iff
RELEASE IN
IHFOfKATION CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AQENCT Office of Research and Roporta
Pro-Pi oi on al Raport10
(aufla pa-io)
INLAMD WATER TRANSPORT IK IHE?
Note
Thie documentorking paper. Tha data and conclusions contained horoin do not necessarily ro present tho final position of QRS and should bo regarded as provisional only and subject to revision. Additional data or cowaant khich may ba available to. the user is solid Tnis raport contains information available to ORR as
DOCUMENT
NO CMAKGE IN CLASS.CI DECLASSIFIED
awn al
lo Introduction
Importance of Inland Vator
Historical Development
3. Oenerol Description of the Preeent Inland Waterway
System
II, Volume of Traffic
- -
world War
HI* fVeeent
1. Extent, Seasonal Availability, and Condition snd
Cut-city of the Betwrk snd Part radii ties
?, Inland Water
Condition, and Distribution
HBlntenanea and Efficiency of Operations
3.. KatarlCa and Manpower Regulremsntc
h. Carrying Capacity
ath
o. By Specific
17. rotsntlal -
Haw
Foreign
DlTerslon of Traffic to Other
U. Improved Maintenance and Repair and Increased
Efficiency of Operations
-ceesMHTiMi
v. UraltaUona, InUnUona, and
1*
Intantaons
3* ,
a* Peacetime
b.
Appendix A. Gape in
Appendix B.
3E1 MTA
CIA/Efl
sBCoam rHPORunoH
IflL&IIP WATER TRAJCPORT TH THE OSSR
Inland water transport in tho OSSR occoante for onlyorcent of all ton-miles of inland freight traffic. Tola distinctly secondary role in, how. ever,ew development. The re In tiro Inportence of inland water transport In the economy of the OSSR haa been declining steadily for many yeaxa despite continuing efforts of Soviet planners to Increase the shore of domoatio traffic carried on Inland vateruayoc Nevertheless, despite tho relatively email per-Oavtan of total traffic which it carrlea. Inland shipping is essential to the Soviet economy for the movement of such bulk cargoes as construction arteriole, coal, and timber, tte waterways, furthermore, provide virtually tho solo mode of transport in some areas, particularly in Siberia.
The total length of the Soviet inland water ay3tea isCOO alios. In the west the Volga and ftdeper-Bug routes are tho longest, while ia Siberia and the oast tha Ob, tbe Irtyeh, the Una, and tho Amur river systems comprise tho major routes. Tho physical characteristics of tho system Impose certain restrictions whlcn cannot to easily overcome. For example, except in the west, all major river routes run north and south, while the main lines of traffic lie east and west across tho USSR. Forth erao re, large sections of the inland water system are frozen for savoral son tha during each yar, thua limiting thair year-round availability.
The OSSR hae nneroua plans for the large-scale expansion and Woveaent of inl nd waterways, tte Volga and its tributarlea are receiving the most attention, with numerous dem and conclizotion projects reported currently The yolgo-Don Canol, now scheduled for completionill, when finished, bringevolutionary change in Soviet inland water transport by enablingo novo freely between the Caspian and Hlaclt seas.
While traffic data are cone rally aparao, It is possible to establish reasonably accurate figures for certain key years. 3 the inland water system1 million short tons, and7 the figure had risen8 million short tons. owever, lecauao of the vartir* destruction of
CWa?fTOlunellnod8 adllion short tons.the covenantillion short tons, andof the Flan1parcent increase 0
STloloarea ia available
ut in the past the Volga River usually has handledorcent of the
total Inland voter traffic, and tho Volga Syotco In its ontiroty close toercent,
Tho Soviet Inland water fleet le geaoraUy of poor quality largelyesult of the low lovol of efficiency among tho workers and the poor condition of vassal repair ond maintenance facilities. The fleet consists principally of baxgoso COO gross registered tonslthough on the larger rivers such as the Volga some vessels of as such0 GBT aro being operated. Most of tho dry cargo barges are constructed of wood, whereas tanker barges usually are constructed of steel. Tugs are extremely inportant in Soviet inland water transport operations, since they furnish tho propulsionarge part of tho fleet. Tugs range fromorsepower, the majority of them beingorsepower.
The USSR iB acquiring relatively little inland water tonnage froa abroad, and little information ls avoiloblo on domestic construction. The major foreign sources appear to ho tho Sate Hi too ond Finland.
