SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES
vent* in Poland and Hungary havethe strength and vitality of anti-Soviet sentiments tn these Satellitesln Hungary, there have beenof strong anti-Communistas well. The Soviet strategic, position in Eastern Europe has been weakened. Soviet policy is now confronted with serious(a) the need to make somewith the increasing pressures ofin the Satellites without losing thcminimum of control over them; (b) the difficulty of using Soviet armed might to put down nationalist and anti-Communist revolt in thc face ot world opinion.
Poland
A new Communist regime, considerably more independent of Moscow than theone. has been established in Poland, with reluctant Soviet acquiescence. This regime is pledged to maintain the alliance with the USSR, including the retention of Soviet forces in Poland as long as NATO forces remain in Germany, but reserving the right to choose whether or not Soviet specialists and military advisors will remain ln thc Polish army. It Is also pledged to introduce certain democratic procedures (presumably compatibleo slop coercive collectivization, and to raise standards of living.
The stability of the Gomulka regime rests on its ability toalance betweenPolish aspirations for Independence and economic improvement, on the one hand, and the minimum requirements of the USSR with respect both to the maintenance of thesystem and to Soviet military security, on the other. Developments in Hungary may
iddle road course difficult for
Hungary
In Hungary concessions were made soand reluctantly as to Intensify rather than satisfy the pressures for change. The regime of the,Communist Imrc Nagy, once purged from the party for devlatlonism.and only recently restored to party membership, took over with the outbreak of open revolt and the employment of Soviet forces. Nagy promised drastic reforms andovernment which included non-Communists. Thearmy does not appear to have been employedarge scale, and its allegiance in the struggle Is unclear. There have been widespread desertions to thc rebels,in the west, and the rebels arc inof some tanks in other areas; but at least elements of two Hungarian divisions arc known to have participated in the repression at the outset
It is unlikely that any Hungarianwill be able toompromiseSoviet security requirements andnationalist sentiment Certain rebel groups appear willing to accept Nagyand it seems possible that he can gradually establish control if he can reach an accommodation with the rebels with respect lo their principal demands: abolition of thc secret police, complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from tlie country, and changes In the composition of the government. If the rebels refuse to make an accommodation with Nagy, the Soviet Union will be faced with theof risking thc developmenton-Communist and independent Hungary or of intervening with large scale military forces to take over the country by force. "
a fi rut.
MiI fi T
Satellites
igns of nationalistic Icrment were seen during thc spring In Czechoslovakia.late lastumber ofpoliticians were released from prison in Czechoslovakia. Rumania, and Bulgaria; In theumber ot prominent Stalin purge victims in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were cleared of Tltolst charges; andpersonnel changes were made, partte-ularly ln the Czech defense ministry and the Rumanian police apparatus But there have been no challenges to Soviet influence by thc governments of those Satellites, and fewof sharp divisions within the local parties. However, in the absenceoviet returnolicy oforeand nationally-oriented regime will probably be evolved for Czechoslovakia and possibly Rumania and Bulgaria. Thiswould be increased If the Hungarian rebels win most of their demands. Albania, on tlie other hand. Is less likely to pressfor independence.
ast Germanypecial case.of East German desires, the USSR win almost certainly not tolerate any substantial weakening of controls or the introduction of effective nationalist influence into theThe USSR regards East Gennany as vitally Important to Soviet security anda garrison ofine divisions there. Moreover, fear among the Poles and Czechseunified Germany with Irredentist claimsactor serving to persuade them of the need to cooperate with the USSR and tothem from supporting an East German independence movement.
Economic Consideration*
ongstanding economic grievancesto be an Important factor behind unrest in the Satellites Reduced use of repressive measures and an increased candor ineconomic problems have recentlymore overt expression of discontent. In an effort to nlleviate tlie situation, the USSR has recently negotiated modest aid agreements with Poland, Hungary. Eastand Bulgaria.
Polish and Hungarianalmost certainly attempt lo lessendependence on the USSR, bytrade with the West, andby seeking economic assistance,In Uie form of credits.
The most serious immediate-problem for Fast Europe may be the fuel shortage which will probably result from underfuIflHments In tho Polish, Czech, and Hungarian coalA severe winter would Increase fuel demands and might freeze up East German open pit operaUons, causing serious shortages which the USSR, with its own coal difficulties, might not be able to alleviate. The bumper Soviet harvest could compensate for the poor Satellite crop of this fall and assure food sup
IMPllCATIONS FOR SOVIET POUCY
We believe that the Hungarian rebellion cameurprise to the Soviet leadership. On the basis of the evidence presentlySoviet policy through thc Polish and Hungarian crises appears to have beenIt is too early to be confident on this matter, but wc believe that Soviet leadership may belate of confusion, and unUl basic decisions are made, may be unable to conduct policy with sureness ofrisis in Western relationships over thc Middle East might make Soviet leaders feel Uiat they had greater freedom of aciion ln the Satellite area
There has for some time been difference of opinion among Soviet leaders about Uie post-Stalin policy of seeking to reduce apathy at home, disaffection in thc Satellites, and distrust in Uie non-Communlst world. Soviet confidence in this policy, generated by gains in morale at home and an improved position in International relations, must now have been shaken by the need to make concessions In Poland and especially by the events inIt is possible that the Hungarianwill precipitate changes In theor structure of Uie Soviet leadership II thc Hungarian rebels are able toubstantial political victory, pressures for policy changes will almost certainly make the position of the Khrushchev leadership increas-
*
ingiy difficult. The positioit of advocatesarder line may be strengthened. Changes in the leadership would be even more likely If the professional military under Zhukov insist that basic Soviet security is being Jeopardized by current policies.
Domestic and Foreign Policy
rrespective of any action which Soviet leaders may feel forced lo take in Hungary, it is unlikely that they will wish drastically to reverse Uie course of domestic relaxation which was undertaken largely for pressing internal considerations and has significantly improved party and popular morale. It is also unlikely that Soviet leaders will abandon the effort to woo the uncommitted areas of thc world and to weaken Western alliances.armed acUon in the Hungarian crisis will have an adverse effect on the credibility of thepropaganda exploitation of anUcol-
onlal movements, but the ultimate effect ln this area, as well as on the atUtudes of Uie Yugoslav and Chinese Communists promoters
of Satellite autonomy, will be determined more
by future Soviet policy than by thc present
emergency action
Policy Toward the Satellites
vidence at present docs not permit an estimate of whether or not the USSR willHungary with additional military force sufficient to quell thc rebellion, in thc event Uiat present measures to establish conirol are unsuccessful. Unless II does so. however, wc believe it unlikely that the USSR would find it feasible to Impose for any longtalinist system of rigid police andcontrols over lhe Satellilcs. For thethe USSR wUl probably endeavor tofurther outbreaks in Uie Satellites by insisting on precautionary police measures and the suppression of anti-Soviet ferment. These closer controls will probably beby ameliorating measures such ashelp in meeting food shortages, moratorla on collectivization, and relief from some other economic pressures. Fast Germany will be watched with particular vigilance.
f confronted by strong nationalistin thc olher Satellites, the USSR will probably attempt to establish Communistwhicharger measure ofautonomy but which maintain military and foreign policy solidarity with the USSR.
Military Implications
e believe Uie Soviet leaders estimate Uiat the minimum miliiary requirements for their naUonal securily Include thc maintenance of effective early warning capabilities on the Satellite borders, of powerful Soviet forces In East Germany, and of secure lines offrom Uie USSR to East Germany The developments in Poland and Hungary will probably resultubstanUal downwardin the Soviet estimate of The reliability of most of the Satellite armedethese circumstances willeen Soviet desire to iclaui its own military lorces ln thc other Satellites in which they arc now stationed, especially in Poland. For thefuture, the possibility of new Satel lite rebellions win reinforce this desir?Uie Soviet leaders will almost certainly retain Uie Warsaw Pact organization In order to preserve thc rights which they enjoyIt
t seems unlikely that US action short ol overt military intervention or obviousfor such Intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which Itwould materially Increase the risk of general war. The Soviet leaders probablyUiat the US nuclear-air capabilitysuperior to that of the USSR, and have probably concluded that at present the USSR, even If iturprise attack, would receive unacceptable damageuclearwith Uie US.
oviet suspicions of US policy andcircumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably increase the likelihooderies of acUons and counter-acUons leading inadvertently to wareries of actions could most readily originate with respect to East Germany.
' See Annex.
6
Original document.
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