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The Soviet Aircraft Carrier: Torpedoed by Perestroyka?
An latrDigrKc AuniiD-nl
The Soviei Aircraft Carrier: Torpedoed by Perestroyka?
The Sotiel Aircraft Carrier Torpedoed by PtremoykaJ
ludgnMnti
("i'o-iwiffw
Mi Wfrf la lUl ret***
Soviei aircraft earlier construction program, an integral part of the "blue water" Navy advocated by former Naval chief Admiral Gorshkov, is in trouble. It hasgWivint rod for criticism in the debate over the navalf Gorbachev's desire to cut defense spending and implement "defensive doctrine."
Influential civilian critics argue that aircraft carriers are inconsistent with defensive doctrine because they arc best toiled for operations at treat distances from Soviet territory, especially in attacking land targets. The critics alto contend that such ships ire inordinately cxpeoii Even in the Soviet mililary. carriers are being criticiicd. especially by Army officers who would peeler lo sacrifice Ibem lo gam additional resources for ground lorcct.
A Tbilisi-class aircraft carrier is on tea trials, another Tbilisi and an UTyanovsk-class unit arc under construction Statements by Soviet naval officers, past construction practices, and recent investment in carrier-related facilities indicate Ihal Ihe Navy's goal is to continue carrier ccflistruetion well into Ike nest century. The Navy, however, is hard pressed to protect Ibe carrier program in the midsl cf changes in Soviei naval Sliategy. For Gorahkov. the carriers were lo beeans of extending the Navy's operailnt areas. Under his successor. Admiral Chernavin, the Navy's emphasis hat focused increasingly on operations closer to the Soviet Union. The challenge facing Chernavin is to repackage the ptocatrier argument to persuade decisionmakers that carriers lie necessary even lor tasks generally accepted as "defensive "
We judge tint ihe Navy's efforts toong-term carrier building
program will"
L.i
T
U .1 moreover, irsoeaslnjly possible thai the force will be reduced runner as some dialing carriers ate scrapped, retired, or sold to foreign navies. If ihe Navy is forced to accept such cutbacks, (he most vulnerable ships probably are the Kiev class units. One hope for the carrien. in view of the troubled relationship belweea President Gorbachev and tbe Soviet armed recces, wouldecision by htm to bay off au increasingly alienated imliteiy. Part of the Navy's goal in any such deal most likely would be ike retention of the exisiing carriers and Ihe construction of additional units
Curtailments in the earrier force, as one partroader cutback inpurpose forces, would impair the Soviei Navy's ability toopcraiions at significant distances from its lerritory. Thisparticularly serious consequences for ihe Navy's ability to defendby aitscking Wesiern aircraft carrien andship* before iheyosition from which Ihey couldlerritory. As Soviet naval strategy evcJves in, (herole probably will be confined to providing all defense foroperating in set areas close la Soviet territory
The Soviet Aircraft Carrier. Torpedoed bj PeruUoykaT
Cxtm.
A k't.-u> tC Sent! uiilracle, aa CWf tf (Wiel9li.unse-kmo*of lWaad bud-tawdBi>)or it-nice -bun. Gocii-lo.ihe pn.ii.uo" ofncilatarftce ihip opcraiiom in area*
