APPROVED FOS RllDSl
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Yugoslavia Transformed^,
Information available as of0 wishe preparaocn of tin National intelligence Esumate.
The foOowing inzeUrgence organizations pervctpated in the preparation of this Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency The Defense intelligence Agency The National Security Agency The Bureau cf Intelligence and Research. Department of State
also participating:
The Deouty Chief* forepartment ot the Army The Assistant Chief of Staff. Inteftgence. Department of rheForce
This (WnM approved for publication by rhe National foreign intelligence Board.
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia will cease to functionederal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform wilt not stave off the breakup.
Serbia will blockandCroat attempts io form an all-Yugoslai confederationcajpa*t)
There willrotracted armed uprising by AJbaniaiis inull-scale, interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercom-munal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward The violence will be intractable and bittei
- There is little tbe United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugosla. unity. Yugoslars will see such efforts asto advocacy of democracy and MtfHJetermiMtion^
'5-SO
Key Judgments
The old Yugoslav federation is coming to in end because tbe reservoir of political will holding Yugoslavia together is gone.e federal system will no longer exist; within two years Yugoslavia will probably have dissolvedtate.*
Although elsewhere in Eastern Europe economic and political reform will be interdependent. Yugoslavia's future will be decided by political and ethnic factors.Even successful economic reforms will not hold the country together.-
The strongest cohesive forces at work in Yugoslavia are those within Serbia.Slovenia. Theyi* of national pride, local economic aspirations, and historically antagonistic religious and cultural identifications. In Slovenia, andesser extent Croatia, tbe new nationalism is westward looking, democratic, and entrepreneurial; in Serbia, it is rooted ia statist economics, military tradition,reference for strong central government ledynamic personality.
Neither the Com-aumst Party nor the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) win be able to hold the federation together. The party ishambles; the army has lost prestige because of iu strong Communist Party identification and because much of the country considersercMlominated institution. No all-Yugoslav political movement has emerged to fill the void left by the collapse of the Titoist visionugoslav state, and none wil
Alternatives to dissolution now being discussed in various quarters are unlikely tooose confederation will appeal to Croatia and Slovenia, but Serbs will block this in an effort to preserve Serb influence.erb-dominated attempt to muddle through, using tbe old federal institutions and military brinkmanship to block independence, will not be tolerated by the newly enfranchised, nationalistic electorates of the breakaway republics. Serbs know *hi
It is likely that Serbian repression in Kosovo will result in an armed uprising by the majority Albanian population, supported by large Albanian minorities ia Macedonia and Montenegro. This, in turn, will create strong pressure oa those republics to associate themselves closely with Serbia.
A slide from sporadic and spontaneous eihnic violence into organized intcrrepublic civil war isanger, but it is unlikely during the period of this Estimate. Serbia's commitment of resources to pacification of the Albanians in Kosovo will constrain its ability to use military means lo bring Serbian minorities in the western part of the country under its direct control. The Serbs, however, will attempt to foment uprisings by Serb minoritiesin Croatia andand large-scale ethnic violence isF)
The United States will have little capacity to preserve Yugoslav unity, notwithstanding the influence it has had there in the past. But leaders from vanous republics will make claims on US officials to advance their partisan objectives. Federal and Serb leaders will emphasize statements in support of territorial integrity. Slovenes. Croats, and Kosovars. however, will play up OS pressure for improved performance on human rights and self-determination. Thus, Washington will continue to be drawn into the heated arena of mterethnic conflict and will be expected to respond in some manner to the contrary claims of al] parties.fj
The Soviet Union will have only an indirectmultinationalthe outcome in Yugoslavia. Thehave some leverage, but they are not going to use it to hold the
Contents
Discussion
the weather. Jttvtt1 Excifiiionatly dement, sir. Anything in thi papers?
Somi flight friction threatening in tht Balkans, sir Otherwise, nothing.
P G. vVodehous<
Behind ibe crumbling facadee old Yugoslav federation new political realities are emerging:
centralized Serbian state, reled initially byMilosevic's former Communist Party andjoined wuh Montenegroew federation.
