The Potential for Mass Unrest in Soviet Central Asia
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The Potential for Mass Unrest in Soviet Central Asia
A Research Paper
This paper vras prepared
of Soviet Analysis. Conunents ana queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief. .SOVA,
Tbe Potential for Mass Unrest la Soviet Central Asia i
taeflwJ> rtport-
Asia facca wbal ia barer* torolonged period of unreal. Underlying tbe iporadk but intense violeoce that hat erupted since but year are deteriorating eccromic and ecological conditions, tbe rising expectationsredominant Iyouthful population, and emerging grass-roots protest and nationalist raovetrtcnts- Tbese factors are likely lo fuel continued sporadic outbreaks of viokocc into ibesgsinst the presence of Russians and other normative nationalities and between native populations.
Over tbe neti (wo to three years. Mcascow's challenge in Central Asia is likely lo evolve from polkring outbreaks of violence to dealing with outright defiance of its policies by republic regimes and. in the region's poorest and most Islamic areas, insurrectionist and secessionist moveroents. Unwilling and unable to expend the resource* necessary lo address the area's problems. Moscow is. for now.assive posture, leaving implementation of political and economic reform to tbe republic regimes. For their part, the local regimes have both adopted aspects of tbe nationalist agenda themselves and largely repressed Ihe growth of national-ist. Islamic, and reform movement* capable ofolitical challenge to them. Thisby the still traditional,political culture of Centralbought them some time. This success in blocking popular challenges, however, may itself provoke violence as social tensions build up and legal outlets of expression arc denied to opposition forces
Moscow's response to mass upheaval or separatist pressures in the region will vary depending upon the demographic and economic character of Ihe area involved. If the Russian population in industrialized northern Kazakh-Stan or along ihe Caspian coos', for example, were faced with mass intcrclhnic violencecparatist challengeililanily nationalist regime, Moscow woaid almost certainly defend Russian lives, properly, and right to remain in Ihe Soviet Union. If confronted, however, with long-term police problermcparatist challenge in areas where Muslims predominate and which are already estranged from theexample. Tajikistan. Uzbekistan, andwould be much more likely to coruuder culling iu losses and repatriate the Russian settler population
10
A happy ending for Moscow in Ihe region vrouidestoration of economic growth at (he national levelolitical environment in which Moscow could reach agreement with republic governments on meaiutes to help solve Central Asia's massive pasjMajag, Avoiding ecological and economic catastrophe would require considerabiy reduced cottonand costly measures to deal with the water crisis -most likelyiversion of waters from rwrthern rivers,pposed by environmentalists and Russian nationalists. Even then, poverty would remain widespread and instability would be chronic. For tbe foreseeable future, the authorities will face explosive divisions over such issues as the rote of Islam, the place of tbe nonnative settlers, unemployment, shortages of land gad water, population control, and outmigralioo, as well as the continuinsj pcsential for the emergencetrong secessionist movement.
Contents
Page
orteni for Central Asia's Future
Shaping the Unrest
and Ecological Squeere
Oeography and Dcrnoaraphy
and Other Factors
Anton, and Their Strategies
Regimes
Movements
and Alternative Scenarios
Likely Scenario: Major Problemslowly Evolving Political Challenge
Upheaval and Secession
Possible Happy Ending?
EsuMUhment and Decline of tbe Old Order
External Influences on Central Asian Unrest
The Potential for Maw Unrest in Sottel Central
or Ctalralm
Central Aaiaa aunory has alternated between Von* period* ofquietude and bunt* of interne turmoil. After the Russian cnisauest wa* Largdy completed by the latehe Central Asian* made sporadic rioieart erTori* to throw orT Mcacow's rule6 so the. This unreal culminated in Ihe Baaasachi revolt, which at its heightontrolled substantial territory. Decade* of repeeaiioo, forced calm,egree of economic peogrca* followedben riot* broke out in Alma-Ata sod otherazakhstan ewerussian party secretary. Since then, the area has reentered what is likely lorolonged period of unrcst-
9 sporadic violence had become widespread throughout tbe region. Initially, the incidents seemed to be spontaneous Interethnic brawls amongut Liycreaamgiy they have takenoliticalDemonstrations whose lb*roei were Islamic and antiforcian 'that is. against naitonalities that had come to the region in modern timet) occurred in Tashkent. Riots latgcly directed against outsidebroke out in Ashkhabad and NcMt-Dag in Tutkmcniya. Dushanbe ia Tajikistan, and Novyy Uzen' in Kaakhstan.une with the Fergana Valley riot* in Uzbekistan.hree-week period, the Ferganabloodiest since the Russian civil war- resultedatalities aad tbe military evacasation0 noeinatrve Mcskhetian Turk refugees
With the general increase io social tension, dashes took place among the Central Asian nationa litre*across borde rs or in areas of miaed population Inhen Tajik and
Kirghir. villagers engaged in battles across the border in ihe Isfsrahousand Interior Ministry (MVD) Internal Troops were needed to testorc order Similar disputes erupted along tbe Kirghiz-Kazakh
aad Uzbekborders andistrict of
Tajikistanarge Uzbek minority
