6
235
national intelligence estimate
NUMBER
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY ,
Submitted by the
DmtCXOR OF CENTRAL INTTXUGENCK , he following OtteOlgence brgenUattots participated in tht preparation ef this estimate: Tht Central InteBlgenct Agency and tht inttmeene* crgenlscricns of tht Department* of State, the Amy. the. Vie Air Forte. anS Tht Joint Staff.
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEDoncurring vert tht Special Assistant,epartment ol State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,epartment of tht Army; the Director of /fatal Intelligence: the Director of IrdtOicence. USaP; and ihe Deputy Dlrtctor for Intelligence. The Jointhe Atomic energy Commission Representative to tht 1AC, and the Assistant Dlrtctor, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ahitawed, - he subject being outside of their furUdlctlon.
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY -
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SATELLITESnta In Poland and Hungary havethe strength and vitality of anU-Sovtet sentiments ln these Satellites-in Hungary, there have been man notations of strong anti-Communistas well. The Soviet strategic position i- Eastern Europe has been weakened. Soviet policy is now confronted with serious dllem-mu (a) the need to make somewith the increasing pressures ofln the Satellites without losing theminimum of control over them; (b) the difficulty of using Soviet armed might to put down nationalist and ant:-Communist revolt In the face of world opinion.
Poland
ew Communist regime, considerably more independent of Moscow than theone, has been established in Poland, with reluctant Soviet acquiescence. This regime is pledged to maintain the alliance with the "iiwii, including the retention of Soviet forcea Poland as long as NATO forces remain In Oermany, but reserving the right to choose whether or not Soviet specialists and military advisors will remain in the Polish army. It is also pledged lo Introduce certain democratic procedures (presumably compatibleo stop coercive collectivisation, iad to raise standards of living.he stability of the Gomulka regime rests on its ability toalance betweenPcUih aspirations for Independence and economic improvement, on the one hand, and the minimum requirements of the USSR with 'espect both lo the maintenance of thesystem and to Soviet military security, on the other. Developments In Hungary mayiddle road course difficult for
Hungary
n Hungary concessions were made soand reluctantly as to intensify rather than satisfy the pleasures for change. The regime of Uic. Communlit irnre Nagy, once purged from the party for deviaUonism.and only recently restored to party membership, took over with the outbreak of open revolt and the employment of Soviet forces. Nagy promised drastic reforms andovernment which includedThearmy does not appear to have been employedarge scale, and its allegiance In the struggle ls unclear. There have been widespread desertions to the rebels, parUcu-larly in the west, and the rebels are Inof some tanks in other areas; but at least elements of two Hungarian divisions are known to have participated In the repression at the outset.
t Is unlikely that any Hungarianwill be able toompromiseSoviet security reqcmcnts andnationalist sentiment Certain rebel groups appear willing to accept Nagyand it seems possible that he can gradually establish control if be can reach an accommodation with the rebels with respect to their principal demands: abolition of the secret police, complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from tbe country, and changes In the composition of the government If the rebels refuse to make an accommodation with Nagy, the Soviet Union will be faced with theof risking the developmenton-Communist and Independent Hungary or cf intervening with large scale military forces to lake over the country by force. "
i-
Other Satellites
Signs of nationalistic ferment were seen during the spring in Czechoslovakia.late lastumber ofpoliticians were released from prison in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria; in theumber of prominent Stalin purge victims In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were cleared of Titoist charges; andpersonnel changes were made,in the Czech defense ministry and the Rumanian police apparatus. But there have been no challenges to Soviet influence by the governments of those Satellites,'and fewof sharp divisions within the local parties. However, in the absenceoviet returnolicy oforeand nationally-oriented regime will probably be evolved 'or Czechoslovakia and possibly Rumania and Bulgaria. Thiswould be increased If the Hungarian rebels win most of their demands. Albania, on the other hand, Is less likely to pressfor independence.
East Germanypecial case.of East German desires, the USSR Will almost certainly not tolerate any substantial weakening of controls or the Introduction of effective nationalist influence Into theThe USSR regards East Germany as vitally Important.to Soviet security anda garrison ofine divisions there. Moreover, fear among the Poles and Czechseunified Germany with Irredentist claimsactor serving to persuade them of the need to cooperate with the USSR and tothem from supporting an East German Independence movement.
