uly8 OCI No. opy No.
SOVIET STAFF STUDY
THE TIE THATOVIET INTRABLOC RELATIONS6 to7 (Reference titles: CAESARnd
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE ASJANIT1ZED.
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATIONTHE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS.SC,, THEOR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SECRET
SUMMARY
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I. STALIN'S DEATH AND THE NEW LOOK IN THE BLOC
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Origins of the radical reversal of Soviet bloc policy from extreme centralism under Stalin to severe decentralization followingh Soviet party congress.
Economic Relaxation,
Moscow disengages Itself from the mechanics of day-to-day planning while retaining over-all control of the satellite economies. The last of the stock companies are dissolved, and the USSR take steps to decrease the dependence of the satellites on Soviet aid.
Political Relaxation.
Moves taken to foster an illusion of satellite independence and sovereignty. Eastern Europethe USSR. Liberalization gives rise tocriticism of Communist regimes and the first overt display of dissatisfaction over Sovietin East Germany.
First Steps Toward 3
Khrushchev and Bulganln attempt awith Tito inS and recognize as valid the Yugoslav doctrine of "different roads to
Effects of the 3
EasternPandora's box.of Soviet leaders Id retrospect. Effects of liberalization at the start
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J
debt to Peiping The Soviets accept China's place in the conmunlst sun. Peiping Isree hand in Asia. Khrushchev, Bulganln, and Mlkoyan visit Pclplng In tribute to Chineseand extend long-term economic assistance to kao. The Kremlin recognizes Communist China as "coleader" of the bloc in Peiping postpones its Taiwan ambitionsoncession to Moscow. Soviet-Chinese relations are undisturbed at the start
II. H PARTY CONGRESS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS
rapprochement with Yugoslavia Is cementedroad economic agreement on tho eve of the h congress foils to unify the bloc ideologically. Khrushchev theses as presented to the congress. Molotov admits past inflexibility offoreign policy and pledges Soviet friendship to all socialist parties of tho noD-Comraunist world. Khrushchev'sour polemic against Stalin brands orthodoxy as sinful.
Satelllto Reactionh 8
Satellite Communist leaders sense impendingof liberal factions in national Communist Failure of the congress to fix the nature and limits of change resultsolicy vacuum in Eastern Europe.
Yugoslav Reactionh 8
Yugoslav position is upheld by the congress. Belgrade warmlyh congress resolutions but privately admits astonishment at the magnitude of Stalin denunciation.
Effecth Congress in Satellite 9
"National Communists" gain new Influence in the satellite parties. Pressure for reinstatement of Nagy grows in Hungary. Large bloc of Polishcommittee members demands the return of Gomulka to the polltburo. "Stalinist" Bierut dies, and new party secretary Ochab allows the official regime
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SEGRET
newspaper to air Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin for the first time in public. Bulgaria andunmask "Stalinists" in April. Polish party takes only token steps to curb freedom of expression.
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Communist "information bureau" had become an embarrassing reminder to Khrushchev and Tito8 rupture of relations. Better organizations forbloc business had rendered the Cominform obsolete. Propaganda value of the dissolution recognized by both Soviet Union and the West.
Satellites Continue 11
Reaction to "Stalinism" is widespread in the satellites by Even ideologically rigid regimes make token concessionsh congress USSRroop cut in East Germany.
Yugoslav-Soy jets 11
Tito visits Moscow in6 to cementof previous year. Basic Ideological differences emerge clearly as Khrushchev and Tito fail to agree on whether Yugoslavia isember of the bloc. communique'atent concession to Yugoslav ideology, the forerunner of future agreements between Socialist and Communist parties. Western source sees Tito's willingness to voluntarily "line up in the Sovietotentially negative factor in future Westernwith Yugoslavia. Importance which Kremlin attaches to good relations with Tito indicated by Molotov ouster.
Rakosi 12
Party first secretary of the Hungarian party was an unreconstructed "Stalinist" standing in firmto "Titoism." Rakosi was no longer in control of the Hungarian party. Suslov probably served him anin June presaging his demotion In July. Gero, the new first secretary, apologizes to the Yugoslavs for "slandors" of the past. Liberal faction of the Hungarian party continues to press factional struggle for party control throughout summor and early fall
BEGRTT
Poznan Riots
Disturbances Id Polandedge between the Molotov and Khrushchev factions in the Soviet hierarchy. Khrushchev thesis on liberalization is upheld by aonune, justifying the denigration of Stalin and denying the existencerisis in International communism. Tour of Poland by Khrushchev and Bulganln incites the Poles still further. The Soviet leaders blame the worker riots on "Westernhe Polish party's central committee confirms the legitimacy of workers' grievances.
Belgrade Reflects Bloc Crisis
Belgrade continues to hall satellite independence as rumors circulate of the Soviet central committee's warning to the European satellites against Imitation of the Yugoslav "road." Khrushchev flies to Belgradewarning in Soptember and urges Tito to withholdfrom the bloc's "revisionist" states. Tito roturns to Crimea with Khrushchev for conferences with Soviet pre sidlum, and Hungarian party boss Gero. Belgrade's Borba signals failure of talks. Tito continues to woo the East Europeanes.
The Lid Blows Off
The Polish October. Gomulka regains party control and defies Soviet interference in internal affairs. party clings to alliance with USSR as "indispensable prerequisite of the Polish road to socialism." Catholic Cnurch reaches working agreemont with the new regime.
Moscow's Reactions to Poland
Khrushchev caught by surprise. The Soviet press displays indecision over proper attitude toward Polish events. estern source io Moscow discloses Moscow's decision to make the best of the situation.
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Hungary 18
Gero's speech extolling Soviet Onion touchespontaneous uprising. "Deviationlst" Irore Nagy swept back into power. Revolt directed against communism-Nagy promises multiparty system, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and neutralization of Hungary. Suslov and Mikoyan arrive in Budapest onctober. The myth of independence in the satellites comes to an ond.
6 19
The USSR's declaration on the satellites is the most definitive sinceh congress. Moscow declares its intention ofore active role in blocin effort to re-establish unity. "Liberalization" defended as correct. Moscow admits "outright mistakes" in past dealings with bloc countrlos. All satellites to remain on equal status with USSR, provided that they"continuing bonds.of interest" with one another and with the Sovietventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the satellites is held possible. oviet attempt to reassert control in bloc and salvage lost prestige and influence before world.
The End of the 20
All bloc countries recognize Kadar regime. Pel-ping hails Soviet military intervention in Hungary as the "second liberation" of the country. Few details of the revolt are available in the bloc.
New Problems to Be 20
Soviet Union placed reliancehard core" of orthodox Communist leaders6 attempt to sponsor "liberalization" in the satellites. Policy details were left to local party cadres. The satellite partiesengrossed in internal disputes and factional strife and failed to agree, even individually, on meaning and practical application of "liberalization." Moscowanti-Soviet opinion and overestimated theof Communist politicians in the satellites. Failure of overtures toward Yugoslaviaowerful, rival force free to subvert the satellitesosition of comparative sanctuary.
III. THE RETURN TO ORTHODOXY (NOVOV 21
After the Polish and Hungarian debacles,Eastern European policy was directed primarily at the re-establlshment of bloc stability. ination of natlonnl interests to thoso of the USSR was called for. ew policy combining politicaland oconomic concession began to emerge. Soviet policyosition midway between "Stalinism"h congress reformism.
Repression in 22
Kadar abandons hope of ruling by popular consent. Hungary againolice state. General strikes and sporadic armed resistance continue into December, but the revolt has been crushed.
Stabilization in 22
Internal freedom marks the atmosphere in Poland. The Polish press attacks Soviet actions in Hungary and accuses present Soviet leadership of sharing guilt for the uprising with Stalin. Gomulkaarty and government delegation to Moscow onovember torelations with the Soviet Union. ovember communique grants Poland political and economicin return for Gomulka's promise to keep Poland in the bloc. The agreement again demonstrates Khrushchev's disposition toward pragmatism.
Peiping Warns 23
Chinese regime's official press organ counsels USSR onovember against the possibility of future mistakes in the "proper relations between socialist countries." Peiping calls "great-nation cnauvinism" the chief stumbling block to good relations between members of tho Communist camp.
Yugoslavia 24
Moscow deliberately stalemates relations within6 in an effort to isolatethe "Yugoslav virus" in Eastern Europe. Tito fights back and accuses Soviet collective leadership of
lack of progress beyond tho negative condemnation of the "cult of Stalin." The Yugoslav loadorthe failure of his September conferences with Soviet presidium members. Pravda castigates Tito for "meddling" in another party's affairs.
Political Stick and Economic 24
Increased hostility toward local Communistreported in the satellites as tho regimestighten political controls and relaxrestrictions. Terror increases in Rumania and Bulgaria. "Soft-line" economic policies dictated as much by Soviet self-interest as by the state of unrest in the bloc. All East European countries announcoconcessions in the months following October.
Moscow's Now 25
Khrushchev admits In Decemberh congress decisions might have contributed to turmoil In the bloc, andpecial plenum of the centralto "adapt" the decisions. At the end6 Poland alono remains an unorthodox satellite Gomulka continues to withhold recognition of the USSR asleader of the bloc, and persists in theof Polish society. Moscow sets about theisolation of Polandast German party communique on6 pledges the two countries to combateaction." Yugoslavs offer Gomulka support.
Polplng's Road to 26
Peoplo's Daily onecember publishes anstatement on the Chinese "road to socialism." The Chinese party concedes the existence of "contradictions" between Communist states and parties, but holds that the "fundamental experiences" of the Soviet Union should guide all Communist parties. The article criticizes Yugoslavia for challenging the rectitude of the Soviot system. Peiplng reiterates its belief that the two principal dangers to good intrabloc relations are "groat-nation chauvinism" and narrow "nationalism."
Liberalism on the 26
Soviet-satellite party conference in Budapest in7 ends three years of "national Communist" experimentation in Eastorn Europe. "Furtherof the Communist camp is called for undor slogan of "proletarianto the will of the USSR. Kadar announces re-establishment-proletarian dictatorship" in Hungary. Poland is the only exponent of "liberalism" in Moscow's European bloc.
Chlnose 28
Mao's "hundred flowers" speech of6 and his7 definition of contradictions within communism created enormous interest in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland. The Chineseerious stake in satellite stability. ogicalof Soviet-satellite differences. Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow and Warsaw in January an attempt to cos-promise differences between the USSR and Poland. pledges his regime to the principle ofInternationalism" and praises bloc unity. accepts Mao's beliefs on "groat-nation chauvinism" and 'Nationalism."
Polish-Soviet 29
November agreement and Chinese goododus Vivendi between Hoscow and Warsaw. Three outstanding points of difference remain. High-leveldelegation to Peiping in7 garners Chinese praise for Gomulka's post-October program. Gomulkaightrope between placating Soviet demands andhis October program.
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Thaw 29
Khrushchev sets about isolation of Tito at the start Shepilov deliberately provokes the Yugoslavs. Party relations practically terminated by the end of Hoscow follows Ideological Insult with economic hurt. Peiping remains neutral. Decline of satellitein April encourages tho Soviet Union to woo Tito again. Tho Albanian party is again the intermediary. responds after the Yugoslav party learns that Moscow has advlHed all satellite parties to strive for awith Belgrade. oint declaration of desire for relations is issuedune.
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Page 32
Presidium Purge in tho USSR
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The expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovlch, and Sbepilov from the Soviet party's presidium givesa free hand in his Yugoslav overtures. Soviet credits to Yugoslavia are "thawed" in July. Tito and Khrushchev meetuguBt.
Tito-Khrushchev Meeting in Rumania
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The Communist leaders agree on like views anddlfforonces. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration6 endorsing "different roads" is revalidated. Joint call for "concrete forms of cooperation" among allparties leaves door ajar for possible Yugoslav participation in international Communist organizationuture date.
Tito-Gomulka Meeting
September conference goes down the line in favor of Soviet foreign policy. Tito and Gomulka endorse bilateral party meetings rather than the multilateral meetings favored by the USSR. Gomulka continues to withhold recognition of USSR as the leader of the bloc. Both Tito-Khrushchev and Tito-Gomulka conferencedemonstrate the conviction that quarrels should be kept in the family in an effort toolid ideological front to the capitalist world.
Gomulka Tightens Up
Gomulka is forced to balance dilemmas in Poland. The first steps to muzzle press criticism of tbo Soviet Union are taken in In March the Polish leader refers to the Hungarian revolt as areversing his position. Polish party disavows the term "national communism." Gomulka vigorously defends his October programay plenum of the Polish party's central committee, and emphasizes importance of alliance with the USSR. In an extemporaneous reply to criticism, Gomulka.recalls the ravages wrought by the Soviet Union to Poland during and after tho war, and claims that his program is designed toecurrence of similar events. Poland's problems are primarily economic in Gomulka and East Germany's Ulbricht moot in June and Gomulka exacts payment for Ulbricht's earlierto "Polish reaction." Polish leader callsBaltic Sea of Peace" and expresses friendship for "all the people" ofeference obviously directed at Bonn.
Orthodox Satellites Tighten Policies.
36
tho winterhe hard-line satellites resort more and sore to politicaland terror. The Czech and Hungarian parties follow Moscow's lead and urge multipartite party onferences as opposed to the bilateral discussions favored by the Poles and Yugoslavs. The Czech press publishes the edited version of Mao0 flowers" speech on Party secretary Hendrych terms its provisions "inappropriate" for Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian party grows more
Shake-up.
the satellites endorse the purge of thecentral committee. Bulgaria and Rumanialocal purges. Poland and Yugoslavia interpret Khrushchev's victory as the forerunnerore liberal Soviet policy toward the blochope not to be realized. Failure of Mao's liberal experiment in China in the spring7 strengthens Peiping'sfor the new Soviet line in Eastern Europe. From Moscow's point of view, the relmposltionard line in the satellites has been successful.
Grows Some Weeds.
Chinese reap the bitter fruit of their policy oflowers bloom. The spring flood of criticism from party members shocks the regime. The party's "rectification campaign" of7 leads to the curtailment of public criticism in June. "Anti-rlghtlsm" and "rectification"ingle campaign designed to squelch all domestic opposition. As aof bitter experience Mao and other Chinese leaders are more sympathetic to Moscow's problems in Eastern Europe.
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The Polish 39
Labor unrest and economic distress sevorely test the Gomulka regime In Gomulka tightens press censorship. Plenum of Polish party's central committee in October attempts to revitalize the apathetic Polish Communists. Gomulkaloodlessof all party members. The greatest threat to party solidarity, according to Gomulka, is "revisionism."
Year After Hungary
is reflected on the surface. Dlssidence is under control. Stability increases. "Liberalism" is confined to economics.
EARS OF COMMUNISM ANDA NEW COMINTERN.
month-long congress of world communism in Moscow. The central "party line" emerges victorious.ame and nebulous in organization, thewas7 version of the earlier Comintern Provisions made for future meetings. olicy declaration is signed by all bloc parties. The document coordinates attitude toward "revisionism" and formalizes the leading role of the USSR in Communist party affairs. Evidence of some compromise in thevague and often ambiguous phraseology of the basic principles of communism. Declaration Itselfthe bloc partiesarrow doctrinal channel. The Moscow conference did not actually solve any of the bloc's problems. Tito's absence an indication of his refusal to accept Soviet sovereignty in party matters at the risk of further alienating the West. The November events reasserted Soviet ideological primacy in the bloc and marked the return of central direction to themmunlst movement.
I. STALIN'S DEATH AND THE NEW LOOK IN THE BLOC
The Soviet empire which Stalin ruled after World War IIupremely centralized political, economic,andentity. Yet only two years after his death,hof the Soviet Communist partyoctrine of "liberal Communism" based on the sweeping decentralization of powers among the constituent parties of the bloc. The immediate origins of this radical change were two negative circumstances prevailing at Stalin's death in the lacklear-cut law of succession to power in the USSR, and the state of chronic crisis which characterized the postwar Soviet economy. The new Soviet leadership was initially preoccupied withaffairsar greater degree than had been the latter-day Stalin regime. This shift in political accent made the years3ime of drift and uncertainty for the countries of Eastern Europe. Simple reaction toatherositive approach to the problems of the bloc, was the common denominator of Soviet-Satellite relations during this three-year span.
Economic Relaxation
Moscow's tendency to withdraw into itself was mostin the economic field. The Kremlin retained over-all policy control of the satellite economies, while striving to disengage itself from the mechanics of day-to-day planning in the bloc.
34 the USSR sold its Interests In theJoint stock companies in East Germany,and Rumania. Inn the new editionstandard text "Politicalt told the countries ofEurope to use local resources more intensively andtheir dependence on Soviet assistance. was to base its economy on those factors which"individual historicalho level of itscharacteristics of its classradual reduction of Soviet advisers andin the satellites contributed to the impression ofof national prerogatives to the bloc countries.
Political Relaxation
Beginning in the springhen it recognized tho sovereignty of the German Democratic (East Gorman) Republic, the USSR took steps to foster the illusion of increased political independence in the bloc. reat deal of lip service was paid to
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the equality of all socialist countries. Satellite political leaders visiting Moscow were afforded VIP treatment not at all consonant with their former status as Kremlin flunkoys.
There were no "liberalization directives" In the Iteriod of trial and error, with Eastern Europe following Moscow's lead whenever possible. The Berla purge, subordination of the security police to political control, and emphasis on "socialist legality" in tho USSR producedcampaigns at national levels all across Eastern Europe.
As the relaxation of controls became more general, popular criticism of the local and Soviet regimes became more outspoken. The East German uprising in3 was the most seriousof the virulent anti-Soviet feelings which lay just below the surface in the satellites. Tho USSR prudently chose to regard the development in East Germanyemnant of the Stalin era, and followed armed suppression of the demonstrationsumber of economic concessions designed to assuage the discontent of the East German workers and to present the new Soviet hierarchy in the best possible light before the world at large.
First Steps Toward Belgrade
In late5 Khrushchev and Bulganln flew to Belgrade to do public penance for the alleged sins of Berla and to lay the foundationew Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The communique which ended the meetingune announced that "different forms of the development of socialism are thebusiness of the peoples of the respectivehisajor and far-reaching concession for the Kremlin leadership to make. Not only did it endorse Tito's heretical brand of Communist ideology, but it invited national-Communist deviations in the countries of the bloc.
Effects of the Interregnum
Moscow hadandora's box in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet leaders failed clearly to foresee the consequences in the first flush of their reaction to the Stalin era. The rapidity with which the doctrine of "liberal Communism" later swept Eastern Europe could only have been conjectured in The policy sought to foster willing cooperation in the building of tho Soviet empire byemblance ofto the builders. The result was, at the startacade of national-Communist states In Eastern Europe whose leaders wero both confused as to their precise role in the post-Stalin Soviet empire and unwilling to exercise politicalin their respective countries,
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If there was uncertainty in the satellites after the death of Stalin, there was none in Communist China. Tho Chinese seized the opportunity to increase their stature politically and economically.
oscow found itself doubly in dobt to the Chineso. Full payment had not yet been made for Communist China'sin the Korean War, and Peiping wasosition to create an incident over Formosa which would easily leadeneral war. This latter eventuality was to be avoided at all costs, and in itself was enough toympathetic hearing for Chinese petitioners in Moscow.
Peiping had entered the Korean conflict only after receipt of firm assurances from the USSR that the bill would be paid by the Soviets in the formodern army and increasedassistance. Part of the account had boenprepaid0 when Stalin guaranteed the Chinese against attack by Japan or its allies and extended an economic development loano Peiping. The Chinese considered the balance of the debt due on Stalin's death.
The periodas marked by sporadic displays of ill temper on both sides as Helping's prestige in Asia and consequently its bargaining position in Moscow continued to grow. This circumstance, however, was gradually accepted by the Kremlin and was balanced by the USSR's conviction that concorted diplomatic and economic efforts in Asia and the bloc were mutually advantageous. Moreover the stature of the Peiping regime as the first great-power Communist state In Asia and its continued acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's role as leader of the socialist camp redounded to Moscow's benefit in the propaganda battle with the West. ecision was made to go along with Peiping so long as the Chinese remained in closo political alliance with, and economically dependent on, theUnion.
In0 economic agreement was expanded to provide for Soviet aid in the constructionasicenterprises in China.
In4 the Cominform journal formalized the USSR's acceptance of China's new place in the sun in hailing Mao Tse-tung as "an outstandingho creatively andow way has characterized the Chinese revolutionpecial type, now typical for the revolution in colonial and semlcolonlal
countries." For the first tine Moscow conceded thai *than its own night be appropriateountry"road to socialism." This relaxed attitude gaveree hand in Asia and set up spheres ofwithin tho bloc. This was more than Tito had beenachieve In alaost six years of wrangling with thethe Soviet Union had recognized and accepted theimplicit In any European power's attempt Ideologicallythe Asian countries. The Kremlin's collectivewas more willing to compromise in Peiping than inIt stood to lose far more through exacerbation of thethan through antagonizing Tito, the lone heretic onof tho European
Inoscow's new collective leadership publicly threw its full weight behind Communist China's new stature In the bloc. Khrushchev, Bulganln, and Mikoyan led an impressive array of Soviet dignitaries to Peiping simultaneously to salute Bed Chinese sovereignty and toomprehensive agreement on Soviet concessions. The industrial construction program3 was extended to includeew projects. An additional long-term loan0 was written into the agreement for the purpose of equating China's level of production9 with that of the Soviet Unionnd an extensive program of Soviet-staffed technical assistance was set up. Jointof two new strategic rail links with the USSR and the return of the Port Arthur garrison to the Chinese werefor. In keeping with the precedent it had set In the Eastern European satellites, Moscow agreed to sell back toits shares in four remaining joint stock companies.
Moscow's acceptance of the Chinese lead in Asia wasinfter Bulganln and Khrushchev had succeeded the "inexperienced" Malenkov. The Chinese People's Republic was thenceforth hailed by the Krenlin as "coleader" of the Communist camp. The mantle of authority bore with it, however, an implication perhaps not to Peiping's taste. As equal partners, neither Moscow nor Peiping was directlyfor the acts of the othor. The Soviet Union coulddeny responsibility for Mao's Formosa policy, for example, should the international climate so dictate. In this connection it is worth noting that the Communist Chineseto cite the Soviet Union as sole leader of the bloc, reaffirming Peiping's role as the junior partner.
Moscow's coolness toward the Taiwan adventure eventually had its desired effect. 5 was the high-water mark of Peiping's propaganda preparation for an offshore invasion. By the spring of the year Moscow could assume that those Chinese Communist leaders who nay have favored an early assault on Taiwan had been offoctlvely reoriented.
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At the beginning of6 the Soviet Union and Communist China had reconciled those differences carried over from the Stalin era. Moscow offerod Peiping strategic materials and economic assistanceate and volume commensurate with Chi-nose desires, and continued to support Mao's position inaffairs. The Chinese Communists reciprocated by proclaiming the close and indissoluble nature of their alliance with the USSR, by ceding first place in bloc affairs to the USSR, and by avoiding oxplosivc situations which might leadeneral war. There were no known anti-Soviet leaders or factions in the Chinese party, and the Moscow-Peiping alliance showed no signs of cracking in the foreseeable future.
II. h PARTY CONGRESS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS RESULTS
At the beginning6 the Soviet Union seemed to beconcerned with normalising its relations with Yugoslavia and the West than with theoretical dissertations with theover "liberalization."
Inulganln and Khrushchev displaced Georgi Malenkov, and collective leadership in the USSRew phase. At year's end they were still intoxicated with the "spirit of Geneva." ow Year's Eve address, the party first secretary and premier jointly calledastlyprogram of East-West cultural and commercial contacts, citing the folly of war In the light of Soviet developments in the atomic and rocket fields.
In early5 the USSR and Yugoslaviaroad new program of economic cooperation. Agreements wore signed providing for Increased trade, scientific and technical exchanges between the two countries,ong-term program of Soviet aid in industrial construction. raft agreement on nuclear cooperation with the Yugoslavs was concluded Ideological differencesomplete rapprochement, but theolitical meeting of the minds had only to await the next conference between the leaders of the two Communist statos.
Theh party congress convened on The congress legitimized the expressionegativetout did not unify the bloc ideologically as may have been hoped for by tho Soviet party. Satellite politicians had been too long deprived of initiative immediately to apply tho broad generalities of the Khrushchev line to concretepolicy. Tho congress, therefore, accelerated divisive Influences already at work in the bloc.
This, in essence, was the Marxist world outlook which Khrushchev presented to international Communism at the party congress
All countries of the world are moving toward socialism. Regardless of nationalevolution must denote the end of capitalism in each country. This crisis, however, need not be violent in nature, but may assume the formparliamentaryommunist infiltrationovernment as In Czechoslovakia orkers'has gained controlountry, it is obliged to select the method of building socialism which best corresponds with the economic, social, and political conditions of the particular country.
The "fatal inevitability" of war between Communist and capitalist countries no longer exists since the socialist bloc is in possession of the weapons and technology necessary tosuch an occurrence, and disavows war as an effectiveof national policy.
Tho world Is divided into two opposingand capitalist,umber of nonblocon-Communist states, chief among which are: India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria,Finland, and Austria.
It is essential in the interests of preserving peace that the Communist camp of nations assumes the initiative on improving relations with the capitalist countries of the West.
The Soviet first secretary's analysis of domestic Issues was another guidopost to the future course of events in the satellites. Khrushchev calleduccessful conclusion of the campaign to subordinate the state security apparatus to party control and to restore "socialist legality" to thenational life,ontinuation of "collective leadership" in the Kremlin, and emphasized the fact that, although heavy industry was to maintain first place in the Soviet economy, consumer wants would henceforth "not be
Molotov, onebruary, admitted that Soviet foreign policy in the past had been inflexible and that he, as foreign minister, had been guilty of "underestimating the newof the postwar period." He pledged the Soviet Union to extend the hand of friendship to all countries of tho world which "opposed militarynd to all socialist parties of the non-Communist countries.
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seeRE?
Khrushchev'sour polemic againstlosed session of the congress manifested the Importance which the Soviets attachedhange in party policies at home and in the bloc. The speech was rife with unpleasant implications for those bloc Communists who in the past had been the most conscientious adherents of the Soviet party line. Past orthodoxy suddenly became an offense against Marxism-Leninism. This speech evoked the most dramatic post-congress reaction in the satellites.
Satellite Reactionh Congress
Satellite Communist loaders left Moscow feeling thatorthodoxy had been rendered even more vulnerable thanthe congress to Incursions by the liberal factions of their respective parties. The other impressions which they carried home were less defined. "Titoism" was nowiving exampleseparate road" to socialism. Therefore, as "Stalinist" Communists were purged,r national Communists should now be rehabilitated.
Khrushchev had decried the negative features of the rigid Soviet foreign policy of the past, and had indicated that In the future ideology would more than ever reflect, rather than shape, policy. Pragmatism, tho Soviet leader's forte, had been reconfirmed.
Bloc Communists could conclude that policy changes as well as personnel shifts wcro in order. The new policies must bo the antithesis of Stalin's rigid rule by terror. This augured the dawn of an era of liberal Communism In Eastern Europe, with two important questions left unanswered by themuch change was there to be, and what were the limits of change? Moscow had told the bloc what it should not do, but had notractical thesis on what it should do. The resultolicy vacuum in Eastern Europe which persisted through the fall Forear, events rather than policy ruled the satellites and eventually forced the USSR to suspend its promises of socialist equalityesperate effort to keep the Communist bloc intact in Eastern Europe.
Yugoslav Reactionh Congress
The Yugoslavs, after the congress, were in anold you so" mood. Politika, in Belgrade, termed the Khrushchevnew page in Sovietechnical and modern,and elastic, and also more humane stage than thoone." The newspaper particularly endorsed tho congress'
formulation of "administrative socialism" and communism through parliamentary forms, and added that these tenets had always formed the basis of Yugoslav communism. In privatehowever, Vice President Kardelj admitted that he had been "astounded" at the magnitude and scale of the Soviet indictment of Stalin. Kardelj insisted that the Tito regime had not had an inkling in advance of the scope of the denigration campaign, and recalled that Khrushchev and Bulganln had actually defended Stalin, while berating Berla, during their visit to Belgrade
Effecth Copgress in Satellite Parties
Nationalist elements in the satellite parties began to demonstrate their newly acquired prestige in March. There were reportsiberal bloc in the Hungarian party's central committee had stronglyetititon for reinstatement in the government submitted by ex-Premier Imre Nagy. Nagy had been ousted by arch-Stalinist Party First Secretary Rakosl5ational deviationlst. Under continuing pressure the Rakosi regime onarch ceremoniouslyeviationlst less likely to embarass the party, Lazlo Rajk, former Hungarian interior minister executedTitoist" in the Stalin era.
Inroup ofentral committee members were reported by the Western press to have demanded the return to the politburo of the purged right deviationlst, Wladyslaw Gomulka. The prototype Polish Stalinist, Boleslaw Bierut, died onarch and was replaced as partyecretary by Edwardelatively orthodox, Soviet-trained Communist, Moscow-oriented but free from the taint of personal^association with the excesses of tho Stalin era. Following Ochab's ascent to the top party post, Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw's regime newspaper, aired Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin for the first time in public. After quoting Khrushchev's dictum that from thes onward Stalin's rule produced "profound distortions, damage andrybunaong step further and asked where the other leaders of the Soviet party had been during this period.
The sentiment for liberalization in the satellites began to crystallize in6 and resultedumber of actions directed against policies and individuals associated with the Stalin era. Bulgaria became the first satellite toome-grown "cult of personality" when the party's centralleveled the charge against Vulko Chervenkov, outspoken anti-Tito premier. In mid-April, Chervenkov was ousted from his government posts and replaced by Anton Yugov, who had narrowly escaped liquidationTitoist" during the Bulgarian purge trials
Onpril, the Czechsacrificial lamb to Moscow when they removed Defense Minister and First ViceCepicka from the government. on-in-law of Klement Gottwald, deceased party chairman and president, Cepicka hadhard-line" Communist, but no more so than many of his accusers in the "model satellite" regime.
The dismissal of three top-level Polish security police officials onpril echoed Khrushchev's callreturn to socialist legality" in the USSR. One of those ousted was Radkiewlcz, former minister of state security, who44 personified "Stalinist" police terror in the country, having supervised the arrest of Gomulka and his supporters
Poland was also the first Eastern European satellite to admit that the public clamor for further reform menaced party ccntrd of ue country. In mid-April the government announced theof the minister of culture tor failure properly to control "freedom of expression" in Poland. Onpril the Catholic bloc of deputies openly challenged an abortion law submitted to the Sejm for approval,ass meeting of Warsaw writers accused the regime of harboring "Stalinist remnants." The writers demanded the electionew party politburo, anappeal in the Communist world, one which would have brought instant suppression six months earlier. In late April it evokedtern rebuke from Party First Secretary Ochab who, onpril, cautioned the "politically unstable" elements in the Polish party against further attacks on party policy.
Cominform Dissolved
Onpril, satellite Communists were nominally cast adrift from the parent Soviet party when the Cominform wasby Moscow to "facilitate cooperation with the Socialist parties" of the non-Communist world. This move had beenin the West followingh congress. The Communist "information bureau" was an embarrassing reminder to bothand Tito of8 rupture of relations, and provided the non-Communist countriesangible whipping boy for anti-Communist propaganda. The actual business of the bloc could be more efficiently handled by existing organizations such as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA groups, while the current emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" madee-emphasis ofclannishness on the part of the bloc countries. The demise of the Cominform was in the nature of an addendum tokeynote speech at the Moscow congress, and was recognized on both sides of the "iron curtain" as one more tacticalin the Soviet Union's war of words with the capitalist world.
Satellites Continueeral izatipr.
By the end of May even the most ideologically rigid Soviet satellites had made at least token concessionsh congress doctrine. Hungary removed its barbed wire and minefields from the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers, Rumania reduced its security police byercent, the East Germans announced their intentions to lift restrictions on travel to West Germany. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia promulgated Internaland invited their political exiles abroad to return hone without prejudice. The Hungarian Government pardoned andto his former post as chairman of the Bench of Bishops the second-ranking Catholic prelate in the country, Archbishop Groesz, sentenced to life imprisonment1 for conspiracy against the state. The Poles ousted Jakub Bcrman, deputyand long-time associate of Stalin, from the government and Politburo. Tho Runanlans similarly disposed of their deputy premier, Petrescu, after accusing himhole catalogue of crimes associated with the "cult of personality." The Sovietseduction of forces in East Germany which provided for the withdrawal by70 Soviet ground and air force troops from the ersatz sovereign republic.
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Blossom
ito arrived in Moscow with Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj and Foreign Ministero place the final seal on the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement outlined at Belgrade inito had not addressed the Russians as "comrades"e used the term in greeting his hosts at this meeting, saying the time had arrived when all that "separates us will be overcome and when our friendship willew and still firner foundation."
The outcone of Tito's visit to Moscow, however, was not quite the complete agreement that the Yugoslav leader had The conference pointed up the fact that basicdifferences still existed between the two antagonists of the Communist world. Khrushchev, speaking at Moscow's Dynamo Stadium onune, announced that Yugoslavia had once again taken its place "within the camp ofnd spoke of the "monolithic unity of the socialist countries" which this development ensured. Tito speaking next reiterated histhat "our way is different from yours." Thein building socialism, Tito stated, was no bar tobetween the two countries, but the implication wasthat Yugoslavia still chose to disassociate itself from the new Communist commonwealth of nations.
secret
This impression was substantiated by the declaration issued jointly by the two parties at the conclusion ofonune. The communiqueatent concession to Yugoslav ideology. Unlike Khrushchev's. Dynamo speech, the communique refrained from assigninglace in the bloc, and went even further thanh congress in its assertion that "the roads and conditions of socialistarc different in different countries." Interpartythe communique went on to say, "should be based on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism, and on the comradely character of exchange of views on disputes.between our parties." Both parties recognized the necessity lor the development of broader relations between Communist states and "progressive movements" in the non-Communist world.
observer in Moscow at the time of the
Tito-Khrushchev meeting characterized the party declaration
tS % erunnor of closor tles between tho socialist partiesfree world and tho Communist parties of thea model for future agreements among "progressive"of the world. He saw the Yugoslavs-as willing to Sovlet column"esult of Khrushchev's acceptance
of Tito's "different road" tohe USSR'sideological compromiseeriod of oven morewith the satellites. This turn of events, theconcluded, was not necessarily an "unalloyedthe Vest" since Yugoslavia, facediberalchosen to identify itself with the
USSR's aims and policies. '
Tito's good-will visit to the Soviet Union was paralleled by an incident indicative of the importance which the Kremlin attached to cementing good relations with the Yugoslavs. Molotov the old Bolshevik foreign minister who had so bedeviled Tito during the Stalin era, was dropped from his foreign affairs post and replaced byandidate more acceptable to the Yugoslav leader.
Rakosi Ousted
A second occurrence at this time was less publicized but even more significant in terms of Soviet-bloc relations. While Tito was in Moscow, Soviet party presidium and secretariatSuslov, tho USSR's foreign party trouble shooter, journeyed to Budapest to evaluate the political situation in Hungary at
of this trip lay beyond the fact
that the Hungarian party was seriously factionalized, or that the party first secretary, Rakosi, was an unreconstructed Stalinist who was despised both within and outside his party.
The Polish party, too, was faction-ridden, and Czechoslovakia and East Germany both were headed by party secretaries no more liberal than Rakosi. But whereas Novotny and Ulbrichtight grip on their party control mechanisms, Rakosi had lost control of the Hungarian party. His influence, even among the hard-line Communists who had once supported him, was now In addition he was an implacable enemy of Tito, and this was not the timeanifestation of anti-Tito sentiment in Eastern Europe. This circumstance probably explains the timing of the Suslov trip.
The Soviet emissary may have served Rakosi with anor may actually have arranged for his replacement. onth after Suslov's surprise visit to the Hungarian capital, onakosi was deposed as first secretary of the Hungarian party and replaced by Ernoard-lineas orthodox as Rakosi in his ideology, but moreto conservative Hungarian party members and less outspoken in his condemnation of Tito. One of Gero's first acts in his new office was to announce that an open letter would bedispatched to the Yugoslav Communist party expressing Hungary's "profound regret" for the "slanders" of the past.
The liberal faction of the Hungarian party won several politburo seats in the wake of Gero's election, but gained little in the way of real political influence. In his initial speech as first secretary, Gero stressed the need for still tighter party discipline;0 June central committee resolution condemning the "malignant antiparty movement formed around ex-Premierungary's outstanding nationalpolitician; endorsed the correctness of the Hungarian party's line sinceh congress; and promised modestin the standard of living and in working conditions. Gero was not the independent-type Communist that the liberal wing of the Hungarian party hadvhoped for, and the factional struggle continued unabated throughout the late summer and early fall
Poznan Riots
The second violent outbreak of worker discontent In the satellites after the death of Stalin occurred at Poznan, Poland, on Striking workers, disturbed over policeof several members of their grievance committee, rioted in the city, damaging party buildings and attacking the regime's security troops.
The Poznan riots appeared to confirm the opinion of that faction in the Soviet party led by Molotov vhich had argued even beforeh congressittle freedom in the satellitesangerous thing. First Secretary Khrushchev, however, could stillajority of the presidium behind his thesis of controlled liberalization. Onune the central committee of the Soviet partyesolution explaining and Justifying the denigration of Stalin and reaffirming the correctness of the campaign against the "cult of thehe central committee denied the existencerisis insocialism, but warned of the dangers of dissension among Communist parties, citing Poznan as an example of the consequences. It appeared that the Russians were content, for the time being, to continue the myth of satellite autonomy.
Bulganin and Khrushchev spent the last week of July in and about Warsawence-mending, face-saving mission designed to bolster Communist prestige in Poland. The time-tested Soviet tactic oi the "carrot and the stick" was never more in evidence. The Soviet leaders for the first time publicly implied that the USSR would guarantee the Oder-Neisse border with Germany, but warned the Polish press against pursuing de-Stalinizatlon too avidly.
Bulganln's address in Warsaw onuly was to haunt Soviet leadership throughout the next year. Speaking of Polish internal affairs as if heember of the regime, he blamed the Poznan disturbances on Western agents and provocateurs, made no mention of the workers' legitimate grievances which the Polish party had already acknowledged, and warned that the Soviet Army stood ready to intervene in the event that reform should turn to counterrevolution in Poland. The Polish party's central committee met in executive session even as the Soviet visitors were leaving Warsaw, andesolution restating theintention of proceeding with liberalization andthe low level of living which had caused the Poznan incident.
Poland's determination to resist the ideologicalwhich the Soviet Union sought to administer wasin two statements which high-level Polish Communists volunteeredestern official in Warsaw. Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz asserted that his country was steadilygreater independence of action and could be useful to the Westiaison role with the bloc countries. Julius Katz-Suchy, Poland's ECB delegateeinforced this view and added, "Poland has more freedom of action than the Westnd this is "only the beginning."
Belgrade Reflects Bloc Crisis
Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the early fall6 gave the best indicationhange in Moscow's Eastern European policy. Increasing intellectual ferment in thethroughout the spring and summer and the Poznan riots in late July had convinced the Kremlin that it was necessary, after all, to define the limits of the political thaw in^theserious omission ofh congress. Over this point Moscow and Belgrade found each other at odds. Tito wanted Moscow to keep hands off the internal policies of the individualcountries. In particular, the Yugoslav leaderree hand for local politicians in Poland and Hungary, the very centers of revisionist unrest which most concerned As the Yugoslav press continued in September to hail increasing indications of satellite Independence and "different roads tot was apparent that Moscow's post-Stalin political and economic wooing of Yugoslavia had neither lured Tito back into the bloc nor altered his desire for morein the conduct of Eastern European affairs.
The new phase of strained Soviet-Yugoslav ties wasby rumors in early September that the Soviet centralhad circulated letter to all European satellitesthem against imitation of the Yugoslav "road tofterh congress Tito had resumed contacts with the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Rumanian parties and could considerarning only as fresh evidence of Moscow's distrust of his political course. The Soviet press contributed to this conclusion. lurry of praise for the Soviet-Yugoslav June partyhich confirmed the correctness of Tito's "separatet fell silent on the subject until late August when Pravda and Izvestla blasted national communism and praised the unity of the Communist bloc in Europe. Belgradeatchful silence in the absence of direct action by Moscow. The Yugoslav economy was now tied too closely to the bloc for Tito to risk precipitious action over nothing more concrete than an ideological abstraction. By the end of the summer0 percent of his country's foreign trade was conducted with bloc countries.
Oneptember, Khrushchev flew to Belgrade onours' notice. The Soviet and Yugoslav leaders conferred for eight days at Tito's Brioni villa on the problems that hadedge between the sometime allies. During this unusualthe Soviet first secretary apparently warned Tito that he (Khrushchev) alone managed to restrain the Soviet presidiumore overt denunciation of Yugoslav tactics in Eastern
Europe.
clicv adamantly rezusea to compromiseingle point at issue and almost completelyh congress doctrine on "different roads to socialism." Continued Yugoslavfor revlslonary movements in the satellites would cost Khrushchev his majority in the presidium, the Soviet leader asserted, and Tito would once again find himself deprived of the ideological and economic support which Khrushchev These threats were hardly calculated to inspire Tito's cooperation in quelling the rush toward nationalovement which he had already publicly sanctioned. The same sources which had saved Yugoslavia8 were still at hand, the lifeline to the West was still open and, even in the case of another outright break in relations, "Titolst" Yugoslavia would survive.
The impasse in views at which the two Communistarrived may have prompted Tito to accept Khrushchevsto return with him to the Soviet Onion forwith other members of the Soviet presidiumHungarian counterpart. This- meetingr'beginning6 in the Crimea, apparently served only to definethe areas of disagreement between the twodifference basically was the same one that was foughtPoland and Hungary in October, "hard-line" vs.in the satellites. Moscow was Ideologicallyin its attempt to quell the forces which ith congress, and this political embarrassmentto the indecision which it carried over into the
The failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav discussions to alterTito's Eastern European policy was confirmedctober, when, Borba, Belgrade's most important newspaper, praised the struggle for revision in Hungary and the replacement of Stalinist norms by "new, fresh tendencies" which made "any attempt to return to the old ways" extremely difficult. At about the same timeannouncedungarian party delegation including Gero and Kadar would arrive onctober for bilateralulgarian party delegation headed by Party First .Secretary Zhivkov was waiting in Belgrade when Tito returned from the USSR, and,ctober,eclaration re-establishing .party relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists, an indication that Moscow's September warning to the bloc had not been fully heeded.
The Lid Blows Off
Whatever further action the Soviet Union nay havetaking to neutralize Yugoslav Influence in the bloc was buried beneath the rush of events In late October. Onctober the Polish party announced that Wladyslaw Gomulka, the right-devlatlonlst hereticould participatelenum of the central commlttco onctober, at which time his appointment to the central committee and politburo was anticipated. The "Polish October" developed rapidly during the next week. The plenum met as Khrushchev, Molotov, Mlkoyan and Kaganovlch flow to Warsaw to attempt an llth-hour reversal of events. Gomulka successfully resisted their threats of armed Soviet intervention, as well as opposition from "old-guardists" within the Polish party, and onctober won election as first secretary of the Polish United Workers' (Communist)ictory which established him as the strongest single figure In Polish politics since the end of World War XX.
The new Polish strong man was outspoken in his opposition to Soviet domination of his country's Internal affairs, forced collectivization of the countryside, and one-sided exploitation of Poland's Industry by the Soviet Union. He did not, however,reak in state or party relations with the USSR. and this critical distinction proved to be his salvation. Gomulka insisted from the moment he took office that alliance with the Soviet Union was an indispensable prerequisite of the "Polish road to socialism." Soviet military garrisons would remain in the country in accordance with Poland's Warsaw Pact agreements. Moscow's guarantee of the Oder-Nelsse line was sufficientfor this concession in the minds of most Poles. Coupled with Gomulka's firmness in linking his regime's future with that of the USSR, his armistice with the Cotholic Church guaranteed the initial success of Poland's "quiet revolution." Party and church both worked to channel popular anti-Soviet feeling into activities beneficial to the future of the country. Inthis end they were assisted by the graphic moral lesson on the folly of an anti-Communist uprising which was simultaneously enacted in Hungary.
Moscow's Reaction to Poland
The upheaval in Poland appears to have genuinely surprised the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's unscheduled arrival In Warsaw was spontaneous, and the Soviet press was caught off balance by the fast-breaking Polish events. Onctober, while Khrushchev blustered in Warsaw, Pravda charged the Polish press
with seeking to "undermine socialism" and to "shake theof the people's democratic system." The Soviet paper accused the Poles of publicly renouncing Marx and Lenin, and calling for the restoration of capitalism. "Even anti-Soviet pronouncements are to beravdaact which "pains the Soviet people." Onctober, however, withback home and Gomulka riding the crestave ofapproval in Poland, both Pravda and Izvestia republished an editorial from thectober Trybuna Ludu in"Warsaw which explained the details of the new "Polish" road tond declared that the keystone of the Polish political structure was firm friendship with the USSR, "based on the ideological unity of Communist parties, complete equality of states, and the full solidarity of our nations." Western sources in Moscow and Warsaw reported that the USSR, caught unawares, had decided to make the best of the situation in Poland and publicly to approve the Gomulka regime at an opportune time.
Hungary Revolts
In Hungary, unlike Poland, events were allowed to proceed too far for any "nationalowever moderate, to stem the flood of anti-Soviet feeling. Party First Secretary Gero's speech to the nation onctober extolling the continuity of Hungary's ties to the "glorious" Soviet Union touchedpontaneous revolution which forced the Hungarian party to"deviationist" Imre Nagy to power as premier, and to elect Janos Kadar,eputationoderate Communist, party first secretary. The revolt, however, was directed against communism itself rather than against abuses in the Communist system, and Nagy, whatever his coloration,ommunist His appeals to end the uprising fell on deaf ears, and he was forced to concessions which would have removed Hungary from the Communist bloc if they had been implemented. Onctober, Nagy called for restorationultiparty political system andovember informed the Soviet ambassador of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the neutralization of the country. Suslov and Mikoyan had arrived in Budapest onctober, probably with advance information of Nagy'sdefection.
ovember, as the Soviet Army renewed its assault on the Freedom Fighters, Nagy was replaced by Kadar who,of past leanings, was so compromised in the eyes of the population as to be useless in any role except thatoviet puppet. In crushing the Nagy regime, the Soviet Union also destroyed the myth of the independence of satellite governments.
SEeRET"
Reform without Moscow's blessing was not to be tolerated, and every government in Eastorn Europe in thonalysis would continue to owe its very existence to tho whim of the Soviet Union. Gomulka relteratod this truism frequently during the next year and used it to his advantage in restraining Polish "revisionism" which, in its more outspoken forms, could have seriously threatened the stability of his regime.
6 Declaration
Onoscow made its most definitiveof satellite policy sinceh congress. ackdrop of revolt, the statement was moreovlot response to the urgent problem of revolution In Hungary; iteassessmenth congress doctrine, the operations annex so conspicuously absent from the originalof the congress. The paperoviet attempt to wipe the mistakes of the previous year from the slate andloan start. Moscow now declared Its Intent toore active role in the direction of bloc affairs. Unity was to be re-established at all cost. The statement reaffirmed tho correctness of "liberalization" in Eastorn Europe, but the USSR admitted it badumber of "outright mistakes" in its dealings with the countries of the bloc. All satellite states would continue to enjoy "equality" in negotiating with thoUnion, the declaration continued, provided one vitalwasbonds of interest" between all states in the bloc. This qualification implied the indefinite perpetuation of Communist-controlled governments, "loyal" or at least "friendly" to the Soviet Union. Moscow's confidence in the attainment of this conditional equality,'said the Kremlin, was based on the firm conviction that "the people of thostates (will) not permit foreign and internal reactionary forces to undermine the basis of the People's Democratic Having reaffirmed the binding nature of its permanent role In satellite affairs, the USSR conceded the countries of the bloc nominal Independence in selecting thoir specific "roads to socialism." Further, the Soviet Union withheld the hope that intergovernmental negotiations "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact" might lead to the eventual withdrawal of Soviet mllltai/ forces and civilian "ojvisers" from the Eastern European countries.
The new policy statement serveduideline for tho satellites in their relations with the USSR throughout theyear. It did noteturn tout Itonsiderably more consorvative and far more detailed document than theh congress manifesto. This time there was no doubt as to who was to call the policy shots in the satollltes.
Theroumber of urgent reasons for the full-dress review and redefinition of Soviet-satellite policy. Soviet international prestige hadody blowesult of the Polish and Hungarian events. The situation demanded that an attempt be made to salvage some fragmentsh congress policy in order to reassert Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Secondly, and probably most important, the domestic_and foreign policy of the Soviet Onion was basedoundation of anti-Stallnlsm and liberalization within its sphere of influence. adical reorientation of that policy at this juncture would have seriously undermined the power position of the Soviet Union In the worldime when it could ill afford to appear Finally, some attempt had to be made to Justify the variance in policy existing towardovernment "friendly" to the Sovlot Union, andovernment which had been "undermined" by "foreign and Internal reactionary forces." It may even have been hoped that,onus effect, thewould enable Nagy to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation and toomulka-llke government in Hungary. Khrushchev stated in Moscowovember that the Soviethad agreed to support Nagy, and had abandoned this position only when it became clear that "Nagy had lost control and was In the handsascist, counterrevolutionary group."
The End of the Rebellion
By the end of the first week in November all thocountries, plus China and Yugoslavia, had endorsed the Kadar regime. ovember, the official organ of theregime, People's Daily, hailed Soviet military intervention in Hungary as the second liberation of that country by the Soviet Army. Peiping had borne with the Hungarian and Polish parties in their demands for the relaxation of controls within the bloc. The Chinese, however, now made it clear that they had no intention of sanctioning any party'; secession from theorbit. Yugoslavia regretted the necessity for armod action but rationalized it as vital for the preservation of socialism In Hungary. The other countries in the bloc continued to condition their citizens to accept the inevitability ofintervention, but released few details on the size and scope of tho conflict.
New Probloms to Be Faced
Tho first ten months6 had seen the Soviet Unionew corner in its Marxist-Leninist labyrinth. with internal affairs and still mindful of theterror of the Stalin era, the Soviet leadership had sought
to base its power in Eastern Europecommonwealthdministeredard core of local,Communist leaders. The new Soviet policy was intended to give the appearance of increased national independence which in actuality would ensure more effective control through the willing cooperation of the satellites themselves. Moscow reasoned that so long as the various Communist partlos maintained a of power in the countries of the bloc, and their external and military policies were closely Integrated with those of the USSR, Internal "liberalization" would have the same beneficlent effect in guiding tho energies of the masses into productive channels as did the incentive system in the Soviet economy. solutions for Internal problems were encouraged, while edicts and directives from Moscow were de-emphasized In favor of general principles within which the local parties were to work out the particulars of execution. Tho detachment with which Moscow viewed satellite affairs prior to the October events, however, militated against the essential ideological unity which the "commonwealth" idea presupposed. The parties of the bloc had become engrossed in internal squabbles, factional strife, and ideological recriminations. Least of all was thereon the application of "liberalization."
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania liberalized their regimes little and Albania, not at all. Hungary, at thoextreme, had attempted to de-Communlze, the one hile Poland had stopped on the brink, and hadovernment in some respects more liberal even than Tito's Yugoslav regime.
Moscow errod in underestimating the force of anti-Soviet opinion in the satellites, as Mao Tse-tung was later to err in China, and in overestimating the ability of local communist politicians to work effectively without detailed instructions from the center. In addition, the failure to cement awith Yugoslaviaowerful, rival Communist camp on the fringe of the bloc, free to exploit SovietIn an effort to pry the satellites loose from Mom-cow's "commonwealth." Even before the Hungarian revolution bad ended, polemics between Belgrade and Moscow over the causes of the uprising threatened to widen the breach irreparably.
III. THE RETURN TO ORTHODOXY (NOVov
In the year following the Polish and Hungarian debacles the overriding goal of Soviet Eastern European policy was the re-establishmont of bloc stability. Moscow continued to back
SECRET -'
away from its imprecise doctrine of "liberallsa." The Soviet Dnion sought tonyonomous relationship between the slogans of "socialist unity" and "proletarianhetalinist dialectic which required the member states of tho empire to subordinate their own national interests to those of the USSR. ow policy compounded of politicaland economic concession began to emerge in the bloc. The end resultormula midway between "Stalinism"h congress reformism.
Repression in Hungary
In Hungary, Kadar at first pledged his regime toiberal policy not unlike that of Imre Nagy. However, the mass deportation of Hungarian civilians to the USSR and the Soviet kidnaping of Nagy as he emerged from refuge In theEmbassy shattered any hope of Communist rule by popular coosent. After mid-November, Hungary rapidly degeneratedoliceoviet puppet-province, unrelieved for the moment by any trace of post-Stalin political liberalism.
Spearheaded by the industrial workers' councils which had cropped up at the outbreak of the revolution, the immediate cause for reversion to terror was an extremely effective general strikeovember. Malenkov arrived in Budapest onovember, possibly with new ordersget tough" policy, and onh, Kadarationwide radio audlenco thatmust be hunted down and rendered harmless." ecember, martial law was declared throughout Hungary, arrests were stepped up, regional workers' councils were outlawed, and the possession of arms by private citizensapital Resistance continued. hour general strike paralyzed the economyecember, and sporadic outbroaks of armed violence were reported in parts of the country. the back of the uprising had been broken and the pattern of the future hard-line regime established.
Stabilization in Poland
Ab another generation of terror began in Hungary, Poland exhilarated in the heady atmosphere of Internal independence. The Polish pressitter attack on Soviet actions in Hungary. Zycie Warszawy, Warsaw's leading evening paper, likened the Hungarian revolt to the Poznan riots and observed that the Hungarians had been guilty only of seeking tothat sovereignty which the USSR had guaranteed them ath congress. The present Soviet leadership had to sharo with Stalin the blame for the uprising, the press explained, since its policy toward Hungarian reformism had been atheory."
On ovember, Gomulkaolish party and government delegation to Moscow to re-examine Polish-Soviet relations in the light of the October events. The resultant communique1 onovember confirmed tho "Polish road to socialism" in return for Gomulka's agreement to maintain close bonds of alliance with the USSR, to keep Poland in the bloc, and to sanction the presence of Soviet military forces In Poland. Thopledged "complete equality" of the two countries, "respect for territorial Integrity, national independence and sovereignty,and noninterference in internalnd cited Moscow'sctober declaration on the satellites as its basis. Tho political agreement was augmented by an economic accord which granted Poland concessions greater than had ever beenby the Soviet Unionatellite country, including trade with the USSR at world market prices and the cancellation of Poland's postwar debt.
Khrushchev as usual had subordinated ideology to politics. With the signature of the Polish-Soviethe USSRthat national communlsm--even though both partiesfrom so designating the Gomulkanotper sc, so long as the practitionerlose alliance with Moscow. Actually the Kremlin had little choice in the matter. Soviet pressure for tighter controls in Poland at this point would probably have resulted in another satellite bloodbath, with the fighting possibly spreading to the two Gor-manlea, almost certainly leadingeneral war. The USSR was no more inclined to gamble on such an eventuality in Europe than it had been in Asia. This logic placed Polandost favorable bargaining position. Gomulka took advantage of the circumstances to make Poland the outstanding exception to the more reactionary Soviet policy toward the satellites whichthe Budapest declaration.
Peiping Warns Moscow
Although Peiping Joined the other countries of tho bloc in the accolade of praise for the Polish-Soviet truce, the Chineseote of warning. People's Daily counseledgainst the possibility of future mistakes in the "proper relations between socialist countries." The editorialboth "great-nation chauvinism" and "narrowut emphasized that the fanner abuse of power continued tothe chief stumbling block to good rolations between the members of the Communist camp. Peiping thus Informed Moscow that it did not consider the Kremlin an infallible executor of Marxi;ua-Leninism, and made it clear that the Chinese would contitiuo to rosorvc the right of independent judgment in tho event of new difficulties within the bloc.
As Yugoslav-Soviet relations had faithfully mirroredpolicy in Eastern Europe in the pre-October period, so now they reflected the swing back to orthodoxy in the bloc. primary task, the re-establishment of tight control over the bloc countries, predicated the ideological isolation of Belgrade and the discredit of the Yugoslav pattern pfcommunism. Recriminations were again in order, and the Kremlin chose to use Albania to this end. ovember, Enver Hoxha, the Albanian party's first secretary, an unreconstructed "hard-line" Communist, strongly Impliedravda article that Tito had been to blame for the Hungarian revolt. Yugoslav Vice President Colakovic was reportod to have commentedhat the Hoxha article was the "final blow" to Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement and that honceforth relations, particularly party relations, would be only "correct."
Tho Yugoslav President took the offensive personallypeech to his party activists at Pula onovember in which he laid the blame for the Hungarian revolution squarely ondoorstep. Collective leadership, according to Tito, had failed to progress beyond the negative condemnation of the "cult ofad "ignored the strivings of the workingnd had permitted the survival of elementsto revive Stalinism" in the USSR and other Communist states. Tito explained that his September meetings with Soviot leaders bad convinced him that the "Stalinist faction" had "forced itsertain extent" on the liberal wing of thehierarchy, and had prevented the spread in other Communist countries of the "separate roads" doctrine which had beenby the USSR and Yugoslavia5-
Pravda rebutted onovemberong editorialTito of spreading the propaganda of "reactionaries who endanger international proletarian solidarity" by distinguishing between Stalinist and non-Stalinist factions within communismime when party unity was the only significant issue. Tito was in error, Pravda added, in trying to establish the Yugoslav road as the only one and in "meddling" in other party's affairs. The Soviet-Yugoslav feud, thus publicly joined, grew progressively more bitter during the winter.
Political Stick and Economic Carrot
Ripples from the Polish and Hungarian events were felt throughout tho satellite world. The regimes reacted more or less uniformly by tightening political controls whilerelaxing economic restrictions. Increased hostility
pn/iD
toward local Communist parties was reported in Rumania,East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes resorted to frank terrorist tactics and began to carry out mass arrests. The Czechs and Rumanians initiated vigorous anti-American propaganda campaigns and increased their harassment of Western diplomatic communities.
The continuation of "soft-line" economic policies in the satellites was dictated as much by the self-interest of the USSR as by the state of unrest in the bloc. Afterears of Soviet domination the Eastern European countries were more than ever dependent on economic assistance from the Soviet Union and, as their state of industrial sophistication continued to advance, the attendant drain on Soviet resources threatened to curtail the Communist economic offensive in the nonbloc countries of Asia and Africa. Economic incentives hadredictable and efficacious means of increasing industrial production in the USSR, and the same system was now applied piecemeal to the Pacification of the populaceonus effect of the policy which compensated to some degree for the suddencrackdown. In the months immediately following October all Eastern European countries announced price reductions, increased wage scales, raised family allowances, reduced quotas fordeliveries of agricultural products, set more ambitious housing goals, and promulgated other consumer concessions. failure to object to Poland's bid for American economic aid in November was at least partially due to the Soviet desire to escape the burden of fiscal succor for its satellites. factors alone are not enough to explain the relative grace with which the Kremlin reacted to the news of Polish-US negotiations.
Moscow's New Conservatism
Moscow's new political conservatism was confirmed on6 when Khrushchev for the first time admitted that the decisions ofh congress might themselves have been the catalyst for the subsequent turmoil In the bloc. Thefirst secretaryuropean minister that that body's decisions, although correct in essentials,had to be "adapted to developments which have taken place since thehrushchev promised consideration of these matterspecial plenum of the central committee before the end of the year.
At the endoland alone continued to defyas an orthodox satellite. Gomulka still withheld his recognition of the USSR's ideological primacy, and persisted in the actual political liberalization of Polish society. Moscow's
desire to isolate revisionist Warsaw was plainly evidenced onecemberzech-East German party communique pledged the two countries to combat the "attempts of Polish and foreign reaction to weaken Poland and the entire Socialist camp." As though inigh-level Yugoslav party delegation traveled to Warsaw to join the Poles in reasserting their contention that many roads led to socialism. ommunique onecember, both sides agreed that bilateral interpartypresent conditions" constituted the "most correct" method for effecting cooperation within the bloc. Negotiations of wldor scope on "individual questions" were not excluded, but it was clear that both Tito and Gomulka foresaw few occasions on which multiparty discussions would be appropriate.
Peiping's Road to Socialism
Communist China clarified Its views on Intrabloc relations when Peiplng's People's Daily onecember published the most elaborate statement on the distinguishing features of the "road to socialism" to emerge from any capital in the bloc. word article, "More on the Historical Experience of theantagonism" between "imperialism" and "socialism" was held to be the basic fact of the world scene. The article admitted that there existed "contradictions" between Communist states and parties, but insistod that these must be "subordinated" to the "struggle against the enemy." Those who cannot see this, the Chinese grumbled, are "definitely not Communists."
Peiping followed Moscow's lead in chastising the willful Yugoslavs. The paper contended that the "fundamentalof the Soviot Union must be adopted by all Communist states. Further, Tito was criticized for claiming that Stalin's "mistakes" were inherent in the Soviet system rather thanperversions of Communist principles. "Mistakes" of the sort Stalin propagated, the article continued, "did notin the Socialist system."
The statement concludedarning that onlyof equality" among Communist parties could guarantee the unity of the bloc and safeguard Its members against the two principal internal dangers of the contemporarychauvinism" and "narrow nationalist tendencies."
Liberalism on the Rocks
A conclusive period was put to national communism's brief day in Eastern Europe by the Soviet-satellite party conference in Budapest during the first week of In deliberate
contrast to the Polish-Yugoslav position on bilateral partythe conference was attonded by delegations iroi five blocUSSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. "Socialist equality" was honored in word, but the real business of the meeting was to augur the return of "hard-lino" communism to the satellites. The Wost, it was explained, hadew "cold-war" threat which had almost succeeded in wresting Hungary from the bloc, and which demanded "further consolidation" of the Communist camp and concentration ona solid front of bloc unity under the cloak of "proletarianto the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Malenkov steered the conference away from "separate roads to socialism" or the Yugoslav position on the Hungarian
The Hungarian Governmentanuary Implemented the "freeze" which the conference had ordained. Kadar, on that date, proclaimed the returnproletarian dictatorship" in Hungary and gave first priority to "proletarian internationalism"otivating Influence in the formulation of national policy. He attributed the October revolution to "foreignnd accused the Nagy regime ofhe first time since the revoltigh Hungarian official had attributed antistate motives to the deposed premier. Kadar further decreed ain the "reconstruction of the countryside" in tho socialist pattern, with particular emphasisenewed collectivization campaign. During the uprising the collectivized portion of agriculture had shrunk fromercentercent of the country's arable land, and this was the first call for remedial action by the government.
"Revisionism" was dead in Hungary, and the camp ofhad been reducedingle exponent, Poland, in the USSR's eastern sphere.
Following the6 events, satellite leadersa round-robin of visits to Moscow and to one another's The themes of the ensuing talks wore those stressed in Moscow'sctober declaration on the satellites and inanuary Budapest communiques-solidarity of the socialistew Western throat to bloc stability, and status-of-forces agreements sanctioning Soviet arms in the satellites. Eastwas repeatedly assured of its sovorelgn status.
The Chinese diagnosis of socialism's ills in6 was oneeries of theoretical dissertations from Peiping which Influenced bloc affairs during theeriod. Mao's "hundred flowors" speech of6 and his7 dictum on the nature of contradictions withinwere seized on by tho Poles as proof that liberalism and communism wero not mutually antagonistic concepts. Reduced to simplest terms, what Mao actually believed was not nearly so important In Eastorn Europe as what satellite politicians said he believed. Polish Communists interpreted Mao's theories as implicit support for Gomulka's "road to socialism." There, wore reports in6 that Polish Premier Cyraokiewlcz had been in touch with Peiping on several occasions during thecrisis and had received renewed assurances of Chinesesupport for the Warsaw course of action.
China, for its part,ouble stake in satellitePeiping's economy was hoavily reliant on0 worth of industrial and transportation equipment which arrived yearly from Eastern Europe, and Communist prestige had been badly undermined in Asia by Moscow's military adventure in Restoration of stability in Eastern Europe was vital to China. Mao's party had always acknowledged the Soviet Union as the model for all socialist countries even while sympathizing, in part at least, with Polish desires for more freedom in the determination of internal affairs. Peiping was thus in afavorable position to arbitrate outstanding differences between Moscow and tho independent-minded Poles. It was in the role of arbitrator that Chou En-lal visited both Moscow andin
Gomulka conceded more in the joint Slno-Pollsh communique ofanuary than in any other policy statement he had made since his ascent to power in October. The document acknowledged Gomulka's position that national differences exerted sufficient influence on the development of socialism to require different forms of communism in different countries. But in roturncommitted himself to the support of "proletarianand "the basic principles ofpledges omitted entirely from the Soviet-Polish agreement ofpraised bloc unity. The Polish firstwas not ready, however, to ratify tho Soviet version of events in Hungary or to tender tho Soviet Union first place in bloc affairs.
^ -'ifiwr--
The Warsaw declarationorerunner of the Sino-Soviet communique signed in Moscow onanuary. This document again emphasized bloc unity in the face of renewed "Western *nPerial-ist" threats, prescribed "genuine consultation" among bloc states as the solution for future difficulties, and repeatedecember warning against both "great-nation chauvinism and "narrow nationalism." In deference to the Poles, there was no mention of who led whom in the bloc.
Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz and Politburo member ^hab garnered further moral support for the Polish brand of communism during their visit to Peiping in early oint Sino-Polish statement reaffirmed the January declaration, praised Gomulka's post-October accomplishments, and anticipated Poland's "increasingly important contributionshe great family of socialist countries." As they had in January the Chinese omitted the customary obeisance to Moscow as leader of the Communist bloc and refrained from terming the Hungarian revolt "counterrevolutionary."
Polish-Soviet Understanding
esult of theovember Polish-Soviet agreement and Chou's good offices in January, Poland and the USSR arrivedodus Vivendi. Both countries gave ground from earlier held positions, until only threeonce remained: Moscow's right to rule the bloc, thetation of events surrounding the Hungarian revolution, and whether Gomulka was truly building socialism. ommunist, monthly periodical of the Soviet party, accused the Polish party of conducting "an offensive against the most sacred possessions of the workinghe peat ex perionce gained by the Soviet people and its Communist party on ?he road to socialist construction." Moscow's tone of voice was lower after the January communiques, andbility to placate Soviet demands while preserving intact theof his October program contribute to his overwhelming victory at the polls onanuary in Poland's first relatively free election since World War II.
Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Again Thaw
By the end of7 the first phase of the recon-solidation of the European satellites had been completed, jon-bloc Yugoslavia was alone an outspoken critic of Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, and, in February, Khrushchev assigned bimself the task of cutting Tito off from the party councils of the bloc until the harder Soviet line had had an opportunity to
re-establish orthodoxy fully in the Eastern EuropeanSoviet party deliberately checkmated Its relationswhen Shepllov, In his final report as foreignthe Yugoslavs onebruary that there would be noin relations between the two countries untilchanged its ideological attitude. As Khrushchevtho Yugoslavs replied in kind onebruaryretorted that further developments wouldThe Soviet attitude and that Yugoslavia's policies Onebruary, Yugoslav Foreign Ministerthe Yugoslav Parliament that if the USSR still hoped toin its "socialistt was "wasting itsthe end of February, party relations between tho twopowers had all but terminated. Moscow's ideologicalwas reinforced by economic chastisement calculated toYugoslavs in tho critical area of Industrialmoratorium was placed on further Sovlot aid undor thethe economic agreements Outright repudiationagreements was withheld, however, which contributed tothat the move was in the nature of economicto Inspire Bclgrado to cease agitating for reform.
During this name-calling interlude in Soviet-YugoslavPeiping occupied neutral ground. The Chineseopposed the disputeelatively passive manner,explicit censure of either participant. arch, Cbou En-lai observed that until such time as the outstandingbetwoon socialist states could be resolved by comradely discussion, the correct course would be to "reserve differences while upholding our solidarity." March statements of otherleaders continued to refer to Yugoslaviaegitimate socialist state and tended to minimize the bitter exchanges between Moscow and Belgrade.
By mid-April the decline of unrest In the bloc made iifor Khrushchev onco again to better his relations with Yugoslavia. It was no more politic now than it had been5 toroo handostile Communist state on the border of tho empire. Yugoslav influence no longer posed the threat to bloc solidarity that it had in the fall6 and the winter All the satellites, except Poland, were againpolitical conformity, and Poland did not nowerious threat to stability because of Gomulka's reassertlon of internal control, the country's geographical situation, and its professed alliance with the bloc. Khrushchev's first peace feeler was directed through the same channel as his declaration ofthe previous fallthe Albanian party. Onpril the
^.SFrftBT-
Soviet first secretary told the Albanians that the Soviet Union wished to concentrate on "what brings the peoplewotogether in the struggle forhehift in the wind from the USSR. Onay, apparently after some soul-searching, Belgrade rose to the bait when Polltlka, the Yugoslav's theoretical journal, quoted Tito's statement that Yugoslavia intended "to take thoto prevent "the further sharpening of relations" with Moscow. Tito took note of the fact that the USSR had stopped attacking Yugoslavia and had "insisted that other countries also treat Yugoslavia differently and not attack it from unprincipled positions." This seemed toate May report fromthat the Yugoslav party was in possessiononfidential Soviet memorandum advising all satellite parties to strlvo for improved rolatlons with Tito's regime and the Yugoslav party "for the timen spite of ideological differences." On the same day that Politika printed tho Tito interview, theparty's central committee sont cordial birthday greotings to the Yugoslav President, and was rewardedeply In which the marshal predicted an immediate improvement in Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union and tho countries of thoisit to the Soviet Union by Yugoslav Defense Minister Gosnjak in June, Tito added, would be in the spirit of "coexistence and cooperation with everyone."
une, Moscow and Belgrade issued strong declarations of their dosiro for friendlier relations with each other. Pravda sounded the keynote of tho Sovietthe imperialists stand to gain"ontinuation of the Soviot-Yugoslav foud. Nevertheless, the old ideological differences remained unresolved. Pravda classified the proposedas "an advance in the spirit of proletarianwhile Belgrade's Borba tormod it an expression ofpolicy of "active coexistence" with all countries of the world. Moscow thus stressed the oneness of tho socialist camp, while Belgrade emphasized the independence of tho Yugoslav position.
Despite these initial overtures, positive Soviet action toeconciliation with Tito was delayed until after the Soviet presidium purge of late June. The Molotov factionhad resisted even tentative attempts to ronew party relations with the Yugoslavs becauso of their conviction that Yugoslav influence bad been instrumental in causing the acute unrest in the satellites the precodlng fall.
Tho expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovlch. and She-pilov from the presidium of the Soviet party gaveandate for his policy of "aggressive friendship" with Immediately following the Moscow house cleaning,told tho Czechs that he intended to soek an understanding with Tito "at the first opportunity" despite the theoretical differences which still separated them. In mid-July, Yugoslav Vice Presidents Kardelj and Rankovic conferred with Khrushchev in Moscow; Soviet credits to Yugoslavia were "thawod" onworking level" Soviet delegation, the firstin Belgradeugust; and the same day Tito andmet personally in Rumania.
Tito-Khrushchev Meeting in Rumania
Tho Rumanian meeting was keyed to the Soviet statement ofpril. No signed communique was Issued, but Radio Moscowthat there hadrior understanding to agree on like views and to overlook differences of opinion. Theconfirmed the "actual significance" ofhat "roads and conditions of socialist dovolopment are different In different countries" and advocated "concrete forms ofamong all Comuunist parties. This latter invocation left the door ajaruture attempt atr Comintern-like cooperation without the Irksome restrictions of these earlier organizations.
Tho Soviet-Yugoslav understanding on the Danube set the stageew round of Yugoslav-satellite party conferences. Tito's immediate and enthusiastic acceptance ofumanian proposalalkan conference stronglythat this gesture had been one of the topics on the Tito-Khrushchov agenda.
Tito-Gomulka Meeting
The Tito-Gomulka conference which began in Belgrade oneptember may be regarded as an extension of tho Soviet-Yugoslav August mooting. The two independent Communists endorsed Soviet foreign policy point by point and minimized tho ideological differences which still separated them from the Soviet party's position. The conference communique, however, usod tho same terminology as the6 Polish-Yugoslav partyin encouraging bilateral party relations as tho mostform of intorparty cooperation. Gomulka referred to the USSR aseighbor and ally, the first and strongest socialist
ommunist verity to which Khrushchev could hardly object, yot one which withhold recognition of the USSR as leader of tho bloc. Tito's strong endorsement of Poland's Oder-Nolsse border with East Germanyajor point of distinction between Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policy.
Conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochementestimonial to Tito's belief that Khrushchevew school of more flexible Soviet policy which might one day bring Soviet communism closer to the Yugoslav model, and to theof both parties that the unity of the international Communist movement must take clear priority over ideological squabbles "within the family." It was not, however, ansurrender by either party. In this sphere sharpwere suppressed, not solved. Although Eastern European communism was still ideologically muddled and internal^ faction-allzod, its parties were agreed on the advantage of presenting an unbroken front to "capitalism." To this end Yugoslavia and Poland both found common cause with the Soviet Union and with the countrlos of the bloc.
Gomulka Tightens Up
Like Tito, Gomulka had accepted Soviet emphasis onunity and had withdrawn from some of the more raalcal Implications of his October policies. Like Tito also, however, he Insisted on the inviolability of what he considered tho essentials of his reforms, and based his compact with the USSR on mutually acceptable compromises rather than-on Ideological surrender. In January, Chou was roported to have told the first secretary, "Do what you-want but don't talk aboutrank, warning agaj.net irritating Soviet sensibilities during the unity campaign. This problem plagued the Polish leader throughout the year.
Gomulka had promised freedom of the press in October, but had also warned against "antisocial 1st forces" at work within Poland. He kept the "revisionist" press in check during the first half7 by balancing these two abstractions in the desired proportion. The outspoken "enrage" Journals continued to demand more liberal actions than the regime was prepared to take, but because of their limited interior circulation, and unofficial status, they escaped the full weight of government censorship for some time. Zycie Warszawy and Trybuna Ludu, the principal government and party organs, could not be permitted tho same tolerance, however. When they persisted inangerously anti-Soviet lino, Gomulka dismissed thoir editors and replaced them with more "conservative" journalists. On 27
February he warned that most of Poland's journalists and writers had "broken with socialism" and had become theof 'petty bourgeois' ideology." This was strongin the new Poland, although liberal sentiment was still too strong to permit an effective crackdown on the press until the fall
Gomulka's desire to minimize his Ideological conflict with the Kremlin became more evident in March, when, for the first time, he referred to the Hungarian revoltcounterrevolution and termed itad attempt to overthrow the Socialist system" at the very moment when"Hungary had stepped onto the road of the correction of past mistakes." Prior to that time the Polish party had held that the uprisingroduct of the same forces which had caused the Poznan riots, legitimate popular grievances,eactionary Communist regime.
