STRATEGIC THINKING AND AIR INTELLIGENCE

Created: 12/1/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

J

TITLB: Strategic Thinking And Air Intelligence

'AUTHORc'a^'Jamee H.J

VOLUME: 2

STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A collceUon ot Articles on Ihe historical, operational, docirinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

the authors They do not neccssanly reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's faciual statements and interpretations.

7

Major General James H. Walsh

purpose In this article ts to discuss, In very broad terms, some of the significant aspects of air strategy lor the future and the vital functions that intelligence must perform In order

to Insure the success of future air operations. The

currently entertained that the 8ovlet rpufnOC may bentelligence of both meteorological and cartographic naturefor accurate firing of ICBUs Illustrate some of therelationships between air power and Intelligence. In away, even the first earth satellites point up the tasks and capabilities of future intelligence systems required for survival under conditions of international technologicalintelligence systems which must meet three basic criteria: global coverage. Instantaneous discovery, andaccuracy,

1 believe that weeasonably good understanding of past and present concepts of air warfare and the relation of Intelligence to those concepts. It Is far more difficult to look Into the future and to do so with the precision and clarity needed to prepare ourselves effectively for the trials andahead.

The reason for this bask uncertainty Is not that many people have neglected the problems of aerial technology and Itsimplications. The reason ts rather that wa an to tbe mldrtechnological revolution. Changes are becoming ao rapid, so penetrating and, In many instances, so contradictory

that the direct and Indirect results of the technological : ,

tton tend toat the same time to. V "

nature and application of touan row's sir strategy. _

less, ft li to this setting of dynamic technical changeorld beset by what often seems'an unllrrdted:

related and unrelated pollucal. eeohomV, pva'nttturj

kxoe that we most attempt "to examine the future

To begin with, we ah-eady have seen major alteration* tn tha taak nature of air forces sue* World War U- .The trarsattton

to jets, nuclear weapons, sonic speeds, countless black, boxes,

of IMS-Fifteen years ago the RAF qualitatively was the world'sair force- Today it Is in third place- More important, it is notlass,road margin, with the air forces of the US and the USSR, it has neither the aircraft, the equipment, the bases, the research and development, nor the funds to

becomeruly self-sufficient force, with strategic

billtles as required by world conditions.

Fifteen years ago the Soviet Air Force was an adjunct of the Russian army. Statistically Itorce In quantity, but it bad poor operational know-how and no strategicIts aircraft were fair, at best Today the Soviet Alr Force is the largest in the world. It is equipped with modem weapons, some of them as advanced as those of any other nation. Itell-funded and aggressive research and de-velopment program. Although it still has many weaknesses, the Soviet Air Force isid for world air mastery.

The US Air Force also has come of age in the postwar period. It has held the quality lead for most of that time and still holds It for most of the important equipments. Its personnel are superior In training and efficiency. But the USAF hasespecially In areas outside the SAC program Its progress is not to be belittled, but In some areas Its progress perhaps has not been so fast or so forward as we would like It to be.

The fortunate aspect is that during the postwar period the USAF has grown tolobal force. In fact, to this date, the USAFforgetting its navalthe only global force extant This American capabilityact of overriding importance. It will remain a. controlling factor in the inter- *

national poweroertain extent. Irrespective "

terAnological slippage and'of the inevitable acquisition'by

Soviet Uiuonlobalr

The most Importantshigle-

atoroic airpower hw beoV^

onlyation can deliver nuclear firepoww over longdia-

tances andhort time Is through the sir. Sea and

delivery of nuclear warheads is Important, particularly In ape-

dal situations. But hi termslobal nuclear war, these ' -

systemsand lome of tbe secondary means of aerialrycanjdojno mare than furnish tocal.jrejrtonal.jnd tae*

Ucal support to the strategic air strike

One of the changes upon us deals with defense In nuclear aerial war. Whereas the offense still seems to baredefense, the old axiom that like weapons are the best defenses against like weapons again could become true.

For the moment there Is very little one can do when an

atomic explosion occurs except to be underground,

equipped with food and non-contaminated water or, preferably, plenty of Irish whiskey. Nevertheless, the very possession of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes may act as afactornot because even the best defense would beof halting an attack, butood defense system would boost the force requirements of the attacker, lower the probability that he can execute his plan with full success, and thus, In some cases at least, tend to induce him to delay bis aggression until he has reached the required force andlevels. It is in the naturehat the aggressor may be unable to achieveosture ofthat he can dare take tbe risk of nuclear attack. If this shouldain hope, for example, because the defender has failed to keep up with the pace of the race, the actual use of nuclear warheads against mcomlng vehicles should reduce the effectiveness of the offense.

