mar)
overn since Tiio's death innear collapic. Insoluble ethnic and regionaleriously dcierioraling economy, and tensions caused by ihe demise of Communism elsewhere have combined loput an unbearable weight on federaland leaders. Moreover, many federaless imporlani role than do ihcir regional counter par is, who wield significantin the Yugoslav system.tffl
eighi-member collective State Presidency.our judgment, has proved unabie ioYugoslavia'i political drift and deal with rising ethnic tensions. Members oribe Presidency ate politically beholden io their home region! and generally make decision) on the basil of parochial Interests. Political rivalries and personal and ethnic animoiiliei among the official* eauie tensions and often prevent agrccmcrrt on key iituci. Moreover, the members have few memories of ihe anti-Narinestunifying tie for leaders ef (be Panisan genual
The Federal Executive Council, which is headed by Premier Ame Macko-vic. has become ihe leading; federal-level policymaking insiiluiion, but il must operate within the contest or Yugoslavia's highly decentralized system. Many regional and federalihose from Croatia andgiving the FEC more authority and staunchly defend local interests againsi elements of Markovic's reform program.
Finally, the breakup of ihe parly congress inonfirmedemise of (he League of Communists of Yugoslavia iLC Y)ederal institution. Local parly leaders still control significant political activity in regions other (ban Slovenia and Croaiia. bu: lb* fed en! party has ceased
eaningful wayjtjaff^
We doubl thai any fcdcialbe able to ifitore the power thai has slipped away from the center. The Presidency will continue to betalemate over important issues. The LCY. having lost ill leading;imply one of many parties competing for power and popular support. It may end uperb*dominated "rump" or
take on ihe characteroose grouping of It.'t-leaning(hat favorfl-P
Although the Federal Assembly has expanded iu role over itse lail few years, ii hat little chance of emerging from the current morass with enhanced power. At the moment, amendments proposed by the Federal Executive Council (hat would lav ihe Groundworkunctioning multiparty parliament arc bonedin regional discussion. At the transitionulupany system continues, the authority of ihe Assemble couldthe contextighlyYugoslavia 4jg^
Yugoslav economic reform and liability hinge an the success of Premier Markovic and his government. The breakup of the League of Communists* congress had the effect of increasing his prestige, and he has announced tbe formaiion ofa new federal periy. Translatingrestige inio increased institutional power for his government will be an uphill bailie, ho-ever. as the various regionsbeir autonomy from the center. If be fails, or if comcr-auv-es succeed ia blocking progress io*ard democratic imiituiions. the setback for reform wctld icceleraie the devolution of authority to the regions,en.ions. and increase human righu abuKi in some regions.
.1 Lfudershlj rlsii m
eocn-Systcsi
country, ifuaeet. eel ji
These beingYafOT-'i-ia'i founder. Mar.hal Joaip Brer Tint, and lhe trials of ihe ayitem are noinhibitedariciy
mulually and colli, tomrihin others eh and Serb
o i
ft
ted
n the federalhare
cthkicm itaiioni ai within cot regions. I' level, undi of power i
BHk -ore Uta.for ol^archical nigne, aadrjxrmaj.esy-.
ajor ethnic groups. The,bound togethera united Communis!he hopehat Ideologythe memory of the liberationwould beetre lire force, to uniie postwar Yugoslavia. At pressure for greater local autonomy grew, ihe regime responded -nh mcaturcd decemraliiallon lhal gave gnaicr authority lo region-al leaden. These concessions merely whetted Ihef tool oSeUU. -to periledruS decentralued framework,remaeDyin the reviaed CoeiaLtuiica1 fm
cal unifjln in IvgO. the diiinirgiatii in one of hn rule and teg anyone frosto e>
Despite Ihe regime's rhetoric and loie. Tiio Mi theee,helylitm. whtn he oita
system began to unravel. Iroe.ically,as inadvertently ciaeeibaicd by Tiio lasi acta:9 cicnti on collectiverotauon "ere designed to preventndould aeiau sufftcteat author:ty ts
keeput cih-ic ri.atrki aod problem)bet-eeniy
prosperous noetk and tbe poorer south. The periodD{ |enc(oi,,
federal leadership, economic deterioration, anddiiia leg ration, which acccleraicd90 under the combined unpad of economic crisis, an explosion of ethnic nationilism^rid far-rcacbing
s . of tbe Federal LndaiakJp
According la the Cca*iiiiiumi. icspcnsibil.ty foen dit itO among several inititniom: the Stale Prealdency (chief of siatei. the Federal Executive Council (executivcXjhe Ais.mbty (legislature|.wniil JanuaryLeague of Communist, of Yugoslavia (at ruling pa'tfj;
- The Slate Preald.nc, lhe highctl federalion ia Ihe country. It iiecJlecrive decision making body of cart csembe.a. -bo rcprcsco- -be us repubCiciindii-opicmsscei The Preside, uthor ily over .ecumy. defense, and foreign pol.ey. In economic andffairs, on Ihe other hand, it aerves primarily lo advisederal Executive Council.