The material and manpower requirements of tho Soviot inland water system are considerable. It lias boon ostinatod that2 the finished steel requirements of the inland water fleet willetric tons, while the petroleum requirements of tho inland water fleet2 are ostinated asetric tons. Completely reliable data ore not available for the number of people ca pi eyed in Soviet inland water transport, but it has boon estimatedorkers were employed
I. Introdqct;^
feportanoo of Inland Mater Transport.
Inland water transport in the USSR ranks second to the railroads in importance in inland transportation. At present the system handles onlyercent of all ton-tiiles of inland freight traffic, bat this relatively small percentage of the total does not reflect the true importance of inland water transport to tho economy or the country. Inland water transport, for example, ls an important medium for certain bulk goods, such as construction materials, ores, cool, and especially timber. Certain areas, moreover, particularly In Siberia, are almost entirely dependent upon waterways for the transport of goods.
During peacetime thc waterways of western USSRreat potential value which is slowly being exploited. Their full utilization would relieve the rail network in European USSR of tho burden of much bulk freight, such as coal, lumber, and ores, thereby increasing considerably the capabilities of tho rail eye tea to carry other key eorrooditioo. The strategic significance of such shifts ln traffic should not be overlooked. On tbe other hand, the econonic and strategic significancearge ranter of navigablo Soviet rivers in Asia is sharply United by the fact that they are virtually all north-south lines of communication, whereas major traffic movements in this area are east-west. This disadvantage is compounded by tho fact that the rivers flow from south to north into the Arctic Ocean area and are unusable in large part for many months of thoouse of ioe conditions.
Froa tho strategic point of view, Soviet Inland shipping Is Important because of ita capabilities for supporting Soviet amphibious operations across short stretches of water against nearby areas. There are numeicoa oreis,around the Soviet periphery where large numbers of small croftajor addition to the ocean-going fleet. In tbe Saltic, for example, attacks could be supported by largo numbers of craft drown from the extensive waterway routes converging in tho Leningrad-Riga area. In the Black Sea the fleets of the Dnieper and the Don could be utllizod against Turkey. In the Caspian theinland water fleet could support operations against Iron. The Inland water fleet available in tho Far that, though probably much smaller than that in ihe west and south,or example,ery Important addition to Sovietor vator transport over tho uhort disitanco to Taiwan, This fleet also could be usefully employed in operations southward along the Chinese coast.
2. ffl fltQrt cag PgTPlQgttat.
In terms of traffic the inland waterway system of the USSR always hasecondary role to the rail system. In tte period7 the Importance of Inland water transport steadily declined as the roll system handled an increasing proportion of total traffic, and the downward trend has continued under Soviot control. For example,7 the inland waterway system wae carrying alightly more than twice3 traffio, while the rail linos were carrying four times as much as they had in the same year. Inland waterways received little real attention during the early years of the Soviet regime, flot until the Fourth Five Toarid transport by inland waterways receive over-all detailed attention. Before that time, major canal prohad been carried on, but fleets and facilities had been relatively neglected. At present, rail lines still carry aboutines the amount of traffic carried by ths inland wotorury system, and there Is littla prospect that this proportion will change appreciably in ths near future, unless therereatly accelerated program to emphasize the role of inland water transport. The following table shows the development of the inland waterway network ln the USSR and the vessel inventory!
Development of Inland Watexvayo in tho'Excluding tho Caspian0 (Plan)
taapj
Waterways (Miles)
Waterways (Miles)
Cargo Shipped (Million Short Tons)
of Self-propelled Teasels
a/
Horsepower (Thousands)
a/
of rfoa-self-propellod Tossels
a/
Tonnage
(Million Short Tons)
