Created: 12/12/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible






3 _

ont-titU* portltfpartdOnitlmcti:oreanttatVmin Dip^rtmrnttMii tottt.ointVUn&flki JnteSifrrve ASvixxy-.COnCVT* tn (All Httmatt "


ppptfrs Of






To identify the (acton affecting Latin American political stability anduon with the United States, and to estimate the trends likely to affect Latinean political and military cooperation and the availability of Latin Americanegic resources.


political instability now trident In Latin America results from serious disturbance of the traditional socialby new economic and social forces. This instability is therefore much more fundamental than that whichthe personal politics of LatinIn the past

The principal political trend In Latin America Is toward nationalistic regimes maintained In large part by demagogic appeal to the depressed masses of the population, of which the Peron regime In Argentina Is an outstanding example. Bimilar, though not identical, regimes already exist In Bob via and Oust* mala. Present circumstances favor theirIn Chile and Ecuador. Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela are the states next most vulnerable to this trend.

S. The general trend toward radical and nationalist* regimes in Latin America is favorable to Peron's efforts to arouse an-

Mtlmate rtUtn oorj to tht UUn AnwrlctaEurvpftn colcofci la Uueludedoa

tagonitm toward the United 8tatei. The same nationalism, however, would probably preclude Argentine political control ovei any neighboring state.

he Communist threat to US security Interests In Latin America Is greater than the limited and declining party membership In the area would suggest, because of the ease with which ft relatively few Communists, operating through various fronts, can exploit the social unrest and Yankeephobla already existing In the non-CommunistThe Communists, as such, have no present prospect of gaining control of any Latin American stale by electoral means. Guatemala, however, Is anofmall Communistcanatin Americanand strongly Influence It* policy.

ft. The pressures of social unrest andnationalism make It difficult for Latin American governments to render on all occasions the degree of diplomatic.


or economic support desired by the United States. With the exception ol Argentina and Ouatemala, they have been reasonably cooperative In theiphere. Generally, however, they have not implemented effectively their economic and military undertakings.

ventually the trend towardnationalism, if It continues, will seriously affect Hemisphere solidarity and US security interests in LatinFor the next several years,change Is not likely to be so far reaching as to reduce substantially the present degree and scope of Latincooperation. In particular,-latin American strategic raw materials will continue to be available, although the governments concerned will seek to drive hard bargains In terms of prices andconcessions.

In the event of global war, the latin Americans would more fully appreciate their community of Interest with the Western Powers and would probablyreater readiness to meet their International military and economic commitments. The Latin American armed forces, however, would not be able to defend critical strategic areas and vital sea routes against serious enemy attack without the direct participation of US forces, although they would be of value In supporting roles.

The more Immediate threat to U8 security interests in Latin America, In the event of global war, would becapabilities for the sabotage of strategic Industries.nlikelyarge-scale and widespread program of sabotage could be sustained, but thewould favor sporadic Commurist successes.


Social Trends

most Latin American countries theof society was dominated byIn alliance with the Church andThere wasmaltcommercial middle class, but thethe population was dependent,and politically Impotent. Withingroup politic* was highly personalbut the social order itself

recent years, however, theorder has been seriously disturbed,by the accelerated pace of Latineconomic development as affectedchanges in the worldby ideological Influencesthe worldwide social unrest ofcentury. Althoughf the population Is atOl engaged Inthe development of mining,and service Industries in latin America during the past three decades has considerably increased the Importance of non-agricultural labor and the urben middle class. In many Important countries theof political power Is ahlfting to politicians whose strength Is derivedfrom influence over city populations. Thla development, still incomplete and uJ-deftned, has given rise to political instability more fundamental than that which characterised the personal politics of the put.