tilth ai Iht aalhcrn Norwettiin Sea, ihe Hedatrra-ncan, and Ikt north-rol Pacificb were outtide II* carer of laad-baicd air -SeFuiH lirc-nfl Oor.hkov't lobiliom were reflected to In, wrldatl and Inh etercoei.i indicaiinr.ti.iioaa al the peilctl ditUr-ce ftuin Soviei Itmtary would continue lo rxcc-tdteled primarily hy ttbmarint* and (and eased iniraft.antntraaralc eiiertsioa of Mtfaceerai-onaavored the eomtrnctio* of mm laow-caeabkohatce lie natality of <tr fact
tAipiaei
i Itiptaa to team/iaaactal:wuimllas Sencie-ta -illwi Iht
Inet. Oorihko- did km limply ropy US Navy aiierafl carriers and deer oterationt US can-era (facially are lurr.hat! diet
itty opttalt a> part af Uric talk foaxa The Sovieti pro*.W. wdtedtie earner*emple. UU force cteetlram immedi.ie ly -ould beand very eauly. Tbey embarked iiuiead onlullon.ry ipproach (ice nrurc I)
wilh Ihe contii-clion of twol.n
hel.rwpitr embers ia. A. hybrid vniiitoiler eo*.fiijtii.lion forwardclicopicr deck .fl, the Muihvai were mtetidcd primarily for intiiub-marine warfare {ASW)opcrationi
Ibe Mil iicpcama inilk the cotstrucicei ofihe ins Soviet vessels de-Bintd lo cany Aaed >ia| tircrtfl The Kiev* carr, Yak IIeofl aai* well a* bc&coc*eri Lax Mcak.ai. iSti art arrwrid -mi. Ihe forwardaorww of lhautk-o. ASW. tad safacrta-ait rnftaUit carriers' abmtyam. for turfiteuniltd by the forte/ i
rtdai. xiliietedad tod.rir.ee. nod lie until aanvhet torn- down-of ibem inwuti Few ih.pt of thrat p. educed (Kiev. Mm.k. fW lottink, and Baku;
f the Kisv-cl.it eirrieet -it followed by (hat of the Tbilisi dan1 (tee finiteote primary Icalur* i* the ability to launchxrfoi manee aiieraflski-jump" ramp on the bo. fSee fujur* 1Ualike the Motkva* andhe
'ik. this.,aakakaf* mmm. int.m
-. uium
Mloam hi a.*l ivBI
SetHt
ltVI*!
rita- IriWnM Ok. f'ol SM
class ii drawing on ihe eaperimcc of ihe previous onerogressively improve the Navy's ability U> bring high-peiforroanc*ea. In teimi orloo Of Soviet naval siraiegy. Ihii would support ihe gradual upantioa of Soviei sea control cesmtons inuvoatcd by Intelligence Comrminily estimate! of Soviei inienlicoi publishedAccording lo (hoe eati-mttes. the air cover provided (for. ibe carriers would bavr wppoeled -office (dree oee/aiiow deeper into the Norweiian Sea and the Noitkweii Paeihc Basin thin had previcwily been practical. The caiiierild have opeiatcd at the ke, pan of large taskncluding cruiseee. destroyerl. and direct-iupporl lubinaiioc
Dteseaing CoaHrerrtrvy
Other evidence indicates ihai.draptic the ihipynrd and tetl faciUly acii.ity. the ctrrkr progiam it inTht Gorthkov nual strategy, wiih iuempha-lU en eoeraliom ai rtiiiiiety (real distances from
Soviei territory, ia changlag tader Admiral Cherna-vin. who replaced himS. For example. Soviet naval exercisesJ have been generally cJotc to Soviet territory-lhe Seas of Japte and Olhottlr, the Barents Sea. and Ihe Ncuwegiia Sea north of Ibe Lofoten-Jaa Mayen line. (Seeeanwhile, under the prtaaure of FVesideart Gorbachev's inter-locking requirements to cat defentc apending, improve lelaiions wilh the West, andilitary doctrine based on war pievention rathei than war righting. Ihe carrier program has tome under intense criticism. Influential critics of Soviet militarycivilian academics- -hare tingled out aircraft carried as being too expensive, inherently oriented to offensive operations, and of quesiioniblc miliinry value.
