NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
REEKS SPY
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA,2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA,2
sen
The inielligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and thc Joint StafTwith the Central Intelligence Agency In theof this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 29
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA, THROUGH 2
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Yugoslavia and the likelihood of attack upon Yugoslavia,
CONCLUSIONS
present Communist regime in Yugoslavia will probably retain control over the country during the period of this estimate.'
Although the regime has officiallyto modify its goal of anand collectivized economy, there will probably be slight and temporary readjustments within the period of this estimate.
It is unlikely that presentamong thc peasants and discontent within thc middle and lower ranks of the Yugoslav Communist Party will reach thc point of seriously weakening thc regime.
The assassination or death of Tito would weaken the regime and would afford added opportunity for the USSR to exploit political confusion and discon-
The Director of Intel licence. USAF. prefers Uie following wording:
oviet-Satellite attack. Uie present Communist regime In Yugoslavia will probablycontrol over thc country during thc period at this esUmalc "
tent, but would be unlikely to break the regime's hold over the country or tofundamental changes in its foreign or domestic policies.*
Although the Cominform will continue its efforts to overthrow the regime, these efforts will probably fail.
If the adjacent Satellites, with Soviet logistic support, should attackhey could at least drive thcforces from the plain area generally north and east of the Danube. Theforces probably could not maintain effective organized resistance even in the mountainous area for an extended period unless adequately supported logistically from thc outside. Guerrilla warfare
Direclor. Joint Intelligence Group, prefers Uie following:
The assassination or death of Tito would so weaken the regime that almost anything could happen.ossible that his present asslitanLi could prompUy stabllite the sltuaUon without any fundamental chunge of policy, nut it Is equally possible that thc CFY could be torn to pieces and emergeegime subservient to Russia."
would almost certainly continue should organized resistance cease.
he evidence of growing cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Western Powers has probably convinced the USSR that an attack by the adjacent Satellites would involve not only serious risk of war
between the US or UN and thesebut also the danger that such awould develop into ar general war.
n the basis of the foregoing, wethat an attack upon Yugoslavia2 is unlikely.*
DISCUSSION
the publicationand4. thedevelopments have taken placeinternal and external position of
a. Increasing discontent, especially among the peasants.
nrest within the middle and lower ranks of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY).
disparity between theof Yugoslavia and those ofSatellites.
economic aid from the West*.
Tor substantial militarythe West.
Stability of lhc Regime
From the outset, the regime haseavy strain on the population, particularly on thc peasant majority. Until" recently, the regime relied upon collectivization ofand upon forced delivery of foodstuffs to ensure adequate food supplies for thcnumber of industrial workers. It held peasant discontent in check by repressive measures.
In recent months, the regime hasthe forced delivery of some foodstufTs and has relaxed some of the more apparent repressive measures. So far. this relaxation has encouraged the peasants to express their grievances more openly. Peasant discontent increased in the fall1 with lheannouncement that the peasants' right
to withdraw from state agriculturalon the expiration of their three yearracts for trial membership was to beor denied. As long as the regime sacrifices the production of consumer goods to the needs of the program for Industrialization, and as long as the program of collectlvizaUon is maintained, peasant discontent will almost certainly continue,
lthough the regime has officially refused lo modify its goal of an industrialized and collectivized economy, there will probably be some slight and temporary readjustments within the period of this esUmate.
measures will probablylo decentralize administrativeto encourage initiative throughauthority and responsibility of localand labor and through allowingtoortion of their profits.
is probable that within the nextthc regime will place morethe production of consumer goods in
Tlie Assistant Chief ol. Deportment of the Army dissents from this paragraph and would replace it by the following:
unnethe Satellites adjacent loachieved the capability of attackingprovided they are given logistic support by the USSR. Despite this capability, we bcflcve It unlikely that Yugoslavia will be attacked2 unless the USSR Is prepared to accept general war. However, thereonUnuing possibility that unforeseen political events and/or miseakulation by the Soviets might precipitate hostilities inintended to beut which could expand Into general war.
We conclude therefore, that thereerious possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia"
order to increase the Incentive for peasants and workers alike. This will not be done at the expense of thc already-strained programs of heavy industrialization and military
e. Tito has made clear that collectivization of the land remains an objective of the regime. Although recent party directives Indicate that collectivization will be forwarded wherever possible, lt is probable that the amount of land under collectivization will be Increased only slightly during the period of this estimate. Recent evidence indicates that the collectives established on land of marginal productivity will be reorganized and some of this landto peasant owners.
urrent and future peasant discontent will be firmly handledocal level, but with such discretion that relations with thc West will probably not be impaired.
believe that discontent amongis not likely to become ato the stability of the regimeperiod of this estimate and that thewill probably be able to copepeasant discontent. Tito's controlCPY. the armed forces, and theappears to be firm. On the otherelements in Yugoslaviadivided and lack effective leadership.
Unrest within the CPY
also exists in the middletanks of the CPY. Some pro-Sovietstill exists ln these groups, anddisturbed by the Western orientationregime Moreover, they have lostpoweresult of the relaxation ofand of the regime's attempt toguilty of misusing their powers.
IS The high officials of the CPY arenot troubled by the currenl shifts of policy, which they almost certainly regardtemporary retreat" Such adjustments have always been recognized by Communists as compatible with Communist strategy. Moreover, it must be apparent lo anyCommunist who has supported the present regime against the Cominform lhat
the likelihood of his survivalegimeby Moscow is negligible.
members of the middle andof the CPY who have expressedwith thc regime's policy ofare being gradually removedas are those who have madeunpopular because of theiranduiet purge of theelements within the CPY willat least through the winter otpurge will strengthen thc regime'sover the Party. Although there willbe some liberalization of thewe estimate that control willIn the hands of thc present
Probability and Consequencesoup
Efforts of the Cominform to overthrow the regime by subversive means have thus far failed. The regime's large and efficientforces will probably be able to discover and liquidate any officials over whom thc Cominform Is able to acquire influence.
A coup d'etat directed against Tito by high members of the CPY, the armed forces, the security forces, or by other dissatisfied elements is unlikely. Tito now commands thc loyalty and obedience of the Party and the armed and security forces, and evenof the regime apparently prefer it to the reestablish ment of alien control from Moscow.
The assassination of Tito remains aHis death, whether from assassination or from other causes, woulderious shock to thc regime, and thc ensuing confusion and uncertainty would provide theewto overthrow thc regime. The CPY. thc armed forces, and the security forces would, however, probably rally behind Tito's successors, at least Initially. Throughout thc period of this estimate, thc foreign andpolicies of the new leaders wouldcertainly follow those establishedthe past three years by Tito. Discord over domestic issues might develop within the ruling group after the first few months, but fear ol the USSH would probably prevent
such discord from developing lo Uie point ol open conflict-*
The Military Situation The Yugoslav Armedhe Yugoslav array now consistsen organized intoivisions, olre mechanized. The size of Uiis army is not expected to Increase slgniflcanUy within the period of this estimate. Its fighting ability, by Balkan standards, is high, and it0 members of the Frontier Quantsecurity forces The Yugoslav air force (YAF)ircraft, ofrc assigned to tactical units. The YAFalanced air force designed not only to fight over Yugoslav territory, but also to carry out limited offensive missions outside the borders of Yugoslavia. Most of Uie aircraft arc of German or Soviet World War II design and construction, and lack of modern equipment would make iL difficult for the YAF toits missions, both within Yugolavia and beyond Uie Yugoslav frontiers. Theof tne Yugoslav navy will remain .
he numerical strength of the Yugoslav armed forces has remained relatively constant
throughout the past two or three years, but Yugoslav materiel has deteriorated. Thesupplies thus far provided by the West
* The Director, Joint Intelligence Oroup, prefer* to replace the last two sentences ot the pamgraph by Uie following:
"There it no apparent successor to Tito who has demonstrated anything Uke his eombinaUon oflo be lough and ruthless toe ether with lhe wisdom la use moderation when the circumstances require it Moreover, there la nobody in thewho begins to enjoy the peesUge and respect thai he does, however grudgingly lhe laller may be given. Yugoslavia Is an artificially unifiedDown underneath, it is alwaya ln danger ol disintegrating Into the age old deadly enmities. Croat vs Serb etc.as been the mainof Tito to harness these dissident elements inlo Uie best team effort in their history. Since Uiete is no apparent successor ot proven equal caliber to lake over, his death can well release far-Uonal discord whose ultimate result Is
have consisted almost entirely of lightCurrent Yugoslav militaryarc seriously restricted py Uie following:
quantity and obsolescenceof Uie equipment
of presentof Soviet and German World War
of spare parts and of proper
shortage of heavy weapons,of antitank artillery,and armor.
of experience of thc generalthe tactical and technical utilizationarms.
S military equipment scheduled forunder the military aid agreement will replace some of Uie materiel now used by Uie Yugoslav armed forces and will supply newly organized supporting units. YAFwill be appreciably increased byy lhe delivery of US and UK equipment, but little army equipment will be delivered before No significant Increase ofarmy capabilities can be expected before the endecause thc new equipment must be delivered to the units, the troops must be trained in its operation andand staff work must be Improved. Even with such new equipment as may havn arrived, the Yugoslav forces could not. during thc period of this estimate, defend the plain area generally north and east of the Danube against thc combined attack of the adjacent Soviet/Satellites. Furthermore, it is unlikely lhat they could maintain effective organized resistance even In the mountainous area for an extended period unless adequatelyloglstically from the outside. guerrilla activity would almost certainly continue even in the absence of outside aid.