a/
3. OoiWral Description of the Pr^ont. Tn1q^ Katarwsv Svnt^.
* Footnote references in arable minerals refer to source listed inppendix B,
:
ae European sector of the DSSR, conprising about ono-ounrter of all Soviet territory, contains raoro than half of all river routes and accounts for aboutercent of all Soviot inland water traffic, 2/
Barges constitute ths major part of the inland water fleets Cn the Volga, bargee generally rangeross registered tonslthough barges up0 CRT are inarges on some of the Siberian rivers range upST. On ths whole, however, these unusually large barges ore not numerous, snd the Inland water fleet Is made op predominantly of smaller craftST. Iho smallerways utilise large numbers of craft fromRT. Most gensral^argo barges are constructed of rood, whereas tanker barges are generally of steei construction. Tugs ore usually wheel-driven, the shallow depths of the waterways asking screw propulsion irrproc tic able. Tugs range fromorsepower, the larger units being used foroperations. Iho horsepower of most tugs, however, varies between uQO, while on the leas important routes the tugs aay be of onlyittle is actually known of the technical details of aelf-propellad river vessolo, which formmall minority of the inland water craft,
the Tolga It the moot important river of the OSSR. Ihe Volga Itself oarrles about one-quarter of all Soviet river traffic, and the Volga system accounts for nearly one-half of all such traffic. 3/ lha Don already is the leading route for grain transport, and its strategic Importance will be greatly enhanced by the Volga-Don Canal, now under construction and scheduled to handle principally such traffic as lumber, oil, and building materials, de Yenleey Riverain route connecting tbe Northern Sea Route with the interior of trie OSSR, de Lena River is another artery of traffic important to the northern Sea Route. The Kolyma Rivor In the northeastern section of the OSSR is of vital importance te the newly developed Industries of that region. Ths coal snd Umber of that area, for example, depend on the Kolyma River for transport to the industrial complexes of the Soviet Far Bast. The Amur lo the leading river of the Far East andain route of traffic for ths Soviet Far Eastern industrial developments. The Amur, furthermore, ie of particular Importance to the shipyards and steel ml lie at KamEonovsk snd to the oil refineries at Khabarovsk.
The inland water fleet is under the direction of the Ministry of the River Fleet, which has five chief Directorates, each responsiblearticular phase of operations. Each Directorate is subdivided into Shipping AdnlniatraUona, of which there were
XXa Volume of Traffic. u Prewar.
Beforear I, Russian inland waterways wars responsible for a
significant, although declining, portion of all traffic. nland water traffic1 million short tons, whereas the railroads hauled
yaterways urually carriedthanercent ofall inland freight tonnage. Because of thao?5forthernora, tho ton-ralle performance ofV'Wter World War I,r
toaffio continued to decline in importance in relation te other means of ta-anaportaUon, particularly railroada, ompariaon of the perforce of inland waterway, in the OSSR,th. Caaplan Sea,
how, theof inland water traffic and the volume of leadingby Soviet inland waterways in
2. world War H.
by inland waterwaya during
torldoae to Hi percent ln comparisonaroant in the prewar years. 8/ The increase in the share of total traffic carried by inlandprobably reflected tie anomouo deolinas in railroad traffic resulttrv from losses of rail equipment and territory, rather than an actual increasearried by the inland waterways. The great destruction resulting from *rldrecluded achievemsnt of the ambiUoua plans that the OSSR
0t orthe plea
f ft^leht, as co-pirod
war, however, Soviet inland harbor
ostwar, levels
^ hem sections of the OSSR suffered extern*veosses of vessels and bargee were tremendous. oviet commission, appointed to investigate war losses, stated inhat the Germans sank or seisedcargo ships, passenger craft, and tugboats andarges, f/ With allowance for sone probable exL^raUonS of losses claimed by the Soviets, itbUshid facttne appreciable number of craft received as reparation* after tha war the substantial net loss of inland water craft greatly retarded inland water transport development, (See Table)
Jiland water transport is operating in the OSSR at reasonablypresent traffic could be greatly increased
IT tne 0BSR ^amveted necessary resources to that and. One of the fewof trafficostwar year is contained in Table 2. It winthat while traffic had recovered somewhat by the endi7 fromlow levels, the actual reported performance?0 percent below the planned goals set9Tccordingpercent rise above
raffic.
Inland Water Freight and Passenger Traffic in the USSR (Excluding the Caspian0 (Plan)
Freight
Total Vol me Carried and Towod
Million Short
Billion
Volume of Principal Goods Carried and Towed
Timber
Million Short
Percent of Total
aa
Will on Short
Percent of Total
Orpin,
Million Short
Percent of Total
Total Number Transported-
. 0 5 0 0
t -
Monthly Traffic In tha USSR in tho Moat Important Inland Uater-borno Co-noditioa (Excluding tha Caa pi on5
Thousand Short Tons fJ
January^-larch
April-May
June
July
August
Sopteabar
October
rtoramber
Doceabor
Total
Tin bar in Rafta
V
0
3
document from which thio tablo was tskon otatod that figuresin nUMons of tons. It ia bolloved that this is an errorand that thousanJo woo mount.