Even political activism that remained largely In peaceful channel* emphasized ann Soviet and arsli-Rassian themes,ashkent, forsen* of thousands of students and intellectuals repeatedly protested the toe of the Russian language instead of Uzbek in publicemanding that Uzbek officials tougbca Ibe republic draft law requiring greater use of Uzbek. Similar campaigns resulted in language laws in Tajikistan, Karakhstan. and Kirghi-aiya. Ecological concerns prompted demonsualions by "Greens" against the Rogua power dam in Tajikistan aad by activists against audear leaiing atin Kazakhstan Rdlgious concernsashkent protest In9 that forced tbe regional Islamicregarded by Soviet Muslimsool ofresign
eneral calming iain the spring of this year, becomingviolent, spreading to previously quiet area*,increasing at lacks on governmentaltbe political leadership of the republics.previous not areas haveigh level of general social tensionhostility exists throughout the region,in report* from residents aad travelersathe Fergana
Valley in9 found Uzbeks stilldligerent mood toward nonnatlves, and tltc last remaining Mcskhetian* were trying to sdl their belonging* and emigrate In Tashkent and Dushanbe, high satiety among European settlers was evidenced by theof departing train tickets and shipping crate* for months to come
la February the Tajik SSR'a capital,had been relatively calm- exploded iaof rioting in whicheople were killedInjured. Muslim extremists played aia organizing Ihe disturbances and wereto some degree by Mujahidia agent* fromaccording to local
fsVeilf^
//awe t. Mlftaar yotiki Irad rvoruria wear kfudlm
of high-ranking party tnd
government official* used (be protests in anattempt to oust the leadership of ih* Tajikistan Communist Party.
Id June in the Kirghizquietest republic to thismoat violent disorder! to dale eiplod-ed in Oah at the esurient end of the Fergana Valley. Beginninglash between young Kirghiz trying to seize land to build bouses and ethnic Uzbeks who were fanning the lame land, lb* riots iprcadthe oblaat as ethnic bands hunted each other and crowds burned police and public buildings.roops were required to restore order and seal off tbe Uibckiatan border,rowd0 Uzbeks from seeking revenge in Kirghiriya. In Frunze, the Kirghiz SSR capital,roup*tudent* La several days of clcsnonstraticsts. prompting (be republic leadership lotate of emergency, la tbe week of disorders aterson* were killedhousand were iniured
V
Factors Shaping the Uawssl
Erwaulc andr*
Central Asia is caught in in cccoomic and ecological squcc it population growtherceni per year) i* outitripping economic growth, resulting in Increasing unemployment and poverty Tbe problem has reached crisis proportions in the Aral Sea basin forming tbe southern half of the region At casrresu rale* of growth, this already highly populated belt will add aboutillion people by tbeense population combined with escessive cultivation of cotton, ihe region's chief capon and largest employer oftraining ecological limits, in rntrticular water resource* The Aral Sea i* tbrcai-cned with virtual disappear*ice because the rivers that feed It are almost totally used forpu niton of agriculture has nearly ended,ajor cutback may be required in the future. The republic regimes have recently begun to grapple wilh
a-xigt-.
Unrett and the Aral Sea Crisis
The Aral Sea erlUi highlights ike Ouerrelatednets of ecological deterioration, economic problems, endl In Central Asia. If ikt sea coniimies to dry up In the nextears, the blowing salt and sand from ihe old sea bottom, combined with associated climatic changes, may progressively destroy the fragile oases to Ihe south and to the east and merer them with the surrounding destrtt. Already lens of thousands of people have been displaced along the formeranotherillion people live nearby Inareas extending about SOO kilometers down the Amu Darya and Syrdar'ya. These areas could be threatened by 'desertification" In the nesi five0 years. Ifarge portion of these people would be forced to move to other overcrowded areas whose Inhabitants are already resentful of outilders In their midst. Stabilising the sea at Us currrni reduced level could retard this process but would requireof about two-thirds af the previous Inflow from the Amu Darya and Syrdar 'ya faboul JJ cubic kilometers of water perurrent efforts lo restore the flow into ihe sea through more efficient water use and some substitution af food crops for cotton production ore likely to produce only about half the wateroccording to Soviet and Wtstern experts. One alternative to save Ihe Aral is to substantially reduce agriculturalThtt wouldajor relocation of ruraltask so likely to ralsr opposition that no political leader has raisederiousAnother alternative would be to obtain water fromroject that would be fiercely fought by Russian ecology activists and officials
these problem* by *uch measure*culling cotton production andegional council for joint action. In their Initial declaration in June, the five republic leaders calledevival of tbeplan to provide additional water to the regioniversion from the rivers of Siberia. However,deterioration and ecological disaster are probably unavoidable.
families in tbe USSR. ranging fromercent in Karakhnanercent in Uzbekistan and topercent in Tajikistanompared wiibercent in the Russianentral Asia israr below tbe average in nearly every Soviet welfare indicator from food consumption to houiing tuppij Nevertheless, tbe substantial survivalraditional way of life in rural areasew other mitigating elements of Centralt such as ibe relatively large supply of private housing suitable for largepeople reluctant to leave this cncrpopulated region for better employment andprospects elsewhere
Caevaphy and OrasnfssaaVy
Economic and ethnic problems in the region are most Interne in its southern sec lot roughly, south of an cast-west line drawn from the northern tip of ihe Aral SeaeMuslims predominate The irrigated oases and large cities of this area. Islands in (he region's vast doetti. arc among ihe most densely populated aioas in the world. With their growing unemployment, religious militancy, and ttV plosive mixtures of nationalities, many of these areas, such as the Fergana Valley, are tinderboxe* of unrest.