Macedonian stats, probably dominated byParty factions with, differing views on the desirability of democrat! ration and market reforms but lubiect to Serbian influence articulated in terms of control over their Albanian minority populations.
Croatian and Slovenian states in the northwest, oriented toward Western Europe andonfederal arrangement with or without tbe participation of Bosnia and Hercegovini
With the departure of Slovenia and Croatia over tbe next year, the Yugoslav federal system will cease to function. ErToru toonfederal alternative to the current system will probably fail within the two-year span of this Estimate, leading to the dissoiu* "on of YugoslaviafjjffjB>
Centrifugal Forces Dominant
Strongforces are drivingyear-old Yugoslav state apart. Although sucb forces have been present for years and the federation bas somehow survived, this time is different. Tito, who embodied the conceptederal Yugoslavia, has been dead forears.eader of his suture, the Yugoslav
federation has beeo held together by institutional inertia, mainly in the Communist Party and the military. The party organization has been shattered and it* ideological appeal leached away by recent developments elsewhere in Central Europe and the alkai
The Yugoslav National Armyecause of its strong party identification and because much of the country considerserb-dominated institution, has lost much of its suture as custodian of the Yugoslav idea. Although the army might unilaterally attempt to hold the federation together, its leadership recognizes that it could not do this alone and probably believes that any attempt to do to would cause the JNA to dissolve along its ethnic faultlincs. Dissolution in this circumstance would prompt Slovenia and Croatia to rapidly assert as much control as possible over army assets on their territories, and theemaining resources would be transferred into Serbian, and possibly other, sutc armed fc
National pride, economic aspirations, and an upwcll-ing of ethnic-based religious and cultural identinca-tion will continue to push Slovenia and Croatia toward independence. Secessionist sentiment bas been powerfully stimulated by Serbian attempts tothe federal political process. Breakaway claims bave reached the point of explicit demands and practical measures that are incompatible with the old Federal Coastitation. Secessionist steps includeof sovereignty, pursuit of independent foreign policy goals, the appearance of republic-based para-miliUry formations, plans for republic-based and -controlled miliary forces, and claims to exclusive control of natural resources. These measures have yet to be knitted together into explicit, internallystatements of national identity, but they will be within the span of this Estimat
Tito aad Nationalism: Missed Opportunity
r.
In the, Tito relaxed ike martinternal point controls and Institutedreform, devolving significantauthority from the federal level to that of the republics. However,ostwarof nationalist leaders began to emerge in thevisibly Inproved unable to accept the politicalef diluted federal and party authority. Ine purged the Croatian party and state leaders, also coming down hard onextremists' as well as liberals inSlovenia, and Macedonia. In doing so he eliminated younger, dynamic nationalistForty elites In those key republics who might have been able toong-term, workable compromise between disparateaspirations and federal structures In the final analysis, Tito proved unable to deal constructively with nationalist aspirations of the South Slavhe hadsuppressed under the parly banner of "brotherhood andfter the Communists' victoryito's multinational Yugoslav state was thus vulnerable after his death to the erupting nationalism.
Overheated nationalism fostered by Serbian extrem-Liu is the strongest among the new fortes driving the republics apart, and it will not go away. Serbian President Milosevic seized powerave ofand ethnic assertion. His followers will remain susceptible to these themes as :bc cement oferodes and other republics resist the imposition of Serbian control. Milosevic's personaltic gestures, risk taking, andenforces tbe appeal his policies have to the Serbian masses.Muoscvic's nationwide power peaked when the other republics rejected bis leadership at the last (aad probably final) ail-Yugoslav party congress, his future in Serbia remains solid. Ioeercent of therule Serbia for four more years. He -UI be reelected iaictory as illegitimate as tbe previous year's, but the salient factor for Yugoslavia is that nearly all Serbian opposition parties eitherre extreme nationalistic views or have been co-opted by Milosevic's rhetoric concerning Kosovo and Croatia. Tbe MUosevic-contrailed press continue to fan the Serbian rationalist flames in Kceovo aad Croatia, but he is no longer the master of that nationalism; hardline opposition parties areMilosevic's lactical position by precipitating con-froourjons with ethnic aiinonues in the Sandzak. Bosnia, and Vojvodina. Thus, virtually any ruler of
crbia during the (pan of this Estimate will probably :fusc to accept the minimal conditions set by Stove-ia and Croatia'for continuation of an all-Yugoslav ate.r-
Nationalist conflict in Yugoslavia is exacerbated by the recent spectacular growth of MacedonianThis has been in response generally to the disintegration of the federation, but more specifically to perceived Serbian threats to Macedonia's own integrity. Macedonian nations Usui bas nowransnational dimension in attempting to appeal to claimed fellow-nationals in Greece and Bulgaria. Since Serbs. Greeks, and Bulgarians reject the notioneparate Macedonian nationhood, the potential for an international crisis is manifataeaeaeafefe
Tito's uniquely Yugoslav version of Communistbacked by force and buttressed by the wartime comradeship among his partisan elite,top to the internecine warfare that took moreillion Yugoslav lives during World War II. The wartime brotherhood of Communist partisans failed, however, to pass its all-Yugoslav vision oooungerThe altitudes that have resurfaced in its place maythey were in thebitter and inter
repression of the mostly AJbaniaQ-poptilated evince of Kosovo is wearing thin the Albanians' -mmitment to peaceful resistance and advocacy of dependence within Yugoslavia and is likely to trans-rm it into armed rebellionrive toward cession. Under conditions of guerrilla warfaretbe Serbs. Kosovars will saek material sup-rt. but not formal union, from Albanians. The loss Kosovo woulditter affront to the Serbian tie of national identity; it is the traditional Serbian irJand, and Belgrade will expend any resources to ain it. The consequences of this decision will bc xracted conflict, with great loss of life and trea-
mia-Herccgovuta represents the greatest threat of nging the fundamental ethnic division inbetween Serbs andlarge-scaleviolence. This republic's ethnic mix of slims (more thanercent) has always been potentially gerous. Elections at the end of November will ease the potential for intervention by Serbia and
hi ipm
External factors are also pulling Yugoslavia apart. Tbe recession of the Soviet interventionist threat in Eastern Europe bas signaled to Yugoslavs that it Ls safe to resume old quarrels. Together with theof associate membership In the EC and other forms of integration with the West, it also has undermined the rationale forprincipal foreign policy legacy. Meanwhile. Slovenia and Croatia have concluded that their chance* for inclusion in Europe are better as autonomous entities than in association with the mora backward pens ofgtsjstatiBa.
Moderating Influences Are Weak
There arc forces for cohesion at work in Yugoslavia, but tbey are weak and fading. Tbe bestthoughthe economic reform launched by Premier Markovic and his effort to create an all-Yugoilav political party capable of competing with nationalist parties and movemenii in the republics. Markovic's economic reforms have enjoyed somesuccess and may have helped postpone national
Kitting Fields
hostility stems from historicunder the Ottoman Turks, when many Albanians chose Islam and rose lo influence in an Empire that often repressed its Christian Serb subjects.lbanian irregulars harried the retreating Serbs.talians and Germans found willing collaborators among Albanians. Some ami-Communist Albanian armed unitsintactn that year Tito gave his chief of security. Ateksander Rankovicree hand toampaign against the Albanian guerrillas that was apparentlyfor brutality even in Balkan annals (an episode hardly noted tn Yugoslav historyhree times since,.
regular army units have been called in to
The Albanian population in Kosovo hasincreased since World War II. With the highest birthrate in the nation and with the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins. Albanians in Kosovo grew fromercent1 toercenthe last census year. It is believed to be near or erhaps beyondercent today. Serbs claim that the Albanians have systematically "driven".Serbs and Montenegrins from the province, allegingacts of terror. The evidence for this'Is spotty at best.'Serbs also assert an Albanian plot lo dis-member Yugoslavia by Kosovo's annexation to Albania, term this treason, and assert bothightand duly to prevent It. However^nb credible-proof of treasonc usj&llusion of this nature has yet -been adduced ' '
Serbia's Difficult Choi
The key question for Serbia is the "fate" of the Serbs who dwell outside the borders of Serbia. This is the issue of greatest psychologicalfor Serbs, and no Belgrade leadership can lightly accept responsibility for splintering the unity of the Serbian people, the goal for which Serbs perceive they hay*bloody wars in this century. Acompromise would also be perceived by Serbs as the fragmentation of the Serbion&eo-ple. the "loss" of Serbian folk'
Serbia could refuse even to talk. Thisthe onus for having precipitated
breakup of the state. However, in such talks alt Serbia's alternatives are also unpalatable: to insist on retaining the federation, threateningse force if necessary to savefor civil war with uncertain prospect ofo opt for Serbia's own secession, concluding that Serbia's interests would better be servedovereign stall than as an "emasculated"entityoose confederation: or to acquiesce in the loose confederationby Croatia and Slovenidt^rWr
In short, it appears Serbia can "save" the unity of the Serbian folk only at risk of civil war. Even if Serbia emergedt would be Intirneiionally discredited, bankrupt, lift to impose its will on more numerous hostileand Isolated in face cf th&problems of Kosovo and Macedoniaifftt^
collapse, but It is highly imprcSaile that Slovenia and Croatia will agree to surrender the authority to the federal government that he has sought in order to implement theext
Recent increases in world oil prices bring andrain on Yugoslav foreign exchange reserves Markovic's initial response has been to cut taxes on retail oil. Added to other problems, this willcompel abandonment of the recently established and much-hailed fixed exchange rate with themark Without this centerpiece of tbe reform, monetary officials willeyursue tight policies. For these reasons, economic reform offers little chance of staving off political dissolution. Even if successful, it would not in itself put the old Yugoslavia together again .f
Other cohesiveeconomic orlittle. The cml service, the professional military, and some security service officers mayresidual loyalties to tbe symbols and institutions of the old Yugoslav state, but their commitment is fast eroding in the face of rising nationalism,religious identification, and proliferatinginstitutions. The attraction of participation in aa all-Yugoslav regional market bas been reduced among prosperous northern republics by the burden of economic transfers to the poorer south. Fear ofand material destruction to be expected from violent partition exists. The strongest cohesive forces in Yugoslavia, however, are tbe nationalistica: work within Serbia. Croatia, and, Slovenia. These internal forces will increase!
S^ent
conomic Reform Program
tabilization program momentarily cut inflation; it did not produce the structural economic changes neededarket economy. Economic indicators continue to fall. Inflation is threatening again. Several of the "achievements" frequently cited by Yugoslava Jump in exports and increase in foreign exchangemostly
Industrial production9 percent in the first half of the4 percent forgust. The National Bank Increased the money supply in July and August, pushing its net domestic assetsercent above the limits spelled out in Belgrade's IMF standby arrangement. Monthly inflation Jumped fromercent in the second quarterercent Inercent annualized)ercent inercentarge Infrastructure price increases In September led to inflationpercentverage personal wages have Jumped as much asercent in the lastnlpb
Although foreign exchange reserves have risen to roughly SIO billion;
At least two-thirds of the "increase" in reserves since January is "hoton exports not yet delivered, delayed payments for imports, and short-term loans.
A significant additional portion of thety result of conversion of foreign exch
holdmgs into dinars by households faced with high inflation in the first few months of the year.
Convertible currency exports climbed nearlyercent from January through August, aswith Ihe same period last year But;
Overall exports climbed onlyercent, and imports4 percent.
Much of the export surge appears to be "distress exporting" by firms willing to sell abroad at anya loss.
' As an indicator of the distress, the value of exports climbedercent in dinar terms, and average costs increased much more during the same period.*'
Despite the moderately greater efficiency of"self-managed" economy compared with command economies, the country has no unified internal markets for goods, capital, or labor. By conservative Yugoslav estimates, one-tnird of economic entities would have nofor existence under market conditions.