The primary architect and eaecutcr of domestic SfTa.rshe Federal Eirculrwc -eabiaeU headed by the FfcC ssrustfentt who it named by the State Presidency. Technically the executive organ of Ihe Fedcrai Assembly, tht FEC ii relatively autonomous from the Lcgiiiaiura; Iu members arc chosen by the premier inwilh ihe Presidency and regional leaders- ft designs and initiates federal legislation, which ii then submitted to the Federal Assembly. The FCC must lubmli tovote of confidence two year, after convening.
tlculit weak, even in relationship to the other federal institutions wot to mention !iiuin Western dcnKscratte lyittmnf delegation* from each of the republicsoiilsiron or to oversee federal aeirtiiy. According la max sources, however, ihe AtsembJj it becoming mm important as Yugoslavia nukes tne transitionultipart) system.
The League of Communists of Yugoslaviac.ft lit* immi important federaldramatic collapse ibis year. The patty is disintegrating under the height of ihe couatry's problems andesult of the dissolution of sunlit power ihtoughoui Eastern Europe.
< .
Principles and Weaknesses
The -eft priitctSes thai have succeeded in keeping an* rcpuMie fraen dominaiing the goerismce!lio caused the gradual decline in efTeetn men of Iv'iIlijI decisionmaking. Thesekideiship. lotation of ofkec. conscnius deeiiionfrik-
, iis jenrin'iuioi km
ed> atalcmaic:
.Collrttive lt*4irshif. The federal O'gsns airoffrom tZ the republicsrules prevent any one memberdecisive authority. Although thisguarantees each region an equal voiceenrai king. It has ledack of act
Rotation. The highest-loci positions usually rotate accordingdevery one orj ej'i and ihui permitting itiiat leadership The incumbent in any poii'.ion usuallt has Utile real authority, acting merelyrtntuipom.
dectsronsthe consent of all republics, allowing each republic and province an erTeetivc veto over many
itial coistriusdecisions ean be passedif ike
erse> approves use of temporary measures.]
I><tentiali;allon.ecision has been made, the regions are responsible forliosrever. they often Mock laws and enaet lubsiilute :iei, despite opposition from federal leader*.
