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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
key problems affecting us efforts to strengthen the near east
httM1
Theuxattons of the Departments ol Bute, the Army, the Navy, the Air rorte, end the Joint StaffIn the preparation ol this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this estimate onpril.
KEY PROBLEMS AFFECTING US EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NEAR EAST
THE MOUCM
lnterestslnjhat region.*
CONCIUSIONS
f.US_secwilyhe Near East. must be consld IS^d? as anjojffiy.'" sJwJMt ol Western strat?gVinl>resu In the region (oUcommurdcations, andair facilities) would require the use of military bases and the free movement of defending forces throughout much of the area. The loss of such countries as Oreece or Iran to the USSR wouldthe defense of the remainder. Soviet successes anywhere in the region, unless effectively met by Western counteraction, would accelerate the trend towardand might even cause some states to seek sxcorronodatlon with the USSR.
The four principal conditions whkh make the regionhole vulnerable to fiovTeTandUK al-iVrlsJopressureaare:
a. The lac* of anyji>oslUvc politicalthe""newly Independent Arab states are generally more intent ontheir sovereignty arid on rivalries amongst themselves than on furthering any Interests common to the areahole Even those states most directly thi catcned bylittle disposition to act in concert amongst themselves, much lessegional basis.
eneral poverty of resourcesforcorionilcT^hderdevelc^ment, social and political ferment andand military weakness. Turkey and,esser extent, Oreece areto this generalisation, but it applies with particular force to Iran and the Arab States.
c- The extreme naUonalkUc sensitivity toforejgn Influence of Iran and the Arab States. This is anti-Western In effect since Iteaction to former British or French domination and Is currentlyagainst residual British Interests. This anti-Western tendency Is aggravated by Arab hostility toward Zionism andwhat the Arabs believe to be theof the US for Israel. The Near Eastern states are also anti-Communist but, except In Oreece, Turkey, and Israel, fear of the USSR tends to be overshadowed by fear of Westernhe inability to distinguish between these
n terieee, Twiej, Iran, Uriel, Lftja, and tha Aria BUtei
fears has contributedrend toward neutralism.
egressive jlecUne.in British ability to defend. Western Interests In the Near East, Inonsequence of the over-all decline In British capabilities, In part the result of Arab-Iranianto eliminate the vestiges of British Imperialism,
s. The United Kingdom would welcome IncreascdTlS support In"the region, both in preserving Bluish base rights andconcessions and In extendingaid and commitments to strengthen the general security of the area. The British, however, would seek to retain the senior parfriefship"ahd" controlling voice litany joint Western program.
France, unreconciled to the loss of her position in the Near Fast,oice In any Western program. France,has little to contribute, while French participation wouldiability In view of Arab animosity toward French imperialism in Syria and North Africa.
Most Near Eastern countries would welcome greater US military andaid and US commitments to defend them in case of attack, but they vary on the conditions under which they would like to receive this support and on the re-ciprocal concessions they would grant Oreece and Turkey strongly desire aUS security guarantee) and would grant peacetime base lights in return. Jordan, Libya, and Saudi Arabia would probably extend further peacetimeprivileges and base rights In return for greater aid. The other Arab States and Israel also desire US-UK aid, but would be reluctant to allow base and transit rights on otherartime basis. Iran alone would hesitate to accept any security arrangement under present
InTurkeyandOreece.expajidedU8as-sistar.ee could be relatively quicklyand lead to an early increase la strength. Israel also could bealthough lis limited population and size make Its military potential much smaller. However, in view of the deep-seated weaknesses of the other Near East countries, In addition to such political obstacles as their anti-imperial ism and the Arab-Israeli conflict, there arelimitations on how much the US could accomplish In these countries over the short run, especially towardlocal capabilities for defense against the USSR Nevertheless, greater US aid and defense commitments, particularly If accompanied by parallel political action, would assist in promoting nationalore firm pro-Westernori-enXation and, if continuederiod of years, might materially strengthen the regionhole. Moreover, theof further base and transit rights or maintenance of existing ones In return for US support would facilitateof the US and UK forces on whom the defense of the Near East would largely depend
While the USSR would^ubJAcssjnake vigorous efforts to counteract expanded US MtMt/in' the Near East, we do not belfeve'that US defensive guarantees and the 'bolstering of local forces would sln themsejves cause the USSR to embark on local, military; .aggression; in'Vait, av stronger US commitment to go to war In event of Soviet attack on the region would acteterrent to local military action by the USSR. However, If the US (and UK) proceeded toomprehens-
Ive system of strategic air and other bases, and to deploy much greater forces In the area, the USSR might considerrowing menace to Its security and might eventually attempt to forestall it by the threat or use of military force, even at the risk of general war. IndawJ, such amight be one fadkeoviet resort to general war, although this decision wouldbe based on global considerations, sat merely on the situation In the Near Mat
DISCUSSION
From the point of view of US securitythe Near Eastern countriestrategic ecUty, witrdn whkh the Persian Oulf and Iraq oilfields and the Sues Canal are of major importance to the West. Defense of these key points would Involve theof US-UK bases and tha free movement of defending forces throughout much of the area. Moreover, the Near East nations are strategically Interdependent; the loss of such countries as Oreece cr Iran to the USSR would greatly complicate the defense of the remain-der of the Near East It would hamper West-em support of Turkey In event of war and would expose the Near East oilfields and their key transport links. At present, Iran Is the Near Eastern country which Is most critically TUlaerabk. to tha USSR' The loss of Iran would not only deny Iranian oO to the West but would Increase the vulnerability of the Sues Canal to Soviet attack through Iraq and the Levant.