Above ibe line, in north Kazakhstan. EuropeansavMliy.uge band of territory, large mining and energy production complexes with mixed populations ate interspersed Ri ihe broad steppes, which are sparsely inhabited by pastoral Kaiakhs. Farther north, in tbe "Virgin Lands'* area. European farmers grow grata on the com. dry plains
The legion's capital cities are the centers of republic politics and agitation against the caiiting order bui also, paradoxically, the strongholds of RussianHere popular movements have sprungoos the native intellectual leadership working in iheeducational and research institutions and have gathered adherents arnong the students and low-level government employees of ihe capital In disoidtis. their limited numerical strength is often reinforced by busloads of disaffected youths from (he surrounding countryside On the other hand. Europeans ate at leasterceni of (he population of all the capitals andreponderant majority in Alma-Ala and Frunie Continuing interethnrc slnfe and militant demonmations arc likely in ihe future
Several unique geographic and demographichave set the stage far coounaung unrest ia ibe region:
Dominance of native republic nationalliles.eversal of demographic patterns rxsor to World War II. native Muslim oat tonalities bowin their "titular" republics. Increasing their population al an average annual raleercent and also migrating into their respective litabsr re publics from Ibe surrcarrsdiog area, (he nativearearger share of thein those republics and an expandingcal force within them. The Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turk-mens have become two-thirds of theirr/ulatiorvs or mote; (be Kirghiz and Kaiakhsidening plurality in iheir more evenly divided republics.
Wired native population!illionof Ibe native nationalities live as minoritiea outside theirepublic Moat of these live in several rones in which iht population is highly mied sad which extend across republic lines (seeowever, no native titular nationalityajority in an oWast outside its "home" republic (as (he Armenians are In Azerbaijan'sObi*si) Whin the overall rise in tensions in the region, conflscu between native nationalities have grown from easily defused border skirmishes over water and grazing rights lo Ihe full-scale com iniots between Urbeks and Kirghiz that exploded In tune. While more such disorders are [uuibic ia the future, there it no disputed territorial claim with deep emotional toots likely to move two people* and their republic governments to an irreconcilable
COwfhCI
Tht European presence.2 millionmillion of whom srea Quarter of ibe region! population Abouteroral of these liveajority in northern Kazakhstan: (heillion live among the Muslimof ihe south. Thereet mlgralionillion Europeans fiom the region in, and lb* rate of popadat-O* growth for those remaining is very slowerceni perevertheless.
r-
fllo-f
T.bsel
Central Asia: Ethnic9
mnltt mtlomttlitt. Th* Caniral AtUo "iriular" Mtlonil.ea-lint as coaDM.tki oaisidchomelus ihern niu-r-r*wbllc Oeaev Eatuvaa ttlettliio. taciudc* Uiiainiam,tans. Gcnruai. aad European Jews (nc4 Central Anaa native lews) Ii doa nol inetud* minor European talinndiili aeeh ai Pain, lain-ata, aad so forth
Mawow.
Siaie Ommiiice. for Simian
ibe Europeans be forced inio precipitate flight, it would add lo tbe major bousing problems in the Ruuian Republic and perhaps createn the core of the USSRrackdown In Central Asia.
Normative Muslimmall minority of nonnative Muslim0any of whom came as deportees in World War It, have remained in the region. They have noi assimilated with the Central Asian native Muslims and are now subject to physical attack for their higher standard of living and their purported collaboration with the rulinghird ofcskhetian Turks have tied the region as refugees since Ihe riots in the Fergana Valley last summer.9 therestill over zW.OOO Crimean Tatars in ihe region,conditionsmany0 per year are returning to the Crimea,increased tension in that area of the Ukraine.
Youthful populations. The rapidly growing native populations have large proportions (overercent) of young adults, whose needs for housing, jobs, and educational opportunities stress weak government capabilities and whoarge pool of recruits for political agitators.'
' Phi ciaudvaiu inn. when ihe prtevetWri of We popaliiion ia the Ii-year-oW ttcuprw. abmetrixni <i
theocial union nlicn Uinuto sharply, parti, beeavse ct inumilicd comneuiionilaHcnd land, and piillf brcaucnl hither kvel(flxiani, iWaiililv imom yaine
Tabic 2
Central Asia: Finale Compel lion of Republic Cap! lab
PceuUiion
IirUffiwul
oflir Russiaationalities
reeuN.*
aphsh
KaauntSSR
Utbek SSR
Tajik SSR
Kifihii SSR
-i: SSR
Ihe percent ef (Opvlition fcv asiionilUits blram0 USSR aw tW moil nrccni diu available.
Elbnic and Other Faelora
NatMim. latcreibnic violence It endemic In tbea product of the fruatiailoni ofany feel theircould be solved If Russians. Germans.and other Caucasian* as well asand other noonative Mutlims werefrom tbe legion Many of the violent eseni* ofplanned attack* by tbe native Centralatainst these noun*live resident.xenophobia of theccording toandoften capioiied by
pctitical. rel,gious. aad criminal force* for their own
purpose*
i la ihe major riots, mobs have increasingly turned on police and party facilities and personnel,umber of headquarter*and attempting toarm* from personnel and storageor their patl, security forces have shown an increasing inclination lo fire on rioters, increasing total casualties and perhaps popular
Settler Bmeklmsk. Russians and other nonnativehave become increasingly apprehensive in tbe past two years over their declining standard of hving and physical security In addition, they now are discriminated against io hiring aad education and eventually wit) face the need to master tbe native languageesult of th* new Uaguage laws. Outrun ration it on the rue, and those who retrain arcore direct force both as national and local political activists aad at vigilante self-defense forces.
Itlmmic Af(7iM*sey. Native Central Asians of all classes identify themselves culturally asoverwhelmingly Suoni withmall minority of Shiilca. Rural life continue* to be organized around Islamic belief and rituals, and Ihe native elite it rediscovering its interest in Islam. Clandestine Sufi religious brother hood i. whkh were active during the Basmachi revolt ofnd continue to exist today, provide potential precedents for an *ntiregime networklam-oriented demonstrationslo the successfuliring of Wahabbile and other militant sects, particularly ha Tajikistano in Urbekasiar aad Turkxacaaya. la theand unstable coviroaavce! prevailing ia Central Asia, charismatic Islamic leaders have begun to emerge andollowing, Periodic demonstration* ia the city of Tashkent aad in Turkmcniya have demanded the return lo tbe *hariai or Koranic law. including the cloistering of women and the supremacy of religious over secular law.
Nationalitat. To date, nationalisu in tbe region have focused on limited objectives, such at expanded use of tbe titular nationality language, rather than radical autonomy or secession proposals. In the future, the appeal of autonomy will continue to grow, but the political elites of Central Asia will probably not be quick to embrace secession. They are anxious to be free of Moscow's supervision, but they abo want the center's support for their political survival and help for the region's severe problems. Finally, mostfear the religious extremism and violence that would be associatedeparatist movement.
Pan'Tar ki tut: Regional Unity Against Moscow.Central Asians regarded themselves as primarilynited by Islam, and to some degree as "Turks" orhe Czar* and the early Bolsheviks ruled the areaore or less unified entity called Turkestan.4 the Sovietsolicy of "divide and rule" by dividing the region into ethnically based republics, and for overears efforts at regional cooperation or leadership
were repressed aturing that time, tho republics as political uaits and the currentbetween themtrong legitimacy, but the idea of Central Asian unity remains attractive to intellectuals nostalgic for the greatness of the old Central Asian empires aad aware of the potential strengthnified front to resist Moscow. Regional unity showed strong signs of revival ineries of cooperative agreements were signed among the republics and an interrcpubtic secretariat was established in Alma-Ata.
I nterrf public. Nell re-VertttS-Satire Conflicts. The lethal battle between ethnic Uzbeks and Kirghiz at Osh in June opened what will probablyrolonged period of Interethnic conflict in the troubled Fergana Valley. While republic officials have traditionally cooperated to defuse conflicts between their respective nationalities, the intensity and size of these riots temporarily overwhelmed them and security forces.
fttartoootarKuthtirtfrt io irani litn far prrroii ho**
rowd itpvbiU itttet. but "
famed byml"rttyfoaird tor.
I
*J
ord Ibenovemenl Biriik put intensea Uzbekistan official* to inter-verse on behalf of ibe Uzbek minority and raised an inm* too* call for ibe formation of an Uzbek autonomous region In Kirghiz!ya Demonstration* in the Kirghiz capital of Frunze called for tbeof the republic leadership. While general cooper-alien between the republics was msintatned until the crisis cooled, the seeds of future interrepublic conflict may have been planted by the Uzbek Premier's critidtm of Kirghiz orncaals and the efforts ofgroups on both sides to focus local passion- on republic officials Since tbe uodeilying social conflicts icmaia. ii will be difficult to avoid further trouble
There fa also potential for conflictumber of valleys where Tajiks and Uzbeks arc ajicieniTajikistan and Uzbekistan each have1 million conationals living inside the other's republic boundaries, Tajik nationalists haverecently as the February Dushanbethe Samarkand area is rightfully part
of Tajikistan because of ihe former dominance of Taiik culture and amajority there. Conversely, Uzbeks makesercent of the puewlaiion in some obiasts of Tajikistan.T, minority protest* overdared In both republics but were defused by coeicesiion* of the irmubUc governments. .