Some of our forward looking scientists are opumlsttc about

the feasibility of employing antl-ICBM missiles, which would

take advantage of the greatest point of vulnerability of the

earlyelle, its fixed trajectory. Many ideas have

- _

been proposed about nuclear preddonation and sophisticated

employment of modern electronics to Interfere with tnwlna;

nuclear attack. VVVj:

Then-umber of passive defensive steps which could - * :

ak< I, tohe vulnerability of our retaliatory

These include the dispersal Of aircraft and

and other forma of base hardening, short exposure times, rapid 'y-y

reaction procedures, and matotenaneaubstantial portion

of the alert force In the air at all.

Unfcatmiataly such systems can be vary costly. They ara

limited tn their coverage and may net be refittta etkoxsgh lac^ L

10

the safety of personnel and certain equipment. Elaboratedefenses tend to disrupt and slow the ability of an airo retaliate as rapidlyegic effectiveness of passive defense Is predicated uponwarning. Byefer to technical alarms such as radar and infrared sensing and to Interrelated strategic and tactical Indications tateUJgenee.

The true effectiveness of defense willunction of the scope, size, quality, and mental effort put into requisite weapons systems needed to furnish capabilities for protection, ivarnlng, Interception, and conn term easure tasks. It may be dubious whether or not even the best defensive system pitted against combinations of different types of attack weapons ever willigh kill rate, but this may not be the critical point

Rather, countersystems embodying nuclear warheads and built around effective warning and reaction responses suggestation may be able to close the gap between the power of the offense and present limitations on defense Suchcould pre-empt the advantage of surprise by sneak attacks by an aggressive nuclear delivery force. They would force the attacker Into more elaborate and costly delivery means,large and massive raids which are susceptible toand tactical detection and to interception measures.

Through all these means and measures tbe offensive may not necessarily be priced out of business, but Its effectiveness should be reduced against Its primary objectivetbe opponentsforce. Thus, it would be hoped, the attacker would be induced not to strike because of the uncertainty over the success of his Initial blow and also because be would have to risk his main force at excessive loss rates. In nuclear war the first blow must be decisive: the retaliatory force must be killed

It is quite clear that intelligence Influences trie

of defense. Whatever the technical proficiency of ait can be Improved by better mteUlgence,

. the technically rnost nrcnuatag* defenses can be invalidated

through mtenigence failure anywhere along- the "aaaesnhry " scientific intelligence to tactical warning.aps it ahould be observed that good Intelligence would allow the utilisation of foreign scientific and technologicalfor the Improvement of our owneyond pro-

11

us with better design patterns, such intelligence also

I should like to turn nowiscussion of variousfactors, some of them here now and some on the horizon, and try to relate themtrategic pattern. .

During the years ahead we shall be approaching practical terminal limits in certain key parameters of weapons systems.

We already may have reached what could be called terminal :>

explosive power, not that It would be impossible to achieve

higher

Within the next few decades we probably will attain terminal speeds, at least for terrestrial operations. We cannot exceed certain speeds without being forced from the earth'sfield. Before we achieve theoretical terminal velocities we shouldar lower practical speed limit for operations directed against targets on the ground. We must remember that the attainment of maximum speed In flight may require more time than would be necessary toerrestrialat lesser speeds.

We certainly shall be capable of terminal ranges In the sense that future air and missile systems will be able to drcumnavl-gate the globe at leastm convinced that there will be no practical limits to altitude, although there may bebarriers to surmount before manned and powered space flighteality. Such restrictions could occur in metallurgy, engines, communications, aero medicine, and no-clear components, among other fields. "

Let me dweQoment on tbe relationship of altitude to tomorrow's air strategy. In the immediate future, altitude

essentially willatter .of tactical advantage Inasmuch .v.. .

with respect to "powered flight, we stffl shall be competing

heights measured by thousands "ofe have comerecognize jhai the a

. '

i faonO a^

moving into speeds up toesult of Improved rocket

fuels, higher thrust engines, aerodynamic advances, and even *

newer blackm talking about situations up

SK*cT

12

/

But today we also stand on the threshhold olltitude QUmcnslons^iffpace vehicles alreadyInlg to heigfitsiles, and unpowered satellites, orare flying around the earth approximately every hourhalf, at heights up toiles. This altitude is bya limit but soon will be exceeded. Disregardingdevelopment of orbital flight, even at this pointof the recent quantum jump is that we arethe capability ol staying In the-

This overriding technological fact wfil have the mostimpact upon military operations. At present altitudes, the airman must worry about hurricanes, fog, winds, and other weather factors characteristic of the dense air which lies just above the earth. Tomorrow's space flyers must be concerned with meteoric showers, cosmic radiation, electronic barriers, and Buck Rogers' conditions within his cabin. Instead of using flighteans of traveling from one point on the earth's surface to another, either for friendly or unfriendly purposes, the new problem will be to reach an orbit, maintain it, and utilize nonpowered flight for scientific, military, and probably economic purposes.

The flying machine of outer space will notts time on the ground,ercent of Its time aloftstatistics, we are moving from transonic speedsSights of several thousands miles in length Intowhere speeds will be of the orderepending upon the height and shape of theeasily mayIP ton miles per day and hundredsof miles per year. ..