n some countries new politicalarises primarily as an accompaniment Of industrial and commercial growth. In all countries Its rise has been associatedapid expansion of governmentalThe leaders of the newly-Important population groups Include functionaries

starring government ministries and etate-contfcJled enterprises. mlliUrj.nd business union leaden. The majority do not have strong tics to the traditional order. The most characteristic altitude among political leaders of this new typetrong tendency toward

lder social elements and Institutions have adapted themselves with varyingof success to the rise of this new and cedentially urban political leadership.who formerly had their spiritual home In European capitals and vrereto the oligarchy by ties of family and patronage, are now predominantly bothand nationalistic In temper. The military, nationalistic by tradition, have shown considerable Interest In the prospect of IndustrialUalion. They are sometimesneutral toward the old order, or even hostile when alignment with "progressive" forces suits their purposes. The various national Catholic hierarchies have for the most part striven to preserve the traditional social order, butew countries Catholic la>men have organized Christian socialist parlies In anto counter antl-clerlcal and agnostic tend-encles of the urban population and to divert the massesore radical course. Only the landed Interests have In general made no effort to Kcornmodatc themselves to the new situation

elations between the masses of theand the new, essentially urban, leadership art much less stable and clear than were those between the people and the landed aristocracy. Personal politics and "feudal" loyalties are being superseded by therelations of Capital, Labor, andThe aspirations of urbanespecially those of organised tabor, are often exploited by demagogues and directed toward objectives Incompatible with theof stable and moderateThe masses to general are poverty stricken, politically lneiperienced, andsusceptible to demajoglc appeals.

he degree of ditruptlon produced by the social forces mentioned ibove varies from country to country. The traditional ct-der still persists In Peru, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, for example. On the other hand, Argentina, Bolivia, and Oart now controlled by politicians who base their power In large part on leadership of the depressed masses. This latterIso be repeated, with localIn other countries which have not achieved, likeelatively high level of social and political stability.

Boiic Economic Trends

lft. Latin America has traditionally servedupplier of raw materials and foodstuffs to the highly Industrialised countries of North America and Europe, and has depended on those countries for nearly all of IUof manufactured products. The Latin Americans, however, are no longer willing to accept what they describeolonialstatus. This attitude Is accentuated by their experience during and after two World Wars, when, despite large income from exports of raw materials, they were unabls to buy the manufactured goods they wanted. Theyreater degree of etononucand stability through suchas protective tariffs, exchange restrie-Uont. export controls, andindustrialization,

ne aspect of the prevalent economic nationalism nasendency toward the expropriation and nationalization of foreign-owned utilities and Industrial enterprises. This tendency arises from political as well as economic motives Immediately after the war Argentina and Bratll bought out British rail tray interests. Recently, the Bolivian Oovemment has nationalised that country's tin mines. In Chile discussion is rather In terms of an expropriation of the product of the copper mines through the esUbUshrncntovernment monopoly of copper exports. In Venezuela there Is occasional talk ofexpropriating the oil Industry, but there Is no Indication that the government contemplateselated tend' tncy la Illustrated by the unwDllngness of BraxQ to permit the explanation of oil rs-

sources except on terms providing for close government control of such operations.

rogress In Industrialisation wU) bedifficult to sustain In UUn Amer-Va Domestic private Investors, seeking quick, highre reluctant to finance long-term developmentoreign private investment capita] for desiredexpansion ha* not been forthcoming in effective quantity In the postwar period. In Urge part because of the restriction* and uncertainties engendered by the prevalent economic nationalism. Industrialisation, therefore, ha* beenonsiderable extent financed with public funds, and consequently It* form and direction have often beenby political rather than economicDevelopment of new domestic industries and the basic transport*Uon and energy services will probably Involve theof capital and other resources from development of the raw material exportof the economy.

atin America's recent preoccupation with industrial development to the neglect of agriculture has adversely affected the domestic supply of agricultural products as well as the earning of foreign exchange though agricultural exports. Even asmall Increase in agriculturalcould have brought substantialIn agricultural productivity,In the growing of food for domestic use.

