NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC COURSES OF ACTION, THROUGH
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
(Port II) Publiihed2
The following member organizations Of the
Advisory Committee participated with the CentralAgency in the preparation ot thi* estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Deportments of State, the Army, Ihe Navy, the Air Force, end the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred,his estimate2 with the exception of the dissents of the Special Assistant.Department of Stale, and the Assistant Chief of, Department of the Army, tooted on page S.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS,PART II)'
Likelihood cf Globalrobable Bloc Courses of Action .
Within the Bloc
Beyond thc Bloc
Middle East and Africa Latin America . -
This document haspproved for releasehe HISTORICAL REVTEW PROGRAMentral Intelligence. Agency.
PartROBABLE SOVIET BLOC COURSES OF ACTION, THROUGH
To determine probable Bloc courses of action, through
believe that during the period of this estimate the rulers of the USSR will offer no real concessions to effect abetween the Bloc and the West and will pursue courses of actionto frustrate or offset any gain in the Western power position.
The USSR will continue its efforts to undermine and destroy theworld by politicalhc Kremlin probably estimates thatwill not be favorable during thc period of this estimate for successful armed revolt by Communist parties in non-Communist countries. It probably also estimates that conditions will not be ripe for bringing additional areas into the Bloc by armed aggression without incurring serious risk of global war.
For thc foregoing reasons, theduring the period of this estimate, will intensify its efforts to isolate the US and to promote dissension within and
'Bloc political warfare techniques Include poliu-cal and economic pressure, diplomatic action In the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the action of Communist parUea and Communlit party-controlled trade unionsthe Bloc, sabotage, exploitation of subversive and revolutionary movements and of civilnd peycholoEical warfare.
among non-Communist countries. To attain these ends, Communist parties in non-Communist countries, through front organizations and by influencing local political organizations and groups, will seek to exploit neutralist, nationalist, racial, and anti-American sentiments, and to stimulate demands for freer East-West trade.
At the same time, the USSR and the Chinese Communists will continue to support existing Communist-dominated armed rebellions, such as those inand Malaya. Moreover, they will remain prepared to instigate or exploit new armed rebellions, shouldcircumstances develop.
It is impossible to estimate withthe view of the rulers of the USSR concerning the outcomelobal war during the period of this estimate. The Bloc continues toignificant quantitative superiority over thePowers in forces in being and inground and air armament. Moreover, the possibility cannot bethat during the period of thisSoviet atomic capabilities may in-
c iii 9
creaseoint at which thc Kremlin might concludeurprise attack could inflict critical damage on thc war potential of the US. On the other hand, it almost certainly estimates that global war would involveinimumdestruction in the USSR and the risk that its system of control would be destroyed.
e believe it unlikely that thewill within the period of this estimate deliberately initiate or provoke global war, or undertake new acts of armed
aggression which it estimates wouldgrave risk of global war. If,it believes the security of the USSR is jeopardizedestern action, it will probably resort to such counteractions as it considers necessary, even though it recognizes that these counteractionsgrave risk of global war.
oreover, inherent in the relationship between the US and the USSR there is danger that global war may result from an actioneries of actions notto have that result.
The Kremlin determines the fundamentals of Bloc policy It will continue to makeconcerning courses of action insituations in the light of its global policy and of its estimate of the world power situation.
We believe that Communist China accepts Kremlin leadership in the determination of international Communist policy. However, we believe that the Peiping regime retains some capability for independent action, and isosition to influence the formulation of Communist policy in the Far East.
The Satellites have no direct Influence upon decisions concerning Bloc courses of action, although the Kremlin, in formulating policy regarding Europe, may take Intonational feeling in the SatelliteCommunist parties in non-Communist countries have no appreciable influence upon Kremlin decisions.
e believe that Kremlin policies and courses of action are directed toward thc maintenance and extension of Soviet power, which lo the Kremlin are indispensable for the attainment of the long-rangeommunist world dominated from Moscow.
Likelihood of Global War
he Kremlin almost certainly estimates that in some respects the posiUon of the West is stronger than it was In the early postwar years:
US is making progress In thcof its economic and militaryis increasingly exercising leadership In
has been made in thepolitical reconstruction of
non-Communist position ln Asiastronger thanargely as aof UN resistance in Korea.
has been made toward thoand rearmament of Westerntoward improving the West's defensesPacific.
he Kremlin undoubtedly believes lhat enmity between thc US and the USSR will continue The Kremlin probably regards the following not only as obstacles to the attainment of Bloc objectives but also as threats to thc security of the Bloc:
as used in this paper, includes Japan.the Philippines. Indonesia. Ceylon, and all ot mainland Asia east of (but not including) Iran nnd Afghanistan.