The Stalemate tl ibe Presidency
anojar^ii;:
The Presidetscyoversees almostarea cf Yugoslav Isle, but iaaaiu authority enly inih other federal institutions and regional leaders, ft has been unable ic siem ihe devolution of power to the regions, and its mostperhaps mostis la serveorum foe negotiating compromisesherepublics and pievinccs. To hi miser oul itpartaat policy decisions, the Presidency some-ti.-nei meets jointly with other federal and itsir*il bodiet to make decisions ard_ati<mpt to ensure thai directives ate carried I
The offices of Yugoslav president and vice president rotate annually among the members of ihe collective Siatc Presidency. The cerrcnl Presidency began its fiieyeir cycle on li MayBciisa> Javie iSer-bio] will serve until1 as President cf the Presidency, the formal head of state Croatia's Stipe Mesic has bero chosen as Vice President and will succeed Joicontenegro's Ncnadill ihen take over as vice president f
Roiatioo cf (be Preiideo.-y
den-.oeralic. All candidates were (jut numinaicd by regional oiliculi. not ihe populace, and all were members of ihe LCV.|aV
ptoccit by which the current Presidency wis formedtrikingcf YugaiUvia's inertaunj tiacralitation.in turnlapporitrong central genxnuiMat. For ike first lime. -rcpk&ici iI'jiiac-edar.ii. Monicr.egro. andave held public, competitive referendum! in cKook ibeirJam; prnoick frctn Sloven it watember of ine PrcsMUocy inhe tUctiOOii the Am it direct Mtret ballotbe heldcdcfil-lott pcii-.icatWorldII (To ihe tccliaieal reejMtremeftl of Ihe law.asirmb^ hid to confirm ihe election, but all four abided by the publiclill. ihe process is not yet
Parilal democrat iMUOn.ln> icncd only to weaken iheewly elected officialsn particular, have coniempi-ousl);hc Presidency a! irrelevant ioa fuiarc ajucen inindividual republics vioaild hold democratic election! and wield increasing power.fficial! have declared their unwillingncu io dealf the old one-pally sssiem" and have called fer election* io be held in all
Cuiil)lo be lubiC-
Cjuently
Moreover, political maneuvering and scandalse early pari of current urn marred ih( electoral procesa and further damaged the public*he Presidency.nd Bcar.ian*S9 deadline andheir Presidency members only after two month, of further political bickering;hal lime thev were reprelenicd in ttelg-ide bj (seneiidenu. NcnadiMomenegre) has alio fated problems The Moniene-grinorginiulion had demanded his recall because of altered involvement Inale of emergency to break up mass proieits during8 fT heejected by the republic centralcanvhile. Kosovo'* original alaic of candidate!scrapped altogether, presumably because ihe canCiflnm wirebe Serbian Irade
Facing IB* I
Deipue oitcnutrie agreement on dctnocr ail aa lionreform, the new Presidency membersand far*most tbe intrenched parochialtheir heme couit-caocs Thethere-
ike the society it represents, is as divided ai il ii
- :
ci
at' Vat
ffc/rrn. The PresaJcoey amo Use issuertkU Yugoslavsook like in(-turf,umber* canao* agree ca thedivision cf po-er bct-cca theoverpmenc and ihe republic. Conswaencly. the.titntioriat workingby Va.il Tupurk^.Ui and femur Prc.ieencj member Mineublc only io propwe social alternative* foiby the federal Ammbly in the sprintince mid-June, the Presidency hascries of meetings with icpublic presidents lo resolve ihe future con'-.stutional staius of ibe country; bo-ever.hat Presidemerb uiiOAaliiL is eapaWe ef kadmaO^cnt duloeve lapaiiicu-lar. his recent ptaposal foeM.o- appear, toorjiarter
n<
mbers have backirwled ruber ihan face the -rain ef localn fuuntcaltar. Jark and DrafZeleno.ic seen totheirr.cr necessary lo folio-eaderiIo.ev.es current line. thc( uswatl)na Markovic and the VCC for iltrgedlyiminatingajainsi Serbia in punning economic reform. fMaf
HmmUM Kighnhe Prc.idtnc, ha. been unwilling io alleviate ihe major blight on Yugoslavia's human rig hisrimi nation against ethnicajority other arc hardl.ner. on ethnic Albanianin. Jevic. and Tupuraawshil ox obediently foOo- Serbia's lead (RiiaZaknc-vci. Onuly ibea resolution condemning Koso-o'sof independence from Serbia, in eiscace aequie.cing io Serbian repression of Albanian human
direct, secrei election, ire aMo.uie.'i ptiesssi) io1 hew members will almosi ccnainly beyine -ho reflect, the liberal poaiiiocs pop-In ai home. Oibtr members of ihethe,robably accepted "that poiiiKil pluralism isprobed, -be more_eomfoe.ab'e -lib mamf tbe old attkrjj
Crone-mic Rtfa'm. The Presidencyleast inAnieconomic ic-form
The Presideno. ho-evir. lacks the aalhorily (anal pobaps the wCUninesal to ash lis constituent* io accent the short-term com ofunemployment, and higher prices. Some Presidency
When Drnovsck President durini the op, he took an early and active role <nrights arena,n leaden ofhuman rights committee and withla9 hi announced-ondope and that federal kg-Jaiio-brought into line -ilk itsrKs-rf-gor the European Conventionhas nei continued Urrcwk'tin human right) issues. Recent humanby the republic of Serbli probablyCouncil membership in the nearhas publicly expressed tin dligail atdecision, on Kosovo, in Septemberthat hc_wou'd no longer participate inI
SufiC,
Ntiivnalhm. Milosevic* UM of ethnicion.li.rn to advance hit personalnother issue confroniini the Preildcney. He hai been urtlUe Co dominateolitics,tpeel him to continue to exploit Pre.ideneyill advance hit interests. He hai only three constantZelenovic.pundiiju: the balance of the Presidency does not favor his broader aim ofcniraliacd. Serbian-dominated political system.