In the long run. Uzbek nationalism may be the most serious threat lo interrepublic peace. Uzbeks are by far the largest Cential Asian nationality,illion Uzbeks live as rruaoriiiet in otherNationalists are pressing the Uzbekistan regime toreater advocate for Uzbek* outside the republic Should regional turmoil intensify orseem near, Uzbekistan might be drawn into aggiestrvc eapanuon lhat would gather in the large Uzbek minorities ntst beyond its borders and per him revive pretentions lo the inheritance of tbe past empires centered on lis territory
Exltratl FolUitotlthough limitedby pcdiiknl and cultural factors, theeffect of cuuidc in/luencei on the regionAfghanistan. Irtn, and Azerbaijan) isgrow. Evidence of outiide Influence eartergedin hut February* riot* In Dushanbe Afghan-ere reported by the republic KGBto have been providing organizaiion-
alsu;
io the period before the ditlarbancea but apparentlynot directly involvedrganiriug tbe protests and the ra bacon em coup attempt. Agitators front Azerbaijan reportedly helped raise the emotional pitch of the crowds by spreading rumor* thatrefngeea were coming lo take their housing. (See
Key Actors aad Ihrlr Stralrgkt
As Gorbachev's reforms continue lo open up and decentralize the Soviet system, Ibe polities of CenlraJ Asia and its reiatiewsbip with Moscow are changing dramatically, lacruaaingly. Mcncow is disengaging from Central Asia: whife mad. to intervene against (Toss breaches of the peace, it is essentially relying on the republic regime* to implement economic and political reform, with limited help from the center. The republic regime* are simultaneously attempting to block emerging nationalist and Islamic activist movements and reuuurc Kustiau actllert even as they move to establish their own legitimacy by asserting Ihdr republic autonomy against Moscow. The key actors-Moscow, ihe republic regimes, and the grass rootseach attemptingo-opt or contain the region's poweiful but inchoateorces without gradually surrendering to them in the process
Moscow
Mcacow has attemptedefuse potential tensions between Central Asia and the center with modest political compromises, such as raiting ihe status of native languagesis Russian, loosening ecniroh, on Islam, and lowering requirements for cottonThe number of officials dispatched directly from Moscow lo occupy strategicositions in the republic hierarchies hut also been significantly
n nddillon, Moscow reversed its past policy of discouraging regional cooperation in Centralof fear8 approved ibe joint catsblubrncaiegionalcommission by the five rrswjbucs.
Mosi important, perhaps. Gorbachevs reforms have launched changes that have presented the rcpublsc leg.me* with new chsJkuges and opportunities for reduced Moscow's dominance and
ia Ibe region. The pclruea! reform, have required the republic parties to open debate and risk reasonably open elections. While the republic parly machines won handily in all republics, the elections did push the republic leaderships toward portions of the reformist agenda and brought some new force* into Ihe political process. However. Moscow and ibe republics have left unaddressed the fundamental problems of ihe region, particularly boweal with lit looming economic crisis, and Mcacow has been reducing iu nbwJule level of financial investment in recent years. While ibis essentially ptasivc strategy limits Mcacow's costs and im-rslveaneniime of preoccupation witb rationalisks greater unreal in law song run if these republic icginve* do not deal with ihe ev-onomic challenge, continue lo rule in an authoritarian manner, and fail to bring ibe new political forces into ihe peaceful mainsiream of
Moscow's resources lor militarily controlling event* in Central Asia are tomewhai limited by the region's geographic isolation, ihe relatively few suitable forces available there, and the demands of trouble spots elsewhere, particularly in tbe Caucasus. Although il has many forces nationwide thai can be deployed lo ihe region by air and. less swiftly, by irain. il hat limited local capability for quick response and would find it dim-cult to deal simultaneouslyajor disorder elsewhere in the USSR and one orentral Asia
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wm not fret* liom Mqkm bui had wad aahwaa-
lititlUan. Kaiahhiua. KIrflMBVa. sad
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r
tUmcoi'aiari "il hot
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torritn.
Moscow's preferred means for dealing with unrest it to use Interior Ministry (MVD) Internal Troops, which nrc better trained and equipped for this task than regular ground forces units. Most commonly deployed against civil disturbances arc ihe MVD elite operational and special police units, which areSlavic and consequently more reliable than the MVD local police, which have frequently refused to aa against their own ethnic group. We have identified only five MVD special police units inenone new special police detachment (of similar size) established In Alma-Ata. In each serious disorder to date,has been forced to fty In Internal Troops from outside the-region
Moreover, when there are crises elsewhere In theas during the Dushanbe and Osh riots thismust selectively use other forces because there are insufficient numbers of Internal Troops available- Airborne units are Moscow's second choke for controlling unrest because of their mobility and higher level of discipline. Airborne forces from Fergana as well as elementso other airborne
divisions flown in from the western USSR were used to help regain control in Osh. Moscow has also called upon units of ihe KGB Boidcr Troops to handle unrest in Central Asia, but the number of units available for these duties is limited.
The Soviets generally iry to avoid relying on regional motorized rifle or tank forces to quell unrest, although these forces did play minor roles in the Osh crisis. Most of such units are manned al less than SO perceni of authorized strength andallup ofto beallup. moreover, presents the dilemma of either using Central Asians, who may be unreliable, or bringing in reservists from outside the region, who may be slow to arrive
Republic Regimes
The republic regimes are closely identified In the eyes of the populace with Moscow, but in recentparticularly in the key republics of Uzbekistan andleadership and newly electedhaveew independence of action and
1 Sccnl
toward Moscow. In genei al. ihew regimesn it tempting to preempt tbe claim of emerging popular mmesncnis to leadership oa aatioe-ibtt aad reform lnues while attempting to keep iotict ibe police cool rob and party machines that bare ma in tuned tbcm In power In the put
The top parly and government leaden hip in theae republic* oomprlica nativeome local Rus-lis nr. and officials cUspatched from Mcneow to man key control positions Heavy industry ministries and tcajce caterpriaca report directly to Meocow ministries end are largely ilatTed by technically trained Russian residents. While ouuiden have made moil of the beyreferential policies began In the Brezhnev years have increasingly put large numbers of educated natives into positions of real power, especially in light industry, services, and local government. Newautonomy legislation is allowinghallenge central authorities for greater deeaion nuking power, and newly elected legislatures have proved cneutiderably more assertive than their rubberstamp predecessors.
local party organs, usually organised alongclan u'nea. have proved to be successful "machines" in controlling patronage and elective politics. They arc accused by the Soviei media of behaving like mafia for engaging In criminal activities and opposincAl ihe worst, scene local clans arc accused of fomenting ethnic violenceactic against higher authorities
With the emergence of grassroots politicalpatty regimes have begun to fight for theirall the tools inherent in their domination ofFor esample, when tbeefied the authorities lolarge demonstrations ia Tashkent in lateUibekistsn regimeough lawassembly, and it recently addedestablishing administrative detention forethnic hate material. Kazakhstan hassimilar laws Activists from Kirghiriyaof regime effortspolitical organization ia that republic,movement groups ccanptain they haveby provocateurs from the regime'swho have disrupted their strategy and
The regime* demonstrated their prowess as political machine* In the elections to the national congress last year and In the recent republic and local dectidos. They got obedient roters to the polls at ihe highest rates in the Union -generallylthough these turnouts were partly due to theof allowing beads of hcuselsolds to vote for their family members. The Central Asian regime* also elected the highest percentage of partymosl of whom rannd overercent of members elected to the new republic supreme Soviets are party members. Nevertheless,hird of all taprcrnc soviet race* bad to be decided by runoffs, and the victorious otvosrticn Candida tea orparty member*if smalleaven of independent challenge lo thepro forma legislative process
In national politics, the Central Asian regimescould be counted on to support Moscow out of subservience to their central party sponsors andrade-ofl for economic benefits. Tbe Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan panics have passed resolution* criticizing tbe Lithuanians for est*Wishing separate Communist parties and dads rations calling for national unity. In recent months, however, tbe Central Asians have also begun to challenge Moscow in key aieas of national concern. For eaample, Kazakhstan is attempting io bar tbe national government from further nuclear testing at ScmrpaUiinsk The Uzbek. Turkmen, and Tank supreme Soviets havedeclaration of sovereignly" declaring the precedence of republic laws over Ihose of tbe USSR The Urbeks and Turkmen* have succufully reduced their cotton quo-las, and the Urbeka plan tohird of0 crop for independent sale on ibe world market.
Grassroots Movement*
Islamic Adiniii. Nationalist and Islamic activist groups aie emerging but aie not yet strong enough lo shape Central Asian polilics. The successful demonstraiioni9 tor language,and religious reform will be difficult to repeat becauic of moves by local regimes lo impose lighter controls on mass political ctpicssioo and co-optation of many Issue* by Ihe republic parties. Although they
electedfen* linportani individuals, ibe independent popular movements captured onlysmall share of (he leaU In recent elections prolaab'y because of scene combination of part* aianipulatioei aad theireiperie.Tcr Currently most have barely erKrged as organirstiOQi and lack compelling issues. "They will probablyorig period of development, before they will be able to challenge the republic regimes elect or illy. Meanwhile, tbe region's social tensions and problems are likely toatalag the likeli-hood of violent disorders, which oftenear political focus
Only Birlik. tbe Uzbek popular front, has achieved republic-wide representation and can claim hundreds of thousands of supporters. By late last year, however, it had become seriously divided over tactics, and later its moderate wing broke off to form the ERKto seek reform by more "constitutional" means. In Kazakhstan informal group activity has been strong, but moat of it has centered on marrow ecology and cultural issues or remainedocal scale.
Religious groups arc likely to grow In importance, altbovih so far they have, for the moat part, been eflectirely quashed or co-opted by republic regimes. For example. Islam andoderate Islamic reform movement, has been inactive since precipitating the ouster of tbe former mufti of Central Asia: the new mufti was elected to the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies and teenu to have become the principal political voice for moderate Muslims. The powerful potential of milium Islamic forces was dramatically demonstrated In tberiots, which were fomentedoalition of militant Muslims aud nationalist groups C
Jibe Tajik Ra si ok her movement, sinner investigation for iu role in ihe riots, electedegislators in ihe elections that followed them
Ruuttu* autd rVoaaarfre Moverntrui Theillion ethnic Europeansillion Muslims from outside Ihe region are now organizing in hopes of forcing Mcacow and local regimes to pay more attention to settler welfare Russians and other Europeans have formed "international movcrncnu" in republicmodeled on Ibe "intermovements" in tbe Baltic republics and Moldavia, and chapters of Ihe extremist
Russian nailonalist organization Pa my at have been rumored in northern Kazakhstan and Tashkent.tbe most effective group* for settler rigbu may be emerging ia ostensibly raultietkm*for neighborhood security or assertion of labor nghu (such as the powerful Karaganda minersorganized during last summer's coal strike in Kazakhstan)
Although these groups are not narrowly nationalistic at present, their potential for adopting militanttactics sssch as strikes, blockades, aad vigilante activity if anlivbt pressure increases vs very high. As the precVwimant labor force cat the railroads and io heavy industry. Russians could iry lo paralyzeactivity with strikes ss they have already done successfully in Moldavia and have triedo in the Baltic republics.ituation of extreme disorder, or if independence were declared in republics thatreponderant native Muslim majority, such as Kirghi-ziya aad Kazakhstan. European settlers might fight secession from Ihe USSR or. where theyajority, attempt to secede from tbe republicsSuch actions might in lum provoke mass retaliations and flights of refugees similar io those in Azerbaijan and Armenia
Outlookrinative Scenarios
Most likely Scenario: Majsvr Prtvhlawaaolvswg Political ChaJhrogr
Tbe most likely near-term future for Central Asia is one fraught with large-scale intcrethaie violence but not mass secession lit movements This judgment is based on the expectation that Moscow will be unable io undertake Urge-scale projects lo addresshealth, and ecological problems fuelling the unrest. Intereibnk violence probably will ruo Ibe gamut of riots between outsiders and natives,mass agitation in the heavily populated oases sod republic capital cities, aad clashes between native astionalities ia the border regions. Whileeparatist "coup" building oa Urge-tcale Intcrctbnk violence cannot be ruled out, morepolitical chalknges ioexample.
Major Upheaval and Secession
Alt/sough less blely. current sporadic disorders could acoalerateajor social upheaval in the next two to threehe likelihood would be increasednowballing secessionist movementreakdown of order in the rest of the USSR, locally, popular unrest could be intensifiedritics] level by widespread food shortages, poor performance or brutality by the republic regimes,ood of the rural unemployed to the cities. Politically, nsore charismatic andleadership axnoag the slowly cuiergjag popular nrnvcracnU or the currently isolated Muslim militants could quickly multiply their effectiveness in mobUir lag the many frustrated ricmem* of Central Asian society
Despite the scopec mchlcrds. however. Moscow and the republic regimes have assets that can work in favor of Stability, particularly the traditionalism of Central Asian political culture and the vested interest ia the status quo of the Soviet-trained native elite. In addition, they could take some Important short-term measures to enhance their position. Republiclaw* and the decline of central party authority are giving republichance to claim legitimacy by atserting themselves against Moscow In suchcrucial areas as reducing cotton production. Moscow, for it* pan. could rekindle hope for benefit* from membership in tbe USSR by implementing, for example, iu pilot job-creation scheme In the riot-torn Fergana Valley and ccenptetma measure* to improve regional irrigation.the Central Asians willmight resume study of more dramatic solutions to the Aral Sea crisis. iDdudiag the plan to divert northern waters. At the same lime. Moscow' might bold off gains by nationalists and Islamic militantsimited opening of the political process and by expanding republic autonomy andoncilialoty approach to Islam. The new elect oral aad parliamentaryimperfect asimited butinfusion of new blood into official politics.
A collapse of Ihe existing order would probably be signaled by simultaneous Fergana-type disturbances across the region or tbe emergenceatrnaclii-type iasiirgcttcy force. It is likely Moscow's security forces will be stretched thin meeting crises elsewhere in the USSR and might be unable to mobilize the overwhelming force that would be needed to restore order should unrest break out in many localities simultaneously. With limited help from Moscow, aome of the republic regimes could control the capital cities for some time but might lose control of tbe countryside to insurgent forces or ibeii owa local political clans act lag as iridependcat warlords
Moscow's responseass upheaval or lo the threat of separatism would dependarge degree oa whereouble emerged; many in tbe elite already see much of theits southernmostan cccavymie liability and politicalID areas such as northern Karakhstan and along Turkrneaiyi'* Caspian coast. Meaopw would almost certainly defend the rights of the Russian populations, including their right to secedeilitantly utionalisj native regime aadart of the USSR. In Tajikistan, UiUkiatan, and Ktrghiziya, bow ever. Moscow could come to see tbe cost ofargeresence and maintaining investments as unbearable. While it would certainly
support fortime any republic regime fighting radical Muslim or nationalist insurrection, if tbe loyalists appeared lo be losing. Moscow could be expected to repatriate Russian settlers and abandon Its investments. And, because there alnsost certainly itational political consensus in favor of the use of force to resist separatism in Central Asia, if one of these republics were to attempt to secede peacefully under Soviet law with iu party regime In agreement, Moscow probably would resist only wilh economic and legs! measures
A Possu.se Happy Fading r
If political stability and ccortotnlc growth wereat ibe national levd. Moscow could provide real incentives to remain with the union, raarticularly increased industrial investment. The Central Asians and Moscow would have toubstantial portion of the unemployed rural population inside tbe region and beyond and, perhaps, mitigate the crisis of ihe Aral Sea basin with additional supplies of water. Moscow would very likely have toajor pan of current cotton production yet continue substantial economic subsidies.evived USSR, however, the peace and strategic control of the area would probably be worth the price.
