|
Archive-Name: vietnam/australia/part3
Last-modified: 1996/05/10 Posting-Frequency: monthly (1st) See reader questions & answers on this topic! - Help others by sharing your knowledge Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by Brian Ross. --- This is the continuation of the article in soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (2/3) --- The Labor party, once more consigned to the opposition benches in Parliament, pointed out that Australia was not bound in any way to help Malaysia, Australia being only committed to the defence of Malaya under the ANZAM agreement. They would have preferred a formal treaty between the two states as to what sort of commitment that Australia was to make to Malaysian defence. This was however defeated in parliament along party lines when it went to the vote. Although the confrontation consisted of counterinsurgency operations in North Borneo, the Government was worried about a direct attack by Indonesia against Australian territory, in particular New Guinea. When in may 1964 Sukarno called upon "21 million volunteers" to crush Malaysia, and his Government told Australia not to interfere in what was basically an Asian problem, warning that if Australia did become involved then the responsibility would be Australia's alone.22 After this was announced there followed a discussion on 21 April 1964 in Parliament, as to whether an attack by Indonesians on Australian troops in Borneo would activate the terms of the ANZUS agreement, leading to the involvement of America. After criticism from the opposition leader Arthur Calwell, who' said that, "America does not believe that its commitment does include the protection of Australia troops already in Malaya".23 The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies replied that while the letter of ANZUS does not cover Australia troops stationed abroad, the intent did. He suggested that, "The United States of America did not even withdraw its support for Malaysia. It has recognised Malaysia, and it wants Malaysia to be maintained... [but] That when it came to the immediate defence of Malaysia this was perhaps primarily a Commonwealth responsibility."24 Despite the brave words the government was worried. It feared the possibility of the confrontation escalating and that as its troops were already in contact with the Indonesians in North Borneo, that the United States would not come to its aid. 25 With defence becoming more of important in the thinking of the Government, selective compulsory conscription was introduced before Parliament on 10 November 1964.26 This was to increase the Army to an effective strength of 37,000. The reason being given was a lack of sufficient volunteers, due to a period of full employment and economic expansion in the civil sector. This build up of the Army was required for, Menzies said, "our deteriorating strategic: situation. We expect a continuing requirement to make our forces available for cold war and counterinsurgency tasks. We must have forces ready as an immediate contribution should hostilities occur."27 The small Australia Army was over-extended by its commitments both in Malaya and Borneo and the result was that only two Battalions to defend Australia. The Army was also committed to providing "advisers" as part of an aid package to the Government of South Vietnam in its war against Communist insurgents and this was stretching its limited resources to the maximum. Obviously more manpower was required if a credible defence was to be mounted against the threat of Indonesian aggression and the only way that could be achieved was through conscription. Then it was announced that Australian combat troops in the form of one infantry Battalion, with supporting elements, would be committed to the war in South Vietnam, on 29 April 1965. The Government was criticised by the Opposition as well as by a strong vocal middle-class minority which could not be dismissed as Communist or pro- Communist in their views. This vocal minority was made up of numerous dignitaries, including Bishops of various denominations, who were extremely critical of the policies of the rapidly changing South Vietnamese Governments. They believed that the Australian Government should seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict, rather than sending more military aid.28 As a result of this decision Australian conscripts would, for the first time serve outside Australia or its territories and north of the Equator. This had not even occurred in World War II, and it particularly incensed the Opposition leader who held to the ALP's longstanding opposition to conscription for service not in the direct defence of Australia.29 This initial commitment of an Infantry Battalion quickly grew to become a Task Force (or Brigade ) of three or four Battalions with supporting units of Armour, Engineers, Artillery and Logistic support, as well as RAAF units flying Canberra's and helicopters and also naval units. The tasks of these units quickly changed, from guarding and defensive ones to offensive operations against the Vietnamese Communists. At its height the Australian commitment to Vietnam reached 8,000 men in 1968-69. Australia's involvement in Vietnam was prompted by three main factors. Perhaps most important of these was a very poor perception by the Government of world affairs at that time. Throughout the late fifties and sixties Australian diplomatic circles were firmly convinced of a subversive "Communist Threat" outside Australia. This threat, initially directed by Moscow, and later by Beijing, dominated Australian diplomatic thought for approximately fifteen years. It had though, roots which went much further back than that. As Frank Cain mentions,30 the members of the coalition government gained anti-Communist convictions well before the second world war. He suggests that the "the road to Vietnam was not only paved with anti-radical and anti-communist rhetoric and actions but that the non-Labor forces came to be prisoners of such rhetoric."31 As a consequences of their repeated successes in federal elections, they were convinced of the appropriateness of these policies. In fact when they failed to "kick the Communist can" as they did in 1961, the coalition nearly lost office. As a consequence the anti- Communist policy of the government under Menzies became electorally self-rewarding and they sought to use it where ever possible. This does not deny that they were not totally convinced for the best of reasons but that they also managed to convince the electorate that Communism must be opposed where ever possible. As Cain suggests, when Menzies made his statement suggesting that "the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia,"32 the anti-Communist convictions developed over the previous five years were now convincing them to intervene and this action led Australia into the "quagmire of the Vietnamese civil war."33 Even after the departure of Menzies in 1965, the ideological crusade to which the Coalition was committed carried it to greater electoral victories. In the 1966 election Harold Holt's government was returned by an even greater majority by an electorate who believed in the necessity to remain in Vietnam. However as the middle-class became more convinced about the dangers of their sons being conscripted to fight overseas in Vietnam, they switched their vote to the Labour Party in response. It was ironic that the coalition by using anti-Communist rhetoric to maintain electoral support now lost office by not taking note of it in the election which led to their defeat in 1972. The coalition government's doubts about Indonesia's political alignment had been reinforced over the years by the acceptance of large quantities of military and civil aid by Jarkata from initially Moscow, and then later Beijing. While in retrospect it is obvious that Sukarno was playing the East off against the West in an effort to gain what he wanted, it raised fears in Canberra that Sukarno was increasingly coming under the control of the local Communist members of his government. This was further reinforced when Sukarno threatened to nationalise the three major oil companies operating in Indonesia (Shell, Caltex and Stanvac) which represented over $US500 million in investment.34 This fear of a Indonesia becoming a Communist country on Australia's doorstep further reinforced the already rigid anti-communist stance of the coalition's leaders.35 This perception of an aggressive Communist threat in Asia prompted Australian foreign Policy planners to support American policies in Asia almost completely blind to the realities of the situation facing them. The war in Vietnam was not perceived as a local rebellion or civil war, caused by discontent, or even as a war of "national liberation" from the last vestiges of colonial rule as it perhaps should have been. Instead, it was perceived by the then Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck', as he related in his policy speech on 23 March 1965, as a conflict where, "the application of the methods of and doctrines of Communist Guerrilla warfare first evolved in China and then successfully in North Vietnam."36 In his judgement the South Vietnamese were not dealing simply with a situation of local unrest, but with a "large scale campaign of assassination and terrorism", the direction of which was coming from "outside".37 This "outside" direction was perceived most definitely as from Beijing. Gregory Clark suggests that this perception of Chinese aggression was carried to the point of "Sinophobia".38 He relates the story of how Hasluck visited Moscow in October 1964. He was seeking to enlist Soviet aid in preventing the success of this perceived Chinese aggression in Vietnam. Needless to say the Soviets turned the discussion to things of more interest and use to them.39 This fear of Communist aggression was not, only confined to the Ministry of External Affairs. The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, said in his policy speech on 29 April 1965 that, "the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South-East Asia. It must be seen as a part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans."40 The fear of this Communist aggression was founded upon what was referred to as the "Domino Theory" by its exponents. Unless this aggressive action by China was stopped in Vietnam, ran the theory, then after Vietnam had fallen, the surrounding countries would follow, just like a row of Dominoes. These countries, which tended to be neutral in their outlook, favouring neither east or west, might become embroiled in another war like Vietnam, or they might defect to the Communist line. It was feared that this "domino" action would eventually lead to Australia's shores and then the policy of forward defence would mean Darwin instead of Vietnam. While it was in confrontation with Indonesia the government had the added fear that, as Renouf suggests, "Indonesian success with confrontation could lead to a reverse Domino Theory - from south to north - with Singapore, a strategically placed island, being an early victim,"41 and with Australia being perhaps the next target. Perhaps more significant than this as to why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War, was the Government's policy of relying on "great and powerful friends" for Australia's defence. The Government was afraid that if the problems with Indonesia came to armed conflict then Australia would be abandoned by America and Britain. The response of its two major allies, Great Britain and the United States, to the problems of West New Guinea and to a lesser extent Borneo, had convinced the government that they did not share Australia's deep concern about Indonesia. The United States was unwilling to support Australia's stand with anything more substantial than words. Both Britain and the United States had seen it against their interests to provoke Indonesia, who commanded considerable power amongst other third world countries and because of the large amounts of investment both countries had tied up there. They feared the danger of Sukarno nationalising their interests without compensation.42 In addition when Australia had asked the United States for an unequivocal commitment under the ANZUS treaty, that it was willing to guarantee Australia's defence in case things with Indonesia blew up first over Dutch West New Guinea and then later in Borneo. While Pemberton suggests that in Washington's mind it was fully committed to Australia, in Canberra the lack of a public sign or declaration to that effect weighed heavily on Menzies's mind.43 So it was that Australia was seeking a method by which America could be "locked into" the defence of both Asia and in particular Australia, against this feared Communist Aggression. The opportunity presented itself when America proposed that Australia provide more advisers and some air and naval aid to Vietnam.44 Australia however seized upon the chance to offer troops, particularly with the expansion of the Army to meet "a continuing requirement for cold war and counter- insurgency tasks".45 While William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for SE Asia, noted the offer of troops, he was more hopeful of receiving advisers instead. As America at this time was not willing to commit her own troops to Vietnam. As Sexton suggests, this would seem to indicate that the Australians believed the Americans were not taking a tough enough line. They had allowed political events, both at home and abroad to influence their actions. The Australians believed that the Americans needed their resolve stiffened.46 So it was that Australia offered the use of ground troops on 18 December 1964. Although the announcement that this offer had been received and accepted by both the Americans and the Parliament until 29 April 1965. Although, as Sexton points out, the request that Menzies referred to in Parliament was not received by the Australian Government's representatives in Saigon until that very day had to be almost forced out of the South Vietnamese government.47 Talks on the matter had taken place well before this date, on 22 April, between the Australian and the Americans. This announcement came before an American decision to commit ground troops had occurred. So it was that at Australian insistence, Australian troops were committed to take part in the Vietnam War not, as was always stated, on the basis of an American request.48 So it can be seen from these short accounts that Indonesia's policy of Confrontation over West New Guinea and Malaysia was a major contributing factor in the Australian Government wishing to become involved in a war far from Australian shores. Other factors that contributed to this wish to become involved in an Asian war were the fear of the Domino theory, the seeming lack of American commitment to the defence of Asian and Australia in particular, and the fear of a perceived threat of Communist As both Sexton, and Cooksey, point out, Australia was not happy with the United States' performance over the West New Guinea and Borneo affairs, so in an effort to build up a "credit of goodwill" with America that could be drawn upon in time of need it would seem that Australia decided to enter the Vietnam war.49 There is an old American political adage that says "not what you have done for me, but what have you done for me lately"? So Australia became involved to show the Americans that if we were willing to help them, they would then perhaps be willing to help us if it ever came to the point of war with Indonesia. ---------------------------------------- ENDNOTES 1 p.70, Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to Vietnam, Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987. 2 p.71, Pemberton, G., All the War, Australia's road to Vietnam. 3 p.24, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea, Australian Quarterly, June 1967. 4 p.628, 'Policy Speech on External Affairs', Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 March 1950. 5 p.881-2, Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957. 6 quoted p.26, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea'. 7 pp.76-9, Pemberton, G., All the Way. 8 pp.80-1, Ibid. 9 p.29, ibid. 10 p.80, ibid. 11 P.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way. 12 p.428, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979. 13 idem. 14 p.889, 'Ministerial Statement on West New Guinea, ' , Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 March 1962. 15 pp.1151-1161, 'Debate on International Affairs' , Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 April 1962. 16 Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea, Australian Quarterly, June 1967. 17 p.30, Ibid. 18 p.21, Current Notes, Vo1.33, No. 3, 1962. 19 p.431, Renouf A., The Frightened Country. 20 pp.431-2, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country. 21 p.436, ibid. 22 p.157, Andrews, E. M., A History of Australia's Foreign Policy: from dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire , Melbourne, 1979. 23 p.1279, 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 April 1964. 24 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November 1964. 25 pp.174-5, Pemberton, G., All the Way. 26 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November 1964. 27 p.2718, 'Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November 1964. 28 p.113, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983. 29 p.114, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis. 30 Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and Anti-Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by the author 31.p.1, ibid. 32 pp.1060, `Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April 1965. 33 p.161 Cain F., `Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and Anti-Communism 1920-1966'. 34 p.178, Pemberton, G., All the Way. 35 pp.436-7, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country. 36 p.2381 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 March 1965. 37 ibid. 38 pp.19-20, Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign Affairs Debate in Australia, a personal account', in King, P., (Ed. ), Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney, 1983. 39 ibid. 40 pp.1060-1, "Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April 1965. 41 p.436, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country. 42 p.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way. 43 p.188, Pemberton, G., All the Way. 44 p.61, Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam Secrets, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981. 45 p.2718, `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November 1964. 46 p.69, Sexton, M., War for the Asking. 47 pp.140-145r Sexton M., War for the asking. 48 pp.165-171, Sexton, M., War for the Asking 49 p.47, Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam Policy', World Review, October 1966. ---------------------------------------- BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives. Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957 Secondary Sources: Andrews, E.M., A History of Australia's Foreign Policy: from dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire , Melbourne, 1979. Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and Anti- Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by the author Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign Affairs Debate in Australia, a personal account', in King, P., (Ed.), Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney, 1983. Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam Policy', World Review, October 1966. Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979. Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to Vietnam, Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987. Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam Secrets, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981. Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983. Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea, Australian Quarterly, June 1967. _______________________________ - -Brian Ross ================================================================= Copyright (c) 1995 Brian Ross. Non-commercial distribution for educational purposes permitted if document is unaltered. Any commercial use, or storage in any commercial BBS is strictly prohibited without written consent. ~~~~~ [Moderator Note: All SHWV messages, FAQs And related files are archived at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/shwv/vwiphome.html. The posting of an article by the moderators of SHWV only indicates the article is within the Charter and does not imply agreement with, nor the correctness of, the article.] User Contributions: |
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: