LIKELIHOOD OF EARLY SOVIET ACTION AGAINST BERLIN IN RESPONSE TO THE SIGNING OF

Created: 5/16/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

OFFICE OFSTIrftTSS

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FOP. TlIE DBiECTOit OP CENTRAL IHTSJilOESC^

LUtoiihcofS of Early Soviet Action against Berlin le timpovac to tho Signing of tho KEC and Contractual Accoreto

Oorrca-i,t of its caspaicn to prevent Wast aornari intaRratlon vith the Uset, tha USSH haa launched aof threats andheao threats have to far leaued primarily frcn thoasternmeirtp while the USSU bta reffjainod iii thooglcxL focal point for any such Ssviet/Saet Goman pressure tact-ice is tho exposed Hetstern position in Borilrio

2 6 CapabllltleB. Tho Corrmniote havo thonot only eharply to increaseaesnont by ouch rueano as C'3TeTti3iat derairotrations in tho Wectern sectors, interference with traffic fcetire-en, Berlin andestem zonesr steaB but to inatituie at anyround blockade. Moreo7or,8 tho Commnieta havo olrwet conplotcd rail and canal by-paeoec around the Western tectors ofhus reducing CV*rrauaist vulnerability to Wast-srn retaliatory action.

3- Aside fron Its capabilities for ground blockade* the USSR is probably capable of farming Western navigation aide on the air corridors to Eerlin and thus seriously interfering with any airlift, perhaps leading Western aircraft to inadveyiently fly outside the corridors and exposeto Soviet action. We estimate ti>at the DSSR has ths capability, if It chooses to ran the riskn of eventually making the Allied position in Berlintsn&blcround blockade plus jamntiig cf navigational aids,

lio It Is ccncalvable that the USSR could attempt tomlcl: coup in Berlin by flooding the Western sectors with groups of Last Berlinera together uith unite of the Alert Police who would otttwtpt to solas oontrol and presusit tba W'ostait accomplio Wo do not believe the USSR could now carry outoup or over*-run Berlin before Allied forces coul.d

5> Indications<, Aside from tho recent threatening stateraonts of QKi leaders, there are no fim Indications of Soviet intentions..

Probable Soviet Intentions. Undoubtedly tha USS3 intends eventually to eliirdn&te the Allied outpoet behind the Iron Curtain in Berlin. rs that the USSR is at present concera'id with ths larger objective of forestalling -ihe Allied Integration

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procran aad that any Soviet decision would depend primarily upon thtr Kremlin's aasesstnant of th* extant to wliioh increased pressures onn would further this basic objective Wo balieve (and recent GE3 threeka would indicate) that the USSR and Its East -nan puppets uculu react In .tone oannar to tiio signature of the FJC and contracta.il accords. Wo eotiaote that cne Sovist reaction wUl'bo further threats end intensified harassing actions In Berlin including new interference with Wastern trade or traffic and Coarn-airt derao-istr^tioas In tho Western sectors

At theime, we believe that the USSR probably would not go so far as to reinetltute on oarly blockade of Berlin, Beforo takingrastic stop, tha Kremlin would have to reckon that this stop would frighten thenvois and the Western Power* into postponing further step? In their progran and into opening four-power negotiations cn GerMen unity on terns, favorable to tha USSR. We do not bslisvo the USSR, with the axpcrie_ice of6 blockade in Kind, would considerenowad blockade would have these effecte- Meath or, that th* Kremlin wouli consider that the Western Powers, despite raieh hesitation within their ranks, would .refuse to negotiate under duress, and that T

such prceoum would not have on adverse effect on West

German dfeierwinction to proceed with rsarraaraent plana. We beliere that theuld recognize that ite present appeal tounity sentlnent amid bo Jeopardized by such atrrong pressure tactics* snd that such tactics fight actually hasten thoof the Western prograa by reinforcing German scepticism en to the USSR's peaceful

8<. In our belief,ho USSR conaldsrc that it still has staple tip* before ratification of theaccords to exploit further its thews of Oeraan unity and that it can still lead tha Western Powers into protracted negotiations without the necessitylockade,,

?o Finally, we do not believe the USSR would at present ba willing to run the risk of general war which it raisfc consider iiould resultarticularly if such a. blockade included interdiction of the air corridorslin.

SHERKIWAssistant Director National Estimates

1B IJ J.

Original document.

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