IH. Present Capabilities.,
Extent, Seasonal Availability, and Condition and Capacity ofand Port Facilitlos,
The total navigable length of the inland water network in the USSR ia0 miles. Much of the system, however, is dosed by ico for iiear. The navigable lengths and navigation seaeone of tho major Soviet waterways are shown in the following table i
Table k
Major Inland Waterways of the
Length (Miles)
Navigation Season
Area
Volga River Hoecow-Volga Canal Kama River Oka-KOacow Systen Marlinskiy Canal System Baltic-Wiite Sea Canal System Northern Dvinii Syston Lnlcper-Bug Routs
Late Apr to Mid-Nov Lata Apr to Early Nov Lata Apr to Late Oct Mid-Apr to Early Nov May to Nov May to Nov Mid-Hay to Late Oct End of Mar to Early Dec
Area
Ob River Irtyoh River Tenisey Rivor Angara River Amur River System Kolyma River
Late Apr to Late Oct Early May to Lata Oct Apr to Nov Apr to Dec May to Nov
Late May to Early Oct
Ths condition and capacity of tba river porta ia believed toatter of considerable coicern to Soviet authorities, snd the freiendllng capacity of theso ports has been called the "weakest phase in Soviot inland waterway/ Iho best available information on selected major Soviet rtvir ports is indicated in the following tablet
Table 5
Selected Major Soviet River Porta* a/ U/
Volga River Major port for transfer of oil, lumber,
(rightand fish from Caspian roadstead
fleet to river; connection to railroad]
accessibleton river
barges but not to Caspian Sea vessels;
major oil storage facilities; port reported
rebuilt.
River Major port for'oil, grain, cement, salt,
(lefttools, and finished industrial
products!ercent mechanised lnto railroad) shipyards; port
rebuilt) probably accessible)
on barges.
River Port handles grain, coal, and probably
(bothIndustriaload junction*
connection to Trans-Siberianriver depths off
A major river port ln thea defined as having adequate; mechanised cargo feollitins, rail connections, and an annual voluma of atonsrade volume of major importance for the respective area; in the Asiatic USSR it ls definedrincipal pdrt with an annual tonnage of atonsrade volume of major importance, without necessarily having good port facilitleB. a. Capacity of barges la given in gross registered tons.
eet.
; fl i-
continued) Selected Tiajor Soriet River Porta
Kiev
RlTer (right bank)
'E
and coal port; road coonectlonaj connection to Trans-Siberian Railroad; shipyards; river base for tear flotilla; major oil storage facilities; accessible to seagoing vesselsons at high "titer0
Major port and trade center; connection to railroad; bass of Dnieper fleet; shipyards; warehoueea; river deptheet off harbor.
River Oil end grain port; connection to roods
(rightrailroad; terraLnue of pipe line
from Maikop oilfieldsj shipyard;off harbor probably regulated
eat.
Krasnoyarsk Teniaey River Grain, lumber, and coal port; goodconnection to Trans-
Siberian Railroad; shipyard;boatsoot draft at full water
Leningrad
River (loft bank)
Hova River (both banks)
port for lumber, oil, construction materials, grain, salt, ond fish; connection to railroad; ahlpyardaj accessibleon barges.
Major exporting port; connection toshipyards; major timber storageies; modernisation of port planned.
continued) selected major soviet river ports
kolotov
mm
saratov
shcherbakov
stalingrad
ease riter (left bank)
moakva ri var
(both banks)
ob river
(right bank)
volga river
(right bank)
volga river (right bank)
e
volga river (right bank)
continued) Selected Major Soviet River Forts
Zaporozhye
River (left bank)
Dnieper River (left bank)
Wn
handlee grain, coal, lumbar, probably- alao natal orae and no tai products; shipyardj aocesslble tovessels| trade volume expected te reachillionear.
Major grain port; connection to railroad; shipyard; harbor installations dosignad for annual transshipmentillion tons could be expandedillion; prewar quay lengtht; port reported rebuilt and modernised; river depth maintainedeet off harbor.
2, Inland Water Fleet.
a. Site, Condition, and Distribution.
land watsr fleet situation in the USSR ls summarised in Table 6. In addition to the tonnage covered by ths table, the Caspian fleet conalatahipsAThe fleet is divided as followsiargo ships, totalingRT, endankers,RT.
