NoT^
TQfl THE CHIEF,
INSPECTION AND SECURITY
G
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE US AND THE USSR
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
rasax to of cu
Holders of ORh iV-i? (The Strategic Itnor .itr.ee theisst to tha US and tJw IIS5S)fjoutoi to insert the tttt be lew in the report. This t'txlj aubi^tloa by the Int*lligenca Orfanitatiyn of ti-.eof State onay, asend* the coordination footoote or,f the report and therefore supernsdes tin cecorandua ofcc achciittcd by the Dep&rt-sant of Stile cu 2$ It do-is not sodifyst iratehe stated positions of ihe other agencies.
"The co.iiurrence or the intelligence ovganizuticrist of State inhould be ^onaideree at United to the aectionoil tierJ Estlaate for
;p'celli,rjence organitaMoni Sepftrtneat of stitts dissents free: tho conclusionKicate strategic .Epcrtcnce of the Far Fast, asini (b) on pagp arr; .mentionedhe paper*
"This dissent ia based or. the belief that thcsortance of the Farespecially ir. considering it as potentially 'decisive.' /Tcblcu* of USSR Mobilisation of the Far Eastr ire unv-er-est luted, especially Vie def^ndence on ana difficulties in maintaining t'io nocesa 3ea transportation,
"US potential forSSR-occupied JapaBj (b) on the sea lanes, and (c)forts to oobilise the Far Fast,to be undor-estimatec. The general conclusion of theat, under certain assuEioticns, tho Har potential of th: US mi.ht be dertroyod,ot considered proven. Nor is the derivative conclusion for US policy believedcnelv, that to deny tc tho Soviet* the consolidated control ofFar East it is necessary bt> traintain 'integrated US ecntrcl oi" the offshorextending froa thoo
cehthal mEUicEtfcs agency
19
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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE US AND THE USSR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PROBLEM, SCOPE, AND
1
Political Estimate2
Economic Estimate
Strategic
Strategic Importance to the
Strategic Importance to thc
GRAPHICS
Strategic Location of Far Eastern Areas.nUcipated2ilitary and Industrial Manpower Potential. Industrialization Potential. Areas ol Food Deficit and Surplus.
Air Distances from Selected Far Eastern Pointsajor Airfields in the Far East and Adjacent Areas. Shipping Tracks and Ports.
NOTE: The graphic material appearing herein con be used validly only in conjunction with this study.
A correct interpretation of the political aspects of all graphics herein requires that the reader bear in mind the basic assumption that present trends in the Far East will continue up to an outbreak of hostilities by the end
Thc graphic presentation of quantitative data is based on information available inhis material is designed to show broad comparisons of basic economic factors, rather than to servetatistical source. Thus, these charts show that Japan, with the greatest industrial capacity and reservoir of industrial manpower in thc Far East, has the greatest food problem in the region. Note that militarydata are based on estimates of World War II strength and do not reflectdifferences.
I
THE PROBLEM
To assess the strategic Importance of lhe Far East to the US and the USSR in the erent of hostilities between those powers by
SCOPE
For purposes of this study, the Far East Is defined as Korea, China (Including all border areas andapan and the Ryukyus. the Philippines. Australia, New Zealand. Indochina, Siam. Malaya, Indonesia. Burma. India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Ceylon.
ASSUMPTIONS
war between the US and the USSR will break out some time betweenand
trends now perceived in the Far East will continue.
the US nor the USSR will basically alter its present policy towardsareas of the Far East
ias Men prepared through lhe coliabnratlre effort* of the intelligence oreantaa-Uona of Uie Department* of State, Army. Navy, and Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. These agencies provided the basic data pertinent to the following aspects ot the problem: politicalilitary (Army. Navy, and Airnd economic (Central Intelligenceoordination with Departmental Specialists was subsequentlyon the Intermediate phases of analysis and synthesis of the basic data. Asthc paper represents over-all conclusions drawn by thc Central Intelligence Agency from analysis of the basic papers.
llils estimate has been concurred in by UM Intelligence Organization of theot State, the Intelligence Division. Department of the Army, and the Directorate of of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents ior the following reasons:
"a. Although the factualn irneral accurate, tu presentation contains obscurities, apparent contradictions and unwarranted presumptions regarding U. S. plans and policies, which are beyond theesult. Uie reader is required to evolve his own analysis of the situation In order toound appraisal of the strategic importance of the Far East.
"n. This Inchoate development Is apparent In Uie SUMMARY, which furthermore does not include all thc salient points of thc dctaUed discussion. Therefore it does notomprehensive abridgement."
Textual material is based on tnformaUon available to CIA on IS April IMS. The supporting data foronsist of basic material provided by the various IAC agencies, as Indicated above, an area by area compilation of the factors of Importancethe Far Eastern region,etailed regional examination of these factors. This is essentially study material ol continuing value lo national Intelligence production on the Far East and Is available in tho Central Intelligence Agency for reference.
twv.3
SUMMARY
In Ihc event of war between the US and the USSR, thc major objective of each power will be destruction of the other's war-making potential. The Far Bast, lying at great distances from the heart of both powers' war-making centers, while notof vital importance to either under continued circumstances of peace, will develop increasing strategic significance to both In thc event of war. Upon the outbreak of hostilities priorhe region's significance cannot be of initial decisive importance: first, because of thc distance consideration; second, because the Far East's considerable resources will not have been fully exploited, developed and Integrated with thewar complex of either the US or thc USSR; and third, because of prior stockpiling of essential raw materials prunarily available in thc Far East. However, should all the major components of the Far East's own self-contained war potential becomeand exploited by either power, the region's strategic Importance would become great. Indeed, under the conditionsrolongedSSR-controlled Far East might even prove decisive.
The USSR, In its drive for world domination, can be expected to continueattempts at expansion and consolidation In Eurasia byof direct
Involvement of Soviet armed forces in an attempt to attain eventual decisive military superiority over the US in intercontinental warfare. Continued Sovietmight precipitate open hostilities with the US before thc USSR has achieved this decisive superiority, as would be the case if war occurred priorhere is grave danger that the USSR, with its vast territory and preponderant military manpower for employment in Eurasia, might well survive and successfully absorb an initial major US offensive against European USSR and thus achieve at least anstalemate. Under such conditions, and if the Soviet Union had established effective control over the Far East by occupation of key areas either in peacetime or in the war's early phases, the USSR would beosition toelf-su flic lent Far Eastern war-making complex in addition to its own European industrial and military establishment This combination could provide the USSR with the capability foraction In global war against tho US.
In the event of war priort is probable that Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines. Ceylon. Japan and southern Korea would favor the US, although southern Korea's active contribution in the war would be restricted to guerrilla operations. Although Siam, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan would desire neutrality, they would choose, with varying degrees of hesitancy, to support the US In preference to the USSR. The position of China and its border areas (exceptew limited areas of the southwest and possibly Taiwan) will be pro-Soviet; northern Korea, as well, will support thc USSR. Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia will remain areas of mixed orientation In which the conflict between European colonial control and Far Eastern nationalism might prevent their effective exploitation regardless of local preferences for either the
US or the USSR. Burma, too, will be an area of deep-seated unrest and doubtful ex-ploitabllity.
Japan, because of its industrial potential, its large resources of trained military and industrial manpower and its strategic location, is the key to the developmentelf-sufficient war-making complex in the Far East This fact was amplyIn World War II. Control of Japan's industrial machine would be moreto the USSR than to the US, however, not only because the USSR has moreneed of the products of Japan's Industry but also because the USSR will be in effective control of the area (chiefly northern China, Manchuria and Korea) whose natural resources Japanese industry can utilize most efficiently. For this reason, long-range US security interests dictate the denial of Japan's capacity, both economic and military, to USSR exploitation.
The present aggressive Soviet attitude in the Far Fast indicates that the USSR already appreciates that realization of the long-term decisive potential of the region will be enhanced by early elimination of the US from the region, especially ifwithout resort to war. Maintenance of the present US position in thc Far East denies Soviet hegemony over key areas of the region, particularly Japan. Loss of that position, for any reason, will greatly facilitate Soviet exploitationotentiallywar factor and will correspondingly reduce the means for subsequent USUS ability to derive fun strategic advantage from the region and to deny its ultimate exploitation by the USSR largely depends on measures to be taken In the period extending from the present. Expansion of Soviet Influence In thc Far East greatly beyond present limits at the expense of the US Far Eastern position in the prewar period politically, economically and militarily, would tend to render theUS position militarily untenable from the outset of hostilities. Once having lost its present minimum position In the region, thc US might well lack the resources needed simultaneously toajor war effort against the Soviet European war-making centers and to deny Soviet realization of the war potential of the Far East.
US strategic Interests in the Far East, therefore, are immediate and continuing, even if limited to denying consolidated Soviet control of the region. Key to this denial is integrated US control of thc offshore island chain extending from thc Philippines to Japan.
FAR EAST: POLITICALECEMBER
U. S- S. R.
U. S. S. R.
MONGOLIA
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j^FAR EAST: ANTICIPATED POLITICALECEMBER 2
INDIA
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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OK THE FAR EAST TO THE US AND THE USSE
DISCUSSION Political Estimate2
The following estimate of the Far Eastern political situation2 is made primarily to permit assessment of: (a) probable orientation of'specific areas towards either the US or the USSR, or towards neutrality; (b) potential availability to the US or the USSR of raw materials, industrial facilities, and manpower resulting from these political orientations; and (c) extent of probable effective exploitation by the US or the USSR of potentially available resources as Limited by local political conditions.
In general it appears probable that up to2 or at the prior outbreak of hostilities:
oriented towards tho US will be:
<a) Australia, New fcealand, the Philippines, Ceylon, Japan and southern Korea. The governments in these areas and the general populace in most of them would favor siding with the US Ln war. (In the case of southern Korea, however, pro-US efforts after the outbreak of hostilities probably would be limited to underground and guerrilla operations.)
(b) Siam, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In these areas, desire formay restrain thc otherwise predominant choice of the US lnto the USSR,esulting tendency towards indeclslvcness and less efficiency in thc event of their participation.
Areas oriented towards thc USSR will be northern Korea and China (except Tibet, limited areas of the southwest and possibly Taiwan).
Areas of mixed orientation will be Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, and Malaya. (The latter three are colonial areas at present. Although tho governments of France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, superimposed upon Far Eastern colonial areas and endeavoring to control them, may be expected to be oriented towards the US. the native populations of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya will be nationalistic, will prefer neutrality, and will determine their orientation according to national self-interest. Inability of thesepopulations to achieve their aspirations for national identity through relations with the respective governments of France, the Netherlands, and the UK can result in their Inclining to USSR-orlentatlon. The political conflict between the European governments and their colonial areas could produce sufficient Instability either to deny any appreciable advantage to the USfrom the pro-US orientation of the European government or to permit access to the resources of these colonial areas only at an infcasible cost.)
7
Of areas expected to be available immediately to the US In the event of hostilities, political conditions probably will permit effective access by thc US to the natural resources. Industrial facilities and manpower of Japan, the Philippines, Ceylon,and New Zealand. The same will hold true, ln varying degrees, for Slam, India, Pakistan, and possibly Taiwan. Although the Republic of Korea probably will be US-oriented, It Is not expected that Korea can make any appreciable contribution to the US, except possible military action by prewar trained guerrilla units.
The resources of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya, however, may not be effectively available to the US unless political stability within these areas Is obtained and can be maintained.
Of areas immediately available to the USSR, initial effective participation probably will be confined primarily to northern Korea and China. Continued Instability ln the colonial areas of Southeast Asia probably would not result In any positive contribution to the USSR despite the possible antl-US or pro-USSR Inclination of certain native populations, Induced by Soviet vocal championship of nationalism. Negatively,such unrest would be of very great value to the USSR, since local instabilityfrom political conflicts would minimize the advantages to the US of access to the resources of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya.
s
FAR EAST: MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER^ POTENT]AL
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ANTIOPAIfD KOllIlCAl OSlLNTATION E3
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Economic Estimate
Denial of Far Eastern resources to ther the USSR would not seriouslycither power's war-making capacity in the early stages of the conflict. Both the US and the USSR are, in fact, now less dependent on the strategic materials of the Far East for the operation of their civilian and military economies than they were before World War II. During and following that war. alternative and less distant sources of some materials have been developed, and substitutes or synthetics have been devised. Stockpiling programs have been Instituted for those materials not readily available elsewhere and for which no satisfactory or practicable substitutes exist
There arc. howevor, some economic objectives in the Far East which, as the war was prolonged, would assume Increasing Importance to the US and the USSR and which would Influence strategic planning for thc region. These objectives could be threefold: first, tootent self-sufficient war-making complex ln the Far East; falling that, to assure access to those strategic materials necessary for full-scaleof thc domestic war economy; and tn any event lo deny both the componentself-sufficient war economy and key strategic materials to tlie enemy. Self-Sufficient Far Eastern War Economy.
That the Far East possesses the potentialelf-sufficient war economy was amply Illustrated by the Japanese in World War n. If either the US or the USSR consolidated its control over those areas needed to make up such an economy,of the region's potential could be decisiverolonged war. At the outbreak of hostilities, the US, through Its control of Japan, would hold thc key area in any such regional economic system. The USSR, with Korea and China added to its own Far Eastern holdings, would possess much of the most Important remaining area. It is pertinent to note, however, that while the US couldimited, albeit costly. Asiatic war economy without access to Korea and China, the USSR would be unable to establish any large-scale war economy in the Far East without access to Japan.
Japan now Is and will probably long continue to be the most important industrial country In thc Far East. Despite war damage, postwar deterioration and uncertainty with respect to Allied reparations policy. Japanreater Industrial capacity, in terms of existing plant and reservoir of trained Industrial manpower, than all other countries In tho region combined.
The value of Japan as the industrial centerotent war economy, however, would depend largely on thc extent lo which other areas In the region could furnish those raw materials needed by Japan's Industry. Without an adequate and assured supply of food, coking coal, iron ore, steel alloying minerals, tin, natural rubber, and petroleum, Japan would be an economic liability rather than an asset to any controlling power.
If thc US were to exploit the Japanese war potential fully, it would lw necessary to supply Japan, over long lines of communications, with many materials which the US itself must obtain from the Farsteel-alloying minerals, rubber, fibres, and
vegetable oils. In addition, thc US would need to supply Japan with petroleum, as wril as iron ore and coking coal. Sufficient petroleum could be obtained from Indonesia to meet Japan's probable industrial requirements. Similarly, enough iron ore isin India, Malaya and the Philippines. However, the problem of supplying Japan's coking coal requirements without access to North China would be extremely serious: India's coking coal supply is limited and probably would be completely absorbedartime expansion of Indian industry. The modest quantities of anthracitein Indochina could not be depended on In the event of hostilities.
Thc difficulties and cost of making Japan the centerar Eastern war-making complex, and the fact that Japan'sin terms of realizableercent of US, probably would make denial ot the Japanto the USSR, rather than full exploitation of Japanese industry as an auxiliary to US war production, thc dominant US strategic consideration.
Japan's Industrial plant would be of much greater positive value to the USSR than to the US; It would, in fact, be for the Soviet Union the richest economic prise In the Far East. In the first place, Japan's factories couldelatively greater contribution to thc industrial output of the USSR than they could to the US, Japanese steel capacity being approximatelyercent of USSR and the satellite countries combined- Second, the USSR would have access to China and northern Korea, an area that could furnish Japan with iron ore, coking coal, tungsten, manganese,everything needed for large-scale industrial development except petroleum, tin, and rubber. Thus not only could the USSR more easily provide the necessary raw materials to Japanese Industry than could the US, but control over Japan's Industries would also Increase the economic value ot the rest of Northeast Asia to the USSR. Control of Japanese Industry, therefore, would provide the USSR with the most important segmentelf-sufficient Far Eastern war economy. Access to Strategic Materials.
The earlier war breaks out, the less time will have been available for stockpiling and technological development and therefore the greater thc dependence of both the US and the USSR on the Far East In any event, however, neither the US nor the USSR would bo dependent on thc Far East for strategic materials during at least the first year ofrolongation of hostilities, however, would dissipate the stockpiles of each and thus Increase the need for key Far Eastern materials. Thc availability of tin, manganese, and possibly natural rubber would be of prime importance to the US, tin being the most important. Access to tin, tungsten, and natural rubber would be prime Soviet considerations. In addition, each power would rely on Far Eastern sources of petroleum, not for direct contributions to its own war economy, buteans of reducing the necessity of supplying Far Eastern military or industrialover long lines ofrief discussion of each of thc key materials and its relation to the US and USSR follows.
Tin,
The bulk of the world's supply of tin Is produced In the Far East, principally in Malaya and Indonesia, but also In China, Slam, and Burmn. Since tin Is essential
BRLltKT
for both naval and land warfare, substitution for it is difficult, and conservation is of limited scope, access to sources of supply is extremely Important to both the US and the USSR.
Should all Fax Eastern sources of tin be cut off, peak US war requirements could be met only in part through stockpiles, .secondary domestic sources and imports from Bolivia, Nigeria and the Belgian Congo. Denial of access to major Far Eastern sources of tin would have serious implications for the US war economy whenstockpiles were dissipated.
The USSR depends heavily on Far Eastern tin, since domestic production and alternative sources are seriously below Soviet requirements. The problem of meeting heavy requirements would directly affect Soviet economic warfare in the Far East and might even influence USSR military decisions with respect to South China andAsia.
Faro-Alloys.
South China is the world's most important single source of tungsten. Burma, Korea, and Siam produce modest quantities.
Tungsten deposits discovered in the US during the last war, exploitation of deposits in Mexico and South America, and stockpiles built up since VJ-day haveUS dependence on Far Eastern sources. In addition, molybdenum, ansubstitute for tungsten in some steel alloying processes, is both domesticallyto the US in sufficient quantities and can be obtained in adequate amounts from such dependable foreign sources as Canada.
The USSR depends considerably on the tungsten of China and Korea.in the USSR is insignificant, and all other sources of tungsten might be denied to the USSR in the event of war. Moreover, the USSR Is critically short of molybdenum, and can rely on only the modest output of Finland and China. The production of some steel alloys in the USSR Is dependent, therefore, on access to Chinese and Korean tungsten.
Thc USSR, with the world's largest reserves of manganese, and India normally represent the major sources of US .manganese supply. Although production in Latin America and Africa Is Increasing, for the next several years at least, US access to Indian manganese will continue to be an important security consideration.
Rubber. iv
Malaya and Indonesia.produce almost three-fourths of the world's supply of natural rubber. Some rubber is also produced in Ceylon, Slam, Indochina, Burma, and India.
Both the US and the USSR have developed synthetic rubber industries and processes far reclaiming rubber. In addition, both powers are systematicallynaturaln Jhe early stagesar, the US would require access to sources of natural rubber until Its synthetic rubber production capacity was adequate to meet peak wartime requirements.onger war would permit theof additional synthetic capacity, stockpiles would be depleted and some new supplies of natural rubber would be required for special military purposes. If war
should break out beforehe date at which maximum US stockpile objectives are to be achieved, the dependence of the US on Far Eastern sources of supply would be increased.
Soviet dependence on natural rubber probably would be greater than that of the US in the case ofhortrolonged warnitial stockpiles would be smaller;xisting synthetic capacity would not only bo less, but the USSR would need more time to build additional capacity and to perfect synthetic proc-
Petroleum.
Indonesia, including all of Borneo, is the principal petroleum producer in the Far East.9ercent of world production. While neither the US nor the USSR relies on theof the Far East for domestic requirements, oil Is one of the most important strategic materials in the region because of the long lines of communication from other petroleum producing areas to the Far East. Access to Indonesian oil wouldajor factor ln both powers' strategic planning, particularly that of the USSR, since large-scale, sustained military operations in the Far East by either the US or the USSR could be more economically conducted If oil requirements could be obtained close at hand.
Food.
The Far Eastet food deficit region. Local food surpluses of the Far East, except for those of Australia, New Zealand, and Manchuria, largely remain in the region. Thus, regional food production would appear to be of limited direct significance to the US, but of considerable significance to the USSR Manchuria at presentsoybeans and some grain to the Soviet Far East and this supply may become an important factor in USSR Far East strategy particularly if food from Western Siberia or the European USSR were cut off. Moreover, the availability of strategicfrom Malaya, Indonesia, India, and South China, as well as the exploitation of Japanese industry, would dependreat extent on control over the disposition of the rice surpluses of Burma and Slam, the two leading producers for export purposes.
Denial o] Far Eastern Resources to Enemy.
Since tin, rubber, and petroleum are of direct importance to the war economies ot both thc US and the USSR, it would be an important strategic objective for each major belligerent to deny these materials to the other. In addition, the US, whose needs for tungsten are much less acute than those of the USSR, would attempt to deny sources of tungsten to the Soviet Union. The USSR, in turn, would attempt to denyto the US.
US denial of Japan's industrial plant to the USSR wouldost important strategic factor in the event of Far Eastern hostilities, but it could of course bethat the USSR would apply the strongest pressures to deny Chinese coking coal to US-controlled Japanese industry.
PORTS OF THE FAR EAST AND SHIPPING TRACKS
(Comparison of sea lane durance* from selccrcd Far East pod* to supporting areas over various roures)
tboic Estimar
In the event of war between thc US and the USSR the decide strateelcach power will be the destruction of the other's means to wage war
rora ,ha
rom
v "1 " Uum rron' 'aclOTSadvantage
or UnUtaUon m flrst yMr or
oro"Un^ereadily apparent strati canc. of the regton win emerge and grow only as hostilities are prolonged
USSH^elS*ca"cc^ Far East to the US and th. USSn, the strategic fata* of the two powers are neither Identical noron-
Ofr East to the US and to the USSR
Importance to tot. US.
a.he Initial Militaryimitations. (a) Offensive.
he Far not' decisive region in terms of US military
Zhiecf"5 TL^1CCn,trS St ecau*,th0 USS*can be reached from ex,stlng
Z8gC air action" Such actione Moreov^the basic
UI contlnue'no indleenous Far ta *5
y ar or ^ooTrZlTiT * ^ the first
year or two of hosUhUes because of prior Soviet stockpiling.
(b) Defensive.
.IUThe Us strategic defensive, which in the last analysis is concernedUswill have nodirect. .ZLd^he Far East at the outbreak of hostilities. S stockpiling of
^iZT^rST"ources for one US f;baS'C US to the continentalotected ,rora attackto the Far East by extensive land and ocean expanses, s estimated moreover that the USSR will continue to lack the means for conducting decisive intercontinental military operations for some timedvantages. (a) Offensive.
While indecisive in the early phases of hostilities, the areas of th* Far Last not initially under Soviet control can contribute, nonetheless, to US offensive
tho
capabilities in the early phase of hostilities. Existing US bases in Japan and hk Ryukyus, as well as potential bases in western Pakistan and India, are within air range of important objectives in theKarachi area being particularly significant from the standpoint of target proximity. There exist additional potential air-base areas as well as bases for other operations of limited objective in support of tho main US strategic effort. The Far East also provides important ocean communication links which facilitate free global movement around the Sovietequisite to US strategic flexibility.
<b> Defensive.
Those areas of the Far East estimated to be available to the US at the outset of hostilities (sec Political Estimate, p.rovide positions astride or flanking probable routes of USSR advance ormost important area in this regard being Japan. The Far East, moreover, wouldegion for tho containment of significant Soviet forces remote from the main objectives of the initial US strategicagainst European USSR Finally, the manpower of the region woulda potential source of large forces.
ifficulties of Exploitation,
The varied difficulties facing US exploitation of the strategicallyfactors initially available in the Far East cannot be overlooked.
(ii) Aid Requirements.
Economically and militarily, the areas of the Far East available to the US are dependent on outside assistance- Thc Far Eastet food deficitactor which is aggravated In particular areas of normal food shortages, such as Japan, by the present dislocation of normal trade patterns. Maintenanceoliticalfavorable to the US in areas of strategic importance is dependent on substantial economic assistance. Moreover, these areas lack adequate means of defense against invasionajor power. Militarily, the Far Eastern areas initially available to the US would depend on the US for varying degrees of assistance In materiel,and even constituted forces for protection against Soviet aggression.
Requirements.
The US position in the Far East is dependent on long ocean lines of communication. Not only isisadvantage in itself, but it also impost's ah added requirement for security. Unless consolidated control over the offshore island chain extending from Japan through the Philippines is secured and maintained, the US will be severely limited In lis means for effectively combatting the considerable Soviet capability for anti-shipping operations in thc Pacific. Thus, the components of the island chain are mutually dependent for the security of their supporting lines offrom the US as well as for defense against direct attack.
and Base Requirements.
