REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF NIE-29 "PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA I

Created: 5/4/1951

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OFPROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DISTRIBUTION (NIEffice of Uie President NaUonal Security Council National Security Resourcei Board Department of State Office of Secretary of Defense Department of Uie Army Department of tbe Navy Department of the Air Force Atomic Energy Commission Joint Chiefs of Staff Federal Bureau of InvesUgaUon Research and Development Board Munitions Board

I! DI-'IIIIT

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OFPROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA

1

This docucrnt hci ipprovod foe release3 HISTORICAL RE7LEM PROGRAM of the Contra! Intelligence Agancy.

The inlelligence organizations of lhe Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. All members of the InteUigence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimateay.

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EVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OFPROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROBLEM

To review the conclusions ofProbability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia" in the light of recent developments.

CONCLUSIONS

has been no new evidence since the publication ofnabling us to determine whether the Kremlin has decided on an attack on Yugoslaviahere have been no major changes in Soviet strength orthat bear upon the likelihood of an atUck by Soviet forcesSatellite capabilities for initiating an attack on Yugoslavia with IitUe or no warning have increased, and Satellite

military preparations are continuing. Although developments to date do not appear to warrant the conclusionatellite attack will take placer indicate that such an attack is more likely this spring than later in the year, they do give added emphasis to the conclusion ofhat "an attack on Yugoslavia1 should beerious possibility."

DISCUSSION

t was concluded, inter alia, that "the extent ol Satellite military andpreparations Indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia1 should beeriousumber ofsince the publication ofalleview of this

Among these developments are the

a. Heavy Soviet ground force equipment continues to arrive in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, further improving the balance of these Satellite forces;

ertain Bulgarian military unitshave been redeployed in the direction of the Yugoslav border, and at present at least one Bulgarian tank division and four Infantry divisions are disposed along the Yugoslav border,

of thc Bulgarian andarmies ls continuing;

aircraft have recently beenall of the European Satellites except

airfields continue to beImproved;

and/orradar has recently been observedvicinity of both Sofia and Budapest;

number of heavy Soviet AA gunsBulgaria and Hungary appears to be

apparent food shortages and theof an increasing number of foodin the southern Satellites suggestsmay be under way;

i Yugoslav satellite diplomatic relations are marked by increasing friction. Aof protests have been exchanged overborder Incidents; several consulates have been closed and diplomats expelled; and the Yugoslavs have arranged for the Swiss Government to represent Yugoslav Interests in the event that relations are severed between Belgrade and Budapest;

oviet and Satellite propaganda attacks on Yugoslavia have been Intensified and have become more specific- Many of the themes which had previously been directed abroad are now being disseminated to Soviet andaudiences, and especially to party and miliury personnel.

k. The materiel of the Yugoslav Array and Air Force continues to deteriorate, with the

inevitable concomitant effect upon theefficiency of the Yugoslav forces, and until Western military aid arrives inquantities, Yugoslavia will becomevulnerable to Satellite attack;

High Yugoslav officials haveexpressed increased concern over the possibility of an early Satellite attack.the timing of these statementsthat they may in part have beento support the recent formal Yugoslav requests for arms and equipment from the US. the fact that Yugoslavia is openlysuch assistance may also be interpreted as further evidence of genuine fear ofaggression.

ome of these developments, such as the movement of ground forces in Bulgaria, the border Incidents, the Comlnform propaganda campaign, and the deterioration In Yugoslav-Satellite relations, point toward Yugoslavia as the target eitherilitary attack or for an intensified war of nerves. Others, however, such as the arrival of Jet aircraft, thc airfield construction program, and evidence ofappear part of an over-all program of military preparations throughout theand the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria.

Original document.

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