The tempo of civilian critictim of tht program picked bp substantially in the Utter putrobably in Connection uitS consideration by tht Congress of
Peopfe's denudes and Ihe Supreme Soviet o( mihtary budtci decliions associated wildh five-Yearcoi|iv Arbatov, the influential hud ef tbe Institute foi the USA and Canid*or example, made two sharp attack* on Ibe carrier prucrarn in*oscow lekvi-lion ducuiixm. he luictitrd ibai th* capanic of ibo carriet protram prohibit aicecdedimocinl ipeni snnualry oa Soviet healthabiojuenUy. aspeech to the Con* ran of PiopUi Otpultti. be eriiwiMd Chernivvn by nine far it*nisUuj moot, on the eirrier rxoarara thai would be belter iued toevtiof nod other to to, proticmi fioin,
The carrier debate has torUnuedcomix increasingly bitter and personal Aria lot,0 Otoayek ankle,1 Abhrotneym for hit involvemrat in aof badactadlaa; Ihe invasion ofo deploymtnl ofad -the construction of tlrcttfl can.cn and other isiioouienior mili.aiy ofli cer, however, argued0 article ihal Altaic* himself -as partly lo blamtny iwlil.tr. tad been made in conned too wnh th irsm. Th* artide anted ihat. alo construct TtalUidit.washe i
ratinen the earner pretrial vti
tflOtCW IW Hovoye wrmpo (rude by Aadrt)
L
Jfhe truck charted thatriunettKal rttpeo. rttMired theave the tame lype of weapon intents at the United States, teaardltti of coat or mitJiary efTecti>encai from ihe standpoint of mEIterj tfTectiveneti. Ihe authors claimed thai camtt*.ihtir capense, are calrtnvtdy vutattabk lo mod-tiniptoaliylear -tapco* ifcat they cllim would almosl lertmnly be ustdar -iih iht West They tuftuted ihat. as pan of ihe prccess Of eonvtttini tht defense Induiiry to luppMUnt the civibin economy, shipyardi aied for carrier cotiMiuc-lioti should beor prducinl lorely nteded meeehsni ihips
Arbaiov reamed hi* attack* oa aircraft cartauilevaaoa Occwasctaiye castigated the ea-ner program ai atocbtr ctimawtonetabit of blindly .minting Wot era tamutary eewlafentMi rcgardkaearto Smset reouottntnii and th-ii imdnaiion-for tbe eooeiomy
ovrordfor rat mimonut so-telltd mrtrafnarrr-"igAemy truistrs mull fuOill Afltr all. mull we ofwery) try lo maith iht level, hare Ihe irusximum that Ihe other ride hai' Ifthettart leaf tut from the roali of Stystraptri should we follow them? The Amerlfans would be very happy to tee us stnk lull ai much
We would ruin ourielvti tomplettly
and Mabahanko. tn additio* lo arguing igiinu future ceauiruclNxi. mg| tiled ttai iheSoviet should consider tceappiisf cainoi il ready completed or nt*titi| compUl.0*
3 repotted that the, ncwed this inclto poualiaJy denagmg that, eetaMt the itirntpbctt ofaessetp t'twaaeali ts cVelai Iu omb sow* of ibe trams*.
dittoed ihal the carrier -raid b* ctlitmcly vulnerable lo modern -capons and -nuM have aLfe cipcetaney of "some Mmpresumablymelcar war
J
Afettvgh Ciham are the meat prominent cnuea ef ihe carrierlso hat com* wade* at temeati of the Sc-iei nriiUiy
c
even among onbodoi offi
ecu. constraints on defense (pending have encouraged leoior Army ofteersook on carriers and ocbei mijor surface ship programsaundiced eye anduggest thai loch piociama ihoulduge pan of ibe cutback* letpiircd of ihe Soviet military.
The Army cniiciim icndi to be Indirect, often talcing tbe form ed contemporary leijont lo be learned from history. Army General Lobov. for eiananle,0 atiMIe lupemedlyeenieerned with the prewar mitnaiy tlseorisi. General Suechia critlctrcd Sttlin't decision7 toajor lurficc thip construction program. Lobov argued that wartime experience luUeqaenily thowed thai ihtiited retourcct thai would better haw been tpcnl on ihe Army andavy composed pilmarily of tmaller units. Lobov stressed that the taperience abo wai relevant to loday'i eoocerni
Carrier Defender) Respond
In Tace or civilian and military criticism, the Navy it alternating to jutiify the carriers by placing them in ibel defensive doctrine. Supporteri of the carrier program ircoc. for caample. thai the ships will be defensive oec.it. Ihey will carry fighters andfighter, are inherently dercssive aircraft US carriers, on the mher hand, art offensive, partly because Ihey also carry "mack aircraft" or fighter-bombers
toplt oi* today whet At/ iht eon-iiruclion of oircraft-tanying tkips crmlrertnci our dejenicrt doclrine.no HVieerAeir main role at platforms fot fighter aircraft ablt to provide long+ante corn for our vewefr -htn ihorebasedfithrer, art unable to help. Tkit defenmtnthrintd to ihe new oir-cofl carritr Jbllhi