Economic Considerations
ongstanding economic grievancesto be an Important factor behind unrest In the Satellites. Reduced use of repressive measures and an Increased candor Ineconomic problems have recentlymore overt expression of discontent. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the USSR has recently negotiated modest aid agreements with Poland, Hungary, Eastand Bulgaria.
Polish and Hungarianalmost certainly attempt to lessendependence on the USSR, bytrade with the West, andby seeking economic assistance,in the form of credits.
most serious Immediate-problemEurope may be the fuel shortageprobably result from underfulflUmentsPolish, Czech, and Hungarian coalA severe winter would Increaseand might freeze up Eastpit operations, causing seriousthe USSR, with its own coalnot be able to alleviate. Theharvest could compensate for thecrop of this fall and assure food
FOR SOVIET POUCY
We believe that the Hungarian rebellion cameurprise to the soviet leadership. On the basis of the evidence presentlySoviet policy through the Polish and Hungarian crises appears to have beenIt Is too early to be confident on this matter, but we believe that Soviet leadership may betate of confusion, and until basic decisions are made, may be unable to conduct policy with sureness ofrisis in Western relationships over the Middle East might make Soviet leaders feel that they had greater freedom of action In the Satellite area
There has for some time been difference of opinion among Soviet leaders about tbe post-Stalin policy of seeking to reduce apathy at home, disaffection in tbe Satellites, and distrust in the non-Communist world. Soviet confidence In this policy, generated by gains In morale at home and an improved position In International relations, must now have been shaken by the need to make concessions in Poland and especially by the events InIt Is possible that the Hungarianwill precipitate changes In theor structure of the Soviet leadership. If the Hungarian rebels are able toubstantial political victory, pressures for policy changes will almost certainly make the position of the Khrushchev leadership
ingly difficult. Tho position of advocatesarder line may be strengthened. Changes in the leadership would be even more likely if the professional military under Zhukov insist that bask Soviet security is being jeopardized by current policies.
Domestic and Foreign Policy
of any action whichmay feel forced to take in Hungary,unlikely that they will wish drasticallythe course of domesticwas undertaken .largely forconsiderations and hasparty and popular morale Itunlikely that Soviet leaders wtlleffort to woo the uncommitted areas ofand to weaken Western alliances.armed action ln the Hungarian crisisan adverse effect on the credibility ofpropaganda exploitation ofmovements, but the ultimates well as on the attitudes ofand Chinese CommunistsSatellite autonomy, will be determinedfuture Soviet policy than by theaction.
Policy Toward the Satellites
at present does not permitof whether or not the USSR willHungary with additional militaryto quell the rebellion. In thepresent measures to establish controlUnless it does so, however,It unlikely that the USSR wouldfeasible to Impose for any long periodsystem of rigid police andcontrols over the Satellites. For thethe USSR will probably endeavor tofurther outbreaks in the Satelliteson precautionary policethe suppression of anti-Sovietcloser controls will probably beby ameliorating measures such ashelp ln meeting food shortages.collectivization, and relief from somepressures. Kast Germany willwith particular vigilance.
f confronted by strong nationalistIn the other Satellites, tho USSR will probably attempt to establish Communistwhicharger measure ofautonomy but which maintain military and foreign policy solidarity with the USSR-Mi litory Implications
e believe the Soviet leaders estimate that the minimum military requirements for their national security Include the maintenance of effective early warning capabilities on the Satellite borders, of powerful Soviet forces In Bast Germany, and of secure lines offrom the USSR to East Germany. The developments In Poland and Hungary will probably resultubstantlal_downwardin the Soviet estimate of "the reliability of most of the Satellite armedethese circumstances wineen Soviet desire to retain Its own military forces in the other Satellites in which they are now stationed, especially in Poland. For thefuture, the possibility of newrebellions will reinforce this desire.the Soviet leaders will almost certainly retain the Warsaw Pact organization ln order to preserve the rights which they enjoyIt
1 See Ai.:
It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or obviousfor such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take stepsould materially increase the risk of genera] war. The Soviet leaders probablythat the US nuclear-air capabilitysuperior to that of the USSR, and have probably concluded that at present tho USSR, even If Iturprise attack, would reoeiva unacceptable damageuclearwith the US.
Soviet suspicions of US policy andcircumstances which Involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably Increase the likelihooderies of actions andleading Inadvertently to war.eries of actions could most readily originate with respect to East Germany.
ANNEX
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Original document.
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