-issemination Authorized Assistant Dlrector/CI
4 No. Pagesopy No.it
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN THE KOREAN AREA
Number 2
Published1
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate onpril.
DATE: 5
to:
COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES EN THE KOREAN AREA
CONCISIONS
Chinese Communists and North Koreans havesufficient manpower to sustain large-scale operations
In Korea for an extended period. Communist capabilities have been limited, however, by critical materiel andhortage of technically skilled personnel.
order to sustain extended large-scale offensiveforces heretofore Identified ln Korea requiregreater materiel and logistic support from thethan they have obtained in the past. Even should theynew equipment, however, we believe that suchrequire Soviet assistance In the form of large numbers
of skilled personnel, including ground combat specialists such as tank crews, who would necessarily come In contact with UN forces. However, thereossibility that other units of the Chinese Communist army have been re-equipped and trained with Soviet equipment in Manchuria and that these units will appear in combat ln Korea at any time,
present estimated strengthombat aircraft of
the Communist Air Force in Korea, Manchuria, and Chinaa considerable recent expansion, but It is still inadequate for the effective protection of lines of communication and for the sustained support of ground forces. We believe that unless this Air Force received substantial additional modern Soviet aircraft, supplies, and technical assistance, its combat effectiveness would be reducedery low order lneek of sustained
Despite numerous reports, there is no acceptable evidenceoviet-blocrmy ls being formed to fight ln Korea, Nor is there any evidence that any regular units of the Soviet Army in the Far East (estimated atine divisionsrigades) will be committed to Korea in the immediate future. Although there are indications that the USSR maytoken units of Soviet or other "volunteers"esture to the Chinese Communists, lt is more probable that the Soviets will provide manpower In the form of sorely-needed specialists such as radio and radar operators, tank crews, and ordnance technicians. Nonetheless, the possible commitment of major, well-equippednits composed of Soviet-blocor Japanese cannot be overlooked.
There are Indications that the Communist air effort In Korea will continue to be enlarged. The current build-up points to the probabilityonsiderable expansion beyondircraft now available to the Chinese Communists. It appears likely that for the immediate future at least, the USSR will continue to augment the strength of the Communist air units ln Manchuria and Korea rather than to commit organised elements from the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force. In any event, it must be expected that the full weight of the air strength available to the Chinese Communists may be committed at any time.
Communist ability to gain air superiority over North Korea would depend primarily on the number of Jet fighters which could be brought to bear against UN airubstantial augmentation of theet aircraft estimated to be available to the Chinese Communists woulderious threat to UN air superiority over Northern Korea. Provided that the Communists continued to enjoy an air sanctuary, a
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serious challenge to UN air superiority in the entire Korean theater would develop if. In addition, major elements of the existing Soviet Far Eastern air force were deployed to the Korean theater.
lthough there are at present no indications of the future employment of Communist naval forces in the Korean war, elements of the Soviet Far Eastern submarine fleet could be employed against UN vessels at any time with little warning and mining operations could be expanded.
DISCUSSION
he manpower resources which the Chinese Communists and North Koreans have available are sufficient, despitefor agriculture, to sustain large-scale operations in Korea for an extended period. Among the critical factors thus far limiting Communist capabilities in Korea have been logistic deficiencies (particularly of food, POL, vehicles, and heavy armament) and the shortage of personnel able to operate the more complicated weapons of modern warfare.
esult of movements during the past few months,ground troops available for operations in Korea are now at an all-time high. Anhinese and North Korean troops are presently in Korea. In addition, the Chinese Communists have anield troops,ilitary district troops in Manchuria. There la also ina partially-trained manpower poolilitia which the Communists have been using to furnish replacements for those military district troops drawn Into the regular field forces.
TOrSEGRET
The Chinese Communists ind North Koreans are now largely dependent on the Soviet Union for logistic and technical support, Until recently, logistical support to the Chinese Communists appears to have been limited to motor vehicles, food, POL, and ammunition. In order to sustain extended large-scale offensive operations. Communist forces in Korea require substantially greater logistic and technical support from the Soviet Union than they have received for their previous offensive operations.UN attacks on lines of communications and failure of the Soviets to deliver supplies adequate to keep pace with combat attrition have In the past been largely responsible for thelogistic deficiencies in Korea.