Without effective markets, enterprise freedom toprices fuels
Monetary authorities can squeeze inflation outrestrictive monetary policies as inhalfhe money supply In mid-stood IS percent above thelevel, and it felt toercent belowbase by late March. The result was
*j 'Iff.
fnfusions of money to ease the recession tmmedi ately retgnited old inflationary pressures.
(continued)
conomic Reform Program Icontinued)
At the same time, restructuring of the business sector has been painfully slow No major firm has been closed because of bankruptcy since Markovic became Prime Minister, despitetough new laws:
Badreporting of fictitious assets byto have grown significantly
Privatizing the socially owned sector by giving workers shorts as part of any pay increase has elicited little interest and some hostility from labor. The program wilt take up toears to reach completion even if cffecti*
The National Bank has (A. power to decertify commercial banks that do not follow proper procedures.0 the National Bank's first audit found that commercial banks hold SIO billion in fictitious assets. Only one bank has since lost Its certification, despite publicby senior government officials that many banks are behaving as they alwaysmaking loans based on political, ethnic,or personal ties, with no regard forpotential. New stock and bond markets have virtually nothing to trade, and tjje new money market barely functions*
The labor, market Is characterised by overand the lack of an adequate social welfare net. Mis: Yugoslav economists believe thato SO percent cf the labor force injhe socially owned sector is rtdundannefegmm
-The one bright spot In tht economy is the growth of the nonagricultural private sector. Belgrade0 new private businesses to formut most of those formed thus far are extremely smalt, in the service sector, and in no position to absorb much of the tabor forct from the decaying socially owned sector.
Slovenia and Croatia. Ihe two wealthiest republics, will find no incentive to remainerb-dominated federation, but they will want to preserve some lies to other republics, and especially to each other. Both already want io free themselves from the economic burden of subsidizing the southern regions ineflcieci industrial sector. Slovenia and Croatia are likely to encourage creation of asonfederation as possible, excluding Serbia but including Bosaia-Her-cegovina and even Macedonia in the unlikely event the latter republic wereosition to join. This calculation will be based both on oolitical/rnilitarytbeir capacity to resist tbeeconomic calculations, especially thai creationarger market would enhance theof their economies andnsakc association with the West more salat
The Furore
In Serbia, the predominant post-Communist ideology will be attuned lo the intense nationalist and religious traditions of the region, countered to same degree by the example of parliamentary democracy and political compromise and market-oriented reforms, associated withears of Weal European peace and prosperity. Which influence will predominate is tbe big open question for Serbia, as il is for other Yugoslav, sor societies)
In Croatia and Slovenia, there willoliucal-ideological spectrum as in Western Europe, ranging from Social Democracy on the left to Christianeventbe right. On the evidence so far. the Slovene political elites will prove most successful in developing viable politicaland in using tbera to maintain working popular mandates. Prospects in Croatia are also positive, although less sure and less advanced. The ability of both republic* to transcend the narrow chauvinism of the pre-World War II era will depend heavily on ihc extent ofas well aswith the developed industrial democracies of the West, particularly tbe European Commanity. It also will depend on Zagreb's ability to conciliate andatisfactory degree of autonomy to Serb minoriliesja Croatia in tbe face of Serbianr
?
Secret
Economic Gap
Exacerbating political tensions over tht years has been the yawning prosperity gap between the more developed northwest and the underdeveloped southeast, particularly Kosovo and Macedonia. Per capita national income in Slovenia9 was.. Macedoniand Kosovo SIS'
Over the decades annual contributions to aFund for Undeveloped Regions have been levied on the developed republics. Slovenes andtoday assert that, although they accept responsibility for assisting the poorer regions, the Fund has been grossly mismanaged. They cite the fact lhat the gap in real standards of living has widened In
Both Slovenia and Croatia have now refusedcontributions to the Development Fund,negotiationonfederal agreement bythey Insist, they must deiymine how their contributions will be jpe/i'.M
Yugoslavia; Relative Per Capita Income by9
Mantle*)*
ThanwUt/SS
Sourcec US. ICP. and conirsone supplied dau-
for Mamt data offtcul YUgoMv dau-fiw pop^lxlu. out.