territory lhan envisaged by Gorshkov. The leadenhip. however, hai not been very precise about tha,to avoid being lockedartime depigment scheme that would reatrid the camerl to operations so dote io Soviet territory as In cater Utile if any advantage over brd-based aircraft. Ckernavin noted, forrwrm*
arn eoti fc/trulw meant Certain peopleimptiiK undprtmUlvt uruttritandint of this Ihey think that state wedopted Ihtihould be purelyefend owscbet. and. in thecvrli'et. rttrtat deep into our territory Yet modernit an land, tea, or in theabort oll.fliad. Howarthipfighti-Sittinurf act skip's ndssiontt. tf necessary, to inflict mittilt strikes on ihe enemy wuhoui wailing for them to enter our territorial waitn'
In denning ibe role of the carriers in rural dtfemiveatriei advocates have raphaiired theof oiler naval fcrew operating clou to Soviet territory f-
Another poieoiial mission it ihe pruleclion of Soviet territory against Wet'ein sirciafl and cruise missiles. Some corner advocates have included thit among the shim' minion, but it his not been stressed. Tbe Navy mar fear ikai associating aircrafi carriers wiihruKcoo nisei ihe danget of losing openiioru! control of the ships to Air Defense Forces authoritiesChernivin lias focused on ihe carriers- lolc in
naval spokesmen also have suggested that, consilienthe recentoviet navalihe new carriers would operate closer la Soviei
IStVllb" I*
il Omni iOil
SettH-'
other naval forces bet conspicuously failed io include hooKUirJ lir defense in tome key stale-menw justifying ihe earner prefrio.'
Although the (bruit of curterti Soviei defensive doe-irlne it oo tho need io brinjnt to an early political solution, the Sc-kl uiStary tetki to maintain the capability fee peeoongeo ewitiotss ihu would include forward mrjvement. For the Soviet Navy, inch opera-liont could include the eapaniion of tea control operations into the Norwegian Sea and Hie northwest Pacifie. The naval leadeelkrp probably believes that an aircraft carrier force would beo keep alive the potiibiliiyofiueh an rapantioo.
Cutback* la Naval Forcet Uadtt Corbachrt Tbe prospects for the carrier rrogram have crown darker amid iidkaiiont of cuibacki in oricr surface ship peojriau. Ccatiiiuctionh Kirov-class nciear-covered cruuer, begun at the Bikk ihipyard in Leniagrtd inai balled later in Ihe year,erchant thip was begun an it. place. The Kirov program, tcoordtbg* ad tree* anctberGewrJuW been pauhod tbrewgh agiintt the advice of the Main Naval StafT and General StatT. Accordingdmiral Kapiianett. the originai concept of opera tons had beenirov, would operate wtih tach earner at part of poweilal ink forcet
Navy It eapsoiting the atmosphere or gfawoH in iu effort to tell the thipa lo the Soviet public and the political leadership. In a* utipecoedentedorter iournaliii reported On an eratenslvt icor of the
TbiHs. InadatticbilofWeMtrnMykpubliereU-tiona ptaffory. he eaclaintcd over the ship'skilorwler. o(O0S-ton anchor, andrand piano in the -ardrcom. Tbe article concluded wilh uremic criti-cbm of those advocailnc shipyard conversion:
Do we nerd lurk ttctnrircV tiniwtr to inot ii citor: n> eong ai new bomber, role off from US otrfietsX ot lout at new atittalt curriers and ASW eruixt, art httlt.e, fevtg or NA TO mittile, est targeted on our countryoowitch owe rt> buildint lust tnow-whtit liner,.'
The tea trials of the Tbilisi alio have been accorded unpreceernicd publicly, including vodespreadand photo cewerage of flight operationsits in9 -etc ancbaraerorisiieally ambitious and probably .ere accelerated io convince decisronmtkert draftingh Five-Vtai Plan (hat the program was mating signiharl progiets
W
Prior to ihe Kite- cancellation, the only clearthairogram of smibicral cutbacks bad -fleeted ihe site of the Navy had beet personnel rtdaetioot and the accelerated retirement of older units. The Kirov eJteoion.r, coalirtned thatesourcespecially the policy of eonvtrtiai shipyard resources to dnliari produe. lion. are onting into ihe Navy's new ccastrucuoo programs. It also indicatedrogram's nvoenen-turn in the form of sunkot enough lo ensure its cootinuaiicoi
Since ihe Kirovere havo beenindications ol at backs ia naval surf.eeThe launch of the fourihAdmiral Lobov, was followed byanneuacemeni thai ihe shlnyatd. iraditionallyproducer of cruisers, wotld hcrtreJoflh shirtlo commercial ships
The changes in new construction, which affect the future of ihe Ntsy. have been accompanied by changet in cutieai order ofIbt aeceitraied serappine ol older units, primarily surface comhaianti
and (ubenarinn built innd IMOi, Oui inS
r*"ti '
5
some SO chad subrnt rises and major turfite (ombstinfi were diraimted Snipping activity ii (cfiliiiiniile ind. for lie tin rime, invoheso bras rifles.'
The combinationonstrained coat* race ion rue tad in locelciiled rdirerneol of oldcf uniti will leaduch tmiller force of rmjw surface cembalants h. ihe tut* of ihe century ihin we had previously indeed likely. Soviet tacrcitta of Ihei iodi-cued ihat theeeled thai their tobiuoai raval opertttonl of the (stare would involve lam talk lace orgamubons. lor oaimpte.hip battle group- titeven Oetl lovers, ind athai took can4 uercUt in Ihe Norwegian Sea. The absence of itiefc larpcfotntationt in rcote eteenl Soweeit mother indication that Soviei Navy planning foe blur-water operation) hit been icaled back at pin of ihe overall naval (drench-men I
s
Outlook for Ihe Cnrrttt Fate.
WOrttt
i that General Moneyev. Chief ol IheStall, alter noting Ihat ihe Sonets did not have "airenft eaiiicrt" but "heavy aviation carrying;(TAKRX iUted0 that (he Soviets would "ftwth these TAKR ilrrady did down but noe inset, One rouiblehat Moiseytv was miking allowances (or any earrier for which an, long leadline itcrm had been ordered andtherefore ai lean one tddilionil .hip could be constructed We believe this interpretation is doubtful in view of the generally understood meaning erf ihe (arm "bidhip -heoe coastrue-mn hit begunuilding ways. Allrmghot specifically ideality ihe ships involved, tie implication of his ilatcmcM was ihil the third lirgebe the last earrier bull Atiummgoonlinualios ofolicy of reseoice eotairainls. therefore.rate-mcnl odxstes that Chernavin hit losl the battle to juuify future carrier coniiiuclion. The progiam mosl litely will end with theeneral cutback in Soviet surface foreei.
A tclited question is what will be th;lready completed or ardor constiuction.Kelt i article
indicated, lie carrier debate had expensed by9 beyond (he issue of future earrier conjunction to indude the fate of those already in0 artide by Georgiy Siurui of the Iwliluteof Weesd Economics sndonal Rda-tlons (IMEMOJeonlirraed ibis espaulon. Afterihe Question of whether to go on building Tbilisi, ttati ihips. Sturaa urged thai "secondly, we should anahra whelher il is eipediem miEiarilyiadto mike the Tbilisi and the eguDr pan of Iht Navy.
If forced to tierlhce some of its ear ner fotos, the Soviet naial leadership -ousd almost cetiainly prefer to pari wiih Kievdais units aad retain the newer units. There recently have been reports Hat the sale of Soviei aircufl carriers has been ditcaued with ihe Indians tad Iht Chinese.
3 Ihe Sovseti edTeitd io sdl theombination of foodluptes.spcrtesmce vigorously diked thai Ihere islo ihb report
ibe Chinese are rumored to ha't asked the Soviets about ihe possibility of acquiring an lircrafi carrierTOL aircraft, f
One hope lor ihe earners, in nr. of tht ire*bled relationship between President Gorbachev and ihe Soviet armed Iwn, wouldecision by him io buy off an iaocsnngly alienated mililary. Although theighest priorily iniluilion probably would be lo restore the nits nude in its submarine programs, another ofny such deal mod likdy would be Ihe mention of ciisting aircraft carriers indnit ruction of
STTTT
Whenruiser aa Aircraft Carrier.'
officialSoviet no.at terminology, end Tbllltl-ttas, units toll under ihe general heading ofoviet spokesmen emphatically imp. howertr, ihat any of these ships is on -aircraftthe term the Soviets apply lo US ships such as the Nimit, The Kiev was tntttatt, telrgerhtd by the Soviets as an "anlUubmarine warfare cruiser"{pioti-volcdochniy kreyier) bur was later recotctoriied as aaircraft-carrying cruiser" (tyitbttrr niiK-wihchiy kreyaer or TAKRJ The Tbilisi hat the same dc venation.