The Federal Eaecudtf Couocll: Fa. or lug Unity and Reforto
The FEC is the*>ff.cial eiecutive organ of the Federal Assembly, but the latter traditionally has had noto select or remove members of (be FEC. Innte Markovic was nominated by the State Presidency lo complete the term of FECBranko Mikullc. who had been forced to resign because of mismanagement of the Yugoslav economy. Markovic then consulted with other federal leaders and regional eaTicial* andabinet; Ihe entire sl.i. wts approved by the Federal Assembly ins Yugoslavia prepares for the iranii-tiooultiparty system, theerm (which .
should have ended inas been extended through ihe end of the year until panics can be Organized and election* can be hcM.df/JkV
The Office of FCC Pro-Jest
ItiSntAttkM. Ai bead of the FEC. Markovic holds probably the most important federal position in Ihe posi-Tito political system: he. more than anyone clie, shapes the government's domestic policies and deter-mines ihe pace of political and economic reform. According to Vice Premier Zivko Prcgt, Markovic and ihe FEC take pains to discuss issues with republic leaders andon.ensus before making policy declarations. Markovic has some influenceand security policies because he ibaresthe collective State Presidency supervisory authority Over the Defense. Foreign, and Interior secretariats.the premierour-year term, subjectandaiory vote of confldence after the second year, while the hud of state rotates each year and merely presidesollectiveAjJfjg
the lack ofn powerful rival,
however, the premier in past-Tito Yugoslavia ha* less authority than do other Europeannd Mar-kovie suffers from tbe chronic problems affecting all
1
mmo
Starkavieconomic Reform Program
Morkt/rte has Implemented an economic prog-am thai hat reduced theyperir-Jta.
i.an tfa percent for the first halfCn the short term ond hat, been designed to adjust the structure oflhe economy by Introducing market-oriented reforms In ihe long term. Thefirti stage of ihr itabilliation program (implemented in January)urrency reform and wage freeze thai:
0 old dinarsew dinar.
Made Ihe new dinar convertible into hord currency lihe first currency in Eastern Europeecome convertible,.
P'tged the new dinar to the deultche mark (DM, at the rateinars per DM. _Froze wage, far six mor.i
The long-term structural adjustment program Islo make the economy work efficiently, but it could double the current IS-percent unemployment rate, if stricily enforted. It Is Intended lo urtamtlne or close firmt by making them operate without subsidies, rrorganise the banking system, create stock markets, promote jointnd privatize companies. The magnitude of the restructuring effort Is illuuraied by IMF data78 that Show total loner of money-losing enterpriserlota! profits of money-making firms, and by statements from Yugoslav official, that put ,hr coit etf bailing out there firms elercent of the national output. Moreover, most banki in Macedonia. Kosovo, and Montenegro ere reportedly beyond
Deiplte Significant gelnt against in/lotion, the in-ereaiingly unsettled political situation Impairs Slar-kovie'i effort, to reuore the country', economic health. Hii program i, coming under increasing attack from labor over the wagefreeze, pons of 'which were lifteduly, and the federai(on Isa growing ttumbrr of itrikei. Inerbian textile workersne-day warninglargest labor action in Yugoslav history.