XlE-e,na roriUon latut-Wuttreats tr* carrtat dUiaUOn la Din.
1 Moreover, local Soviet aucceats anywhere In the Near Part or the development oftrends unfavorable to the US mightontagious effect on the attitudes of the rest of the region. Soviet-Satelliteof Oreece or Iran, unless offset by strong US counteraction and/or US commitments to Turkey and other Levant countries, would powerfully reinforce the trend towardand might even cause some slates to seek accommodaiion with the USSR. We have estimatedhat successful Soviet seiiure of Oreece tn particular might cause even Turkey, If not firmly backed by the US, to veer toward neutralism. Soviet successes In Iran might have strong adverseeffects on Iran's nelghbwa The devrlop-meot of strong neutralist saawwent In aorne Near Eastern countriesimilar effect on the policies of theaatm, especially among the Arab States. Oats* other band, local Soviet successesrouse other Near Eastern countries brsflbs Oreece and Turkeyore realistic aajaerlaUon of the Soviet menace and. If met kjwfectrre US-UK eountemeasures, might aaatrj strengthen the pro-Western otlcntalicarfthe Near East-em states.
i
Internol Weaknesses ofArea
1 The Near Eastharacterisedeneral poverty of restates (eicept forconomic underdevekfateat, social and political Inslabmiy, mints? weakness, and lark of regional cohesion. Throe weaknesses Interact to limit the regies* pawer polentlsl and ability to resist outsak pressures; they make It vulnerable toenetration and impede US-UK measures tawnier the Soviet thrtal
espite the strategic Marwepecdence of the Near Eastern countrtw,ffce lack of any positive unity within the aspen contributes to the weakness of the NearBM and hampers US-UK efforts toregional beats. The Near East is pol lUcajJelatively hefjn ins collection of young and immature rxatasaJ states. The conflict of interests wlthlaft* region Is In fact more significant than anyeawmon ties.for the border slateslose proximity to the USSR, the Near Eastern countries are far more concerned with ffcaaotic problems, local rivalries, and theconflict than with the 8orirt three* Even the directly exposed states -Oreoea, awJbry, and
display Utile interest In concerting common policies to meet the Soviet threat Numerous lntraregiona] tensions, especiaJIy Arab-Israeli animosity, tend to keep the region dlrlded. The Arab League, the only active regionalU loose and Ineffective,ommon antipathy toward Israel, but prevented by rivalries among the Arab States themselves fromenuineforce. These local rivalries and the lack of agreement on common interests impair the Near East's capabilities for achieving econcsrue and political stability and Increase itsto the USSR. They make difficult, if not impossible at present, the development of any broad-based Eastern Mediterranean pact.otential unu'ylng force within the region. If It could be properlywould be the common fear, though varying in degree, of the USSR
urkey and,esser extent, Oreece are the strongpotnts of the area, being in general politically stable, to some degree Industrially developed, and having more or less represents-live governments. These countries havewell-equipped and trained ground forces which could put up substantia] resistance against the USSR, although by themselves they could not longoviet attack. Fear of Soviet and Satellite aggression doml-na'-ss Oreek and Turkbh foreign policy and has led these countries lo seek the closestassociation with the Western Powers.hird potential area of strength, has recentlyloser US/UK. alignment, tn part because of Its recognition of the potential Soviet and Arab threat to Its new and hard-won independence and in part because of its economic dependence upon the US.
he Arab Slates and Iran, tn contrast, are weak and In most catee unstable, with as equivocal attitude toward the great power con-flirt. They arecxlly backward and undeveloped, except for their one developed asset, oil, and their economic base foe further development fn terms of skills, natural and human resources, and Indigenouseak. Political and social korUbnitj anal ferment Is chronic in moat countiles, which are characterised by the more or lesscontrolmall ruling classas-aavr and Illiterate population. The constant tavtarylng of special Interests, such as the assay, and the congenital weakness of most Arab and Iranian governments make revolu-tfcna, coups, and assassinations recurrent feat-em of political life.
T The weakness of the Arab States and Iran Br* largely to the fact that they aremalUonal stage from medieval to moderneconomic, and political systems; the taeasnres to which they are subject In making gals transition and the unequal rate of change lam given rise to serious social, economic, snd political stresses whichundamental enee of the Instability of the area. Chief ataong these elements has been the risentelligentsia and urbanthe former element, which is the standard-bearer of nationalism. Is both Idealistic and awAceional tn Its ouUook and. being denied Its price in the sun by the lagging development ef the pre railing political and social order, tends to develop radical nationalist and often leftist leanings. Ethnic, religious, and tribal ivoblems in many countries also create social tensions, the Kurds and Aserbaljanls, foe ex-asDple. being potential separatist groups.the local Communist groups are small, theyistinct if as yet limited subverxire and sabotage potential, especially the out-la wed Tudeh Party In Iran, and they are In ato capitalize on any Indigenousban ces which may develop
a. The Iranian and Arab armed forces,from Jordan's small British-trained Arab Le-gkn, are extremely weak. The Egyptian. Iraqi, and Irsnlan armies have benefited to some extent from British or US aid, but they art tar below Western standards, and graft and corruption are widespread. Their wfU-So-reslst In event of Sovietow.
ft. The extreme nationalistic sensitivity to for-esgn Influence of the Arab States and Iran sert-eauly hinders US-UK efforts to align them with the West This sensitivity Istn effect, since Iteaction to former British or French domlnstlon and is currently directed against residual British Interests.
The current rtlffleolUe* over Brttbh oilIn Inn md Iraq, Egyptian efforts to aecure British troop withdrawal, and theupsurge of Arab feeling over Morocco, all reflect such nationalistic and anil-colonialThis anti-Western tendency Isby Arab hostility toward Zionism and toward what the Arabs believe to be theof the U3 for Israel. Nevertheless, the development of these nallcos has been subjret to strong Western Influences whkh are still potent, and the Arab States and Iran can be said to remain mora or less pro-Western at the present Urne.
n both the Arab States and Iran, there has been aome trend toward neutralismossible avenue of -scape from Involvement in the East-West conflict. Although the Arab States and Iran are all anti-Communist, their fear of the USSR has tended to beby fear of Western "impcitallun."In the US-UK response to theirfor aid and concerned lest the US and UK do not seriously Intend to defend the area, some cf these nations have tended to fee) that their best chance for survival might lie tn ton-tdentlflcatlon with either side. Dan Inhas long eovght to play off the great powers against each othereans ofIts independence. Despite Iran's acute fear of the Soviet Union, Its Internal weaVness and resentment against UK exploitation of Its oil resources have made It adopt anattitude which hampers Western efforts to orient Iran toward the West Since the Korean episode, the Arab States haverowing realisation of Soviet ambitions, but they have been In general apathetic overSoviet encroachment, and moreby antl-colonial and nationalistby frustration over US neglect of their aid requirements as compared to those of Israel, and by resentment over US policy on Palestine. In the event of further Western reverses In the East-West struggle, especially tn the Near East, and In the absence of US-UK counteracting efforts. Near Eastern corAdence In US-UK ability to contain Soviet expansion would be shaken and the tendency toward neutralism reinforced. There have been aorue indications that thes seeking actively to encourage this tendency.