nflation has increased the economic and political strain In Latin America. It has Jex-pardivd the levels of living of the laboring eltsses in urban areas, thereby compelling the governments to expand costly socialprograms. Agriculture In general has not benefited from inflation because of the increased cost of manufacture* and because of government interference In domestic ndrkets.

n economic crisis In Latin America was averted only by the rise in prices for Latin American export commodities following the outbreak of hostilities In Korea. If the terms of trade should seriously deteriorate manymerican economies would be severely shaken In countries where large-scaleof Industrialisation artarked slackening of those programs would produce grave social and politicalhe countries most vulnerable In thisMexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chileare those which could render the greatest material support to the United States In the event of war.

Baiic Political Trends

he most Important poll Ik a] trend In Latin Americaoward the rise of radical and nationalistic regime* like those InBolivia, and Ouatemala. Such regime* are based In large part on mass supportby promises to relieve the want* and ful/Ul the aspirations ol depressed segments of the population. Recent elections In Chile and Ecuador have brought to powerregimes more Ukely than theirlo develop in this same dlreeUon. Radical mass movements in Peru and Vene-suela have been forced underground by rtp-resenutlves of the traditional order. In their frustration these popular movements arcof exploitation by Imitators of Peron'sven in such relaUvely stable countries as Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico there are extremist elements ofpoUUcal potential.

The mounting pressure for radicalchange In Latin America alarmsthose governments controlled by Ihe traditional ruling group, as In Peru and Colombia, and stiffens their resistance to any substantial change. This repressive tendency hinders even moderate change and so renders more likely the eventual outbreak ofviolence. In Colombia there Isa widespread guerrilla resistance to the regime.

Where power has already passed, as In Mexico, from the traditional tonewleadership, the government* are also boa-tile toward mass movement* and toward poU-Uclan* seeking powerew wave ofThe weakness of these otherwise stable political machines lies in their many unfulfilled promise* to the urban masses.

n tr_

premises Impossible of fulfillment during the present phase of economic development Chileecent example of one such libers) end moderate regime which hasto this weakness. Only In Mexico Is the existing political machine strong enough toeasonably confident estimate that it would be proof against overthrow bydemagogic opposition. t

The military retain considerable political Influence In aU Lal'n American countries.

[ In those such as the Dominican Republic. . Nicaragua, and Paraguay, where theorder has not been seriously disturbed by new aoclal and political Ideas, military and national leadership are essentially Heal and no conflict between the two Is likely . except In termsalace revolution. In ' countries where tha old order is underut has not been superseded, the position and r future conduct of the military are lessnd predictable. The Venezuelan Army, for .'- example, put the literal Action Democratic*.

Into power In IMS. but turned It out again ' three years later. The vacillation of the Army between the old and newn i Venesuela and elsewhere, appears due to the . fact that the new sort of civilian political leaders, while promising to satisfy military aspirations, also sponsor radical changeshe social order. Yet even where the Army has taken direct control, as In Peru and Vene-. suela, the resulting governments have been sensitive to popular demands for aoclal lm-i provement. Where demagogues gain mras support, as In Argentina, or whereare responsiveelatively broad and articulate electorate, as In Mexico and Uruguay, the capacity of the military foraction and their influence upon

the government tend to lessen.

eron's success In Argentina hasthe existing trend toward demagogi; and nationalistic regimes In others In Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. Peron has fostered this bend by giving material or moral aupport to like-minded nationalThe trend, however, Is primarily tha consequence of national cotidlUons andin each case. Even If othershould adopt domestic and foreign policies closely resembling those of Peron. their essential nationalism would preclude their becoming mere satellite* of Argentina.

he trend toward radical nationalism to Latin America la adverse to USommon expression of suchis Yankeephobla. This spirit Is in conflict with the Idea of hemispheric soU-darity and cooperation. As expressed inpolicy. It Involves withdrawalthird position" of neutrality between, even active opposition to, both the US and the USSR. In practical application this policy adversely affects only US Interests. Peron is actively endeavoring to Induce other Latin Amerp-an states to adopt this "thirdRe has had no apparent success so far. but the general trend is favorable for his purposes.

Basic Military Trends

ST. The primary function of Latin American armed forces has always been theof Internal order. Althoughwart have occurred within the area, they have been rare and are outside ofexpectation. Latin American military establishments have never been developed In the expectation of having to resist Invasionnt-class military power without the support and assistance of some other major power.

he Latin American governments have now agreedoordinated approach to the general problem of Hemisphere defense, with the assignment of tasks to particular states under an over-all plan and the preparation of their forces to perform the tasks assigned. Such planning le proceeding through the agency of the Inter-American Defense Board. At the same time various Latin American forces art being modern tied and developed under US Influence. This Influence Is exerted through Joint US-Mexican and US-Brarilian defense commissions, US military missions In all other Latin American countries except Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (the present armed forces of which wereunder UShe training of


Americans at Service schools In the Canal Zone and the United States, variousmutual security agreements, and the provision of Limited quantities of US military equipment

The major Latin American powersdesire to Improve their air and naval forces and toeasonable degree ofin ground strength. Unskilled manpower is available in adequate numbers, but these states generally lack the Industrial and financial resources, the skilledand the qualified officers to achieve this goal by their own erTorls. Any considerable Improvement and expansion of Latinarmed forces will therefore require US isslslance In tiaining and In the provision of (Miliary equipment Moreover, even In the test circumstances, the Latin Americans aoukl never expect lo meet attackrsl-c'ass military power without direct US air and naval support.

Communism In lolln America

to. The Communist threat to US securityIn Latin America la greater thanparty membership In the area wouldbecause of the ease withtlaUrely fewperating behind labor. Intellectual, and other fronts canthe toclal unrest and Yankeephoblaexisting in the non-Communist popula. Hon. Ouatemslarime example of howsmall Communist minority canatin American government and stronglyIts policy.

uring thehe SUHnlst Communist parties In Latin America hadembers and polled anofillion vote* In variouselections. Since thenember-ehlp ha* fallen to. Most of this decline has occurred in the three moat im-porUnt Communist parties, those in BreaU. Chile, and Cuba, each of which has lost about httf of Its members. In many countries the Communist Party Is now officially suppressed. In none it It an Important electoral factor. The Communists, a* such, have no present prxapect of gaining control over any Latin

American government by electoral means. Their direct participation In national politic* is significant only In Ouatexnala.

he Communist* have bad some success In their efforts lo gain control of Latinlabor by eatabUshlng reliablela in key positions In strategic labor union* and in national labor federations. Theycompletely the Internationalof Latin American Workersn recent years Communist control of labor unions has been somewhat curtailed byactko, but such action has alsoandommunist Labor leaders. In Chile and Venezuela, for example, government restrictions on union acUrity have tended to give Communist andlaborommon senseommon cause. Moreover, even where Commutiists have been ousted from official poslUons of union control, they retain some Influence as rank-and-file labor leaders or as officials In non-Co mm unlst unions. Furthermore, the Communists have sought Influence among the mass ofworkers. Through their Influence in labor theyapability for Interrupting the operations of strategically Importantby means of strike* and sabotage.

he Communists have also beenIn penetrating LaUn American educational tyiUiat, Intellectual circles, and thoseorganizations formed to give expression lo the new spirit of uHra-neUonallsm. In this way they seek to Instill prejudice In the rising generation, to Intensify socialistic andtendencies among thetoatriotic coloration for their ownnd to give suchto nationalism as will most cftecUvely hinder Utln American cooperation with the United SUtes.