Many of tbe self-propelled vessels ere old aad of thertype, and as many burn wood, their operations are notably inefficient. That the general condition of the entire fleet nay be poor is suggested by frequent Soviet press demands for more and better maintenance. On the other hand, the probable attainment of the Fourth Five Tear Plan for the construction of inland water craft would mean that aboutercent of the self-propelled fleet and over ho percent of the barge fleet would now beears old and presumably, therefore, ln good condition.
RB|>ii
Main te nance and Kffleleney of Operationa.
frequent criticism by the Soviet press and radio Indicates that although there haa been soma improvo-wint, the quality and quantity of maintenance in the inland water fleet are, in general, extremely poor. The poor maintenance stems from two principal causes. The flrat cause is the low level of training among the workers; the second is the generally poor condition of repair and maintenance feoilittea. Although the OSSR is dotted with ahip repair yards of varying sises and capabilities, previous studies indicate that their efficiency uaually la very low0
Operating efficiency also la low. For example, accordingress release. Minister of the River Fleet Shcshkov stated inl that traffic does not move according to schedule and that more efficient oargo handling at porta could have increased the quantity of freight hauled0illion metric tons. Tho Minister also observed that some cargoes hauled by rail and road could move more profitably by This observation is confirmed by other press reports.
Table 6
Distribution of the Inland Water Fleet in the OSSR (by Basin0
Basin Group
of Vessel9
Total Horsepower
Thousands Bircent of Total Horsepower
European
USSR
2
Central European OSSR
7
Southern European OSSR
Eastern DSSR
(Siberia)
OSSR
723
1 i
continued)
distribution of the inlaid vfttor fleet in tho ussr (by baaln groups)
0
baoin group
of vaceal sou-propeued' .
total horsepower
thousands percent of total horsepower
planned)
total horsepower
thousands parcont of total horsepower
towed
total tonnage
thousands percent of total tonnage
european
USSR
M.5.
1
3
central european
USSR
3
southern europoio
ussr
6
eastern
USSR
{siberia)
ii.7
0
USSR
B
t
continued)
Distrl button of tbe Inland Water Float ln tho USSR (by Baaln Groups)
0
Basin Group
Rorthorn Control Southern European European
Type of SSR SSR (Siberia) USSR
TOKOd
19U5
Total Tonnage
. 0 of Total
1 Tonnage
* of Total
3 0
3. Materials and Manpower RenuiroTTronto,,
ndhich follow, contain estimates of the steel and petroleum requirements of the Soviet Inland water fleet as based on extremely general assumptions.
-
Estimated Finished Steel Requirements of the Soviet Inland Water Fleet (Excluding the Caspian2
Thousand Kotrio Tons
688
Table 8
Estimated Petroleum Raqulre-onts of tho Soviot Inland Water Fleet (Excluding tho Caspian
Thousand Metric Tons
Diesel Oil
Fuel Oil
lubea and Orease 6 8
Total
On the baaia of oatliaates of consumption by vassal theetroleum requirements of the Caspian Sea fleet have been calculated to beetric tons annually. hioh contains the most detailed material available on the manpower situation in Soviet inland water transport, stated that sraploymsntlersons. It has been estimated that the number of people emoloyed in inland water transportorkers
lu Carrying Capacity, a. Total.
Assuming that planned traffic goals are Identical vith capacityough estimate of tha present capabilities of Soviet inland vxter transport can be made. Traffic goals0 colled for the haulingillion short tons of freight over an average distanceile8otal8 billion ton-nllea. The capabilities of any transport eysten, however, depend largely upon the resources which are applied to it, and the USSR haa clearly failed in thia respect to capitalise completely on the potentialities of its waterways and their port areas.
h. By Areas.
The following table illustrates the relative traffic potential of the major river areas in the USSR-
Tabic 9
Planned Cargo Turnover in tho USSR By Major River Basin0
Basins
Plan (Billion Ton-milee)
anf total)
Northern Eostarn Sou thorn
Total
Tha following table giving the volume of traffic in the USSR for specific key eoraaodittee5 Illustrates tho relative Irwjrtanco and Eoocraphlcal distribution of these coraaodity movements in river traffic, vith the exoeption of movements in certain limited sectors, it ia probable that thie pattern is typical of present-day traffic.