Declining British Copobilrries In Ova Near Eoil
lthough the UK has long been theWestern power In the Near East and has, by US-UK agreement, primary strategicfor the area, the progressivain British ability to protect WesternIn the regionajor problem for the US. In part this decline la aof the over-all decline In Britishand growing local recognition of British weakness, and tnesult of the growth of nationalism and xenophobia tn the area. These factors have been exploited by Soviet propaganda The British system of alliances with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, based on the concept of Britain ai the senior partnerarms aid and protecUjo and receiving in return peacetime base and transit rights, Is becoming increasingly offensive to Iraqi and especially Egyptian nationalism, and these countries demand that the alliances be revised. Egyptian denunciation of the iMS treaty, or provision for British troop withdrawal In any treaty revision, wouldajor problem for the UK, whose Near East defense plansuponecure base and strategic reserrea In the Sues area. Oreek demands for Cyprus may also prove troublesome In the future, although they areeriousnow.
ecause of financial stringencies and the drmands of home defense, NATO, and the Par East, the UK cannot at present either give substantial aid to the Near Eastern countries or station sufficient forces tn the area to achieve any more than Initial defense of the Canal aone tn evtot of war. British plans contemplate wartime reinforcement of the Near East from New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa, as well as the UK, and the UK also hopes that once the Kashmir Issue has been settled, Pakistan can be persuaded to participate. The UK Is seeking to stimulate Commonwealth cooperation and aid has been promised,greai has been vary alow.
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Moreover, in view of the probable timeto mobUlie. train, equip, and transport ebeablt Dominion forces, they would bedelayed tn their arrival tn event of war. If the Commonwealth countries could be Induced to prepare for prompt retofotce-meat of the Near East and pcrtops even to contribute to the peaxtlme garrison. British defense capabilities *ouM be materially
Illesult of the UK's reducedthe UK i'seir wouldreater degree of Joint US-UK responsibility,greater US aid to the Near East countries, stronger US air and naval forces tn the area, and much closer combined planning. The UK also hopes for US support In preserving British base rights and economic concessions to the area. However, the UK would expect to remain the senior partner In the area, with eorninand responsibility, and would expect the US to herd British recommendations andbased cn the long British experience to the Near East. It woulj also look askance at any apparent US effort to ease It out of its po-alUon of primacy In the area. Moreover,US and UK viever how to conduct relations with the Near East countries, such as the differing US and UK approaches to the oil problem, might cause friction between the two.
French Interest tn the Near fort
lthough the French lack the capability to contribute to the security of the area, and the anU-cotooial sentiment In certainIs even more anti-French than anti-Brit-tsh. French interest to the Near East remains strong. As Is evident from French irritation at being excluded from the recent US-UK Malta conversations, the French will seek to be included to any combined plane. French participation, however, wouldebUfty to view of Arab animosity toward FrenchIn Syria and North Africa.
Reglonol Attitude Toward Greoter U5 Support
esult of the UK's reduced strength and Influence to the area, the Near Eastare locking mora and more to the US. Notwithstanding the trend toward neutralism to some parts of the region, these countries would welcome greater US (as well as UK) aid and US security conimttinenU, although their attitudes vary on the conditions under which they would like to receive this support and ti the reciprocal privileges they would grant Almost all these countries are already receiving US or UK assistance to one form or another, they recognise It as indispensable to their own development, and most of thero ha re already sought tocrcascd support.
IS. Nevertheless, many Near Eastern countries will be insistent on particular types ofand sensitive to the conditions under which It is given. In Iran, the Arab States, and probably also Israel, national senalbonies, fear of outside Interference, and grandiose ambitions must all be considered. These countries want large amounts of aid with as few strings attached as possible, and wD be quick to react If they consider they are not receiving equal treatment, particularly to the case of the Arab States as opposed to Israel Moreover, they will seek aid for ambitious eco-rxanlc development projects and fortheir armed forces on big-power fines that may be well beyond their presentThey would tend to resent what they considered to be US-UK dictation as to the type of aid they would receive and as to the complementary domestic measures they were pressed to undertake.
IT. Most Near Eastern countries would alsoirm US-UK pledge to come to theirto case of war. Turkey and Oreece hare been most persistent to seeking thisbut the desire exists In other stales as wen. They do not consider the UK system of alliances or existing US-UK policy state-menls as sufficient guarantee and wouldnn and unequivocalnilateral US anl UK guarantee ofwithout any eorrunltrnent on their part. Thereide dbparlty to the probable wfJl-togness of various countries to go further and conclude formal security pacts with the U8 and UK. Oreece and Turkey would adhere to any form of security airangemeot whicha firm US guarantee. Most Arab states
(and Israel) would probably agree to bilateral mutual assistance agreements (preferably supplanting fie British system of alliances In Egypt andf these were accompanied by substantial US-UK aid. However, they would doubtless Insist that, while the US and UK be committed to come to their assistance, they not ba committed to support the US and UK In event of hostilities outside the Near East HtheNCarEastwerenottovaded.most of these countries would prefer to remainneutral In event of general war. They would also insist that any bilateral pacts beasis of full equality between theand avoid the objectionable features of the alliances with the UK. Iran alone would be hesitant to sign any pact whatsoever under present circumstances.