The Satellite Armed Forces
SJnTS(Tla'SliUry CaPabi'ities( into those of the neighboring Satellites
years. The arrmes of Albania, Hungary Ru-
59onooo
en. organized intoivisions, of
re armoredechanized- These forces hare grown in sizeen organized intoivisions Innd it is believed they will continue tothroughout the period of this estimate. Tlie Kremlin Is reorganizing thc Satellite ground forces so that they will conform to the Soviet pattern. The Bulgarian army isthe most loyal and formidable. Itsivisions are almost fully equipped with Soviet materiel, reserve stockpiles areand morale is good.
air forces of the SatellitesYugoslavia have more than doubled1 and arc now estimated tototal strength of morewhichre jet fighters. Theirprobably be further increased by theof many older aircraft byaircraft of more recent designand by an Increase inof jet fighters.
Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia
ultimate Soviet objectives inremain the elimination of the Tito
regime, the replacement of this regimeovernment subservient to Moscow, and the political, economic, and military reintegration of Yugoslavia into the Soviet sphere. There is no evidence to indicate clearly when or how the USSR intends to attain these objectives.
following factors might indicateintention to precipitate an attackHungary. Rumania, andYugoslavia
increase in the capabilities offorces of these Satellites. It tsthat2 the air forces ofSatellites will outnumber theoperaUonal aircraft approximately twotheir ground forces, with Sovietcould at least drive thefrom the plain area.
Satellites adjacent toevacuated the majority of thckey border
and Satellites propagandasince made psychological preparations
ossible attack on Yugoslavia bythe Tito regime with fascism and charging It with participation in Western preparations for future aggression.
n the other hand, the Increase in thc armed strength of Uie adjacent Satellites during the last two years does not necessarilyoviet IntenUon to launch an attack upon Yugoslaviaatellitestrength would almost certainly have increased substanUally during the period as part of Uie Soviet program or preparedness, even If Yugoslavia had not defected. There has been no apparent sense of urgency in Uie preparation of the Satellite armed forces for offensive action, or In the coordination of their military activities. It Is estimated that Uie Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian armed forces will not complete their reorganization and reach maximum effecUveness unUl Uie end3 and Uie Albanian not until
hc economic program of the adjacent Satellites, designed to advance simultaneously thc industrial base and Uie immediatecapabilities of thc Satellite area, has materially advanced Uielr state ofThere is. however, no indication that thc long-term alms of Uie economic program are being sacrificed to achieve greaterwar-readiness.
urrent Soviel and Satellite propaganda provides little evidence concerning Uieof an armed attack upon Yugoslavia within the period of this estimate. The volume of propaganda directed ol Yugoslavia hasconstant Recent propaganda isidentical in its hosUllty with that ofheeclarations that lhc Yugoslav people "woulday lodisappeared by September andhase In thc general war of nerves against Yugoslavia.
he Kremlin may believe that theof Tito nowess serious problem for thc USSR than it has in thc past and that Uie elimination ot the Tito regime Is not an Immediate necessity. The USSR has prevented the Titoisl heresy from
undermining Its control over thc Satellites, and Tltoisin has made little headway ln the International Communist movementthe Kremlin undoubtedly recognizes that Yugoslavia cannoteriousthreat to the Satellites within the period of this estimate.
Post Soviet actions suggest that thedocs not consider Yugoslavia as an Isolated problem, but views lt as one of several factors affecting the general position of the USSR. Consequently, there ls little likelihood that thc USSR willatellite attack upon Yugoslavia without carefully assessing the effect of such an attack upon the generalpolitical and strategic position.
The growing cooperation betweenand the Western Powers and theindications of that cooperation within thc last sbt months have probably convinced
the USSR that an attack by thc adjacentwould involve not only serious risk of war between the US or UN and thesebut also thc danger thatonflict would developeneral war.
herefore, we believe that an attack upon Yugoslavia2 Is unlikely.*
Assistant Chief of. Department of the Army dissents from Ibis paragraph and would replace lt by the following:
1 the Satellite* adjacent toachieved the capability of attackingprovided they are given logtsUc support by the USSR. Despite this capability, we believe It unlikely that Yugoslavia will ba attacked2 unless the USSR Is prepared to accept general war. However, thereontinuing possibility that unforeseen political events and/or mlscftJeulaUon by Uie Soviets might precipitate hosUUUes InIntended to be localized, but whleh could expand Into general war. We conclude therefore, that thereerious possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia during
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Original document.
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