The Soviets, however, have trouble eiplaimnt wnr
Kiev and Tbttist-elati ship, ore roi aircraft carriers.
Soviet naval officers commonly refer to them as airerafl carriers when talking among ihemietves. and even Soviets who should knowAdmiralslip in public discusssons.tivox taierview, Ckernevia referred to the Tbilisi several limes as on aircraft carrier (aviaoonii) andsabseoueealy embarrassed by ihe publicationetraction, which noted ia boldface print thai ihe Tbilisieavy aircrafi-eorrying cruiser. Aretraction wo, publishedKrainty. ctxat's description of iht Tbilisi a, an aircraft carrier during coverage of ihe ,htp', sea trial,
Wh, do ihe Sovieii avoid cotegoeltUg these ships as air/reft carriers' We speculate thai pan of Ihe etpleaatlon lie, in the hlomrtu. Convention, which
regulate, iht movement ef ships through ihe Turhitk Straits. The applicability of the Convention to olr-crefl carriers Is subjectarying interpretation. One view is thai it prohibits their movement. The Sonets contend that the Convention allow, theaf aircraft carriers be/ongtng to Black Sea moral notet. but ihey may have decided lo avoid the issue, rather than meet it head on.
A steend factor probablp Is the Soviet tradition af auodaslng aircraftclassic power prelection weapon of the USWestern ogrrtldve intentions, both against Ihe Soiiet Union and in Third World operations. Colonelrvov of the General Staff, foe exempli, staled InThe US Navy end its structure are effentive. Cm on* really, for esampit, considerform defmsivet Tbey an. Ant of all. on offensivelmlly. ike Soviets may feel fiulified In colling their shipsecause many features of theirshipboard weapon!relatively feware traditionally anoeielid with cruisers, rolhtr that vMth USttyl, aircraft carrier.
ones. It. howcee. eoeiiirueiinn endi wild Ihe Ul'yarMvtk and all (he older ihipt are kepi in seenzt. the Soviei Navybare onlywven-earrie/four Kkvt. iwo Tbilliii, and onethe Inn mth Tbe rote and eapabih-ly of ihaie ihipi -ill depend on Ibe nature ot their riiib.rkcci airwir.ni "id ikcir onboird armament
lb- embarkedbe niswmg eompoiiUm,ey indie* mr of the ihipa* likelyrote So.ioi devefopmeni of earner-bated avimon rt proceedingithi eoneurrentty. The SotIcm areTOL aireraflollow-ont to He For cert, which have been inih the Kievi tinee iheO*They aha are de-electing
dieting Compoiiiioa. AUhcegh Soviet airerafl earri-
alite then Wcudsoueua
.anery atartnamcnli. Heir piimary weapon lyitem ii
crniwntiooat laleoffand landing(CTOIJaircraft, ulioi dtbetcatapultij-jsmp ramp We radge that Ibe StwUueploy both lypet of aircraftihtirn ibend thai ihe aiajor rote ef ibtie aircraftbe air disrate.
Theitrwiags. now comrxaed ol tbouielicopters, probably -ill be recquipped -ilk iheYofc-d! Fulmar.n ihe mid-We anticipate that Ihe FaJaui -illiinifieani advance over tht Ferger-etpeeuJIy in possessing supersonic tpeed and an tir Utcctpr radar. We tmtniieypical Kiev ahvna, would aaetode tome IJ of (heaenelieopieriltr native, alla. htely pouibilily. ii lhai Ihe Kiev-etats willenstvcly modified to accommodate CTOL aircraft
We are uncertain tbotii iht future Tbilisi tti-ing. Threeflaaher.olcrom. tad Su-JSoperated with Ibti tea (nil. Soviei statement* have been vague or ecnlradiciory ai lo which aircraft will ultimately be cboten. suggestinginal choice hai aot yel been made W. behove thai Hanker and Fulcrum tie iht leal candidate, (tee figure JJ. Wo jadet that Ue Ranker, on Ihe batii of its perforoaaaet characiern-liot. it the candidate Ihe Navy would prefer. The Flanker, (or ewmpse.ombai radius efi compared witho TOO kilometeri for ihe Fulcrum. Soviet writings however, have discussed the potubuiirntedand to we cannot rule oui ihe possibility ihat iht ihip will eairy boih Flankers and Fubrrumt.
Each Ibilcii airwing probably wouM consul oliwo sonadrons.no II Flanker. well at perhapt aiahe Flinktr-.i, air superiority fit bit.pced ofwould provide .he Solei Navy wiihn sei-boied highperformanoe aircraft.ircraft will be bunchedk. rump and retrievedhe nr of arretlee -irti. Soviete eredtledapability lo carryeeaft. buikink thit unlikely. Our judgment ef it) io 11
Flankertonimutioo of ihe Soviet practice of aot iioriag aircraftindicated by Ihe apparently irnall number of aircraft litdowna on the Bighiven if the Soviets were to itore aircralt oo the Higkl deck, the number carried probably -oeM be no more than about SO, including helicopter! Tbe UTyanovtk airwing will probably be .lightly largerthaa ihti of the Tbilisi,
on i
i
lthouth thefocut of Soviei carrier ttrwingt probably -illtighter aircraft designed for an defamedo not rule out the pouibilily ofoperation) atiinil ihipt or in gel, on shoreaircraft ideniined with (be earner itvariant of the tUndard fighter-bomber.that Iht Soviet Navy* correal intention itthe Frogfooi at pin of lit eartwrrather thana carrier-bated eombaiNevertheless, (he ute of any renior. ofillusmies the potential foi futureoperations, and weaken* ihe Uavy*Iht shipefensive beoauteit will carryaircralt Despite ihe Navy', publicIbe defensiw nature of ihe earlier |
j enwhaiired ihal an aircraftryry lie..bit platform in that Ihtf the airwing can be modified inwiih the required miction..
Flanker and Fulcrum aircraft in service with the So-iel Air Force, alreadyecond.r, (round allact role, including dcbvciy of nuclear weapons, and (hit capability probably is retained on naval wriiom. IV capabilityonduct such atiaeks prob-tbly will improwesult ol
j Othernwove ihe shin's
open lo the Sovieit il ihey decide I
I*rd.*ti*ck capability would be io deploy bnd atiac*sik* nidiilometer rang*I on surface ihipt. Tht TWIki might be lemBttued lo arty neb weapon, powoty ianach irvci ilabr lei tteneo with US Met sec that*.
Tht Soviet Carrier foree of iWft
indJ pour..ngmfietM mUmi
capabdiiy ia its oaboaidiemtf
Jt determine al ihiihether ihe Ul'iaaonia will hint ananiithip Multhab. Mof So-wt paw pracuct
fa*on ahreiafi tanm piobakly -til be* sweeping ki ofoviei naval forte.iaraditional Soviet navallit being reassessed under the pressure*tufttteacy"and dtftnch ai anb-SSBN opermton. aadof
nay be abandoned esunry. .ail. eaten, inch We
The pieeli for Soviet navalberefore. appear lo flnx an even gicatc eaphaci on com auad of the ica In cnAligsouTh* aekt leii of>uch radical* aavalhat ii.heUoe refected in change,forco. ihal ia. iaoattuaiatirha
a ley ekmeiMMv*lfcect*.vmMhea iheraaioned coaduclini rwore ambilioaa totli. espeeiik, those mjsiruii control of areai such a* the Norwegian Sen and the nonh-eil Pacific Under ihe Soviei naval ilratejy thai Ii evolving aider iht pressurehe primary rob of ihecraft airier force probably -illrovide air defense
io Soviei i
SeaofOUeeshide tappers iblx r* the sUatcgiC Wrvkt role and Ihe reu.li.ncto pw-.ect tie SSBN* from enemy ASW ello.ii Ihr primary purpoir of oporiiibu by Soviet navilpurposecitdiag the earners -iberefore ii likely lo bo to support Ihal million rstber Ihsn liking cn the broader reanonsibsluie* envisaged by Go-thkov
Th. rob of Iht Navy bdcfcnd.act home landy enemy lirtrnhLCM units, and ampeoeowionsat-ntd legitimatenvisaged b, ciilluat rtqairing opu.tioni relatively close toitniiory. Thli eonBicti -ilk ibe Geeshtov des.ro loy. including ilrerifl ewrsers. capableack.rigunlit well before ihey reachedpo.iiw. from
which they <OwId .'kc Wl Itrnit-y.
Original document.
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