development of US overseasto Bloc territory.
increase of US strategic air strength.
rearmament, including theand production of atomicand the development of
rearmament, and thcrearming West Germany and forWest Germanyearmed-
program for rearming Japan,alliance of Japan with the West.
ithin the period of this estimate,the Kremlin Is unlikely to conclude that the US will be militarily or psychologically prepared to initiate global war against the Soviet Bloc. However, it almost certainly believes that global war might result from actions and counteractions In localsuch as Korea.
he rulers of the USSR almost certainly believe that opportunities will continue to exist for making progress toward both their Immediate and their long-range objectives without resort to global war. They probably estimate that:
political unity andare likely to be undermineddevelopments, such as the revivalGerman military power, theGerman and Japanese products intomarkets now dominated by otherconflicting tariff and trade policies.
exist for weakeningby exploiting discontent andin Asia, tlie Middle East,Latin America.
c The political systems and the economies of thc non-Communist states are brittle, and vulnerable to depression and inflationary crises which would have damaging social and political repercussions.
d. By contrast, the prestige and Influence of the Bloc will mount as the political and economic strength and unity of the Blocto make steady progress.
t Is Impossible to estimate withthc view of the rulers of the USSR concerning the outcomelobal warthe period of this estimate. The Bloc continues toignificantsuperiority over thc Western Powers ln forces In being and in conventional ground and air armament. Moreover, thc possibility cannot be excluded that during the period of this estimate Soviet atomic capabilities may increaseoint at wliich the Kremlin might concludeurprise attack could Inflict critical damage on the war potenUal of the US. On the other hand, it almost certainly estimates that global warinimum widespread dcstrucUon in the USSR and the risk that its system of control would be destroyed.
We believe it unlikely that thc Kremlin will within thc period of this estimateinitiate or provoke global war, ornew acts of armed aggression which il estimates would involve grave risk of global war. If, however. It believes theof the USSR is jeopardizedestern action, it will probably resort to suchas it considers necessary, even though it recognizes that theseInvolve grave risk of global war.
Moreover, Inherent in the relationship between the US and the USSR there isthat global war may result from an actioneries of actions not intended to have thai result.
PROBABLE BLOC COURSES OF ACTION General
e believe that during tbe period of this estimate the rulers of the USSR will offer no real concessions toettlement between the Bloc and the West and will pursue courses of action designed U> frustrate or offset any gain in the Western power position.
Probable Courses of Action Within the Bloc
uring the period of this estimate, the USSR will almost certainly continue to place primary emphases within the Bloc upon ex-
TO P '
Bloc productive capacity, especially in those industries basic to industrial growth and to military production.
Kremlin will almost certainly placepriority upon enlarging Its atomicand Improving Its defenses,air attack. Bloc military forcesincrease greatly In size, althoughimprove in combat effectiveness.
program for integrating theSatellites into the Soviet economic,and military system willreorganization of East Germanylines and preparations for theof that area into the Bloc as awill also continue, Soviet efforts toand intensify control overwill be maintained, but not at thcimpairing Sino-Soviet solidarity.
Probable Courses of Action Beyond the Bloc
he USSR will continue its efforts toand destroy the non-Communist world by politicalhe Kremlin probably estimates that conditions will not be favorable during the period of this estimate for successful armed revolt by Communistin non-Communist countries. Italso estimates that conditions will not be ripe for bringing additional areas Into tlie Bloc by armed aggression without incurring serious risk of global war.
or tlie foregoing reasons, the Kremlin, during the period of this estimate, willits efforts to Isolate the US and to promote dissension within and among non-Communist countries To attain these ends. Communist parties in non-Communist countries, through front organizations and by influencing local political organizations and groups, will seek to exploit neutralist, nationalist, racial, and
' Dioc political warfare technique) Include political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and frontthe action of Communist parties andparty-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc. sabotHRo, exploitation o( subversive and revolutionary movements and of civil wan, and psycholocical warfare,
T'O P OBOnET
will increase its efforts to undermine the West Berlin economy. These efforts will probably include moves to seal off Westfrom East Germany and East Berlin, and to harass traffic between West Germany and West Berlin. If the contractual and EDC agreements are ratified, the likelihood ofharassing tactics will probably increase substantially and progressively. The GDR may even threaten to use force In order to test Western unity and resolution.
believe, however, that thenow estimates that the use ofin Berlin either by the USSR or bywould be met by force on the part ofand thc other Western occupyingthat measures short of force wouldto the maximum of WesternFurthermore, the Kremlinthat the US at least would nowto resort to force if the Westernin Berlin became or were about toThe danger of global warwill remain great. However, wethat in the pursuit of Its objectivesBerlin tohe Kremlincourses of action which itinvolve grave risk of global war.*6
Communists probably estimateattempt to seize additional territoryby the identifiable use of Chinese Com-
*The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, dissents from this paragraph because It Implies lhat the Kremlin, because ofto risk war. would stop thc measures envisaged in paragraphhortoint where "the Western poslUon in Berlin became or were about lo becomehe Special Assistant. Intelligence. Department ofampaign of gradual strangulation against West Berlin in the hope of making the position of the Western powers in Berlincannoi be ruled out on these grounds.