M In the Utln American armed force*,the Influence of Communist* andsympathisers is alight. In general, the officer corps constitutes the strongestto Communism In Latin America.

ince the outbreak of the Korean war the USSR hasarkedly Increased Inter-eat In Latin America. This increased alien-

een reflected in the larger volume of Soviet broadcasts to Latin America, the movement* of important Communists, and the resolutions of recent Cornmunist-apon-tored conferences.


Since World War IT the Inter-American system has been subjected to new strains. Isolationist and anil US sentiment among Latin Americana has been kept alive or strengthened by the political, economic, and aoclal problems reviewed above. Latinbelieve that the US does not appreciate the urgency of these problems. They In turn do not fully understand the demands of the global situation upon US attention andand resent the failure of the US to glie them the financial and militarywhkh they believe they should have.

The outbreak of hostilities In Korealear test of Latin Americas willingness and ability to cooperate with the US In support of UN objectives. Initial enthusiasm wasIn the united support given by Latin America to the UN decision for action Inand to the resolution passed in the Council of the Organization of American Stalesthis action The five nations whkh had not yet ratified the Rio Treaty quickly did so. (Guatemala, however, has not as yetIU Instrument ofater, all but Argentina voted for the UN "Uniting for Peace" resolution and all supported the re-

. affirmation of Inter-American unity whkh came out of the Much-April 1CS1 meeting of the American Foreign Ministers, in addition to this political aupport, Latin America agreed, in principle, to Increase Its output of strategic raw materials

ore recently. Latin Americaneacept those of Argentina andhave giren excellent support to the US on all the Important political questions on whkh the US and the USSR were opposedthe) session of the UN General Assembly. Moreover, they have moved with caution on the Issues of Iran, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, despite their strong desire to support the national aspirations of otherFinally, since the rjeginning ofive latin American governmentsColombia, Ecuador, Peru, andentered Into bilateral military asjafsjaaei agreemenU with the US. Two othersand Bi arilhare signed suchbut have not yet ratified them

IB. Some considerations tend tothis record of governmental eooptretiori. Ln the week* after the opening of the Korean conflict Initial Latin American enthusiasm gave way to an attitude of caution andFearlobal war has beenby Communist and Fcronlat anti-US propaganda, whkh stresses the theme that Latin America ha* nothing to gain and much to lose from embroilmentorld conflict To dale, troop contribution* for Korea have not been forth coming, except from Colombia, and the recently negotiated militaryhave been subjected tottacks by Communist, nationalist, and other anti-US element*.

Economic Cooperolloh

he role of Latin Americaupplier of strategic raw materials, partkularly In time of war when access to materials In otherareas may be denied, makes Latin Amer-fcan economic cooperation vital to US and Hemisphere defense. Latin America atsupplies the United States with over thirty strategic mineral, fiber, and chemicalIts output of copper, petroleum, and sine forms an essential complement to US and Canadian production. The area la the only Western Hemisphere source ofncluding tin, cordage fibers, mica, quart* crystals, and monastic, and It la the principal Hemisphere source of antimony, ehromite. manganese, tantallte, and tungsten. The great bulk oftrsteglc materials comes from Mexico,eru, Chile, Bolivia, and BratiL

t1 meeting of American Foreign Ministers the United 6tales obtained from tha atin American nations pledges to Increase he production and the allocation to the US of strategic materials In short supply. The

implementation, of these pledges has not been as effective as the emergencyhole has not been expanded above general postwar levels. The feelings of latin Americana respecting this form ofcooperation were displayed at theMinisters meetingequest that the US proposal for increases in the output of strategic mate rials be accompanied byof assistance for general Latin American economic development. In general, emphasis upon their role as producers of raw materials is resented by Latin Americans as imputing totatus.

Latin Americans In general do not oppose the entry of foreign capital for the purpose of exploiting natural resources, but they arelncreistngiy Insistent on exercising control over the scope and form of suchThis Insistence stems not onlyilitant nationalism, but also from theof some leaders for conservation ofand the desire of all to obtainro quo.

With respect to trade wilh Commurust* controlled countries, the great majority of Latin American nations have promised either formally or Informally to comply with the provisions of the Battle Act. Nevertheless, some strategic materials, particularly Chilean copper, reportedly have been transshipped to

the Soviet Bloc via third parties In Western Europe. Latin American officials, however, have generally been cooperative when ap-

.preached by US officials with Instances of lax

-enforcement of trade controls.

.Mililory Cooperation

The Latin American armed forces are notprevent capable of providing adequatefor the area In the event of war, though they would be of some value In supporting roles.

ll Latin American countries except Oue-tcmala have esvsb'Uhcd their ellglbtily for reimbursable military aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Actost of them have submitted requests for such aid.they wlah to purchase tho mostanced types of US equipment, types which they do not actually need. In US opinion, and which the US cannot provide, either at all or In the desired quantities, under presentShipments to Latin America under this progrrm have therefore been small. The Inability Latin Ai -lean governments to obtain desired UB equipment for which they were willing to ptr his caused considerable resentment and has led to some purchases of European materiel, to the detriment of arms fltandardtsauon.

nly the five countries which haveinto bilateral military assistancewith the US are eligible for grant aid under the Mutual Security Act ofhey are Cuba,Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. Shipments under this program have only Just begun. BraxD and Uruguay have signedagreements, but have not yet ratified them. Such an agreement isominican ReoubUc. Of the nine countries so far approached, only Mexico has declined to negotiate.

Latin America's low priority In relation to Europe with respect to US military aid has caused general disappointment andin Latin American military andcircles. Rivalries and mutualamong Latin American states have also led to complaints about InequitableIn the bestowal ol US aid. Go far,these discontents have not seriously affected Latin American military cooperation with the United States.

Fourteen Latin American countries have received US Army or Air Force missions, or both, and nine have received US NavyGenerally they have been well satisfied with the work of these missions, but have not jiade optimum use of them. Argentina,has allowed lis contracts for Army and Air Force missions to lapse without renewal


ost Latin American governments wDl be under increasing pressure from urban middle class and labor groups to pursue policies aimed both at Increasing and at redistributing tha

xuUcuU income. These pouote* will lnvohe e> pensive programs ol Indus trial! ration andwelfare, often beyond the current fiscal capabilities of the countries which undertake them. Under 'hea* circumstance* UUn America will conUnue toertile ground for demagogue* of the ulUanationallst a*ne Communlat type.

ihe best immediate prospectsheck upon the extremist forces of social andchange are to be found In countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay, where moderate urban groups have been establishedolitical factor. Other naUoos. such as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, have theforImmediateneeds, but It Is doubtful that thenow In powtrthe Arm/ In Venezuela and Peru and the Conservative Party In Co-loroblaact inay as to sllay popular disaffection and ensure political tlabllT.y. Countries with only limited human and physical resources, such as the Domin):en Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, aeeia firmly set In the traditional soclsl andpsttern. The example of Guatemala, however, shows how readily thli pattern can be radically changed in such countries by abut purposeful minority.

The general trend toward nationalistic regimes maintained In large part byappeal to the depressed masses may be evpected to continue. Such regimes already exist In Argentina. Bolivia, and Ouateroala, and present circumstance*lrIn Chile and Ecuador. Peru,and Venezuela are the states next most vulnerable to this trend.

In any case, the trend towardof basic Industries, especially those now under foreign control, is Uxely to developThis trend woulo' not In Itself deny U8 access lo strategic rawhenationalised would still havs to sell theirthe availability of thesewould be affected byreater degree than at present It Is also likely that production would decline, at least temporarily, In naUonallscd Indus tile*.