Protection of the US position In the Far East exclusively with US forces would probably exceed the capacity of US manpower resources. The alternative is development of indigenous forces. In general, however, thc effective militaryof Far Eastern manpowerreater expenditure of time and resources
14
than docs Western manpower. Even potentially, the principal Initial contribution to US strategy to be made by Asiatic forces would be In terms of ground forces for thc defense of their respective
The most effective potential forces are those of the Western-populated Commonwealth areas, Australia and New Zealand, but both these countries have definite manpower limitations. Among the Asiatic nations, the armed force potential of Japan is the most significant but utilization of this potential is presently confronted by poliUcal objections. While the manpower potential of India and Pakistan isadequate to prevent Soviet invasion of the Indian subcontinent, the neutral inclinations of these two nations and the limited availability of trained leaders and materiel renders uncertain the timely provision of defensive forces adequate to Insure security of thc subcontinent. PoliUcal factors also render uncertain the availability of potential Par Eastern base areas for prewar development by the US. Development of forces and bases under war conditions would constitute an added burden and might well be ineffective.
(d) The Factor of Initiative.
The final difficulty to be encountered in the exploitation of the Far East by the US is closely related to the problem of timely provision of potential forces and bases. Possessing the Initiative in opening hostilities, the USSR may be able to mount surprise attacks in such force as to overcome limitations on its offensiveand thus overrun areas for which the defenses otherwise might be adequate. This consideration applies particularly to Japan, Taiwan, and northwestern Pakistan. Effective US counteraction followingevelopment wouldajor war effort. Despite thc factors of disadvantage presented above, failure to solve these difficulties and to accept the consequent political, economic, and military costs will deprive the US of the increasing strategic advantage to be derived in thc Far East and may subject the US to an ultimately decisive threat from the USSR. b. Developing Significance.
As war may be prolonged beyond the first year or two of hostilities and initial strategic stockpiles of one or both major belligerents may become depicted, the Far East willegion of increasing significance to US strategy. The factors of importance in the Initial military phase discussed under paragraphbove will continue to be of supplemental significance to the main theater of war, and, as the center of Soviet war production is moved farther eastward, may acquire growing direct significance. However, in this intermediate phase of hostilities, the principalImportance of military factors In the Far East will derive from their bearing, in conjunction with the poliUcal factors, on continued US access to the essential raw materials of Southeast Asia and India and on the denial of those materials to theonsolidated and strengthened US position in the Asiatic offshore Island chain extending from Japan to the Philippines wouldaterial factor in securing the most favorable US ocean routes to Southeast Asia and to India also, sinceof the Suez route would appear doubtful. In addition, US development and exploitation in that island chain would serve to deny Soviet access to the southern
15
regions of eastern Asia. Conversely. US loss of control in that island chain would facilitate Soviet southward expansion.
As previously noted. US loss of Us position in the offshore island chain is notatter of yielding or foregoing one independent baseime. Loss of position at the northern end of the arc would threaten the communication linespositions farther to thc south, even though those positions might be hold in considerable strength. It would therefore be important to peak operation of the US war economy after the first year or two of war and to reduction of Soviet war output in this intermediate period that the USonsolidated position in thc Far East's offshore Island chain.
c. Ultimate Strategic Importance.
Of greatest US strategic concern In thc Far East Is thc realization by the USSR of that region's potential for developmentelf-sufficient war-making complex. In the eventrolonged and indecisive US offensive against the Soviet European war center, the Far East under consolidated Soviet control might wellecisive factor of war. Not only does the region contain all essential elementself-sufficient war economy, but its tremendous manpower resourcesool ofilitarily trained, albeit demobilized, Japanese. The Japanese prisoners of war now being retained by the USSR include large numbers of former Japanese officers and technicians. In the event of Soviet control of Japan, such key personnel could contribute to rapid Soviet exploitation of Japan's military and economic potential-Further, the geographic location of Japan suits lt for ultimateajor offensive effort against the continental US. Soviet possession of two major Independent wur bases, one hi Europe and one Ul the Far East, coupled with probable Soviet advances In materiel and technology that can be anticipatederiod of yeurs, couldritical threat to the continental US war potential and hence to US survivalorld power.
d. Conclusion.
While the full strategic significance of the Far East to the US is deferred and will materialize onlyrotracted war, US ability to derive full strategic advantage from the region and to deny Its ultimate exploitation by the USSR depends at aon maintenance of the present US strategic position in thc region. Expansion of Soviet Influence in the Far East greatly beyond present limits into areas of present US control would tend to render the remaining US position militarily untenable. Once having lost its present minimum position In the region, the US might well lack the resources needed simultaneously toajor war effort against tbe Soviet European war-making centers and to deny Soviet development of the war potential of the Far East.
H II1 HWBR
2. Strategic Importance to tbe USSR
a. he Initial and Intermediate Militaryimitations. (a) Offensive.
At the outset ol hostilities, thc Par East could not contribute signifi cantiy to Soviet efforts to destroy the basic US war potential because
he US would be temporarily independent of Far Eastern re
aourcea;
(ii) Uie US war potential would be located primarily in thcUS;
(ill) the USSR at this stage would lack the military resources needed toecisive intercontinental war; and
(iv) so long as Soviet forces in the Far East were dependentombination of stockpiling and access to the Soviet European war production complex over the Trans-Siberian railroad, grave risks would be involved in mounting anoffensive from Soviet Far Eastern bases, (b) Defensive.
The Far East's contribution to Soviet defensive strategy in this period would be for the most part passive. No Indigenous Far Eastern forces would be capable of threatening thc USSR with offensive action at the outset of hostilities, and. in any case, the basic Soviet war potential, located In central and western areas of thc USSR, would be protected from Far East-based attack by extensive expanses of formidable terrain which could not be feasibly surmounted except by US air action at long range. For these reasons, the Far East at tbe outset of hostilities would not be an immediately decisive strategic region from either the offensive or defensive point of view.
actors of Immediate and Developing Importance. (a) Offensive.
Both in the prewar period and in thc early stages of hostilities, the USSR nevertheless woud have Important strategic objectives in the Far EastSoviet expansion In the Far East could provide;
(i) Security of established USSR Far Eastern bases;
ccess to Important sources of strategic materials and theirto the US;
(in) The potentialelf-sufficient Far Eastern war economy;
sources of military manpower, including theof Japan which could be exploited effectively by use of formerand technicians presently held in the USSR; and
and routes of access to the continental US notablyAsia and the North Pacific.
Taken In total and with requisite exploitation, the attainment of these objectives ultimately wouldecisive contribution lo thc Soviet strategic offensive.
(b) Defensive.
Defensive intermediate objectives in the Far East could be attained by confinement of US Far Eastern positions to the peripheral areas initially available and by preventing, through political or military action, successful US exploitation of those peripheral areas. By these measures, the USSR can:
(i) Maintain or expand its defensive buffer on the south and east;
imit the flexibility of the US strategic air offensive;
(in) Tie down substantial US military resources in the Far East and, as the result of harassing attacks against the North American continent, contain additional significant US military resources in the continental US; and
(iv) Provide increased potential forces for the defense of thease of Exploitation.
The USSR's intermediate strategic objectives in the Far East may be at-tained at moderate cost because of the fundamental nature of the Soviet national objective and Soviet singleness of purpose and lack of scruple in pursuing thatAdded to these Soviet policy considerations, which reduce the cost of attaining strategic objectives, are factors of military advantage. The USSR already possesses predorninant forces for offensive action within the Eurasian land mass. Moreover, Initial military dispositions can be made under optimum conditions, and transport limitations are being overcome through prior stockpiling, industrial development, and relocation. Finally, the very nature of the Soviet national objective provides the USSR with the advantage of surprise In initiating hostilities. All these considerations tend to limit the military costs involved in Soviet attainment and exploitation of itsstrategic objectives In the Far East, thus enhancing the attractiveness of that region lo the USSR.
Strategic Importance.
Having attained lis short-term objectives in the Far East, the USSR would have under its control all elementsowerful war-making complex. Development of that complex could proceed unmolested, except by US counteraction which would have to be carried on over long distances and at great military cost. Rather than draining the Soviet war potential, thc Far East would add progressively to the total Soviet means for resisting the US main effort. In this light, the Far East, even in the early stages of conflict, could be an Important factor in the USSR's ability to absorb andS offensive against the existing Soviet European war potential. Were that offensive successfully absorbed, the Far East subsequently couldelf-sufficient war base fromustained Soviet attack might be mounted, in conjunction with an offensive based in Europe, for the destruction of the continental US war potential and thc consequent elimination of the USorld power.
Current Soviet expansionist activity in the Far East viewed in conjunction with the factors of strategic significance presented herein indicates that the USSR already recognizes thc long term decisive importance of the region to thc Soviet nationalof world domination.
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Original document.
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