The development of terminalterms ofpower, range,nd speedwill not bring the technological race to ah" end.lQ capitalise on the new dimension of altitude and perhaps endurance rather than distanceecisive srea of militaryflt tary superiority will be dependeart upon mlatlre.advan'tages 'In. electronics,"warning, and deception. "Thus the sciences oftrum en tation and intelligence wfil become truly decisiveIn the equationhich the chiefseek to conquer altitude and achieve enduring control from

ground to outer space.

SECfi^

13

Modern air strategy will be affectedumberroblems, eachof whk^ could,become cruclaldn varyinghere U. for example! the requirement that

portion of the aerial strength must be on constantA strike force that requires one or two daysilitary liability. Even In today's war it wouldon theeffective air force must be numerically strong andget its combat aircraft into the air in time. It must be -.

locatedarge number of bases, preferably distributed on several continents and located at varying distances from the enemy. Moreover, it must be supported by reconnaissance forces operating vigilantly around the clock. Only such an air force Isosition totrategic, though notphysical, invulnerability.

In former wars, material strength was the decisive factor. The speed with which fire power could be delivered wasmportant butubsidiary element. The natureuture war is essentially noispute about territoryompetition for gains In the time dimension. This Is because, In the first place, technologyariable In time. The speed with which this factor varies will continue to increase as long as technological progress continues. In the secondey to success In air and missile warfare, the initial rounds of conflict are little moreontest to operate faster than the opponent. Surprise attack will be successful If the attacker moves faster than the defender. It will fan if the defender's "reaction tune" deprives him of targets andthe attack schedule.

Intelligence must come to closer grips with the timeWe are dealing not with one uniform period but withset of different time car^ortes. There Is the time prob-

lem of maturing manpower, scientific discovery, and technolog- '

lea!in generations. .Then Is the dura- . - , tton of research and" development programs,.

productlonrand'

a period of years tohere Isthe complex arningranging an the way from advanced strategic warn- ' ng measured in weeks, months, or era years, to tactical waro-

lng. measured inhere Is the problem ofL -and taterceptton, rneasured in seconds and

Pre-emptive. retaUalkon, deterrence, counterforce,and disruption attacksone way or another, are tied > pecific time requirement. The more mobile warfarethe more moving targets are assuming significance,

lessuestion of mere "capability" than of "capabilityAn airplaneigh yield weapon canan air base; the problem Is to destroy Itime whenwill be most lucrativefor example. Just beforewhen an attack.is to be launched from thatI add that only Intelligence can provide this

tant "timing capability"?

Perhaps an additional Illustration will clarify this thesis"Reaction time In guidedt Is important to count missiles in terms of numbers, warhead yields, and the like. But the foremost problem Is that of reaction time or response.

If ittrategic missile force four hours to launch, whereas the opponent can launch within minutes, the obvious advantage belongs to the side with the shorter reaction tuneprovided It has adequate warning.our reacting force will never leave the ground; Its threat will be pre-empted. If this Is correct. It appears toistake for Intelligence to count the degree of deterrent power primarily In numbers of missiles or warhead yields. It will be necessary to assess, above an, relative times of reaction.

Earlier we discussed the new parameters of altitude. It iselieve, that we reflect on tbe purpose ofat such altitudes. The use of outer space win penultcontinuous observation of any point on the earth, awhich, although not entirely without precedent,ew departure In modem strategic warfare. Space platforms are Decerning Indispensable elements of effective warningterns against future means of weaponsnless we. -conquerreat deal of the scientific knowledge which we require tohe technological race win not be avalt

Furthermore, orbiting vehicles eventually wfll ba used is'carriers and thus wfll develop Into crucialoffensive and defensive mlsaffe

AH this poses the spectra of outer apace military conflict which will involve three phases': first,'thecompetition'**

15

Into space tn sufficient quantities to occupy desirable orbits and to make profitable scientific jise of orbital .flights; -seebnbVthedeve^^

from our own orbits and for countering the enemy's mill tartly significant orbital activities; and third, the ability to neutralize or destroy terrestrial and aerial components of orbital systems.

This new sphere of warfare raises some perplexing problems in world relations. In addition to traditional surfacethere will arise sovereignties over vacuous orbits and the areas beneathsystem of biter laced surface and spatial boundaries thousands of miles In depth and tens of thousands of miles in length.

A new pattern of international relations must be developed in which orbits are occupied peacefully or conquered and in which orbits must be delineated. During peacetime tbe nations must respect each other's scientific and security operations in the orbits, and In wartime, of course, the purpose will be toall of the opponent's space vehicles. In turn, there must be capabilities for protecting the satellites. It is clear that this involves entirely new types of "aerial" operations, as it is also clear that the diplomats and International lawyers will have to do some bard thinking to settle peacefully the problems of orbit allocation and orbit sovereignty.

The introduction of the orbital dimension Into warfarethat factors such as Iron Curtains, the dispersal ofand missile sites, and the ability of navies tooIn the vastness of the oceans will tend to loseThe nature of the new implements Is definitivesuggest that the use of truly underground and ofmay dominate the terrestrial scene.esult,and techniques of surprise will undergo verythe exact nature of which we

ation to exist and survive under these conditions,system mustredominant security tech-ystem must meet three criteria; globalInstantaneous discovery, and absolute accuracy.'- The ays- ust be hu^ operatica^'bott in war and peaot Ihteffi.,must be run not only for the benefit of, but by thoselesponslble fca- oecislona of life or

Iave reached the point where It Is necessaryxamine this strategic framework; with Its epochal Implications

in the practical light of where we are today and to consider the

becoming Increasingly serious. The danger of tactical

prise is not lessened when the enemy, in additionighand rapid strike capability, alsoapability for low altitude air attack and may be developing mixed high and low altitude offensive forces.

Taking an even broader view, we can say that the nuclear explosive and the supersonic delivery vehicle have appearedoment when society is quite defenseless against suchDuring the last few centuries, war has taken place at the margins of society. Society supported the war from Itssurpluses and remained intactoing concern despite losses and devastations.

You recall that during ancient times, the situation wasDuring the Middle Ages, every town had to be self-sufficient for defense, with walls, moats, shelters, food, and water reserves. Practically every citizen had to bear arms. The American frontier town servesore recent example of this dangerous way of life.

I believe that society eventually will adjust itself to thetechnology of destruction. Perhaps we may have totroglodytes; our ancestors were. Architects may develop new types of resistant houses and "safe" urban settlements. Perhaps we shall develop anU-radlatlon protection. Theof 'hardening" can be applied to many human needs.

71

X am predicting only that the human mind win not stopAfter It realizes the grim threat of modem weapons, society gradually but Inevitably will take measures to assure Itsm basing this prediction on my faith thatman, morally and Intellectually, is not huerior to previous generations0 years ago.".

Whether this process of social adjustment Is .going to hutr perhapsut drirtagjhis Interim phase, humanity well may^ be passing'through the greatest pern of ft*ar five years from newwfil be Immeasurably more destructivear0 A. D. Our security, therefore, must be tailored to get us and the Tree World safely through this immediate period of extreme hazard.ri

It is this Interim character of the present militarycon!roots us with many perplexing problems. Defense

planning', which Includes tatelngehce.Ts'faced with

paradoxes.

In this age of matt mom offensive strength, there mayreat deal of reluctance to use up-to-date weapons, simplyno one wants touclear war. Yet we must prepare our wivesontest which requires us to put the

bulk of our resources Into nuclear armaments. As aj

we may have only limited capabilities to wage war tn which nuclear weapons do not provide the bask; Are power..

Yet some people have gone so far as to advocate the retention of full-fledged non-nuclear forces in addition to atomic forces. It Is generally agreed that we should prepare ourselves to fight with nuclear weapons. Yet some contend that we also shouldapability to fight tn the style of World War IIhigh explosives on the ground, at sea, and even from tbe air.

We probably could agree that the availability of non-nuclear forces would be very advantageous. Several types ofexplosives will remain with us, even In the nuclear age. Under certain tactical conditions, those may be even morethan nuclearwhich is tbe main reason why they should be retained.

Unfortunately, the question Is not one of advantage oror even of choice. Tbe question la one of capability in all aspectamanpower, military organisation, research, funds, training, equipment,nd so on.

Suppose that we maintainuclearon-nuclear defense establishment. There Is tbe high probability or near-certainty that tbe investment tn non-nuclear arms would be Invalidated as soon as tbe first atomic weapons are used. This win happen, almost inevitably, at the first serious militaryof either belligerent.

But the question of non-nocjear armaments Is notatter of duplication- 'The cost of matching atomic system* -with non-nuclear weapon* tn terra* of relative military eflec-trvenea* would be exorbitant. More si an Infant,econd force could not be established on any reasonable seal* unless we acquire two seta of our akaflntatlwo set* of oar qualified manpower, and two Stat* at'ora country. -

I am not raising the issue of limited versus general war. The requirements of any local war situation can be met fromand programmed forces and" V

m addressing myself to the problem oftoon-nuclear force at the expense of our atomic strike and defense units, which must be maintained at andegree of readiness because of the overwhelmingof the Soviet nuclear threat to the US and the Free World. We cannot turn back. There mayollapse of nuclear courage, but no longer can there be any doubt that we have crossed the nuclear Rubicon.

A similar paradox confronts us in disarmament. If the danger of attack could be eliminated by reductions of force levels and by the outlawing of particular types of weapons, the security of all nations unquestionably would be enhanced. The trouble is that with the power of modem weapons, even minor Infractions to disarmament agreements may prove fatal

be Western Powers tried to control German arm-amenta. But practically everyerman arms violation of the Versailles Treaty was reported. Many work shopswere discovered in which. It was said, machine guns were being produced under the guise of baby carriage*.