The Chinese Communist forces which have heretofore been identified in Korea have apparently lacked the skilled personnel required to operate modern arms and equipment. Thus, even should the Chinese Communists and North Koreans receive large amounts of new equipment, their forces would require extensive reorganisation and retraining. We believe that the Chineseheretofore identified In Korea will not be capable ofsubstantial amounts of modern equipment without Soviet assistance in the form of Urge numbers of skilled personnel, even including combat personnel, such as tank crews, who would necessarily come in contact with UN forces.
However; there have been reports that "major units" of the Chinese Communist Army have been undergoingand training in Manchuria with Soviet equipment. Although these reports have not beenerious possibility exists that substantial units of Chinese Communists using modern equipment may be committed at any time.
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ommunist air capabilities have been greatly increased by the influx of additional Jet aircraft into the area adjacent to the Korean border, and by the intensive training of air crews in Manchuria. The Chinese Communist Air Force is estimated to have availableircraft, includingircraft of the North Korean Air Force andoviet-controlled aircraft operating with, but not organic to, the Chinese Communist Air Force. This aggregate air strength consists oi -he following aircraftetistonround attackight bombers; andransports. The jet fighters are apparentlyand, in some cases at least, appear to be flown and directed by Soviet personnel. Of theircraft, lt is estimatedet fighters) are currently based innd then China.
t the present time, UN air superiority largely precludes the sustained use of airfields in North Korea by tho Communists and therefore the effective range of their aircraft Is limited. The Communists have been making continued efforts to maintain these airfields in operable condition in the face of counteraction by UN aircraft. The Communists haveirfields available in Norm Korea which are usable, or could easily be made usable. Seven of these airfields have been recently constructed. The majority of these airfields are suitable only for piston-engined planes but some might be used for very limited jet operations. For the most pert, the airfields in North Korea have been located In places close to rail communications. Due to UN airlogistical support has presented many serious difficulties and as long as UN air superiority is maintained, lt will severely limit the Communist Air Force capabilities for offensive andoperations from these airfields. There are, however, adequate airfields In the Manchurian sanctuary from which the Communists can launch air attacks on UN forces (see map).
Operating from the Antung area, even the Jet fighters could range well behind UN Lines. However, this extended range seriously limits the sortie rate and time over target.
he present Chinese Communist Air Force is estimated to have the capability of launching from bases ln Manchuria and China, during anhour period, theighterround attackight bomber sorties; and the airliftroops. However, the effectiveness of such an assault would be hampered by such factors as combat attrition and maintenance problems in addition to the range limitations discussed above.the relative low level of Chinese pilot proflciency and, with the exception of the Jet flghexs, the inferior performance characteristics of the aircraft wouldajor limitation. Thus, unless the Chinese Communist Air Force receivesadditional Soviet aircraft, supplies, and technical assistance, its combat effectiveness would be reducedery low order lneek of sustained operations.
Sonet or Soviet-Sponsored Military Forces WhichUsed in
oviet Line Divisions. The strength of the Soviet Army ln the Far East is estimated to beine divisions and five brigades. Of this total, lt ls consideredorce ofoivisions could readily be made available for operations in the Korean wax. These divisions include an airborne corpsivisions and upank and mechanized divisions with adequate supporting forces. This force could be moved to Korea and committed to combat withinoaysecision had been made to employ it and lt might appear in or near the combat zone without being detected. Soviet Farstockpiles are sufficient to supply and existing lines of
communications axe adequate to transport the necessarysupport. Augmentation ca* this force by drawing on Soviet line divisions in the western USSR or after partial mobilization wouldonsiderable period of time and would beby Soviet strategic and tactical requirements elsewhere in the world.
Forces. It has been reported frequently
that an international "liberation" or "volunteer" army is being formed In the Far East. There ls, however, no evidence tothat this ls actually being accomplished. Details concerning the supposed composition and location of this "army" have varied considerably. In addition to Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese, such an "army" could draw upon Mongol-type personnel as well as Soviet and Eastern European "volunteer" units. Of0 Mongol types now serving ln the Soviet Army, virtually all are technically unskilled basic riflemen. There are moreen of military age in Outer and Inner Mongolia and Slnkiang, Some tens of thousands of the Outer Mongolians have served in their own or the Soviet Armed Forces. The present Outer Mongolian Army, which includes some small mechanized elements, could be expanded rapidlyen and readily be equipped by the Soviets. "Volunteer" units could be formed from the existing armies of the USSR and the European Satellites at any time. Such forces could significantly Improve theproficiency of existing Chinese and North Korean forces, bul could be easily Identified as Soviet-bloc nationals if they came in contact with UN forces.
Forces, The Soviet Far Eastern air forces haveauthorized strengthircraft of World WarBeyondet fighters estimated to be ln Chinaunder Soviet control, there are no other Jetto be ln the Far East, although Jet operations are reported
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to have been conducted by both the Soviet Navy and Air Force In the Daircn area. It Is possible that Jets may have beenwithout having been detected by intelligence, and we believe that the Soviets have the capability of deploying jet units to the Far Eastelatively short time.
Thereirfields in the Sino-Soviet Far Eastiles ofh Parallel in Korea, or the Japanese Islands of Honshu and Kyushu. The Soviets probably could deploy their entire Far Eastern air strength onields. Of theirfields In North Korea, some are capable of supporting very limited Jet
There ls ample evidence that the Soviets have beenPOL products, including Jet fuel, in the Far East inquantities. Providing no effective UN action were taken to disrupt Communist supply lines outside Korea, It Is believed that the Slno -Soviets could supportajor air effort in the Korean theater.
he Soviet Far Eastern air forces were deployed to bases adjacent to Korea, range factors would still preventoperations by Soviet light bomber and fighter aircraft against targets or UN aircraft in the extreme south of Korea. Air attacks could be directed against UN naval forces andshipping ln Korean waters. Night bombing attacks of limited effectiveness could be delivered to any point in Korea, or against UN bases in Japan. Saturation-type day bomber operations could also be launched throughout most of Korea if the Soviets were willing toigh price in losses, or if they were to succeed ln gaining air superiority over Korea. If, however, Soviet medium bombers were deployed to bases in the Fax East, they wouldincrease Soviet air capabilities and expose UN military installations In South Korea and Japan to the danger of atomic
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air attacks. Although there are do known medium bombers in the Far East, an unconfirmed report states thatU-4's have been transferred from European USSR to Manchuria.
The bases from which Jet operations In Korea could beare located in the Port Arthur/Dairen, Mukden, Antung, and Vladivostok areas (seesing wing tanks, Antung-based jets could operate as far as Seoul; Port Arthur/Dairen and Mukden-based Jets could operate generally as far as the line Chlnnampo-Wonsan; and Vladivostok -based Jots could operate effectively onlymall portion of northeast Korea.
Communist ability to gain air superiority over North Korea would depend primarily on the number of Jet fighters which could be brought to bear against UN airubstantialof theet aircraft estimated to be available to
the Chinese Communists woulderious threat to UN air superiority over Northern Korea. Provided that thecontinued to enjoy an airerious challenge to UN air superiority in the entire Korean theater would develop if, in addition, major elements of the existing Soviet Far Eastern air force were deployed to the Korean theater. Despite reduction of effectiveness due to range limitations if operations wereto bases outside of Korea, the Introduction of elements of the Soviet Far' Eastern Air Force could be effective through sheer weight of numbers.
aval Forces. Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces consist of the Fifth Fleet with headquarters at Vladivostok and theFleet with headquarters at Sovetskaya Gavan. The surface forces of these fleets consist of two cruisers, two destroyer leaders,estroyers, eight destroyer escorts,vessels including minesweepers, subchasers, mine layers, landing craft, and motor torpedo boats. The submarine fleettrength ofubmarines includingcean patrol types,edium-range types, andoastal types.
Indications of Probable Scale and Nature of Soviet Assistance In the Immediate Future
Force Assistance. Additional basic manpowerrequired by Communist forces In the Korean area, butIndications that the USSR may provide token units ofother "volunteers"esture to the Chineseare assuming the major burden for prosecuting theprobably, however, additional Soviet assistance will beform of sorely-needed technicians such as radio andtank crews, and ordnance specialists.as ground combat troops Likely to come In directUN forces may be of Asiatic appearance and beChinese Communist uniforms. It is not likely thatMongol units will be employed. There are nothat combat "volunteer" units for Korea areIn any of the countries of Eastern Europe orline divisions will be employed in the immediateis no evidence that any combat units have beenthe Satellite armies for service lu Korea.
Is estimated that at0 Soviet armyassisting ths Chinese and that ansecurity police) are with the North Korean array.have supplied virtually all the heavy North Koreanequipment, electronic equipment and antiaircraft gunsManchuria, and North Korea and virtually all POLas well as some food, vehicles, and ammunition foroperations. The USSR will probably supply tanks,motor vehicles, POL, rations, and ammunition toChinese and North Korean forces. Numerous reportsthat fairly large-scale re-equipment of ChineseManchuria with Soviet weapons may be expected.actual and potential Increases in logistic support from the
USSR include evidenceteady flow of materiel into Mancaurla and of increasing efforts to move materiel from Manchuria into the forward combat zone in Korea. In addition, tbe constructionirect rail line from Vladivostok via Kraskino to North Korea is being rushed to completion.activities ln the Soviet Tar East have recently beenand industrial output in the Irkutsk area baa been Increased and is being diverted to the east
AM" Assistance. The Soviets have supplied most of the planes in the Communist air force. Communist Jet fighter strength has been steadily Increasedonsiderable ntep-up in ]et training has been observed in theAntung area of Manchuria. Coincident with the ferild-ep cf Jet fighter strength la Manchuria, there has been an increase in tbe number ofngaging UN aircraft in the SinuiJu area.
Organisational changes, increased activity of long-range air armies, the establishment of special defense fighterln Vladivostok and Dairen areas, and tbe expansion of tne ground Interceptor network (with operators using thelanguage) ln North Korea provide further evidencerobable early increase in Communist air operations in the Korean area. Finally, there have been substantial ahlpmonts, on an urgent basis, of Jet fuel from Soviet refineries to
Naval Assistance. Indications pointontinuance of Soviet technical and advisory naval assistance in both surface and submarine warfare to the Chinese Communists and,easer extent, to the North Koreans. In addition, virtually all mines thus far encountered ln the Korean waters have been of Soviet manufacture, and lt ls known that large shipments of Soviet mines and torpedoes have been assies to Far Eastern Communist bases.
Indications Cianrornlng Probable Employment of Coaanisnlat Forces in the Immediate Future
ilitary indications point to the employment of ailNorth Korean and Chinese Communist Army ualLs in offensive operations as soon as these armies have reeslTsd the necessary supplies, equipment, and Training. Although there are no acceptable military Indications that combat units of ths Soviet Army will be committed io the immediate future, there are numerous reliable indication that Soviet-blocwill assist Chinese Communist and Nurth Kornam Army
Mi Present Communist diasoslUessie Keren arelasnrssuev* for eitherustained defense in depth or for Uunch-ing an offensive. Communist strength in tbe Weal and Weal .central sectors Is fax greater than would be required even for adefense.
rom consideration cf the continuing and substantialla Com man 1st air strength aad eapahiliUea (parttrnhwly the build-up ia Jet fighters, logistic support, and airfield repair asde believe thai the Communists willincrease their air efforts. The current build-up points to ths probability at further and considerable expansion beyondircraft now available to the Chinese Communists. This type of abased build-up could be extended progressively toajor portions of the oWie&Fsjr.tatwn Air forces as* volunteers" or otherwise aUbdngh there are aothat they Intend to do so. The Communis to meanwhile may be expected to bring to bear the full weight ofavailable to the Chinese Communistswhenever and wherever they asanas it to be to their advantage. The emphasis ssi airfield construction and repair indicates that air support of
Communist ground troops and attacks on UN lines ofshould be expected. All these Indications suggest that the Soviets will continue to enlarge their air effort by stages geared to their assessment of US and UN reactions to eachmore, and the degree of success achieved by the Communist air forces.
here are at present no indications of ths probable future employment of Communist naval forces in the Korean war,mining and submarine activityonstant threat
Original document.
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