Cooparolion with vfca Untied Storesituation Short of Global War

Both the Communists and the nlttvotably theyand intrigue, wfll aeek to curtail Latin American cooperation with the United State* The social, ecooocnlc, and political condlUonse been described will afford them op-port unities for anti-US agitation. It lahowever, that the Communist* can gain direct control over the policy of any Latin American stale, at least during the nextyears, or that Argentina can gain political control over any neighboring country. It is possible that Per on may succeed In slignlng other stale*ombination toigh price for cooperation, but any suchwould eirooet certainly be unstable.

The pressure of exaggerated nationsUsmec I* the capacity, and at tlmse the willingness, of Latin American government* to render on all occasions the degree ofmilitary, or economic support desired by Ihe Unitedventually this trend toward exaggeratedtwill seriously affect Hemisphere solidarity and US security interest* In Utln America. Nevertheless.ituaUon ahort of global war, the present degree and scope of Utln American cooperation with the United Bute* is likely to remsln basically unchanged for tha next iera: years. Defnit* commitment* by UUn American government* w'il behesftanuy and their implementation will probably be alow. The presentof aliategic raw materials to meet US re-ejulremenle will continue, but theconcerned will seek to drive hard bargains In terms of prices and of economic concessions.

Cooparolion In tha Ertrrl of Globalhe outbreak of global war would bring to Utlnreater awareness of danger to ihemselve* in the global situation and of their community ofith the Westernreater readiness lo meet their International military and economic commltmenU would probably follow.he US military position In the Western

We mlsphere remained secure, even Argentina and Guatemala might be expected totheir anti-US propaganda and,to cooperate in defense of the

The Latin American armed forces vrould not be able lo defend critical strategic areas and vital sea routes against serious enemy attack without the dL-ect participation of US forces. They would, however, be of value In supporting roles. In general they wouldbe adequate to maintain Internal order, to guard against sabotage of strategicand land transportation routes, and to protect air and naval installaUons fromor small-scale raids.

fter the outbreak of global war the United States could probably obtain anywhere Inmerica, except possibly Inthe air and naval facilities necessary for US participation In the defense of strategic areas and sea routes, including consent for the sUUonlng of air and naval forces at such sttllsUcns. There would, however, be great reluctance, to the point of possible refusal In some cases, to permit the entry of US ground forces unless large-Kale Invasion appeared Imminent Latin American governments would be even more unwilling to admit to their territories the forces of other Latin American states.

n the etentof global war Latin American governments would generally agree to anof their armed forces, but* wouldUS assistance in the provudon ofand training and would seek to Impose aa much of the increased expense as possible on the United States. Xxpanded Latinground forces, US equipped and trained, could eventually assume major mpceurlbOlty for the defense of continental areas. It Ishowever, that Latin American air and naval forces could evrr relieve the US of the major responsibility for air and naval defense.

ecause of the mutual suspicions of Latin American governments, their limited military resources, and popular sentiment against service overseas, it it doubtful that anyLatin American force would be afor operations outside of the Western Hemisphere, it is possible, however, that Br aril might be persuaded totvV ston, as In World War II. and that othermight provide token contingenta The number and effectiveness of such forces as might be made available for such service would be limited by the amount of US aid available for training, equipping, andthem.

The eoonocok dWocattons Incident to global war, including curtailment of eoooomic development and social programs, wouldcertainly increase Internal tensions andnstability In Latin America-with proper inducements, theof strategic materials could probably be Increased.

In circumstances of global war it Isthat all Latin American governments would agree lo suppress existing overtorganizations and would have theto do so. The extent to which the activities of the underground Communistcould or would be controlled would vary with the determination of 'hethe effectiveness of the local Intelligence agencies and police, and popular atUtudes in each country,

he greatest danger from Communists In Latin America In time of global war would he that of sabotage In strategic Industrie*.It is unlikelyarge-scaleof sabotage could be sustainedthe area, the dispersion and vulnerability of key targets, especially inn systems, and the generalof police and security forces, would favor sporadic success, especially In the period Immediately following the outbreak of war. 1


Original document.

Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: