pciixal kadOship to hold simultaneously tbe position* of Politburo member, government mi ms-tor.leaste facto basJa- party i
Jpc4etnbdssst Wrwpens Predwerlo.
compree.
ToduUrywide program* beginning ineipaad and spcradc prodnciionTypically, the advent of new weapons atand composite facilities bad meantof tooling, jibs, and fixtures. Theappeared to ba broader ia scope aad iowstb effort* toarge array
Sawn lm /apesnstnar la rawu:riti The moat rocQprebeevaivc evidence of the increasedto defense Industries has recently appeared In open sources Our cilculatiooaig jump la tbe level of investment in tbe defense-rndasstrialetween tbec tablestimated average annual investment in theasacbirsc-bailding ministries chnabedrabies, or byercent, between these two periods Tbe corresponding rise in investment in the civil suchine-building ministries wa*illion rubles, orerceni
Reflection* of these investment trendsore disaggregated levelbserved in the tank and aircraft industries, area* where advancing weapons technology dictated substantial improvement* in both existing and newlant and equipment
tWapa IBU rutin
!ltd Average Annual
In tbe MSnd Mexahvoriking Sector, SeSeetrd Periods
il
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ft. I
mi-7i t-ao mt-ts
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Cl>it minlntta
Detente mlniiuie
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1
We have been able toajor program for the aircraft Industry beginning in the. Many airframe plants were exoandod and uouaded.
10
of ibe newmsndnd tbeir supporting f"*^ 7
productionowever, indicsle these required atelective upgrading of manufacturingFor example, new aircraft,ir rms-siks, and submarines make more extensive use of high-strength materials like titanium and composites, which require special msciinmg capabilities. New materials, complex shapes, and ihe rnlniatuxixattoo reflected io many advanced systems, inch as strategic cruise missile guidance and propulsion systems, gener-ally detnarsded more sophisticated equipment than was In place in Soviet industry in tbe.
ovla Bedle We do sot whine) peWdeoce Uul II I.
txuil used forsaroasea,
Asllustrates, however, the upturn in the growth of production floctfspace that began7 (and reflected the three- to four-year lag between investment and tbe external completion of defense industrial buildings) was not followed by an upturn in productionhich would have been expected given tbe two-year lag pattern for earlier years. Instead, production did not begin io rebound untilthen onlyumberinvolving both poBcy-level decisions andproblems, probably underlie thein production:
consixuction and tooling time has been longer than average for several recent advanced systems. For exarapk, production preparation for0 tank and ihendircraft-each manu-factored in massive newover two more yean tha- oreparation for comparable earlier systems
An increased emphasis onby tbe supply bottlenecks characteristic of thead'and an intensified drive to gear up for the production of advanced systcma-probably meantaI number of Soviet defense-industrial facilitlea were producing al lower rates or not producing at all.
Tbe induction and widespread application or new, more scoedsUcatcd, and more cosily equipment sets, integrated production lines, and automated management systems for new weapons prodaction very likely required longer periods of assimilation. Indeed, although the time required to build and equip plants for new weapons has varied greatly.
T;e* botUenecli iret
To-antO-il Induitry.
In tbt section -Staffing tie Foeas
Ruing weapons oosuallcrtag economyalso encouraged Uoscow to bead down procure meat fxoartb lad mtroooce snore cOVsent newDespite ongoing cflbns to introduce rosea roe-saving tocbnolcary. we estimate that the costs of Soviet weapons have coniinned to increase (see figureoscow, therefore, srss preparing toajor costly and technologically more difficult phase of the amlrtary competiuon withoattraiaed ecoaomy
A/awagaswvx Ambitious productioncom Hoediih the froqsesslly unreliable indus-txial sapply system, have kd Sonet eaterprisedefensetryecome as self-reliant as possible. For cxarapk. In thehe Ministry of the Aviation Indnstry was reported to have plants for producing sheet aluminum, magnesium alloys, shaped metal, and plaster and robber predicts Aboutercent of all aviation production (airframes, air-breathing engines.and avionics) was coocentraied in Iheenterprises. This high degree of self-sufficiency created ganecesasry duplication of effort, problems in siaodarcltfaltort. aad productioa at indficieatiy low rates
Defense industrialists appear to ba making greater efforts to pool their talents and avoid duplication of effort, although the evidence is too fragmentary toefinitive yadgmenL Several of the advanced systems in production draw key components from oiher^mioistries rather than rrtv cm ln-house capabili-
3.
To unpeeve enterprise management, ihe USSRajor effort laoeeublish automated management systctnsoth tbe cmlian and defease sectors of the ecoaomy ASUs are compuleri reel systems used for the managementariety of productioa ami planning operatlorti,accounting analysis, organization, process control.
and design The automated process control system (ASUTP) may include direct numerically controlled mafhinr toots, industrial robots, and fleiible manu-factaring systems. AeoordMg to the Soviet press,0 Soviet industry had eats Wished asorcSUs, which included moreSUTP applications
Morasrsclodiag defenac-indastiisl eaterproea.bora teleatified as having ASUs tn operatioo or stautsr devesormtrnt daringnd early
nkhis kind of aalomalloo baa begun to pay divi-ckTWs lot the defense ladtsstry, al leastimited basis,eneral Secretary Gorbachev claimed that use of auloeaaied design systems ia the aircraft industry made it pcasibia la raise productivity lo three times the previous level aad to reduce the lime taken in planning production by twoalf years
Modtfylag SW/aVag aTasfgas. Although thaof many operationsingle plant typically has led loduplication to Soviet industry, bringing together final assembly and majorSubassembly operation*ingleorganirod around group technologies and flealble manufacturing processes can help to IncreaseIn weapons production. To tha eatent tbe Soviets add or rebuild production Uses with modern, integrated rnanufaduring processes, they will find it kas necessary so coo us us Ueipaad or modify pro-daction fadliiies when tbeyew weapon system or substantially tnodify an existing model. Tbe re*"irce savings could be substantial. Accordingecent Soviet surveyoostivctioa protect* by Ibe AlUJnion Bank of Fmastcing Capital Investment, constructing new facilities is aboutercent more expensive than expanding cutting facilities and stoutercentensive than renovating existing plants
USSR: Growth to estimated Production Cost* of Selected Soviet Weapon System!"
B3
4T5
JS
"
I** 1
f i
I I 1 I
1 J J 1
Sovtcti have iraditionally constructed newof iisodxrd design lo acconxmodatc newprograms. La thehethis approach whh buildingslo acaammodaleand"
prcductson facilities erected in thethose In Unk and aircraftUrge, npaa apal muKifloorrd bnddines made ofwenis*"*
JjTbey also provide the flexible workspace needed for modern manufacturing processes, allowing production lines to be rearranged, upgraded, orperiodically. For example, in such largeail similar parU can be manufactured on one production line or in one area (group technology>.
while in anotherroup of machines operating automaticallycairal ataikM can cocnptete all machining operaucetaingle compooenl mewing from machine lo machine (fteublrhe buildings Ihua make possible Integraled rrianufacinring operaiions aot onlyingle plani. hot aboingle building
Many new peoduction facilliiea responsible foradvanced weapon* rnmhine BCmiMjtralJOa and inginccriag. imall parti production. largefabrication fiuihing, and final atacmbty. Euo-plea include the Kharkov and Onaak unk plaats, producer* of0 tanks: lhe Oor aiyyard, producer of ibe Charlie-class cruise rniatile submarine, the Tango- and Victor-II data attacknd man recently the Sierra-dais (lita-niam) aad Kilo-daisnd the Ul'yaoovsk aircralt plant itill under construction (secome of lhe advanced components require highlymannfacturing facilities, and these are frequently
ng iSeated "ithweapon assembly. For rumple. -Jat least rune of theirframe planU have added or are adding specialized facilities for producing nonmetal composite parts
L'pgradiwgTtehtsologj
Modernization of tbe weapon production base has inquired more and better product ion tecbnology aad equipment For much of the necessary support,Industry could look Inward, since its ministries and plants produce many of lhe rnachine toots, robots, and computer* and virtually all of the critical micro-dectionics and telecommunications components for adranced production equipment and system'
We cannot precisely gauge the growth ia key Soviei rapport industries or in total imports of Western technology attributable to the demand* of defense-industrial expansion. Nevertheless, trends in tbeand pace of Ihb upswing suggest that demands connected withwere especially strong in tbe-ole in increased imports The party and government had already adopted (inesolution to increase the
The Ulyanovsk Airlaats Adducing fndwiSM CapabilitiessasiW Scale
When faced wilh ihe challenge of producing ihelrerafl. which /remi llgntficamly more complr< than earlier modeli. the Soviet' choir toarge and eualttativelp different fadlliy rather than retool or reeaulp an e'Hung aircraft peoduction plant
ke Sovten have been conttructlngaircraft production factttty nearthe Volga RiverTie plane Ittelf
probably willauarandand support factinic anotherhe coralwhen complete, will have cart Ihe njurv-drni cf about Ueetuel more them eme-holfcf all floor .pact added to aircraft final aiiembly facilities InS
The plant will be extensively equipped with mp-ee-date manufacturing equipment and industrialncluding cornputertied design, monagemrnt. and Information systems. According to Sovietthe complex Is Intended toWestern Style" plans. Incorporating the latest technologicl for Manufacturing wide-bodied planes. The Sovieu have also sold thai lhe complex will not only manufacture airframes but also ultimately win produce theavionics, and ether compcmenss fee aircraft
produced ot the plant. We believe theondor heavy military transport will be the first aircraft to be produced as Ulyanovsk. On tike beats of ike rtse
and ccmtiguroilon ef the plant as well as Soviet
statements, we also believe lhe plant will produce the
ILJI6 transport
role of tbe KGB in tbe collection of the results of Western science and technology. The resolution stressedorldwide scientific and technical revolution was taking place and that. In the interests
of national defense aod the development of (be runeeorsorny. it "aa necessary lot tha Sewict Govern -maat to obtain timely usfeeutalioo on aratatific and technological dcvtlcpsnents throughout ibe world. Tbe KGB waa anlhoriEcd to focui on ibe mililary and industrial applies boos of tbrse developeoenis. aad Ibe collection program apparently gathered momentum ia Ibe afUrmstb of (be Central Committee plenum In
J.