IS. There Is little desire anywhere tn thefor any security arrangement, bilateral or multilateral, which does not Include the US and/or "UK. Although the Arab League has made some efforts towardoose sec urity part, this Is directed prima rliysrael, and Is exceedingly weak. The Turks have shown little Interest in closer defense ties with their neighbors within any frsme-work which would not also Include the US. Although Oreece and Turkey, among others, have raised the questionediterranean pact with US-UK participation, paralleling the North Atlantic Treaty, there is also little regional sentiment for this. It would beif not Impossible, to get Israel and the Arab States to loin together, and severalmight be unwilling to extend theirbeyond their own frontiers. More over, the military establishments of most Near Eastern countries are so weakegional paet would serve little useful purpose. Under strong US-UK pressure, many Near Eastern countries might eventually be persuaded to Joinegional pact, but this seems atong-range possibility.
ost* Near Eastern countries recognise that they might be called upon to make some reciprocal concessions, such as base and tran* alt rights. In return for greater US-UKBut willingness to ovotinue present base and transit rights or to grant new ones In peacetime varies among lbs Near Eastern countries and wouldartawpendent on
the type ol US-UKand the
amount of sM. Oreece and Tarstje willing to alow the U8 and UK peacetime bases In rttoraecurity guarantee. Egypt. Jordan, ana araq already allow base rights to the UK, eats Saudi Arabia to the Ua Jordan, Sauft erak*.acd the new state of Libya would doubtless Is willing to expand these concessions, dxadag eeaeetlme tn return for greater aid Howtwav, the other Arab states, particularly kgyat, aau strong nationalist aversions to the scaottiraaof foreign troops on their aat, and such concessions would be dimes* ta negotiate. The Egyptians maintain that tack own forces, if suitably rtrengthened.couMaaUally defend the Sues base. Israel, too, wkwe probably willing to allow accessOK farces In war-time, might balk at the present of peacetime forces and Installations. TflsSt all the Near Eastern countries would ttef awxe secure If stronger US-UK forces were afcafloned tn the region, many of them would prdrr to see these forces stationed elsewhere EM within thelr own frontiers.
tffects of on Expanded US rVooram In the Near Fori
SO. An expanded US progrm lor bolstering the Near East could xasttxawry assist in strengthening the /rtablaj awl pro-Westcn orientation of the area, but Oast are distinct limitations on what could namably bein the short raw. la view of the fundamental weaknesses of want countries In the region, in addition to each politicalas their antl-lmperlaraaa and the Arab-Israeli conflict,read* conceived US-UK program Including aecwdtj commitments, economic aid, arid the buQdtog ap of localforces could not dedriwerr tn crease the Near East's stability ornse capabili-Ues over the next few years. He weaknesses of the Near East are too dres-seated to permit rapid progress In the short rwa on an over-all regional basis, although stpttcant results could probably be attained Msneh countries as Oreece, Turkey, andIsrael, where the groundwork alreadyt wouldustainedlna effort to over-
come Arab and Iranian resentment of US-UK influence and poUcies and lo conTtrt anti-colonial and neutralist aentl'ovntore cooperativeour, time would also be required tooncept of common Interests within the region that would permit programs to be undertakenegional rather than largely bilateral basis.
any countries will make ambitiousfor economic ad, but the ability of these countries to absorb such aid will beby governmental mef3clency and insia-bully, local graft and corruption, inadequate technical skills, and the dearth oflocal capital. U8 aid would be most erfec-tree If concentrated In the field of egi[culture, but many countries will be equally Intvested in early IndustrtallssUon. However. US aid accompanied by technical assistance and used properly by the local governments, wild even In the short run contribute lo the pro-Western orientation of the region, ameliorate those conditions which underlie local unrest andCommunism, and lay the groundwork for progressive economic developmenteriod of years.
he capacity of the Hear Easternto absorb and effectively utilise largc-acale military aid Is also limited byInefflclency, inadequate officer and NCO cadres, lack of training, and the absencetrong economic base. Greece andas well as Israel are hampered by suchalthough substantauy Increased military aid could be expected to materially Improve their local capabilities within ashort time. Inb states and Iran these difficulties would be even greater, and the problem of military graft and political Intrigue would in many cases be acute.light arms and training in guerrilla warfare might be best suited to.thaof these forces, they win tend, like the Iranians, to demand such equipment as Jet planes and tanks.Moreover, they will beo the US-UK guidance andassistance required to mavtmlse theof the arms aid received. There is also the risk that the Arab States and Israel may acek to utilise Increased US aid against each other and the much leaser risk, to lb* car; of the Arab Stales, that they mlghl pur. aue local conflicts among ihemselre*.In the shortS-UK aid program could bxewove their will and ability to conduct delaying and harassing actionstet attack, and their wUllconess to cooperate with US-UK forces.
onsequently, we consider thatajor Improvement tn the economicIrrternal stability, and militaryof the Near East through US-UK programsng-nm proposition, much could beIn the near future. Concreteof greater US-UK Interest In the region. Including an area-wide military and economic aid peogrwn, particularly tf accompanied by parallel political action, could be expected lo reverie the present trend toward neutralism In the Arab Stales (though under presentprobably not In Iran) andincrease local capabilities for delayingvent of war. Moreover, thebase and transit rights which tha US and UK might secure LQ several countries would greatly facilitate deployment of the US and UK forces, upon whom, for the next few years at least, the defense of the region would very largely depend.
Soviet Reodion to Greater US-UK Activity In the Near East
If. Skirt the thwarting of its early postwar attempts tooothold In Orrece and Iran, the Kremlin has not fVJy exploited Its capabilities tn lbs area. Because of tha very weakness of the area and of the Western fortes based there, thea/ have felt that the region presented little threat to its security and could be easily conquered In event of war. Recent fJoriet Near Eastern policy has been confined to promoting internal Instability and Intra regional tensions and reducing Western influence. Soviet methods have Included propa|anda to aggravate nationalist suspicion of Western motives, expanded trade contacts, local Communist efforts to cause Interna) and Intra rrgkcal dissension, and tnciteioent of mlnorily groups.
he USSR wouM obviously be rnkrusly concerned over any expanded; activity
tn U* Near East, although tt Is difficult toat what form IU reaction would take. Soviet propaganda haa already pointed to the planned expansionUK air basesew step toward encirclement The USSR might And It profitable, at least for the present, toelatively -soft" policy tn anto encourage neutralism, wean the Near Eastern countries away from the US-UK Woe. and undercutWestern program. The Kremlin has recentlyolicy of this type toward Iran, with apparently substantial results, and there have been some indications that It may seek to fellow this policy toward ether countries as well. Through expanded trade contacts, assurances of peaceful Soviet Intentions and simultaneous threats aa to the eenseouenees of westward orientation, the USSR might play upon the anti-colonialism and feare of the Near Eastern countries with some success.
n the otherthe USSR mayeries ofressures, Including threats. Intensified anil-Western propaganda, larger scale subversive activities, promotion of local coups or separatist movements, and possibly even local armed Intervention. The Kremlin might thus hope to IntlmVJaU the Near East-era countries, offset Western efforts tostabilityro-Wealero orientation.possibly secure control of keyhe underlying weakness and testability tn the Arab 8tates. and particularly the current crisis in Iran, offer substantial opportunities foe Communist exploitation. The USSR,l- probably not able to provoke aCommunist revolution or separatistIn any Near Eastern country at this time.
The USSR and Its RateUItei also pose amilitary threat to Oreece, Turkey, and Iran, but there Is no firm evidence of an early Intention to attack.
n the final analysis, the Intensity of the Soviet reaction to expanded US-UK activity to the Near East would depend largely on the nature and extent of the US-UK program. We believe that clear evidence of greater US-UK determination to support the Near East,ormal US security cornrollment to go to war in event of Soviet attack on the region, would acteterrent to local armed intervention by the USSR There la reason to believe that existing US aid and expressions of Interest to Oreece. Turkey, and Iran have already caused the USSR to act with caulloo. On the other hand, an extern We US-UK pn> tram involving greater aid and defense oonv mllmenU. plus the progressive developroert of strategic air and other bases and deployment of much greater forces In the area, might be considered by the Krernlinrowing threat not only to accomplishment of Its objectives In tha Near East but to its security as wtlL The Kremlin would probably be eitremely sensitive to the prospective development of substantia US-UK strength in such close proximity to the southern USSR. In these circumstances, the Kremlin might eventually feel It necessary to forestall such aby the threat or use of military force In the area despite the risk of generalevelopment might be one factoroviet resort to general war.this decision would undoubtedly be based on global considerations, not merely the situation In the Near East
Original document.
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