Key legislation needed lo implement the next phase of lhe reform program t, 6eint blocked byand
Croatia, tht federation's molt prosperous republic,
because they want to mtria federal power OrerSerbia, retting from ihe Impact ofpolicy on in unprofitable Industries,broken with ihe Markovic program inA, exporn become ten competitive,on financial codapie. and labor unreilMarkovic mayo-confidence voteausterity. If he caves in to populareconomy probably *itl drift bock towardand the economic trlid will drag
Nlaraotic has atsramlincd :healio increasing in aliticncr. He has reduced the tabinetaembers and has
trcere traditional!)'with less Qualifiedo eruurc elhrue and regional balances. Compared with itsc iisch i. tha Markovic FEC Ii -cighted in (aior of ihe moraestern-oriented, and promarkci northernroatia and Slovenia retain (he tame number of scats on tht smaller FEC a* before (Ave and three,hite Serbia been reduced by one position ic four members. The representation of tbe smaller southern republic! was slashed even father. Ecosern-eallf irnpeetanl FCitfolios aach ase. Foreign Eciaamicand Eeonom^eDere'cpmeni arc held by erfieials frcrr. the
Taking Admnragi- ol Keetnr Funis
By alt accounts. Markork and lhe FEC were Ihebeneficiaries of (his year's precipitous decline of the LCY. Eves though be had been distajscirig himsclE from lha ICY for soma- Markovic attendedih party congress in January and. according tobservers,an like image iHit was In marked contrast to ihe spectacle of peiiy squabbles put on by parly leaders. Support among vongressional delegates for hi! reform plans ileaily enhanced Us prestige. They andcrsed ia economic reform program and agreed loarly'spo>er and to Improve pectecuon of tiuitan rights. Markovic was thena>jr Yugoslav politician to publiclyultiparty
concept that was unthinkable little moreear ago buthat was apparently supported by Ihe vail majority of party delegates (Croatia and Slovenialready held republic-level multiparty elections; most other republics -ill .laid elections Ihis fall.)
oil certainly welcomes the prospect of diminished Inter fere ace from tne LCYtC steel-nsr.i. after lhe LCY congress debacle, he said thai bit govemnxails only io ihe Federal Assembly, not to ihe LCY. Ia April Markovic an-nouaccd t'.at tkea*iuut*ta In lhe federal adm nittration would be eliminated, removingLCY authority in thecaocnliat precondition tounctioning federal multiparty system *^
Markovic hat moved to takehe party's disarray lo direct political reform much at he has dominated economicmaking Inif-riler economic ainenCnsen.s. be has proposed amcadmiais lo Use Yugoslav Co* si ii alien that would give ike force ef law to tee political measuresby Ihe congress, such as tegatu.ngegulating lhe formation of political par-tics, and providing the legal basisroad array of andSu.^|
However, lhe opposition of several republics toof Markovic's piopouls makes adoption ofreform package unlikely in the nearmost republic] have accepted (hein principle. Croatia and Sloveniawill not approve the actualhas insisted cm adopting politicalier that.mar promtof any am- Bga
The League of Communists la Decline
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, now in its death throes, hat traditionally been lhe country's ruling political institution. Party leaders made all
SjBfcf
u
important deciiions. which were thengovernmenlof whom wereImplement*lion. However, withoutpersonal authority lo bullrai il. (he po-er ofp*ny hi* gradually declined, rim Inwiih the growing importance of region*!ihen in comparison -iih ihe Pre.ieief.eyFEC. The LCY hi* becomepo-erlui io organize itself, rnueh lei* !oof ibe Yugoslav
Tbe Ruw in RctfoctalUm
Since Ihend especially ilncc ihe denh of TllOower wiehin ihe parCy ha* devolved from Cbe federal level Co thelthough party leaders in Belgrade have been important participant, in policyhey have relied for theirnhe primary duly offficial* bis been to protect the interest* of their borne cons timeffew who have itiempted to reject ihe dictates of the regional partyost have suffered severencluding the loss cf their party poii-
Authority for personnel palha pi the most important tool of controluling Communistto the region* during. As late