Aggjeastte, ciaadesauw, collection effort* coasisiusd through.SO the Soviet* ac-qalrad0 military-reImed technical doe-bbm ii ipercept of which were ultimately applied in peed action. Major scquiailtoo efforts were targat-ed aad continue to be targeted on microelectronics fabrication eqsuprocal and computers. The dimeter of tbe USSR Aeadcaiy of Foreign Trade wrote1 that Ihe cent of purchasing foreign manufacturingoe-tenth the cost of relying on tbe domestic mtVaatractare toe necessary equipment and mana-'acturiogide range of Soviet data dernonsiratea that ihe bctvents of foreign technology to military research projectslignitesrom lhao the, and thai foreign technology has been applied to theasaanda of rrswarch projects ia all key defense ind as tries
MaeaJaa Taati madophisticated mAchlne tools gait*le advances In srasspon design and increases (agoab of tbe modern iration program, laolitburo decree assigned rnponsibilily for the development ofmachine tools for the defense industry to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. As shown in figureationwide production of both eorrveounsl aad advanced machine tools grew steadily7 whan the Seyviet* out back production of conventional machine tools to concentrate on expanding production
of numerically controlled fNC) and computercontrolled (CNQ snacblae tenia, aateimntk lines, robots, and rnaaapalslors.
Soviet imports of tnacsune bob from the West also climbed in theseelthough many cooveatiooal tcob were iotryorted, probably to compensate for tha Soviet production cutback, many others were highly advanced- For example, since Usehe Soviets have imported snore ranchmiag cemris from Japan than they have producedThe Soviets alto have entered in to at least jo scientific and technical agreements with West Pnro-peasfor sasnserieal control technology, aad nine for oesibCe Bsaaafacrariag svstcma
Although we caonot estimate the total number, many automated machine tools have been installed la tht defense industry since the, wind nag NC rnacaisM tcob. machiningtornsted wcMing
systems, ccaneyers, precision casting equipment, and automatic robot-Inclusive production lines. Extensive use of Western-origin equipment of that Ivan has been documented in all defease industries
Despite tbe assistance provided by the United Stales, Western Fxiropc, and Japan, the technological level of Soviet computer-opera led machine tools lags about three to four yaars btsnad Western models, and bassbic macs fact on ng systems are Ave to ail years behmd. The USSR also lags tha West comiderably in both the peed action of advanced robots and their intesratlon into computer-assisted manufacturing.
ad Cawt/mttrt. Basic rmcroclec-uonic devices, especially ilitegratcd circniu, arecomponentside variety of electronic systems for weapon* and production equipmeaL Analysis of
Figure 5
USSR: Imports of Machine Tools From CbcSelected Yean)
USSR: FhMfissce Under Coastructiaa siurgrsled Orcoll PrednctioB
led
n 11
Thusimkmo! Ifla uuii Cat aBtUleutUci unfl mtul-[mnlnf matMni uWi lad biic taa nnvtilrd mini
chwas ratios foi mh year.
i computer-aid cd design) ind severe shortages of pro-
grsmers and rerxtir lechrikiant have constrained sp-pucaiiooi
USSR, however, has been slow to apply compot en to process control, stock cotitrol, mschine lool control systems, sad especsslfy product design systems (computer-aided design. Or CADI According toof open literature,ercent of all Sovietfacilities had maiafranac cosnpaltrsncluding case-third of tha facilitiesmployees By comparison, nearly all USfacilities with snoreeusaoyeaa have coenpaters Sbortagna of sceyhsssJcaied CAD msaafac-tnring systems have coa in bated to the rising coals of the USSR's more advineed weapon systems and farther stressed tbe taut supply of skilled manpower, la addition to equipment shortfalls, stow software development (especially for machining operations and
Although tbe USSR now has modern, unifiedor systems, its progress in computer technology and production has been dwarfed by advaacea in the West and Japan. Tbe Soviets lag the West by an eatimated seven lo eight years in mainframeand five to six years to tbe development of minicomputers and microcomputers.
Shafting Ike Feces Toward Civil Udsotry
The campaign io modernize the defense industry was in full swing when tbe already slowing pace of Ihe economy began lo falter mote dramatically. Believing
USSR: PiwJuctioD ef
adequately with three developing constraints thai ultimately combined lo slow indiWriil growlh:
A growing ihoitage of several key rawiron ore, steel, lumber, and rsonmctailic minerals.
An increasing shonaje erf energy, plaguing (he industrial sector.
- RapidJy developing bottlenecks in rail Iramporta-
ls addition, duringhe planners badestructive process ta motion in the investment specie Specifically, lhe ecoceatrauoo of urvcatmcat on upgrading the production capacity of existing enterprises engaged more enterprises in theprocess, thus hampering the flow of production at least temporarily In addition, the scramble ainong claimant*hare of the more Lmited irrvestmeat auocsticnt produced aa investment mil that neither added propratiiooatcly to new capacity nor replaced much old technology with efficient new varietieu.
seepLen ol
i
u iadoum or itliuen unOi'tr-nt Ule otriei.lly
claimedpetoH.rlaCTiO tbe**
utio unu deana
Souree* ass^lhDanMSaf. IvIOS*
better management (such as that practiced In the defense industries) and increased productivity (based in part oo rising purchases of Western equipment) would offset slower growth in capital and labor, tbe Soviets planed sadarked slowdown of investment growth. Bat therowth and productivity that the pUrincrs badnever occurred ai average annual growth of ONP fell toerceni during lhe lOtb Fivc-Year. la devising and implementing their growth strategy, the planners evidently did not
The leadership probably came to rea li it that the USSR wou Id aot recover its past economic dynamismmodernising its civil economic base At the same lime, (hey probably also were greatly croceracd about Ibe dragechnologically backwardindustry was becoming for defense industry, which by theu supplied by ai leastml ministries producing materials, components, parts, and in some cases entire nbsysterns. As Gorbachev has said repeatedly, and as our rovestascntshow (tabledvitian machine budding has beenhe albxcation of investment. given ibe overall limits placed oa investment aad the competing demand* of defense indnstry, agriculture, and energy
We believe that ander General Secretary Brtxbnev the Soviet leadership opted for mean re* that offered hope for improved performance at relatively little mat abniissg defense oaanagxssent expertiac with tbe civilian sector, applying the military model for progress in soence and technology, aad orienting basic research and develceirnent organisations to
J
applied research' Shortly after assuming powerorbachev endorsed and ei tended each of these measures, but he abo declaredore basic restructuring of the economy would beor, canary to restore vigor La the economy. Hit punsrge increment la investmentnbataatialof rt -enoal aoubty in favor of crribanbaitdiag
This shift in focus toward civilian Industrialpromises to both czxnplerncat and compete with military modernization:
Complementarity, catching op or even kcasxing up with Western military trcnnoaogy. aa well as ccpiog with defease costs, depends oo raising tbelevel and efficiency of civilian Industry, especially the rru chine-building and metal working sector.
Competition both the civil- and defense-ind us trial sectors must vie for ismsunent, labor, and materia a. ai the margin
TV Brrzhawv Program: Modernizing an the Cheap
la their earlier efforts to modernize civil Industry. Soviet laden initially relied heavily on espaaded imports of foreign industrial technology They hoped that these imperii wouldelativelyshortcut to overcoming some of their mostindustrial deficiencies. Although Western lechreclaim an important element in Mcacow's drive to modern lie Its broad industrial base, emphasb shifted In tbeoward speeding domestic technologurl irinovatibD. This reflecteddevelcrmemi
andssstryhole wss aaaking rnor ase cf foreign manufacturing technology. Average lead-limes for eaaimibtiag and diffusing Importedart much longer in the USSR than in tbe West, almost alwaya exceed the plan, and ihow oo signs of diminishing.*
Weitcrn technology haiisincentive tonew technologKal solutions. For example, Brezhnev alh CPSU Congress complained that foreign pnicssaacs wen essstssng industrial maa-agcrs to relax their efforts to develop iisdigeasows techssctogses.'
Western controls on the export of key technologies to Communist countries were tightened In ihe, making it more difficult end costly lor the Soviet! to aexjeire the quantity of technology used So modernize their industrial plan and increasingabout brvTimiag loo dependent en Western suppliers
Meanwhile, Brezhnev stressed the need to make greater use of the experience io the defense Rector to isriprove the civilian economy' At the0 Central Committee pleasant he called apoe tbaindustry toreater contribution to the development of the national economy. He specifically directed military-productioti-related industrialto help the civilachine-building sector develop and apply critical newnd he rest era ted tab call ath CPSU Coasjrtaa la1
Elements of tbe defense leadership at first opposed the new policy but were overruled because the general consensus in the Kremlin was that tbe civilian"was inesult, defease resources and talent were transferredimited scale
mm iof iba lisnaatsar
ta cinlua awl lata and iodoaUis wu aprSlad *>
. Man proceasea Sevefapcd by mmlYmrX
clrslUa reaaarehsaH ma ba
li jMIWI.Irir>iii sbeiarWthat
'See Dl "esesrea PaperICOt!l
atfymptom af Sonet Pn*Umi In Vttnt Weitem Trcknolot)
Followingv', death Idop defense industrygned to sun-legic potu In tbe civilian ceooom* and ceniraJ sdnnauirslive organs '
t ]
In addition, research projrsms were eau Wished Inib Five-YearS) lo develop techno logy,nd manufacturing processes that would loppon eeooomic devtiopirieni and be uaeful in tbe designd notion of sophisticated weaposu More iban Itan* of ibe programs dealt wiib leebDoiogse* that have both cmuan aadspplics-tion* oooapcaltaa. oowdexbiMeczUanscsgy, robotics, computers,iber optics, industrial lasers, aod anucorrosion protection. Tbey were well funded and man* ted by powerful cootfunctionally equivalent to tbe VPK. Theyto be designed to draw military aod civilian elements together ia area* of minusl interest, Inspor-tant srsilitary systems designers and deferiso industrial managers were made commission members along with Ibe Coanmaader ia Chief of Ibe Strategic Rocket Forces, tha Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, aad thahief of ihe Baltic Fleet Soviet military research and production faciti-tie* have been identified as
Meanwhile, theBrezhnev'* successors, Konatantin Cheraeoko and Yuriylook stepseorient the Academy of Sdancea to applied RAD and draw it into programs with dual
C
m* elvtl IwassuttJL Since Septemberlarger numbers of
base been ceoogSTtoto academy research miniateselp speed up tbe assaoulalioa ofinto production. The academy abo is admitiing more applied researchers and industry-basedfrom tbe defeaseIn4 elections of defense-indial
personnel to academy positions Tbe academy ismore directly with the military la appued technology development program* aad, wiib iu par-tidpetjoo in researcheing used lo transfer (eennology from defense to lha real of tbe economy
Perhaps the most ttssaftcaai shift azTcotasg lhaindustry during5 pun period,took place ka investment la tbe rnoc&riobtiildingrid.orking lector. The planas never published, but statistics revealed during the past year show that investment in tbe civilian machine-building crummiessaercent higher than. The sozpiiad corresponding smawth in Inxsuneot ia the military machine-building oiinittrics "as catty 9less than the growth plaaned tor all investment laib Free-Year Plaa. Tbt large increase posted ta civilian machine building possiblyeadership ceci-lion that moderniialion of the economy would require more than managerial and technical iuppfrom the defense Industry or reforms in iht sdonUfic sector.
The CcaUacnav Agiaia: Matching Rhetoric With RssWaa
Since coming to power laorbachev has made it dear that he wantsccelerate industrial modernization. Indeed,eries of speeches andell-pubii died appearances. Gorbaebev reiterated many of the idea* adVaaotd by hVezhaev. Andropov, and Cberneako, iacindiag tha need to:
Increase RAD eflorts throughout science aadand orient RAD work io address ihe needs of tbe ecotsonry.
Acceierate the late of rteaacsaaeal of ootmoded plant andaaL
Appoint osorc tsxhakaOy compeleol msnagers and introduce plannlag and management techniques thatremium on oast effectiveness.
Reduce orgsniralion barritra to Iht application of scientific advances in Industry
Moreover. Gorbachev luu urongl) rmtcratcd thecallt for crril industry to ma la It tbt defenseciii.ii defease inanagement leefcruquea
Unlike earlier leaden, bem-ever. Gorbachev hat enun-ciaiod bia idea* more rigorously and ha* made mod ermtauoc ihe censcrteeee of hi*program Ha baacaSad for.
Iracretunag ihe inutmttv. of machinery ia the ova chine-building aeeiorercent4ercent
Increasing machine-bauidiag output byercent3
Pushing capital investment in civilian machine buildingimesevel.
Tbe plan also callsripling of tbe irrveaUneni resources devoted to toentific programs to help pro-rnote rapid technological prcajress througboat iadat-
try.
la both Gorbachev'i speeches aadb Five-Year Plan Directives, tbe em^basis is dearly on msprovlng performance of ih* crviban machine-building sector
Ina outlined tbe longstanding pattern of
aegket:
Unjustified enthusiasm fot theof new erarrprtui and neglect of lhe requirements of ike entiling ones bieeme iisndord wiih the planning agenda and many mlnlsiriri The balk ofand equipment went lo lhe newfatilltlei.imely replacement of lhe obsolete equipment In enisling fadllilei and planti actually was not done The process of niiel renewal wan loo anew, and rkr eg* structure of lhe plant and equipment deierlorated.
Inefense industry also wat modernlred mainly by the erection of new facililie* rather lhaa by reasovalion of cJd facilities,ood dead of lb* plant and equipment ia defense industry is aba* obsolete. Although the information available onlan does notalculation of the investment Intended for the defenso-indastrlal ministries, they probably are slated to receive tubals filially more thanercenthey were given. Bat so analysis of investment targets
that the nine defenae-Lndustrial tninlstiics will not receive nearly as much of an iacrense aa theercent stated for the cavil enlauaVies.
Gorbachev has insistedeclamed increase la ibe quantity and Quality of machine tool* and toolmg equipment; robot* and flexible annirafscaring *yt-leini. microelectronics and computers; automated management systems; anda addition, be has singled out the machine-build jig industries, which are likely to be the major beneooa-ries of the increase in bsvesuncut. Tbe Montr* of the Machlae Tool and Tool Building Industry- eh*manufacturer of machine toots and flexible machinetopercent increase in investment6 alone, Tbe productionhe Ministry of the Automotiveriaied lo inczcaac al leastear6he mayor civilian producers of microelectronic components, computers, automated management systems, andequipment have also been tingled cut for iub-tiantiil growth and develaproeoi la addition, tbe Soviet* have communicated through CEMA chaoneii and high-level visits lo East European countries that they Fook forward to Increased industrial cooperation and larger quantities of high quality machineryfrom Bloc countries
Im^icattoaa ami Oudeok
During tba last decade Soviet weapons usdnstries mode major stride* toward improving their ability to produce advanced military hardware. Tho Soviets have largely overcome problems incT.-ber cf system* incb asO tank,ndnterceptors, new transport aircraft, titanium robes* rises, and several new strategic and tactical musiles la fact, according to our analysis, the Soviets currently have In place the requisite plant andto produce more thanercent of the full array of military hardware we are carraatry project-in* to ba deployed through the end of ib* decade.
I
Thei. in-o nuke ibe experiencemodernization campaign routine GorbachevIhal ladaatrial machinery and- uiust be replaced every2 yean, andfor Istrxcasiag Use relit latent rates in Useseeior imply an slroost certainlyfcnl of recyritasj everyas* cycleof US defease industry. which also stressesof nest weapcn systems sriih oewtech oology la trying lo move ihe USSR ontopath. Gorbachev must overcome resourceimpediments, decideat extenta-UI factor into hla invrslrneot policy,bard to creale Ibe peredyihka (breathingneeds to implement fully hla economic and
Resourcesopetllioa al lb* Margin
Despite some* bat improved eoonomic performs nethe USSR Hill confront* serious resourcebe smbilious aril-industrial moderaiza-tioa aod consumer food* progrsmsajor esisarnaoa of investment from aa economy that is already stretched tight Similarly, military rrqoire-ments show ao inns of sbslang. If the Soviets cosstln-ae lo seek qualitative lasprovcmcatt ia weapon as current development and prcductioo programs indicatethe costs of technologicalor exploitation sriD continue to drive upcosts. Tbe cocrtpctilioa for resources between esvil and military programs, therefore, will be intense.
Although we have no clear indication that theindustries will suffer from this competition, Lev Zaykov, whoull Politburo member and party secretary for defease industry and general economics, declared publicly inhat ihe defensewill step up its production of civilian goods and,ecificaliy. will devote resources to aid in tbe retooling of the light and food industries. Thus, we believe ibe Soviets will be hard pressed lo increase mililsry procurement outlays much beyond the high levels thai have prevailed for the past decade and still meet Gorbachev's other goals. However, evenprocurement outlays at currently high levels would allow resources lo be channeled to rebuilding
civilian plant and equipment without sacrificingforce modern its tioD. Tbe greater the share of machinery devoted to ootsdefeose purposes In, tbe better the prospects that Gorbaebev will succeed in improving the productioa capabilities of civil Industry, which ullimaiely will benefit tbesector.
We do noi have any hard evidence on bow military leaders aad defense industry officials have greeted the civilian modernization program, lo ibe, articles in the restricted military presssome disagreement over whether to redactsin favor of increased allocations tond industrial modernization. Toil issuelias not been resolved
There are signs, however, thai at least an important faction of tbe Soviet military realizes that long-term com petition with the Wesl demands development of Soviet high-technology support industries, including those in Ihe civilian sector. For example, in5 Soviet Major General Vaayleov acknowledged in Komm until rooruihenykh ill. the journal of Ihe main political directorate of the Soviet armed forces:
Today whet Is required for serial production of contemporary weapons and the newest combat equipmentot conventional or ordinarybut the moil contemporary and frequently unique equipment. Including fundamentally new Instruments, computer-controlled machine tools, robot equipment, the latest generation computers, and flexible production systems. In other words, ihe present ttage of the military-technicalwhich has been Imposed onus by imperialismigh level af development af those branches af industry with the best prospects, af the most contemporary technology,ighlywen* force.
Moreover. Gorbachev reportedly has assured defense leaders thai the military and defense industry will benefit from modernizationu> ^
ikii
by3 Gorbachev had committed hirriieJf to
mod cm union of militaryot aircraft, submarines, nod other advanced Items; had authorized major resource* for tbeof new, exinmcty powerful, aa area of itroni miUtary Jeter cat; and bad approved other advanced -eacarch programs aa weD.
>aa assuaged tbe mibtary'i roanould auffer from bet efforu to revitalize the overall
Oorhaehev may be able to aave ing on cturca! develor-nents in and depkryment:
More seajhlsticated and more capable weapon iyv teens, such aa thend tberobably will allow the Sovieu to meet rnijsion requiremenuailer numben and coiiibly lower overall costs.
Tha USSR and Its Warsaw Pact allies are in tbe early atagearogram to improve the combat capabuilies and extend Ibe service ureaumber of their older weapons. For example,2 Unas are being upgraded with new fire coo (rot. ammunition, armor protection, and We estimate that the cost of carrying out er the nextears win be only cuc-third of what it would cost to replace these tanks with the latest So-set models. Sovietndighter* arc also undergoing an eiiensive retrofit program that wilt add more capableadars, andefense systems.
mber of types of weapons enteringIt declinmg in these area* where technology advaitces afford greater mission flexibility (such as fighter atrcrnft and tpacc launch vehicles) or where the Soviet* have made substantial progress inmission reauirernenti (such at ICBMs).much of the design and production resources freedesult have been shifted to other military programs, the savings from future ennartlidsiion could be directed to civil usage
If Gorbachev's iirveatmeat strategy docs not begin to pay major dividends loh Five-YearX however, the Soviets will aooa face tome loughhey are already in the initial stages of identifying resource allocation priorities for tbe oast rWyear. and key defense decision* probably will be made ia the. During this lime period, tbe Soviets also will have to installhe defease iadustzy to support the production of new weapon rysuras ia.orbachev's pat* to iSTprove the ixrformasee of the dtoi
forced to either tl. or red-re the pace and scoperogram Cutting back. lion probably would notoviet military capabilities until thebe Industrial capacity for producing nsost of the weapon* acheduted for ckptoynsent through thet already ia place. Slowing civil-industrial modernization, however, wouldreater loog-Urm Impact because it would erode tbe defense industry's support base, whkh will be increasingly important to Soviet military competitiveness in thead beyond.
Tirhailigj Faiatvadasg the Went
IsngaxUag Western (and Japanese) tecbaokosry is one -ay of cccnpenaaiiag for tbortfalii ia domestic RJtD. The Scwieu may have taken measure* in theo step sp these i
C
irst thief Directoratest called for an IsKrease ia the KGtVs eflorts to eonanre technology abroad with more attention to obtaining hardware
revealed that
live SovieU were pulling pressure on the Eastservice* to Intensify their science andcollection sctlvlties-
almost as much for -foreign technical assistance" as for total.
There ire few indications so farajor upsurge In Ihe overall level of legaloft prices for the USSR's major exportand obligations to client slates suggest the Soviets will not have the reserves to *astain large increases inlso, there continues to be resistance in some quarters lo Importing Western techrseaogyof these on dorricstic iruxwution. For his part. Gorbachev has called for more "rational" concentration of imports on key projects. As In other aspects of his modernijaiioo program, Gorbachev apparently feels that much more can be obtained through improved use of indigenous resources
Western export controls and enforcementand trade policyargueore restrained import policy. Export controls have hit Ihe Soviets especially hard in the hlib-technology area* of computers and microelectromc* and in Ihe use of this technology in advanced manufacturing applications thai an crucial to the modernization program and the production of tdva need weapons. The Soviets are concerned about their vulnerability to aggressive Western export controls and nre trying to reduce it through greater technological self-reliance andtechnological cooperation with Eastern
On baUnce, we believe Ihe Soviets will continue to rely on their, -trategy of selective reliance ongy from the West. Although the Soviets are clearly making greater use of technology developed in the East Europeanof which is more advanced than that available in thetechnology still lags well behind the Western state of the art in most key areas. Moreover, the Bastalmost certainly cannot sufficiently increaseof machinery and equipment to meet growing Soviet requirements over Ihe next decade.ikely, therefore, that Soviet reliance on Western innovations
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MicroWrcrronies: The Problem of Catching Uparge,
Because the Soviets will probably continue to depend on Western technical advances In the volume produc-lion of semiconductors, ihey are likely to remain at least three years behind in semiconductor technology and production capabilities. The USSR, however, could lose substantial ground if the US Deportment of Defense's VHSIC (very-high.,peed Integratedprogram is successful In creating VLSI (very-lorgt-uale Integrated) devices with Improved military applications. VHSIC de-ices are Intended to provide greatly Increased capabilities In militaryThe USSR will have difficulty manufacturing more advanced VLSI or VHSIC devices unless il makes significant advances In production and clean-room technologies, material purity, and overallcontrol. The Soviets have not yet demonstrated an Independent ability to develop advanced production equipment for monolithic Integrated circuit devices: thus they probably will become even more dependent on Western equipment lo produce increasinglydevice!
will increase in areas critical to modernization of both the dviliao and defensecomputer* aod software, telecommunications,and CNC machine tools (seen the military side, taking into account Western programs such as precisioo-guided tactical weapon* and ihl Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) along with ad-vaoce* in such key areas as electro-optics, fire control, guidance and navigation, and signal processing, tbe Soviet covert acquisition program almost certainly will be at least as aggressive as it has been since Ibe.
Structural Impediments
The impact of new domestic and foreign technology, however, depends on how well Soviet industryon it. Systemicaplanning process, prices that do not adequately
Improved quality, and poor producer-coeauimpeded th* assimilation of technology. The del- induiiry it platuod by Ibeae same sys-irtnio problems, albeitesser decree than the real of Soviet industry. For example, sh bough there ia close cooper* lion betwoea Soviet weapon designand peoducers. mariufacxuring research and engineering usesrc separated from productioa facilities, whichtrong barrier to improving msnnfacturing procures "
Gorbachev and the central leadcrthip that be has assembled have thown (hat they rncogBirt the systesn-ic brakes on faster technological progress, but so far an have seen no signs that they have workedonsistent set of policies to deal wiih them. The new Soviet leaders thus far have been unwilling or unable lo make fundamental planning and management changes ta either Use defense or civilian industrial sectors. Moscow still places its highest priority on maintaining tight centralized control over all facets of tbe economy while coctiDoing lis efforts to carry out industrial mode miration by tbe usual methods of political iatervcollon ind party control Tbe approach remains primarily "innovation byhishas inherent limitations, priorities cannot be ei tended too far without diluting their erJoctiad high-level rob'vsl intervention it similarly coo-strained
Soviet history is replete with rrsrwpir* when special management icchatqacs, abundant resources, and strong political backing were unable to prevailystem generally mbospitsble toMoat, if not all, of the industries Gorbachev has targeted for priority attention are likely to prove equally resistant to pcsalKal solutions This, along with resourcecontinuing dependence on Westernand accelerating Western advances, suggests that tbt Soviet lag behind Western prodwetico technology will not diminishover ihe next decade
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oe Tun*
Tune may be one of the greatest constraints on GorbackeVt rcosa for maneuvering. He needs time for hit itvestmcnl strategy to achieve enough progress In key oigVtccbnology industries to prepare the de-fcascs-bole for the military competition fromt century. Whether be gets the time he seed* could dependarge extent onrall Fast-West relatsoeship, and particularly oa the roSitsry competitioo with1 Stales. Tbe Soviets may see laeosselve* aader coaoacterabie mill tary pressure from Washington. Gorbaebev,mustong-term Industrial atoderaixa-lies) program with aa accelerating; military-lechnologK-al ccenretilsod
Hit strategy seems dnected ia part alha requisite breathing space. DomesiicaUy, be apparently has convinced tbe General Staff (hat hislioohelp tbe defeaseIn fceeign policy, his recent arm* control initiatives, summit diplomacy, and efforts to mend fences with Westers Europe, Japan, and Chins art reminiscent of Soviet foreign policy leading up to tbe detente period of tbe.ate. evenxodest scale could bay Gerbacacv the time he needs And be clearly i* acsjsg, ia our vitw, wiih aa appreciation that aa arms control agreement eoold -especially ia tandem withUS budgetaryslow US miliury expansion. Detente would alto mtk* Ii raster foe ibe Sonets lo acersire tha lype* aad qwssuoxlea of technology needed for ibe rnoderruulioo program, probably on farorable credll lerms
Tbe un pinuns for Soviet defease irrdustry of short-iin on cither or both fronts vary from scenario lo scenario:
Diplomaticfalttvt/domeitlcailurease tht pressa re of Western miliury competition could be Bviiigatedebound In the domestic economy. Under such circumstances, more invest meat funds probably would be available tordefense-industrial rnodemiraDCin andprocurement. In addition, i
. iladustziaf base could more effectively support lha growing lecacologtcal aeeda of ihe defease aector. although ihe Soviets prrsbabty would act be abacatch iheeapons sophistic*
Diploenalte lucceit/domr/iU failure If Gorbaebev ia able lo affect Western militarythrough direct agreement or unilateral US cutback* Ineconomic rooderoi ration fails, ibe ohtloo* for the defease indusiry is mixed Ahhoogh (he Sonets afaxxost certsiaJy srill be able to held enough wen pees to maiatsia parity, defenseprobably would be hard pressed to close the technological gap. The notable esceptic* would be if the West relaxesport controls on soph is ties ted machine tools aad computers.
onwsTlc failmrtfdomtllk fodlurt.orbachev's overture* to ibe Wesl are unsuccessful aad if las modermration program fails, Ibe impact oa the defense indnt'ry would be more severe. Weapons plants would be called upon lo both Increaseand produce more advanced systems. Pressure to produce woaldisincentive for the defense indusiry to naiphairrc modeinuaujei. Defense in-dssstry probabCy would be further hinderedely on lagging support industries fortechnology and equlpmem. Soviet reliance on Western technology would continue under ihisnd tbe Soviet technological sag probably would increase
The overall Impact of any scenario, however, probably would be softened by several factors ihal hive helped, ind probably will continue to help, the Soviets to
compensate for their overall technological inferiority to the West First, there ja no case-ta-erse correlationecsatosogical advisee ia productioa aad aa improvement in mil nary capabilitieslways aof considerable dursttbe attainmentechnological advance andew weapon system. The Soviet* hare often succeeded ia translating technologicalinto weapon system* more rapidly than ihe West. Thus, the tecsusologscal level of rkr*oyad Soviet and Western systems it more eornpsrsbic thaa is tha general level of leehnoiogy. Second, we expect the Sovietsontinue to be able lo surge aheadarrow front of militaryas Ihe cap-citation of titanium -beesuse they have chosen to place more empbans on these areas than ibe West, bins lit. strategy, tactics, aad the aamber of weapons still countreal deal in determining combat effectiveness
In sum. we believe Moscow has reevaluated and modified it* traditional approach to weapon* actruisi-lioo The USSR probably anil continue to produce and deploy cotrrparauvely larger nutstbert of weapons in arras where ibis approach to meeting mission requirements it mandated by technical shortcomings or is more cost effective Tbe Soviets, nrvertbelesa, are placing greater emphasis on the development and msntfacture of complex systems that requireindustrial technology Their ability to meet future military recjairemeni* will requirearad pace of modermration beto realize the daal bene-fltt of cost savings and weapons irnproranenl
Bin*
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Original document.
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