Table 10
Traffic In Major CommodiUee over Some of the More Important Waterways in the5
Thousand Short Tons
Major Co^Kxritlas
.Rivers
Amur
Iblepar
Don
Irtyah
Kama
Bora
Northern Dvina
Ob
Oka
Onega (Lake) Sheksna
Svir
Volga
Tenisoy
la Rafts
2
&
Timber
in Vessels
&
250
7
Total Cargo a/
othnr cargoes not
not available or negligible amount of traffic.
i g
ft>tantlal CamMUtloa. 1. tew Conatrnefflnn.
ator-aysantral and easternSooosfatS?^ fW8'probably ie receiving
ln^ese^, planned to
cheduled to bo improved or en-
h ^to Ui* the Don HxWvith
JTbe""ifehie believed
of Soviet inland-waterway planning, there ie
indJoat?#that completion of this>ajor Soviet construction project at thla time,
* CanSong-heralded goal of Soviet inland wa^rvayp^nnors apparently ls receiving much attention and may be
originally planned date hle
onary change in Soviet water^LQbJ!froaly^>od-lookedBto the Black Sea. It is poeelble to
make only the most general estimates as to ito ultimate camcitv but iwW
in draft. IS/ ile-long Turkmonian Canal project which .rill^SR, is another important objective of Soviet .m^ votorlD thouTthtSt
the ^trueting very few small craftnwijor Portion of ite deliveries under tho
reparations program, but Finnish shipyards alao have setaei
- 20
' S "
In wartime tho opportunity for tha DSSH to aocuro substantial quan_ities of vessels from overrun territories might be groat, hut It le believed that ln most instancea such vessels would be employed where found rather than transported to the USSR, The possibilltloo of foreign acquisition for the Caspian fleet ere alight. The Caspian Sea loexcept for the small craft able to pass through the upper Volga.
3. Diversion of Traffic to Other Suns.
rthtticoncerned
iverting trnffio to, rather than avoy from, the inland water system. DurlagUorld Uer n, diversion of traffic also was toward, rather thanfrom, inland waterways. The share of traffic carried by inland water rose during that period from theercenteportedercent, pro-ably becauae of the proportionately greater damage which tho milroado Cn the basis of World War IT experience, lt amjaaro that in the event of war there might not be any considerable diversion of normal waterway traffic te othor medio of transport.
Caspian Sea traffic is limited almost entirely to bull: cargoes, and rail lines around the area are so few that it is considered lono'ssible for any substantial mount of Caspian traffic te be diverted to other medio In addition, tho shortage of tank care would sharply restrict the diversion or largo ahipaonto of oil from Caspian tenkors to rail lines.
toW* tttqtananco and Remlr and Increeaedf QrnmmMona-
Maintenance Is ot an extremely low lovol in tho Soviot inlandsystem, but it is probable that there vill be improvement during peacetime, if past trends and future goals ore any ^uido. Operations likouise oro not satisfactory at present. It is probablo that, during peacetime, officioney will improve someuhat, artime, present operating levels would be maintained only through the exercise of ouch oxtrcrao moaauros as outright ailitary control, round-the-clock operations, extensive overloading of"ships, possibly the diversion of skilled labor from other fiolda, and severe penalties for such malpractices as accidents, obeontcoiem, and personal in-efficlonoy.
lamitatione. Intentiona, and1. Ifaltatlons.
Tho Soviet Inland waterway system Is not of sufficient iaroortanoo te over-all Soviot transporta toifting factor on any brood course of national action which mi:ht be contemplated by the USSR. There are certain aspects of Soviet inland water transport, however,
- a
which ore noteworthy for their retarding effectarrower frame of reference. The physical characteristics of auch of the Soviet river system, particularly in Asia, for example, impose restrictions on its utilityajor means of transport and. In effect, prevent the USSR from achieving certain possible objectives. Except in the western USSR, virtually all major Soviet rivers are nortb-aouth linos of communication, while the major lines of traffic movementt-weet lines, especially east of the Urals. Consequently, the rivers ln the central and eastern areas cannot bo employed as alternatives to the Trans-Siberian Railroad to reliove the traffic burden on that line either in peacetime or ln an emergency caused by wartimeof this major tronacon tinea tai route. Their value in tho economic exploitation of the Soviot Northltod, moreover, by their direction of flow, from south to north. The preponderance of river traffic in the central and eastern areas consists of raw materialsipped out of the area to industrial centers olsewhore in the Soviet Union. If the direction of flow of the rivers were toward the Tranc-Siberian Railroad, which is available for yoar-round service, thc streams would be far more useful. Flowing into the Arctic Ocean, they deliver downstream traffic into on area closed by ice conditions much of the year. The barriers set by the topographic features of the inland waterways are obviously impossible to overcome exceptinor degree andery slow rate. Possibilities for expansion and increased efficiency of the system arc discussed elsewhere in this study.
2. Intent!one.
The operations of the Inland water fleet do not reveal any significant conclusions as to Soviet Intentions except In the narrow and immediate sphere of improvement In capabilities. Tho ro; Jor conclusicn of strategic significance which raifht bo drawn from presont inland waterpolicies is that plans to increaae capacity of tho inland water routes may be tied into soae long-range over-all plan to free the rail lines of aa much responsibility as ponaiblo for the transport of relatively unessential bulk commodities, thereby assuring greater mobility and flexibility for the rail movement of high-priority traffic.
a. fancatinn.
peacetime.
thsre are practicaUy no measures which thc West can take apainat it in peace tlnq.
Most of the vital sectors of the Soviet inland waterway system are in ths area west of the Urals and possibly are sore accessible to attack than are the Asiatic waterways. Severance of the traffic flow on tho Volga would be particularly serious for tho USSR beaause this river ond its tributaries oro by far the most important waterway system of tho USSR, In the oast, Amur River shippingajor vulnerability. In the event of decisive attacks against thia waterway, the industrial complexes along that river would be seriously hindered. The extensive use of locks and sluices in mony areas, moreover, makes the entire system highlyetermined and prolonged campaign by air and mine attacks against Cespian shipping could damage seriously the Soviet potential for oil In view of tho absolute essentiality of this traffic, any serious reduction wouldajor blow against the Soviet military potential.
APPENDEC a
GAPS IN nrra.UG5TiOS
knowledge of Inland uator transport ie much leao complete then ie taowledjj of nerchont shipping, the primary roaaon being that in!
ropoign mirvMllaneo than ore morchant shipping operations. ie much less interest in the operations of the Soviet The important role which
g Ploys, however, in support of domestic activities contributing to Soviet military' capability ia sufficient reason for the expansion of Intelligence coverage and tho study of inland wator transport.
oa^croatlon Is needed on such topico affecting levels, train? diversion,
Snern? Ifenpouer data are noedod Sn
goneroi terms. Intelligence on labor output, availability, and requirements
f ^naidorQKLo aigrdficanco in estimating actual or poSal tranoport rxtrforaonco,
ft ov^a2 inoaco of very great importance Is the alaoet
complete absence of accurate and up-to-date information on all aspects of Sfn^ operations (fleet, traffic, and porta). For this reason, Caspian shipping has been mentioned only infrequently in tho foregoing discuaolon Tnat the area is of vital and increasingvor,ted
tho Caspian Sea than in ths entire ocaon-golng float.
alcs of lnportanco concerning Soviot inland water
tranaport In general on which intelligenco can bo sold to be fair conaidorable expansion. *mong these topics ore fleet andadminiatration and organization, basio fleetand operating
lsor view of what
Port -ytem actually io doing or what it ie capable of doing Without ouch information there can be no clear idea of either tho present importance of tho inland water float or what can bo exnocted of the
data regarding ^rformance during World Uar n
* the potential abiiit/of
system to contribute to vnrtlno operations. Toeate on orient
Jf-^ Qbmtyinf^
past acnieveaonts and futuro
SOURCES
APPHiDIX a
USSR-Inland Vaterrntollirerco Survey,
5 Preliminary, subject to revision.
endtrategic Tnt^Tn-n^iiiml.
Chapter THI,
OBI SerialSSR ond. Sat^vPb^IjXflBd Ua.fr mvp,
fattens! latflm^nCfl5
Bslzak, Voeyutin, Feigin, Ecoocrdc Oaogranhv of the,
IWonsl totfllL^nCy5
erialSSR ppdTnlnn/
Mitchell, Malrin, The harltlno History
IjltollllTonce5
SerialSSR andnlanrt toterunva.
and CoanMnieationsStrato-ic Intomrronce Di.7oat-
Chapter Till, Jul .
national5
OHI Serial7Janoaltion of Tha Soviet Etorrhnirt FT,
,
BatimJ inWIrr^flo ^irm.
ORT SerialSSR
JMd.
Original document.
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