as (he. Tito had been able lorieated Croatian parly leadership and install more malleable successors. Today, however, regional panics namearty officials tfram lne central commute* onot vice
Theh Congren of the LCY in Januarylo preserve partyapart over Che issue of regional party power. The Slovene* proposed to transform ihe LCY officiallyeague of fully autonomous regional parties that could vcio federal partyhen thai concept -as vetoed, the Slovene delegation left the congress andew days later lo break wiih the federal party.did Iheegional parCy. Federal parCy leaders, having failed lo preveni the debacle, appeared incompetent and powerleuMt
Mile-wvlc'. Aiteaspc To Doeolnau the Party Hardline Serbian leader Slobodaneenfar without muchpreserve some mea.urc or Communis! authority ai the federal level. He wa. behiod the original call In9 (or (he extraordinary congress, and he was ihe major loier when il fell apart. After the Slovene walkout. Milosevic -as unable to penu.de remaining delegates to permit him to dominate the proceedings andhis influence beyond Serbia. The delegation, for Croaiia. Bosnia. Macedonia, and the Yugoilav Army opposed his call to continuehich he would probably have used toor control of tbe party.f^ K
The Croatian and Slovene panics have since refusedfforts to convene new deliberations, and the Macedonian and Bosnian panics arc Unlikely to cooperate In hi. larger goal. Recently. Milosevicocialist Piny of Serbia io succeed ihe Serbian Communiit parly. He appears io see this allegedly,onitiiuenl pari Ofnew LCY and will continue hiswith other pinyloumpany under Serbian
The Federalarliament In lb* Wings?
The role of ihe Yugoslav Federal Assembly ismore impottani is Yugoslavia enter*ultiparty system. The Yugoslav Federal Assembly has traditionally acted as ain most Communisthas hid lie lie
ffirm or (less often) reject decisions already made at Ihe esecutivc level or by regional power barons. Inowever, iherejtcied Ihe FECs proposed budget, subse-quenlly forcing iben Premier Bunko Mikulicesign. Thisfirst inign Of greater legislative asseruveness and of ihe increased: accountability of ihe FEC lo ihe Assembly.aflfe
The Assembly is made uphambersoverlapping responsibiliiiei: both bodiesaloag regional lines rather thanaccording to population. In practice, bothusually vote by regionalfrom home. The president and membersFEC are nominated by the Presidency:Assembly presently has no authority lonomin.lions, they do formally elect theAssembly does, however, have the authoritya vote cf no-eoflfidencc on the government:ha. been threatened but never uken.technically resigned hi.
The composition of the As.embly often makeson legislation difficult, if not impossible. Ininstances, there ire provisions forawemporary measure through the mediation of the FEC and theevice that bat often been necessary io prevent ibsoluie siakmuc of ibe leg's!*-
it in the Assembly committees: In theommittee meeting, were "about as interesting as the avenge LCYEC secretariescould bluff iheir way through meetir^sand__
hcWjl
"ggVajpa-anintdrmitive prcientatton. arcunacceptable Incept from the Defenie and Interior Secretariats, who answer directly to the Pre tidendembers ntutibe prepared to deal wiih informed questioning.
Jar Miliary', Political Hole
The Yugoilav Ptople'i Army USAi. in our Judgmtnl.
Ii the only ligntficani integrating /arten lhe Jedtial If el. Tht JSAmfitd. ethnically ime-gtatrd military unite composed of ground, air, and
navalfnreelurrent overall peacetimeapeaiimattlyen Strhs conilliuit ep-proximatelyercenthe offittr carpi, bit tht lopre dambuied proportionally among tht
ftti<jat akannnV
Dcipiic (he grc-ing intpcrunee of (he Aucmblyolitical inmistion. the ouilit) of delegate*e-ma mrd general.)according- 10 oITi-clali. in purl becjuteisicm thai allocate, jubi
numcricall) among (hect Moreover, iirrui at
Theha, atwaiiolitical a, well at /minor,out a/ the wartime fartlion movtmtm and hoi in own party organiza-lioneague of Communists. Overhe otfcer carpi are LeagueofCY)ilitary leaden are occuitomedilling lurh Important political Jobsecretary of internal attain and dt/tnit leeritary.
Even retired itraae officer, kttme had politico! influ-^ut^^ault c/ ihtlr high-ranking party polilions.
(he federal level hai traditionall) been unattractive; official! were afraid of luting their influence at home. Now. however, tone c- unci arc cpeninj theoaititucMy office, in theirove that will make it caiicr to bypau the regionalat lean on routineimprove diieet nuaaion of inform,ciu, and irfluent
Outlook
Wa doubt that arty Yugoala' fcdctalre.we thethat bai been itippiiffrom the center since Tilo'i death.evelopment wouldoa.or ihifi ia regionalsniiiety cieaiaaUty gives the euipieioo of man) YugoiIavi ibat ibey would tu-Tcr if power rcveried to Itc'gride. Cbromc ethnic problems, in pariicular. appeare0 mediation by the Presidency. Markovic. the PEC. or any otherof federal-level Yugoilav poliijciar
In lhe coming year.expect the Federal Aucmbly to lake on more charade rut teagitlataret. ncverthctcas. the Aucmbly will probabiy be unable lo item the tramfcr of powerheany ct ike FEC'a proposed coaaiitutional amendments, which would lay tbe groundworkultiparty system, will remain bogged down Indiicuuion Debate on bowvttcm uouid work bai bcrcly begun, and dcliberaiioni will certainly: of much contention Accordiag la fimbauy oPkials. if federal e'evtions do not take place by :he endhe terra of the federal eban-.berexpire. leaving the Assembly virtually
Neither the Pudency nor ibe federaln an, ihapc to withstand the meregional power;
The Praideney hai little chance ofseful role bec-uae (he parochial ,nteratl )mJ
have brevghl itwdiall .howijra of abating.
7?
.
. *' ; .
ihe pail year Ihe rail; has been relegated to ihe pollilcaliiobably continue inrcuinini lu tone of tupport only in lit iriJin.rn.il auuihcrnilosevicbjbl> succeed Mil; in galvaniring otherjii) leaders la *ork together to contain hn ambl-
if Premier Markc-ic unirti. lie -ill
uitcmpt to lateof thevacuum io increase thehoriir that of other federal ln.Ulul.oas. He -ill also promote detnoaati-faiiooaliipari) system a. acaar/ to estab-tmm public .uppoet fo. enhanced centralr. he -il! fice lirong resistance to ceniraliM-nan and lo portion, of bit economy proaram.and Cre-ila. In particular, will continue io opposehat five the federal government more powerublic economic deci.ion making ind internil .ecumy. Milosevic and Serbia will lead the oppcuion to trial economic and political reform. All of ihe republics -ill hesitate to accept ihe potentiallybnnkrupieie. and unemployment lhai would re.uli from full implementation of Markovic'i eco-
r.omtc piogramaffkaifll
Matkc-ic ha. .Hied publiclyi. government inicndi to run la multiparty federal elections by the cad of 1MO on the platform of bo econonwe reform program. He aneouiieed In late July the fcraalion ofo^i- Reformto beederal-krel potfucal pinyhl and an umbrejln organiwtion ikai incorpo-rate.exiling paniei tnii supportram. According to numerous opinionarkovic
i. ihe mott popular politician across all region, and. In our judgment, i. the one rnosi likely tu succeedouatt) wide election. However, how he intend, theprocess to work It not yet clear, nor hailamrd how heuge to convince regional politician, ioniform method ofederal government. Embassy repon. indicale thai federal election, are unlikely to be held this year: if they do not take place. Markovic mirast federal ]
Markcme -ill cruitc likely fail to iriaslait hi. prcalige into increased iMtii.tioaal po-er far hasraaaaM; the probable vwiback for reform -ould complicate relation, with the Unitedegional po-er -ould slo- economic and political reform, especially in the southern republics, further human rights abuses would be very likely. especially in Serbia and caltern Maccdo.-iiJ
n. r'iF"
partK Fraajn b*
n: jiuri
.
policy eonfu.tonould rc.ultai the center -ould be difficultand other couniiici io deal-ould be the onlyn aunci ir Kdk>vo.c ofdealingcoa.iiitilion.lBut ibey -ould hive lutlcno IgTiiliU forum wiihinMorcewci.of Ihemsad his; 1
lonal icnsicni. ihui making tgr
illMtam.
Original document.
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