REVIEW OF PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY DURING 1952

Created: 5/1/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

COPT HO. ASSISTANT OIBECTOR.OflE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

REVIEW OF PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANYN THE LIGHT OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

REVIEW OF PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANYN THE LIGHT OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES

This docusanr. has been approved for release thi-oogh tbe HISTORICAL REVTEW PROGRAMche Contral Intelligenca Agoncy.

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HRP fi-S

The tnlelligence organizations of the Departments of State, thc Army, the Navy, thc Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith thc Central Intelligence Agency in thcof this esUmate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate onec. however, footnote of Director of Intelligence. USAF. to paragraph 7.

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REVIEW OF PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANYN THE LIGHT OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES

ESTIMATE

Thc recent Soviet notes on Germany are Irequently cited as indicativeossible shiit In Soviet policy toward Oermany. In thc first of these notes, the Kremlin proposed that the Big Four discuss "without delay"eace treaty nnd conditions forunification. The second note reiterated the views expressed in the first, andthe necessity for Four-Power discussion of "the question of conducting free all-Germanithout, however, committing the USSR to any definite course of action.

tbe Kremlin is actually prepared tofree elections in East Germany andthe establishmentreeGovernment, these steps woulda significant shift ln Soviet policy

hift ls always aSoviet notes on Germany are not Inevidencehange in SovietGermany. The only new elementsnotesroposal that apeace-loving Germany" beto rearm,roposal thatgranted all former members of theand all ex-Nazis not convicted asNeither of these newItselfremlin Intention toits policy of retaining CommunistEast Germany while attempting tothe Western position in Westthey seem designed only to furtherobjective through appealing to thesentiments of thc West Germans. noteuggestion tha'."could" be made of conditions lor free

all-German electionsommission formed by the four occupying powers. At the same time, the notes reiterate the essentials ofGerman policy as laid down in the Prague declaration of

content of the Soviet notes, as wellCommunist activity relative to Ger-makes It appear probable that theobjective In delivering the notes isupon the nationalism of the Westto retard West German IntegrationWestern defense system, to dividePowers, and. in general, toof Western defense plans.

Kremlin probably estimates thatWestern Powers agree to Four-Poweron free all-German elections, theof the EDC and contractualwould be automaticallyesult, the whole Westernmight be delayed, or crippled.other hand, the Kremlin probablythat if the Western Powers rejectconference to discuss termsall-German elections, public sentimentGermany, Britain, and Franceso strongly against the EDC andagreements that thc governmentscountries would refuse to sign theor that the agreements would not

he Kremlin almost certainly estimates, therefore, that Its proposals for German unity come at lhe time when they can do the most harm to the Western defense effort and to Western unity. Moreover, the proposalsthe USSR to nothing more than talk, and

the Kremlin has never been averse todiscussion.

e believe, therefore, lhat the estimate InProbable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Oermany, remains firm:

"In order to delay West German integration with the West and West German rearmament, the .Kremlin might attempt negotiations on free elections throughout Germany, but only to gain time. The Kremlin almost certainly believes that free elections would resultepudiation of Communism in East Germany. Moreover, the Kremlin would not be satisfiednited Oermany which was not under Soviet control could be kept neutral, or that Germany, once free, would not eventuallyand turn against the USSR. We believe, therefore, that the Kremlin is unlikelyto permit free elections to take place, even if the Kremlin were convinced that by this

means it could block West Germanwith the West and Westactical manoeuvre, thc Kremlin might remove some of its more overt control mechanisms. Including some of Its military forces. We do not believe, however, that the Kremlin would so relax its control over East Germany as lo affect thc foundations of Soviet authority."*

It is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF. that the recent Soviet notes when considered In the light of other late Soviet moves suggest an alternative course of action which the Kremlin might follow in the event that It anticipates failure In preventing West German rearmament and tnte-graUoa with the West by other means. Thus Uie posstbllitr should not be precluded that the Kremlin may be prepared to make real concessions, such as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, should thc Western powers' agree to the Kremlin proposal for Four-Power meetings on Uie German problem. Including Uie suggested discussion of the holding of all-Ocrman elections.

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Original document.

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