Nevertheless, the security of the Western Powers did not seem vitally threatened, despite the fact that the Oermans maintained secret arsenals and continued surreptitiously to produce weapons which they were not supposed to have. These weapons did not seem powerful enough toeal threat to Western security. Neither were the camouflaged divisions which the Oermans maintained

But In ouration which produces perhaps as fewr as many as several hundred high-yield weaponseal threat to the peace, even with makeshift delivery' vehicles, especially if other nations fslthfuUy adhere, to therr disarmament agreement* You are well aware of ominousto such agreements .'In North Korea,

The'point Is that we cannotiscoveries of nuclear fission, electronics, and aviation. We have to lire in theworld. Technological progrenwfll tend to "break through" even the most elaborate anddisarmamentbreakthrough wmneoat-

sttate renegotiation of agreements. There will be little, if any,

I confess that thisry dismal picture. It will not be changed by expectations that the human race will become peaceful and angelic in the nextears. There are two brutal facts which we hare to remember. The first is that the Soviet regime still is around Although it sometimes seems to be showing signs of middle or even old age, there is no new evidence that proves that Kipling was wrong when he wrote: "Make ye no peace with Adanizod, the Bear who walksan."

The Soviets have not changed their basic objectives. Their policies have remained constant in areas that count. Including their fantastic military preparedness effort. It is clear that the Soviets do not expect that the millennium of peace has dawned. While they prepare for war we cannot turn our backs. When they talk conflict, we cannot risk to Ignore the peril When they arm themselves with the most modern weapons, we cannot reduce the magnitude of the threat by wishful thinking about their supposed inability to do that which manifestly they are doing.

We can philosophize that the Soviet Union will enter into an evolution which, after some time, will transform the present Bolsheviks intoocrats or Puritano not believe that anyone who has studied Russian and other revolutionary history seriously expectsutation will take place.

o not postulate eternity for the Soviet system: then- time wfll come. The question Is, when? So far, reports about their demise usually proved quiteheir resfiience has been extraordinary. Dtatmgulahmg our hopes from realistic planning assumptions, we would be foctfhardy not to give them an additional life erpectancy: of one or two decades. We must assume that they wfll remain In powerdur-ing the entire period when th* technological challenge *to the US win be

It Is not certain, of course, that the Soviets deliberately wm launch an attack on tbe ua But at the same time we cannot be sure they wm not. In the same vein, there is no doubt but that tbe social system of Russia is changing to many ways.

20

But is thisavorable development? One danger

surely is that if the Soviet dictatorship were UquWabed by

or otherwise, this eventwhich only optimlsta^pecTit

timecouldajor Internal crisis. Such a

would be uncontrollable. This means that it could lead very

easilyorld conflagration. There Just Is no way by which

we could conjure away the ominous dangers in our future.

This leads me to the second point of pessimism about peace in the foreseeable future. Itistake to consider theis the only cause of conflict. Wherever we look at the continents today, there is plenty of politically combustlonable material Old political structures are breaking down. New nations are emerging. Most cf them have their ownambitions, and some of the older nations showsigns of decay. Economic difnculties, culturalIntellectual crises, and ideological passions acerbate many of these political changes, not to mention inflammatory propaganda campaigns, political warfare, and the like.

Unfortunately many of the political minds still function as though we were living In the time of gun powder and sea power. Few have grasped the significance of the modern technology. Thereangerous tlmelag between political thinking and technological reality. As Industrial technology advances, psychological stability weakens. We must admit thethat world society will grow sicker and ever moreeven as the descendants of Icarus reach out for the moon.

It Is unjustified, therefore, to expect that all nationsrestraint to order to avoid nuclear conflictnations win, but the odds are that there winew.

win act Irresponsibly. Hitler was not the last specimen of

. Recent sociological research assertsargepolitical rulers and regimes have been, historicallyla motivation and actirmThere-Is no doubtrulers, especially those who. aceraired uhlirnltedave been, at least partly. Insane. -In fact, a

historian coined the term "Caesarian insanity" to order to describe the actions of many Roman emperors.

Although we have made some political progress, the world nevertheless has had more than Ita share of insane, criminal,'" *

and powerrulers duringh century. Crime and

Insanity rates tend to rise as industrial civilization

It may be very convincing to us to say that because of-

existence of hydrogen weapons the power-seekers should mend their ways. This type of argument remains unconvincing to the evil doer who Is willing to accept the risk, regardless of the consequences.

There Is only one way to reduce the probability of crirninal aggressiveness. That Is, to remain militarily overpowering and mentally more vigilant than the would-be aggressorto outsmart and outarm him at every turn and to applytechniques to protect himand usfromiscalculation. It is not enough to possess what could bestatistical posture ofhe aggressor also must be convinced that it is inadvisable for him to break the peace. But do we master the techniques by which we could nave such an impact on the opponent's mind?