Nevertheless, Moscow will not regain the direct con-trol it head in the region through the, oven if no republic actually secedes. The tightly ccntralued Comma nisi Party no longer exists, and the republic regimes wiD have to seek legitimacyprcscn tali res of native interestsis Moscow. Native asseitive-ness and weak ecomomic opportunities willreduce the Ituropean population In the region. Regional unity, even if limited, will further erode Moscow's influence. And Mcacow will abo have to share trade and influence with outside powers such as Iran and Turkey .
o conceivable scenario thai will bring Central Asia prosperityigh degree of stability given its ethnic divisions, burgeoning population,resources, and barriers io economic development. Even such solutions to iu problems as industrialiu-tioo and migration from tbe countryside are likely to generate their own measure of instability
flMssfajatlni
Appendix A
and Old Ol
ea/ period, the Raiaiaa empire ccav-cruered large area* of Central Asia from the romidi of the ateppea iprtseot-diy Kara kJisian aad Turkmen -iya) aad the emirates of the southernsent-day Uzbekistan andhe proceatrption an Isu-goty completed by tbe IHBOs. but.6 to tbe. Central Aalau madehrow off Sovietcrim ofinspired by Islam and aimed at achieving,culminated la the Basmachi inaurrcctiori. which at Ha peak controlled substantial territory With all organized ccpoartion Milled by the, the Soviets setigid poike-iute tystem directed from Moscow but admin me redative leadership. Cotton growing in large-scaleagriculture came to dominate tbe regional economy.
In tbe period through, the native elite gained prog restively more power at the republic level, and decade* of economic development and political integration appeared to lock tbe Central Asianfirmly into tbe Soviet system On the other hand, the traditional Central Asian way of life continued more or leas unchanged in tbe countryside, where two-thirds of the native population continued to reside
campaign beginning3 removed all the long-tenured party secretaries and two-thirds of the top leadership.6 Moscow canceled the long-anticipated project to divert river water from Siberia to Central Asia,stagnation in the national economyannual investment ia tha region began to fall By the, with Central Asia's economic growth stowing andral Asia's long, slow rite ia per capita income ended and anernptovment began to rite '
The Alma-Ata riots in6 marked tbe begin-ni ni:ew round of unrest In which- conflict,umber of major riots ipread across Central Asia. Paradeticslly. however, as Soviet Uoopsbeen repeatedly called opoa to put down outbreaks of vicaence. Moscow hat lowered its level of dominance over regional poll Ires la the. ihe leadership of the rrxsubsacs stabilizedew group of republic party tccieia net thai had MoMwi eonhJcnceegree of popular tope*oreover, nationally mandated reforms and elections opened the political process somewhat, and grassroots movements rose to challenge the parly'-morropoly of power.
In, apparent stability began to break down. Soviet leaders after Brezhnev aiucked the Central Asian regimes for their rampant corruption andfa."urc to produce results; an antiooeruption
Appendix B
External Influences on Central Asian Unrest
.Soviet Baajaaj
Tbe greatest ouuide influence on Central Asian event.ikely io be the movements for chance within the USSR itself. Baltic and Axcri popular fronu, by example and by direct technical assistance, have alreadyajor pari In stimulating Ibe rite of independent popular movement* In the list two years. Axcri agitators reportedlyajor Impact by helping toajor riot in Dushanbe and lesser disturbances In Freeze.
Afgbanistaa
igher overall level of modcreizatioa andsecular outlook than prevail*nd especially Tajiksemotional ties to their ethnic brethrenborder, aaaay of -bom arc descendants offrom therevolt ofbe Afghan Musahsdmaa ethnic Tajik, called upon Muslimsise up in sympathy with Azerlsood's forces last year mayup their orgsmring efforti amongTajiks, which had begun as early astothese efforts bore fruil
during the February riois in Dushanbe when Afghan-influenced groups emerged in the leadership Ibat planned tbe disorder! Some Mujahidin considerwithin theeans to end Moscow'* support for the Kabul regime and to eventually attack the regime within Ihe USSR. Therearticularly receptive audience inpoorest and most fervently Muslim republic
Iran
Iranian influence--lacking aa organizational base in thefar leu developed than that of the Afghan rebels. Radiobroadcasting Into Turkmcnlya by tbe large Turkmen minority In Iran has been the Iranians most successful measure lo build influence so far. But potcnialiy Iran couldtill greater impact among tbe Soviei Tajiks "ho are culturally and ethnically Iranian. In comingoreradio transmit ten and the opening of tbe USSR, particularly the relaxation of border controls and theystem, are likely io provide greaterfor Iranian influence to be felt. '
Tnrfcey
inor factor to date. Turkeyajor influence in the neat fewof the Central Asian elite share aof being part of the Turkishecular State with aMuslim population may have much toandource of trade aad investmentregion. Tuikey is eipinding its internalthe USSR,
the Turkish business community gave money and political support to the Arcri cause during Moscow's military action. Turkey's pro-Weslcrn, capiialistand moderate. Islamic tendencies mayonstructive roleounter*eight lo Muslim ei-tremist influences from Iran and Afghanistan
Unfit Hti'l
Original document.
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