BRIEFING ON INF MONITORING

Created: 1/18/1988

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

BRIEFING ON INT. kwtwinu

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BRIEFING COVERS OVERVIEW Of INF rWITO^NG,fS AND THEIR IffACT ON KJN1TORING;

OUR ASSESSJtNT OF THE SOVIET

WNITORING STRENGTHS AND lEAKNESSES IN- POTENTIAL CHEATING;

ONCERNS AND UNCERTAINTIES;

" OVERALL EFFECT OF MONITOKlNG REGIME

INTACT ION

THE INF TREATY CALLS FOK THE ELIMINATION OF ALL GRUUIffi-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES (AND THEIR LAUNCHERS) WITH RANGES0 KM, AND SPECIFIED ASSOCIATED SUPPORT STRXTURiS AND EOUIPftKT. THE TREATYROAD SETPEMTIVE IIASURES, INCLUDING:

N-SITE INSPECTIONS;ATA EXCHANGES;

NOTIFICATIONS;

DESIGNATED DEPLOYMENT AREAS; AND, MEASURES TO ENHANCE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL rtANS.

SLCRLWJ-m,

I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE NATURE OF THE KMTORINGill BE DESCRIBING. THEY ARE BASED ON THE INTELLIGENCE OmJNlTY'S CAPABILITIES OF CURRENT AND PROGRAMMEDYSTEMS AND ACTIVITIES. THESE JUDGMENTS ARE NOT BASED ON RIGOROUS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS BUT ARE SUBJECTIVE IN NATURE, AND USUALLY DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE IN ANALYZING SOVIET FORCES OVER THE YEARS.

THE INCLUSION OF EXTENSIVE ON-SITE INSPECTIONN THE INF TREATY PRESENTS USEW REGIME. OSI IS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE, BUT IT ISANACEA. ME RELY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO SERVE AS THE FOUKUATION FOR ASSESSING OUR OVERALL MUM TORI No CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY DURING THE PERIOD WHEJt WE ARE LOOKING FUR ANY ILLEGAL PRODUCTION, TESTING, STORAGE, OR DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS. WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE SWIETS COULD ttlrnrWOUCE MISSILES AND TELS OR CONDUCT PROHIBITED ACTIVITY AFTER THE INSPECTORS HAVE LEFT. OSI Mia WORK TO REDUCE SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN THE GAINS THEY MIGHT DERIVEOVERT FORCE AND Mia INCREASE THE SOVIET COST OF CHEATING.

V6 2 TEMS SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TREATY, SOVIET SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION ARE:

- SYSTEMS:

0NTERMEDIATE-RANGEHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

0 NOT PICTURED IN THIS VUGRAPH, BUT ALSO SUBJECT TO ELIMINATIO*.', IS THELC*

2

CANISTERS

SPECIFIED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

OF THE SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE TREATY, THE SS^ IS AN OBSULETE SYSTEM,ALL LAUNCH SITES HAD BEEN DEACTIVATED OR CONVERTED TO OTHER PURPOSES BY DISrVsNTLEMENT Of AlRFIWtS CONTINUED UP TO THER0UND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILEEW SYSTEJl WHICH WE ASSESS HAD NOT KCOKL iTEWTIOiAL.

STRUCTURES:

0 "FIXED STRUCTUREAUNCHER"INGLE-BAY GARAGE)

THIS VU6RAPHICTUREF M8 OPERATIONALINE SINGLE-BAY GARAGES PER BASE

0 MISSILES AND TELS ARE HOUSED IN THEM WHILE UNIT IS AT THE BASE

0 ROOF SLIDES OPEN FOR LAUNCHING, IF NECESSARY'

0 ALL SIKJ-BAY GARAGES AND FOKDATIONSISMANTLED '

MAJOR. fPNlTPftlNft TA3KS

THE TREATY CAN EE DIVIDED INTO THREE GENERAL AND POTENTIALLY OVERLAPPING PHASES:

" PHASE I; ESTABLISHING THE BASELINE. IN THIS PHASE, HE MILL COMPARE THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SOVIET-DECLARED FORCES MITH INTELLIGENCE CQrWJNITY ESTIMATES. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DON* FOR THE FIRST EXCHANGE OF DATA, AND ME WILL BE MATCHING FOR ANY CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

- PHASE Ilj REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS. DURING THIS PHASE, ME MILL MONITOR THE DRAWNf THE IN? FORCE AND THE ELIMINATION OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES.

";LOBAL BAN ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. ONCE THE DECLARED FORCE HAS BEEN ELIMINATED, HE Mia LOOK FOR ANY COVERT PRODUCTION, STORAGE OR DEPLOYMENT OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS. ME Mia ALSO BE LOOKING FOR THE TESTING OF ANY MISSiaS TO RANGES0 KILOMETERS.

VGPART OF OUR ROBUST MONITORING REGIME, THE COOPERATIVE MEASURES

INCLUDED IN THE INr TREATY Mia ENHANCE OUR ABILITIES TO MONITOR SOVIET ACTIVITIES.

DATA EXCHANGES:

0 INCLUDING UPDATES OF THE ORIGINAL DATA AFTER TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE.

ON-SITE InSPEHIONS:

0 BASELINE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES KILL CONFIRM. THE rtrtJi-ANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DATA.

0 aOSE-OUT INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED OPERATING BASES AND SUPPORT FACILITIES MILL VERIFY THAT TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED OR REMOVED.

0 SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES FOREARS MILL ACTnERREKT TO CHEATING.

0 ON-SITE INSPECTION OF ELIMINATION raOCFJKJRES FOR MISSILES, LAUNCHERS, AND SUPPORT EOUIPftNT.

0 COftflNUOJS ON-SITE HMITORING Cf THE PORTALS OF THE VOTKINSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT, WHICH IS THE FINAL ASSFJIBLY FACILITY FOR THEND POSSIBLY THEND

OTHER COOPERATIVE MEASURES INCLUDE:

OTIFICATIONS:

0 INCLUDING THE INITIATION OF ELIMINATION CF TREATY-LIMITEDHE TIME AND ROUTES OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IN TRANSIT TO ELIMINATION FACILIITES.

- MEASURES TO ENHANCE MONITORING BY NTM:

0 SEVERAL, AND ON SHORT NOTICE, THE US CAN REQUEST THAT THE SOVIETS DISPLAY, AT ANYISSILE BASE, ALLTaS WITH CANISTERS AND OPEN THE ROOFS OF ALL SINGLE-BAY GARAGES. THIS IS INTENDED TO HELP TO ENSURE THATRE NOT BEING ILLEGALLY MAINTAINED ATASES.

VG8 OVFRVIFW OF MONITORING JIM^fE

WELL THEN ARE WE ABLE TO MONITOR THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE INF

TREATY? LET US BEGIN BY FIRST ANSWERING THE QUESTION, "WHAT IS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT DATA PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING?"

FIRST OF ALL, THE DATA PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS INCLUDESACILITIES WHICH ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.

SSCRFJ/NOFORIJ

EXCEPT FOR DIFTTONCES IN AGENCY VIEWS ON THE NUMBER OF NON-DEPLOYED SS-2QS, THE KWBER OF DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED FORCES ARE CLOSE TO

ALTHOUGH THE DATA ARE WITHIN rEASON, WE CANNOT IJETERMINE IF THE SOVIETS ttCLARED THEIR TOTAL INVENTORY OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS, SINCE ONLY DECLARED FACILITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY THE DATA.

ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN OURASELINE ESTIMATE Of MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT DECLARE SEVERAL FACILITIES HISTORICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH TREATY-LIMITED imjjTH

THE BASIS FOR MANY OF OUR CHEATINGARE THE TASKS THAT RE SUIT FROH THE TREATY if. CAN NDNITORWITH

im AND THE COOPERATIVE rlASURES OF THE TREATY? THEY ARE THE RJLLWING:

" iXTDWNE THE WMBER OF INTE#OIATE-rlANK MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS imOYEI) AT MISSILE-OPERATING BASES.

ETERMINE THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF DEPLOYEDND THEIR LAUNCHERS.

" DETERfUNE WHETHER ANY BALLISTIC MISSILES HAVE KEN TESTED TO RANGES0 KMS.

VGCONFIRM THE ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS.

- CONFIRM, THAT TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS ARE NO LONGER PttSENT AT MISSILE OPERATING BASES, AND SUPPORT FACILITIES.

- CONFIRM THAT rTODUCTIW OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS AT DECLARED FACILITIES HAS CEASED.

VG 13

ECRET/NOFORN

NOW, WHAT ABOUT CHEATING BY THE SOVIETS? OUR ABILITY TO DETECT ANC IDENTIFY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES DEPENDUMBER OF FACTORS, SUCH AS:

- THE SIZE OF AN ILLEGALTS READINESS;

HETHER THECBM ANDLCM ARE BANNED, LIMITED, OR UNCONSTRAINED IN START.

IN GENERAL, ME COULD PROBABLY DETECT AND CORRECTLY INTERPRET ACTIVITY INVOLVING THE ILLEGAL DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OFN HIGH STATES OF READINESS; ESPECIALLY IFRE CONSTRAINED OR ELIMINATED BY START. ME DEFINE HIGH READINESS AS THOSE MISSILES WHICH ARE-CAPABLE OF BEING LAUNCHED WITHIN HOURS OR SEVERA. DAYS.

VG 16 REMAINING UNf.FRTAINTIFS AND CQHCE&g

BASED ON THESE MONITORING JUDGMENTS, WHAT AKE THE INTELLIGENCE COMKJNITY'S MAJOR REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES AND CONCERNS? THEY ARE BASICALLY TWO:

- FIRST, NON "DEPLOYED MISSILES WD LAUNCHERS.

UNDECLARED OR NEWLY-PRDDJCED MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS COULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS IN CRISIS OR WARTIME.

ECONDLY, THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MOBILE MISSILES. THE TREATY ELIMINATESMALL PART OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INF SYSTEMS, THAT IS, LAUNCH CRITICAL ELEMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REDUCE OUR OVERALL ABILITY TO DETECT SOVIET CHEATING, BUT IT DOES MAKE IT EASIER FQK THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE MANY SUPPORT aEftNTS OF AN ILLEGAL FORCE IN PEACETIME SO THEY COULD FIELDORCE IN CRISIS OH WARTIME.

IC

" AtSO, ALLOWING CWfTlHLIBM7 OF THEN START COULD CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS TO HIDE, BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITIES Cf FACILITIES AND EOUIPPCNT.

V517 IMPACT OF THf TREATY'S OmRATlVT ITASURFS

WHAT IS THE IMPACT Cf THE TREATY'S COOTRAiTVE rEASURES?

IN PHASE I, OSl AT FACILITIES AND BASES SPECIFIED IN THE rWrtANiW OF

UNDERSTANDING KILL ALLOW US TO RELIABLY ACCOUNT FOR THE SOVIET INVENTORY AT

KCLARED LOCATIONS. OSI WILL INCREASE OUR CONFIDENCE THAT PROHIBITED

ACTIVITIES ARE NOT OCCURRING AT THESE LOCATIONS.

CLOSE-OUT INSrTOIOHS WILL ALLOW US TO CONFIRM THAT ALL TREATY-LIMITED

ITERS HAVE BEEN RFJWED FROM BASES THAT ARE DECLARED TO NO LONGER HAVE AN

ASSOCIATION WITH INF SYSTEMS.

- COOPERATIVE ftASURES WILL BE WST USEFUL FOR MONITORING THE ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES.

THEY Wia ALLOW ITS TO ACCURATELY iXTERMlNE THAT THE DECLARED NUMBERSITEMS ARE BEING ELIMINATED IN THE AGREED MANNER.

PHASE III,

" PORTAL WN1TOR1N5 AT VOTK1NSK WILL ALLOW US TU CONFlhTl THAT NO PROHIBITED MISSILES ARE BEING SHIPPED FROM THAT FACILITY.

11

j20 OVERALL EFFECT OF MONITORING RE6IE

BELIEVE THAT THE TOTAL EFFECT OF THE INF TREATY'S MONITORINGPROHIBITS THE PRODUCTION AND TESTING OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS-WOULD WORK TO REDUCE SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN THE GAINS THEY MIGHT DERIVEOVERT FORCE AND INCREASE THE COSTS OF CHEATING.

- PRODUCING AND TESTING MODERN WEAPONS IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH EVEN UNDER IDEAL CONDITIONS; THE NEED FOR COVERTNESS MAKES SUCH ACTIVITIES CONSIDERABLY HARDER.

SOVIETS WOULD QUESTION THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF MISSILES PRODUCED COVERTLY OR NO LONGER FLIGHT-TESTED.

FINALLY, THE BAN ON INF WEAPON SYSTEMS WILL PRODUCE GREAT OPERATIONAL UNCERTAINTY FOR COVERT FORCES, SINCE MUCH OF-THE NORMAL TROOP TRAINING WITH THE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED.

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