'The Assistant Chief of, Department of the Army, supports the dissent of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, noted inbove. -
'Asia, as used in Uils paper, Includes Japan,the Philippines, rndonesia. Ceylun, nnd all of mainland Asia east of (but not Including) Iran and Afghanistan.
munlst or Soviet forces would stiffen non-Communist opposition, particularly in Asia, and might create grave danger of war against mainland China or even of global war.the Communists are probably confident that further progress can be made towards the achievement of their objectives in Asia by political warfare. We believe, therefore, that during the period of this estimate thewill refrain from attempts to seize additional territory by the identifiable use of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will not intensify their efforts to overthrow non-Communist Asian governments by thc open rebellion of indigenous "armed liberation" movements. Existing movements have been reduced inor stalemated, and the overthrow of non-Communist governments through open rebellion would now require Chineseor Soviet intervention of such magnitude as to entail the possibility of war against mainland China or even global war.
We believe that throughout the period of this estimate the Communists willigh priority to strengthening their organization in non-Communist Asian countries,Asian ties with the West, and exploiting Asian neutralism. They will also seek totheir popular following in Asia. The Bloc will increase its use of economiclo influence the governments andof Asia. At the same time, they will make organizational and psychologicalfor the'intensification of the "armed liberation" movementsater date.
Korea. The Communists will probably not take the initiative to break thc military stalemate in Korea during the period of this eslimate. We believe that the Communists will protract armistice negotiations so long as they consider that they can continue to gain political and military advantages from the situation in Korea.
If an armistice Is concluded during the period of this estimate, we believe that the negotiationolitical settlement will be complicated by Communist injection of Far Eastern issues unrelated to Korea. Whether
O 1' OCCnET-
orolitical settlement is achieved, wc believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged.
apan. The weakening of Japan'spro-Western orientation and thcof the resurgence of an armed and non-Communist Japan will be importantobjectives in Asia during the period of this estimate In pursuit of these objectives, the Communists will place economic,and psychological pressures on Japan In the attempt to encourage and exploit thc Jupancse sense of insecurity and desire for improved relations with the Bloc. threats to Japan will continue to be coupled with offers of trade with Communist Ch ina and the Soviet Bloc. At the same time, the Japanese Communist Party will continue to agitate against the government and Its pro-US policies and will attempt to increase Its subversive potential and popular following.
ndochina. The Chinese Communists will probably continue their present type ofto thc Viet Minh, but probably will not invade Indochina or introduce large numbers of combat troops in thc guise of "volunteers."
Middle East and Africa
The Kremlin will probably conduct anactive political warfare campaign in the Middle East and Africa. We believe that the USSR willajor effort in the UN to court the Arabnd that within the countries of the Middle East and Africa Uie Communists will probablyupon efforts to establish common fronts with nationalist and other anti-Western groups.
Iran During the period of this estimate, thc Tudeh Party in Iran will continue Its ef-
forts to discredit the US and thc Shah to force the withdrawal of US military and economic missions, to weaken and divide theont. to infiltrate the bureaucracy and the security forces, and to sUmulate riots and These tactics will probably increase Tudeh strength and influence. Although thc many elements of uncertainty and instability in Iran make it difficult to estimate withwe believe that thc party will not regain legal status or develop sufficient strength to gain control of thc government by infiltration or armed revolt during the period of this estimate. While continuing itsof Tudeh. the Kremlin is unlikely to take any drastic action to influence the Iranianexcept in the eventar moredeterioraUon of Iranian internal stability than is foreseen during the period of this estimate."
e believe that Communist strategy in Latin America during the period of thiswill concentrate upon attempts toand make use of nationalist parties and labor, student, and Intellectual groups. The Communists will seek to exploit social and political unrest and anti-US sentiment Into limit or obstruct Latin American co-operaUon with the US. Thc USSR will probably increase its efforts to detach the Latin American countries from the US ln the UN and in other international organizations and will seek to enlarge the participation of Latin Americans in Communist-sponsoredlabor and "peace" conferences.
iscussion of the elements of uncertainty andran, seeProbableIn IranovemberOriginal document.