m<
Except for Kosovo, organized warfare arising out of chronicnlikely in Yugoslavia during the two-year span of this Estimate; but communal conflict of vinous kinds win continue whatever the outcome of the present crisis. There is already rising fear in Belgrade of interethnic confrontations and clashes within republics with unpredictable consequences. In many cases traditional ethnic animosities are linked to irreconcilable territorial claims. As in mosthe bottom line in Yugoslavia may well be the question of who gets the real estate. Territcu.il issue* will be tbe roost likely source of conflict between republics during tbe next two years'. Any suchregardless of its causes, could be the first test of tbe conflict-rcsoiutjori mechanisms now contemplated for the CSCE
In the unlikely event that Serbia attempts to shape tha secession process by military force, it would have to overcome determined resistance by the secededand it would have to rely almost exclusively on Serbian troops. In the long run. reincorporatingand Croatianified federal state by military force is beyond Serbia's rosources. especially given its preoccupation with Kosovo. Slovenia aod Croatia will be capable of defending their sovereignty and most of their territorial integrityar with Serbia but at great cost to their limited reserves of manpower and material. European opinion would be outraged, and this wouldegarive effect on Serbia'* already
A central bank, determining macroeconomtc policy,ommon currency,ommon exchange rate,entralauthorityommon custom regime.
Powers reserved to republics
Veto over actions of the Confederal Authority.
Control of internal tecurity, includingof minority rights.
Operational control over some or allunits stationed on the republic's(with the possible exception of navel and air force units).
Raising taxes and allocating funds tomutually agreed confederal
Only the Serbs can open the dooronfederal Yugoslavia, and Serbia's leader. Slobodanholds Ihe key. Some observers feel there are pressures on him to try. If he does not, he would give his opponents the leverage to remove him. The potential penalties of failure to compromise would be too great, in this view, for the peoples and leaders of Yugoslavia to forgo every effort toomprornlseeejjgj^
prospects for closer postpartubn economic and ;IturaI association with Europe, For most partici-uus there is little to begained. and much to loseull-scale war, '
mostscenario for Lnterrepublic violence >nehich Serbia, assisted bydisaffeetedSerbianhe other republics, moves toeputed territory intogreater Serbia, with =ndant and bloody shifu of popuUtioo, Theo engage in such adventures will grow during
die penod of this Estimate. Serbia will be restrained both by the intractability ^minority problems in berbia ttself and the justifiable fear of intervention by neighboring Balkan powers, especially Bulgaria and Orecce. to assen control over Macedonia
Terrorismerious threat in Bosnia and Hcrccgo-vina. Kosovo. Croatia, and Macedonia. It could also iptll over into border regions of Serbia proper, as well
Septet
Milan Kimn
into Greece and Bulgaria, [aside Yugoslavia itself, it could degenerate into punitive act;oris-and rcac-tioru. bringing an mass violence, igjgw*^
Outside Influences Limited and/or Menacing
Tbe United Sulci will have little capacity to preserve Yugoslav unity, notwithstanding the influence it has had there in the past. Any US statements in support of the territorial integrity of the old federation will be used by federal leaders to strengthen their case against republic attempt to assert their independence. Statements by US officials on behalf of national self-determination will be used oat of context by republic leaden to rally support within their nationalagainst central controls- Albanian leaders in Kosovo wiD play up any attention by American officials to human rights issues. All parties are likely to press the United State* for material support aad will look askance ai US public pronouooemenu if such support is sot feetheceninggJfJjgggeV
European powers will pay lipservice to the idea of Yugoslav integrity while quietly accepting theof the federatioa. West European governments share Washington's hope that Yugoslavia'swill be peaceable, but they will not provide much financialstrian officials fearconsequencesreakup of Yugoslavia but say. nonetheless, that they favor democracy and self-determination above unity. Bonn, with its influence in
the region greatly enhanced by unification, willto foster individual contacts between German state governments and the emerging Yugoslav juccc,.
Italy's "Pentagonal Initiative" to promote economic and political cooperation with Austria. Hungary. Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia will provide aframework for the adjacent northern states to adjust relationsransformed Yugoslavia,its contours. As independent democratic market-orienied states, Slovenia and Croatia would have natural affinities for this group based on common institutions and historical associations. Serbia, as It will cvorre in the two-year period of (bis .Estimate, will find its access to both the Pentagonal Group and tbe EC inhibited by its failure to adopt similar ecoaoenic and political reforms, it* failure to negotiate fully amicable settlements with Croatia and Slovenia, and by its human rights performance. There will be economic and cultural incentives pulling Serbiantoward policies conducive to good relatioos with tba "Pentagonal Initiative" aod other Europeanbut assertive and often narrow forms of nationalism and statismontinue to haveover such incentives in Serbia's internaldye i aBBBBaaaV
a#
^^Fret
The Soviet Union *C1 have only an indirectSerbian nalionaliit government in Belgrade, freed
example,ultilateralconstraints imposed by its erstwhile Slovene and
the outcome in Yugoslavia. Its geographiccomponents, will be tough in asserting its
its retreat from hegemony in Eastern Europe andin tbe south. In doing so it will look, as
domestic preoccupation with centrifugaltraditionally has. to the north and east for
Similar to those in Yugoslavia, will make it aand support. Romania,er-
tor.articipant in Yugoslav events. Atally in Balkan rivalries, win nothreat
Moscow would wish to associate itself withSerbia. Bulgaria will, at best, retain iu traditional
in quite arcaitcc-
m i wnir mine ei
atisfactory negotiation of thecannot be reached. Russia's positionweakening of central authority in Belgrade will depend on Moscow's post-Cold-War perceptionirredentist Sentiment among some of Yugoslavia's preferred security arrangements in the Balkans.Some have dormant but nonetheless potent short, tbe eastern and western parts of aon adjacent territory and population. Among Yugoslavia will have to come to terms, eachTirana's interest in Kosovo is the least manifest different contexts, with the post-Cold-Warthe mostrr "a*
would exercise an almost irresistible attraction for Kosovo Albanians. Meanwhile. Bulgaria's already vocal territorial claim on Macedonia will grow more stndcnL These are problems for Serbia: for Croatia and Slovenia they offer leverage in settling claims and counterclaims with the Serbs. They in turn have border problems of their own. but they do not match those of Serbia in potency and immedia
efforu. possibly in the context of CSCE. lo dealposture,hreat only to thevtotci
12
Annex
The Peoples of Yugoslavia
arc Ihe most numerous of the South Slav peoplesake3 percent of the Yugoslavse Cyrillictrong miliary tradition.
Croats make7 percent of7 aullion) omantrong Westernon-ented intellectualarried out massagainst ethnic Serbs as Ute as
Slovenesercent of the population,illionro singularly concentrated *ithin the borders of the Republic oftrong Catholic Slovene nationalistaditional fear of cultural dominationsmoat cosmopolitan, European peoples iaisproportionate shareational wealth and enjoy highest stan-lard of living.
Macedoniansercentillion eoplerthodoxtrong ethnic identi-t, but some cultural ties to both Bulgarians andtrong commercialongstanding bone of contention betweon erbs and Bulgarians.
Montenegrinsercent or theirtually all live in the Republic of Montenegronhabit poorest region introng identity with Serbian Orthodox Church.
Muslimsercent of the1re almost all ethnicraceto Christians who accepted Islam under Turkishost live in Bosnia andeject islamic fundamentalism.
Albaniansercent of the populationillionargest non-Slav minorityastest growing ethnicost are islamic but some are Roman Catholic.
Hungariansndercent oflmost all live in the Vojvcamu. tradition of enterprise and prosperity.
13
Opstinas'in Which One Pecajority
in Yugoslavia
Original document.
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