We are in the midstasting crisis which Mao Tse-tung haa described as "protracted conflict" Political andweapons are being used every day to advance thecause. In modem conflict even though actualmay not be taking place, air power and tbe threat of almost Instantaneous massive destruction have become the keyof the psychological as well as the physical struggle.

The extent to which we can deter the opponent fromus determines our freedom of action on many of the world's battlefields. If tbe level of our ready deterrent strength Is too low to provide the assurance that the enemy wfll not react with an all-out attack, we could be inhibited ta executing proper defense actions in subsidiary theaters.

Deterrenceecessary condition for tbe maintenanceand the waging of limited warbut It cannat.be .*

static condition If it Is to keep thatf any tmtoiore effective weapons system, the best posture of

deterrence existing before the technological mutation is -'.

to rapid nuTlfficaUon. We Dveorld where the threats lo .'

eaceeloptr< tcday tar

on the drawing

It at true that so long as the two main competitors ran neck

to neck,ajor advantage tn one or more technological _ .

fields may not neceaearfly upset thetate of

22

tual deterrence may be reached which essentially woulda world conflagration could occur against theof both the US and the Soviet Onion. Hence I

believe that the Soviets merely are trying to catch up in the technological race. On the contrary, they seem to havethemselves to win the technological raceroad front, not only in many significant scientific areas but also to combat operational strengths as distinguished from mockups andIn other words, they may be trying to surpass us simultaneously by at least one whole and perhaps two weapons generations.

Tha technological race Is the very essence of protractedIt Is the main event which we cannot afford to lose. The essence of this conflict is not, as many of our contemporarieseries of limited wars to the Jungle and in the desert. Any American intervention into limited war depends crucially upon our relative technological posture. If we lose therace we cannot fight on local and regional fronts. Nor will an Increase In our capability to fight to Ball or Tlm-buctu Improve our over-all deterrence. It certainly Is not likely that, should the US fall behind to technological capability, the Russians will press their advantage merely toew fringe benefits. The struggle between Rome and Carthage Is more meaningful to our times than the formalized and restrained war-tournaments of some epochs tn the history of Christian Europe.

Technological superiority in means of delivery Is the essence of success in nuclear war. Tbe Idea that nuclear war wfil take the form of an exchange of mutual blows perhaps forecasts correctly what Is going to happen. However, this is nota concept on which the military planner should wort

The purpose of planning for nuclear war Is to achieve such

predominance of strengthuclear blow can be'tthe undue riskeadly tetaliatory blow wfil

returned. Even tbe Soviet military leaders who, dining

Stalinist period, belittledppear to rccogntae that surprise could'; be the condition

of nuclear-.

The acquisition and maintenanceynamic capability toapid and devastatinga proportionately dynamicprereomatte* to survival. -The nation

23

which Insures that its retaliatory force is. In fact, effective at all times. Is obtaining rraTl'piim protection againstnd preemptive attacks. The success of preventive war and pre-emptive nuclear launchings depends upon theof triple or quadruple surprisetechnological, tactical, tuning, and conceivably strategic. The US can keep Itsguard up only If It is able to render those surprises too costly, too impractical, and too uncertain. Thus surprise attack will be too risky for enemy resort only if the US keeps ahead to technology and totelllgence, as well as to Its force levels and, above all, to reaction time*.

Should we lose tempo and should one or more of theseof our security crumble, the enemy's superioritysuch that he need not use nuclear weapons except asThe so-called ultimate threat of large hydrogencould become 'demilitarized"by manipulatedthe aggressor says:rant that you canyou will be completely devastated through my firstleave it to you whether or not you want to elect your if you retaliate, you will die, at best with the

tog thought that you have killed some of us. Or you may survive under our whip. That Is yourt is known that the Soviets are doing considerable research on conditioned reflexes and brain-washing techniques.fear and the conditioning of the opponents' mental and psychological reaction* are strategic concomitants to nuclear weapons. The Soviets dontet.

Previous wars have lasted for years. Ever sinceodern industrial society with its longwar could not beuture waratterewhink It isto place all attention on toe destructive phase of- .: "':

In previous tunes, the length of the war allowed us to remedyshoftcomlngs and omissions

row, once the climax of the conflict has come; we than be risoners of our previous decisions. In that criticalfaaU not be able to rncreaee our fore* levels,ew set of technological weapons, adjust oar tactics to outdo those of the enemy, or even reassure the fearful and give orders to th* .

ET

The protracted conflict may last longer than any previous war. Although the climactic or decision phase ol this conflict may be short, still, the conflict could endure forThanjTdecadea. We are in tbe battleonsequence, tbe main battles are being fought by military forces in continued readiness, by warning and intelligence services, by the research andcommunity, by national and Industrial planners, and by budget makers, as well as by moral and Intellectual attitudes.

Militarily speaking, tbe decisive phase could be won or lost by tbe staff and operational officersoears before tbe shooting select or reject certain weapons systems, succeed or fall In shortening lead times, organise offensive andforces, determine the balance between force elements, and plan deployment and reaction tunes. It also may be won or lost by the executive and congressional brancheslmelagears, the force levels to beIn any technological phase; by the weaponsprocurement, and logistics planners within the military; and by industry, all of whom, together, have the task ofand producing superior weapons faster and in larger quantity than the enemy; finally, by Intelligence officers who must try to forecast the relative strengths and weaknesses of the strategicoears ahead Tbe latter willoron whether or not they convince the powers-that-be that their best estimates are valid

In protracted conflict, the climactic phase may be war tn its most extreme form. If tbe climaxatter merely of threat and surrender, it wfll be the mostof all wars. To intelligence Its most significant aspecteconflictar during peace.

It Is easy to enumerate the need to win the technologicalthe requirements for adequate numbers of weapons andadvantage of hardened and dispersed base locations,for fast reaction times, and so forth. But thethese requirement* are difficult to satisfy i* thathas the economic capability to live up to theof protractedhe carry period of the nuclearam not talking about budget* which can be Increasedo not mean various degrees of economicm4 readiness.efer to more -

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win the technologicalation needs numericalsuperiority In technicians and_.lnvenUve v7r

Unless the most revolutionary educational changes are made. It is unlikely that sufficient scientists and technicians will be produced to satisfy the growing needs of mcreasingly complex military programs.rogram which marshaled allresources into scientific and technical curriculawould be Inadequate for acquiring that degree of technical superiority and material effort which makes the launchinguclear attack or the psychological threat of such anelatively riskless affair.

The cost of weapons systems Is rising geometrically, while the Increase In productive capabilities proceeds much slower. There Is the problem of protecting and rebuilding our cities and facilities to surviveuclear environment. This Is aso far largely untouchedwhich clearly accentuates the severe limitations on our economic capabilities to meet the challenge of the nuclear age. In this time of economic plenty, scarcityhe supreme fact of civilian and, above all,economics.

Material resources are not the only limiting factor. Time, whichajor resource, also Is In short supply. Forthe time needed tolueprintodern weapons system has become suchilitary force never possesses an active arsenal without at least someean obsolescent tn tbe sense that certain tasks simplybe accomplished against opposition or must be undertaken at excessive risks and costs

There is one inescapable conclusion from thisrequirement and capability. It is this: thehas the potential choice of,an entire technological . of weapons. At least several weapons systems wfll beto do the same- -

Because of the immunological potential available to both aides,'

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he will have to ch-clde" whetheraster or slower '

weapon, an exploatva with greater or lowereapon of'

endurance or ofhould he guard against high orattack? Should he dispenseto

favor ofhould he select an earth satellite "anchored"0 miles shove It* target to de-

liver nuclear firepoweror should heubmarine from which toissile?

In practical terms the strategist can select'orflfa Urrj'ted

number of systems from this entire technical spectrum, which will grow as we progress further Into the scientific era.on the other side have to make similar eliminations. The chances are that the choices may not be Identical because of different strategic objectives, production capabilities,doctrines, concepts of defensive warfare, and so forth. In turn, because the choices probably will be different on both sides, the possibility of surprise and other major militarywill increase.

Therefore, intelligence must forecast. In ample time andthe enemy selection so that proper defenses can beOf course, the choice of the enemy may impose the need for counterweapons. which mayeedback against our original weapons choice.

It is necessary to Insure that the relationship between what we actually have and what we require to counter the enemy's principal threats is such that we are not accepting undue risks. If weoor or overly narrow selection from theif intelligence falls to guide the research andcommunity concerning the enemy's probable selections, we might invite attack, provide Inadequate defense, andlife and liberty. But If our totelllgence is keen and our armament effort generous we might ensure peace for the period of the technological cycle.

Weonflict which has and undoubtedly willdecades but which at present Is changing. c. Fuller coined the termwarfare" toWorldnd U. This expression no longerto future ^hnqrtf ral warfare.?-

I am afraid that the Commmusts haveatherunderstanding of the strategic rmablexoa tavolved In this new form of technological struggle. They seem to understand; toterrelaticna between* social conflicts'and iechnfcal and eco- >ornlc competition. More than that, "thej areto achieve an overwhelming rtrategic pcature In ther otogteal realm. They are girding to win the technological -race against the US. Whatever the disadvantages of asystem, their regime responds to rapid dcdelonmakxrkg.

In this area, we do not seem to have matched their We are said to have made the decision

to strUu? the first blow. At the same time we havfneglected to Introduce sufficiently into our thin ring the fact that if the opponent is allowed opportunity toroad tacticalthrough an Initial blow, the retaliatory strategy must be more costly and complicated In order to compensate for the risk and loss which could occur at the outset and weaken the retaliatory force before It goes Into battle.

Under the postulate that tbe enemy strikes first, defense must be more expensive than under the postulate that we shall not surrender the initiative. It follows that we must not beto pay the price of our security against an opponent to whom we present the gift of the deliberate surprise attack.

The technological race has engulfed us exactlyastriver occasionally catches the unsuspecting oarsman.ituation cannot be met and overcome by preaching to the river, by throwing away the oars, or by using only one of two bands. Inituation, all skills and all strengths are needed to ride out the rapids and not get smashed against the rocks.

The fundamentalant to leave Is that therace, because of various economic limitations andclimates, may not be won by any super power engaging In the com petition, even with all Its strengths. But this race very well may be lostountry which fails to put Itsbest efforts Into tbe challenge

It Isarge extent the duty of the nationalto explain to our nation's leadership the trueof this strategicray that we will not falltask which Is indispensable not only to our survival butaurrrval . v -

Intelligence has been getting the fill about the Soviet Bloc, or at least enough, of them to enable many right decisions to be made. But we have. not. ben able, otten eunuch, to. getnforrnation and evaluations accepted and actedomber fact'Is that as professional Intelligence people we haveot entirely grasped tbe meaning of protracted conflict to the uclear mlasfie age

I believe ft not unfair to state also that aa professional mtat-Ugence people we have bean dlaappomtnagty alow ta

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standing the nature of the pressing problems which areus. Only too of leoour categories of analysis and estt mates still reflect the strategic realitiesassinge' know all about the deposits of even the least Important raw materials, but we may miss major scientific discoveries. Our battle orders of the Infantry are considerably better than those of earth satellites. We are adept ta measuring floorspace, but we are rarely engaged in comparing lead times. We are able to refine our calculations of weapons yields to tbe first decimal, but tbe analysts worrying about Soviet neuropsychology hare yet to break through to tbe national estimates. We produce mountains ofut our progress In data handlingLenin's title, "one step forward, two steps backward'* We are considerably better tn post mortems than In warning. Our understanding of man's greatest resource, time, hasfuzzy ta most areas.

All ta all, although we often express our conviction as to bow Important Intelligence is to national security, we ourselves have not quite realized the crucial position we are occupying ta the present power struggle. It Is really the effectiveness ofwhich, together with the effectiveness of our scientists. Is the basis of technology. Beyond the development phase.Isultiplierivisor of military strength-in-being. It is the one "weapons system" which by necessity Is ta constant touch with the enemy, regardless of whether there is war or peace and ta war, of course, tatelllgeneea key condition of success.

But we must elevate cor sights beyond the old saw ofbeing the "first line ofntelligence at thewhich should make defense economically practical,superior, and strategically victorious. In theage, intelligence literally wfll merge with tbe decisivesystem, lest the'missiles be entirely Ineffective. ' '

But Intelligence will not be able to do this Job unless It comesgeechnological system .in Its own right. We roust get'the cqulpmenC our ubiquitous, Instantaneous, and. ency-ClopediC mission requires We Etat have the hires to operate these tools We must develop utilization techniques which are at par with or better than those ecrulprnenta And we must be able rapidly to feed our information to all* ' -

One feature wtll remain unchanged: the ability to think. Electric computer* and spacejelescopes arc nour sense andeasoning by false analogy, preoccupation with minor problems to the detriment of major issues, emphasis on decimals and disregard for the hugewrong philosophies about the rules of evidence, deluston-ary procedures such as the piling of estimates upon estimatesnot to mention normal human failings such as prejudices, wishful thinking, parochial Interest arguments, andall those will remain possible In the era ofwarfare. The machines, even the electrons, are no better than the brains they are designed to serve. It Is gratifying to think that when the machine proves to be Inadequatefor example, because it may take three months to "program" Itcommon sense and "conventional thinking" still will be called upon to take it* place.

The plain fact is that the machine, however good, will not replace the analyst. The machine will make the humanore powerful toolthis is the main reason we need It in intelligence. Intelligence technology Is Indispensable for the rapid h'^'ing of thousands of data and for the reduction of innumerable variables to manageable factors. This technology is the key to speed, coverage, and accuracy; to computation; and to experimentation with, and testing of. our conclusions and estimates (for example, through "gaining" techniques).

But intuition and insight art necessary to make thework. In turn, Intelligence technology wfll make It* greatest contribution If it allows deeper insight* and ever more creative Intuitions. Man has remained the key factor Inwarfare, as he was the key to victory when rock* and clubs were the most powerful weapons. Military, orroader sense, conflict Intelligence wfll be at it* best when ft L> ba-sed on brain intelligence: IQ's pins wisdom.

Pending the dawn of the technological age tn Intelligence, we should face up more courageously to the facts of life,.bow-ever

ation and as the core of the free World alliance, we have been underrating the danger for more than twelvehy was Intelligence not mors reliable? Why did we fall to see the obvious? Oar own thought pattern* and oar Intel-

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