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THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION9
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THK POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION9 Reportoint Ad Iloc Committee *
THE PROBLEM
I- We bare been directed to estimate tne likelihoodoviet resort to direct military action
DISCUSSION
conclusions are based on considerations discussed in the Enclosure.
CONCLUSIONS
The USSR has an overwhelming preponderance ol immediately availablepower on thc Eurasian continentonsequent capability of resorting to direct military action at any time. The principal deterrent to such action is the superior war-making potential of thc United States.
There Is no conclusive factual evidence of Soviet preparation for direct military aggression
A deliberate Soviet resort to direct military action against the West9 Is Improbable. Moreover, the USSR Is likely to exercise some care to avoid anoutbreak of hostilities with thc United States.
G. As part of Its efforts to counteract the Atlantic Pact and US military aidhowever, the USSR will seek to Intensify and exploit the universal fearew war. In this It will pay special attention to Scandinavia, Yugoslavia, and Iran. It fa unlikely, however, to resort lo even localized direct military action.
he fact remains that international tension has Increasedt will probably increase furthern these circumstances, the danger of anoutbreak of hostilities through miscalculation on either side must be considered to have
ThU esUmnte was preparedoint Ad Hoc Committee composed or designated repre-BcntaUves ot the CIA and of lhe LntclUccnce oreanltaUooa of the Departments ot fiUle. Uic Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It has been concurred in by tbe Directors of thai*xcept as Indicated la lhe footnote below. Tbe date Of the estimate Ix
" The Director of Int*Ul*enee. Department of the Army. believes that the last sentence ofreater possibility of war3 thinad. cxlsU; and that It should read "In these circumstances, the small but continuing dancer of an unintended outbteak ol hostilities Uiroucti miscalculation on elUicr side must be considered."
ENCLOSURE
As ofarch IMS. we estimated that the preponderance of availableand of considerations derived from the "logic of tbe situation" supported the conclusion that the USSR would not resort to direct military actionur present task Is toorresponding estimate with respect to the possibility of Soviet military action
The USSR continues to enjoy an overwhelming preponderance ofavailable military power on the Eurasian continent. During the past year it has maintained, and possibly accelerated, its efforts to enhance Its military capabilities through both the Intensive development of basic war Industries and tbc qualitative improvement of its military forces. There has recentlyignificant Increase ba Soviet troop strength in Oermany through thc arrival of recruits from8 class. It is not yet apparent whether this Increase is temporary or permanent In general, however, Soviet military preparations appear to be precautionary or long-term. There is no factual evidence of Soviet preparation for aggressive military action
In the absence of conclusive factual evidence, our estimate must depend on our appreciation of thc fundamental objectives and strategy of the USSR. Thisset forth hi,, and elsewhere, need not be repeated here at length Thc pertinent conclusion ls that the USSR would be unlikely to resort to direct military action unless convincedilitary attack by the West on tlic USSR was ta active preparation and impossible to forestall by non-military means.
Our estimate of8) has been borne out by the event We may be permitted, then, to assume that the situation as Itear ago was not such as would cause the USSR to resort to direct military action. Consequently we limit our present consideration to developments since that date which might cause the USSR to resort to such action. These developments arc:
Increasingly evident US determination to resist further Sovietin Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Near East, and to encourage, organize,local resistance in those areas. In thc context of Soviet thought, thismust appear to be essentially hostile and preparatory to eventual USnot Indicative of Immediate attack. Thc USSR is particularly sensitive toof US influence from Western Europe and the Mediterranean intoon the one band, the Balkans and Iran on the other.
gradual increase in the will and ability of Western Europe to resistaggression,orresponding decUne ln Communist political andcapabilities in that area.
e. Increasing rigidity in tbe partition of Germany and the development of an extremely taut situation at Berlin; ta particular, the success of thc airlift ta defeating the blockadeeans of coercion with respect to Berlin, progress toward thcof Western Germanyolitical and economic entity within the Western European community, and deterioration of thc Soviet position ta Eastern Germany and ta Germanyhole.
fffieitBT
top nttoiK'
cL The persistence of individualism and nationalism in Eastern Europe, dcsplt. further forcible consolidation of the Soviet position in that area (excepting Yugoslavia)
e. Tito's successful defiance of thcatter of greatest significance ir. the development of International Communism and Soviet hegemony.
ailure of the situation in the Near and Middle East to develop asfrom the Soviet point of view, as might have been expected, and the curreni trend toward adjustment and stabilization in the internal conflicts within that region Communist successes in China and prospects in Southeast Asia are mattersunlikely to cause the USSR to resort to direct military action.
Thc rulers of the USSR are presumably realistic enough to perceive that these developments do notanger of immediate attack. They will appreciate, however, that the opportunity for Soviet expansion westward by non-military means has ended for thc time being, and they will be apprehensiveontinuation of the present trend result eventuallyorresponding stabilization of the situation in the Nearurther deterioration of the Soviet position In Eastern Europe, and an ultimate danger of US attack upon the USSR. In these circumstances the USSR must give serious consideration to the advisability of resort to preventive war while It stillreponderance of immediately available military power on the Eurasian continent.
Tho deterrents toecision are the realization that It would precipitate an immediate decisive conflict with thc Unitedresent lack of adequate defense against atomic attack and of meansecisive military attack on the United states, respect for the present general superiority of US war Industrial potential in termsong struggle, and reasonable hope of improving the position of the USSR in these respects with the passage of time. Philosophically prepared to take thc long view in the absence of an Immediate threat and confident that future crises of capitalism will produce new opportunities for Soviet aggrandizement by non-military means, tbewould have reason toremature showdown while assiduously developing its capabilities for eventual defense or aggression.
On balance we conclude that the USSR is unlikely to resort lo preventive war9 at least Its most probable course of action will be to continue itsfor eventual war while seeking to arrest or retard the indicated adverse trend of developments (para.y political and psychological countereflorts in formsfamiliar. In following this course thc USSR will seek to intensify and exploit the universal fearew war. It will pay special attention to Scandinavia,and Iran. It is unlikely, however, to resort to even localized direct military action, except possibly with respect to Finland and Yugoslavia. In any such action taken, lt will probably exercise care to avoid direct collision with the United States.
US and Soviet forces are in actual contact only in Germany and Austria. The fact that in thc courseear of acute tension the USSR has carefully avoided any action there calculated to precipitate armed hostilitiesresumption that thc USSR would not resort to direct military action merely to break theat Berlin or toatisfactory solution of the German problem. On the contrary, present indications are that thc USSR may soon discard coercion, as rcprc-
3
scnted by the blockade of Berlin, for the time being, in oider toore satisfactory situation through political negotiation.
vulnerability of Finland to Soviet pressure and the gravity with whichviews Norwegian adherence lo the Atlantic Fact requires specificthat case. Threatening gestures toward Finland and Scandinavia might bediscourage any possible Finnish hope of rescue from the West, to confirmto neutrality, and to Inhibit Norwegian Implementation of the Pactmilitary occupation of Finland, however, might have exactly the oppositeSweden Into the arms of the West and stimulating Norwegian demandsmilitary support. For these reasons, mcrcaslng Intimidation Is to bedirect military action Is
-Similarly, threatening Soviet gestures might be more effective that direct action in Inhibiting Yugoslav rapprochement with the West, Basically, however, the continuing existence of the Tito regime is intolerable from the Soviet point of view and real efforts to liquidate lt must be expected. Any attempt to do so by force of arms would probably take the form of Insurrection within Yugoslavia with covert Satellite support, as in the case of Greece. Direct Soviet military intervention would be unlikely unlcss lt became the only means of preventing the military alignment of Yugoslavia with the West, Even in that case, Soviet Intervention would not be Intended toeneral war and could do so only If the West chose to take armed counteraction.
Soviet sensitivity with respect to Iran requires specific consideration of that situation also. In terms of the Internal factors involved, the situation In Iran Is more stable than Itear ago. There has been, however, an Intensification of Soviet pressure upon Iran and there remain opportunities for indirect Soviet intervention through Indigenousmovements, as with respect to Azerbaijan and the Kurdish tribes. Thc Immediate Soviet purpose appears to be to prevent Iranian adherenceear Eastern pact analogous to Uie Atlantic Pact and acceptance of substantial OS military aid. Although the USSR has been at some pains to buildegalistic basis for direct intervention with reference to the Treatyhis appears to be part of thc war of nerves. Direct Soviet military action in Iran9 is considered unlikely.
Accepting our estimate of Soviet intentions, the fact remains that interna-Uonal tension has increased8 and will probably increase furtheroth sides are actively preparing for eventual war. In these circumstances there is increasing danger of on undesired outbreak of hostilities through miscalculation by cither side. Such miscalculation could occur in underestimating the determination of thc opposing side or in exaggerating its aggressive intentions. Both miscalculations would be presentituation In which one sideosition from which it could not withdraw in thc face of an unexpectedly alarmed and forceful reaction on the part of the other.
TO^^CREJ
Original document.
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