In March, also, the Poles disavowed the term "nationalas descriptive of the "Polish road to socialism." escription, according to the party's thebretlcal journal, Howe Drogi, implied the limitation of Communist influence to "narrow nationalhe antithesis of Marxist theory. These semantic distinctions cost Gomulka little in popularbut contributed to the appearance of the Outward solidarity of the Communist camp. The cause of "right communism" for the presentead letter in Hungary, and the mass of the Polish population paid little attention to the party's ideological Gomulka's domestic popularity had other thanroots, and, so long as he held out against Soviet dictation of Poland's Internal policieseturn of economicby the USSR, he was on reasonably firm ground in paying lip service to the Kremlin's version of abstract Communist theory.
id-May plenum of the Polish party's central committee, Gomulka reaffirmed his October policies, and indicated that his subsequent concessions to Soviet policy had been little more than superficial adjustmentsifficult political situation. "The road to socialism in different countries can take forms other than those of the road to socialism in the Sovietomulka told the meeting. The Polish party, its firstsaid, would continue to oppose forced collectivization, restrictions on free speech, and would support coexistence with the Catholic Church for an indefinite time to come. Gomulka said, would stand firmly behind its alliance with the Soviet Union, its friend, ally, and protector of the Oder-Neisse frontier.
Gomulka's true feelings toward the USSR were revealed in bis extemporaneous replyirect attack by one of the "Stalin 1st" members of the central committee who badeturn to orthodox communism on the Soviet model. The first secretary heatedly recalled the ravages which tho Soviet Army had wrought in Poland In the course of its "liberation" in World War II, the imprisonment of Poland's wartime party leadershim of Stalin, and the ruthless exploitation of the Polish economy by the USSR in tho years before the October events. Repetition of these humiliationsertain consequenceeturn to the pre-October party line, he said, and all his actions weretoward avoiding this ultimate folly. The transcript of this speech did not appear in the published text of the plenum, but tape recordings of it were circulated among high echelon officials of government and party. The Soviet leadership could thenceforth have suffered no illusions as to the fact that the USSR's physical proximity, far moreommon viewhared philosophy, kept Poland In the Soviet bloc.
Gomulka's most urgent problem was economic in nature. Low productivity, low wages,ow standard of livingicious cycle that beset the almost bankrupt country. The only immediate source of relief appeared to be foreign aid. TheUnion in6 hadortion ofdebt; but credits, foreign exchange, and machine goods from the West were badly needed, and Gomulka was not one to permit ideology to stand in the way of national survival. October and June he concluded economic agreements with Austria, England, Sweden, and France and in June received his first American aid in the form of a rade Trybuna Ludu characterized the agreement as "exactly what we had askednd as significant In helping "to break down East-West trade barriers" and "lessen International
At the end of June, Gomulka conferred in Berlin with Walter Ulbricht, EaBt German "hard-line" party leader,at Moscow's suggestion. Tho Polos had been highlyat Pankow's reference in December to "Polish and foreignnd took the occasion of the June conference to exact payment for the insult. Ulbricht,oint communique utterly at variance with his prior position, endorsed the actions of the Polish party since6 and agreed with Gomulka that "historic conditions and national characteristics" may determine the forms and methods of approach to communism in different countries. Thisar cry from the bristling hostility which the East Germans had previously displayedthe "Polish road."
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Tho bilateral government communique wont down the lino with Soviet foreign policy andow note in callingBaltic Sea of peace." eutralized Baltic had traditionallyream of Russian policy makers, and the inclusion of the satellite governments in the schome was probably envisaged by Moscow. Poland's role In Baltic negotiations, and its future relations with other riparian countries, however, could differ materially from Moscow's script for the plan. The Baltic is Gomulka's only window on free Europe, and Soviet sponsorship of the "sea of peace" plan could afford Poland an opportunity to widen its contacts with the West without antagonizing the USSR.
Another indication of Gomulka's desire to foster closer contacts with the Western European community was his use of the Berlin conference to express his desire for friendly relations with "all the people" of Germany. Gomulka had sporadically pressed for diplomatic relations with Bonn, but the highlyOder-Nelsse question prevented serious negotiations in that direction. This reference let the Federal Republic know that Poland still hopedapprochement.
Orthodox Satellites Tighten Policies
Throughout the period ofinter "freeze" in Eastern Europe the orthodox satellites consolidated theirpolicies. In April the Bulgarian regime Increased its use of terror to dispol the last remnants of Hungarian sympathytlll restive population. Mass deportations and student expulsions were reported, and the government admitted that its intellectuals refused to conform to strict party discipline. In Hungary the reactivated security police againight lid on "illicit" political expressions, the liberal Hungarian writers' union was suspended in January and its leading figures arrested, and Minister of State Marosan declared that since not enough "fascists" had been bungthey had better be hung" Rumania struggled with widespread unemployment andrief flurry of intellectual dissent in the spring. Albania wasroduct of the Stalin ora.
The orthodox political line of Poland's satellitewas typified in the Czechoslovak party conference held In Prague fromo The Czech central committee urged "multipartite discussion of Important politicaln unabashed criticism of the Polish and Yugoslav position. Party Secrotary Hendrych found "Important strata" among the intelligentsia and working class susceptible to "Woetern-sponsored subversivenational
coiiiunlBB, and people's capitalism." Of these alien deviations, "revisionism" constituted by far the greatest threat tocommunism. These mistaken notions, Hendrych continued, must be replaced by traditional Marxlst-Lenlst concept? eturn of "socialistn Czechoslovak arts and letters. For two years Czechoslovakia had experienced the stirrings of liberal thought each spring, and dissatisfaction with the regime's cultural policies persisted, particularly in Slovakia. Hendrych termed this attitude "ultimately unacceptable." enewed drive for collectivization ofthe bellwether of orthodox communism, was promised the nation's farmers. Above all, the secretary concluded,indissoluble ties of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union must be further strengthened and defended.
The Hungarian party had already denied the validity of Mao0 flowers" theory, but had not published the text of the Chinese leader's speech. The Czech press became tho first in the satellites to reproduce the edited edition of the speech onune after Hendrych had termed it inappropriate for application in Czechoslovakia, where traces of "imperialist espionage and subversion" survived.
The newly constituted Hungarian Socialist Workers' party held its "first annual" conference two weeks after the Czechs adjournod, and echoed the Czech line withoutvariation. The conference packed the party's politburo and central committee with ill-disguisedlected Jozsef Revai, former hard-line ideological czar, to the central committee, and condemned "counterrevolutionaries" who sided with Nagy against the regime. Kadar told the conference that "brotherly friendship with the USSR must be representedand without shame."
Post-PreBldlum Shake-up
Another indication of the return of regimented uniformity to the satellites came following the Soviet presidium shake-up which was announceduly. Every satellite, withoutendorsed the purge unequivocally. Bulgaria and Rumania purged their politburos; Hungary belatedly reaffirmed thecorrectnessh congress doctrlno but gave noof reimplementing liberal policies.
Poland and Yugoslavia welcomed the Khrushchev victory as indicativeore liberal Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe Khrushchev, however, during the remainder of the summer, made It clear that regime stability,articular political shading,
was the sine qua dod required of each satellite leader. The Soviet first secretary smiled on the ultra-Stalin-like Novotny in Czechoslovakia, and called East Germany's Ulbricht the "most faithful of all the faithful." This was not liberalism, no mat-tor what the standard of measure. Everywhere Khrushchev went ho was met and followed by slogans of bloc unity, the basic theme of Soviet policy since This was not at all Khrushchev had boen sufficiently shaken by theand Polish events of the fall6 to acceptelaxation of political controls in tho bloc was the surest way to dissipate Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.
From the Soviet viewpoint the reimpositionard line had been reasonably successful. Controls in each country,Poland, were now adequate to suppress public displays of dlssldence,irm and rapid oodorsement of Soviet policy decisions could now be relied on in Eastern Europe. There was no incentive for further ideological experimentation.
Mao Grows Some Weeds
During tho spring the Chinese Communists, too, harvested the bitter fruit of0 flowers." Mao Tse-tung In an unpublished address In February had urged bis party cadres to stimulate criticism from the people. The order was carried out with exomplary Communist zealousness, andtheorrent of intellectual criticism against the party's monopoly of power and basic policies rainod on the regime. Some of the most vociferous complainants wereparty members. The entire experienceitter one for Mao and those advocates of the "hundred flowers" policy who, like him, had overestimated popular support for the regime and underestimated the depth of the unreconciled opposition.
and "rectification" were, .k- rnnntrv "squelch antiregime utterances in the country
A party "rectification" campaign, designed to improve party agitators' techniques In handling the masses, wa. launched in April. In June, Peipingtrenuously editedversion of Mao's February speech which put severeon popular criticism of the party's power position and major policies, including its policy on relations with tho USSR. Simultaneously the regime unveiled an "antirightist" campaign aimed at thoso who had heedod tho earlier parole to attack the rogimo. In August, as reaction gathered momentum, "antlrlghtlsm' rectification" were mergedingle steamroller effort
These developments, whatever their consequences in thecontext, undoubtedly rendered Mao and other Chineseleaders more sympathetic to Soviet problems In Eastern Europe, and more ready to agree to the hardening Soviet position relative to the satellites.
The Polish Exception
The Gomulka regime in Poland continued toarrow tightrope between accommodation to Soviet wishes and theof its independence. age strike0 transport employees in Lodz tested the economic policy severely inut Gomulka remained firm and the strikers roturned to work convinced that the country lacked the funds necessary for an increase. The failure of the economy to improvo at the rate anticipated by most Poles was reflected in Increasingly caustic press treatment of the regime and its policies. In early fall Gomulka tightened censorship and, in October, closed down the "revisionist" student Journal Po Prostu. The studentwhich ensued were not directed against Gomulka personally so much as against the bureaucracy of the lower echelons of the regime. They became disorderly only when rowdy delinquents turned themiolent holiday, representative of theof Polish youth in general.
h plenum of the Polish party's central committeectober concernod itself less with relations with the USSR than with Gomulka's callew spirit of vitality in the party. Liberalization had continuedoint at which party influence had all but disappeared in the countryside, and was only nominal In the other strata of society. The plenum emphasized Gomulka's determination to adhere to the "broadliberties and national freedoms" which had been instituted in October. The press was promised that its right tocriticism" would be preserved, but was told that "anti-socialist" or "anti-Soviet" criticism would not be tolerated. Gomulkaloodless "verification" of all partydesigned to weed out the opportunistic and apathetic. The fight, as tho first secretary pictured It, was to continue against both "revisionists" andhose whoeturn to "Stalinist" principles, "revisionism" being viewed as the greater of the two evils. No new action to solve the economic crisis was projected.
Gomulka's problems were now internal. If he could succeed in stabilizing his economy and in restraining his press from ill-considered attacks on Soviet policy, ho would stand to gain from Khrushchev's status quo outlook on the bloc.
TheYear After Hungary
Eastern Europe on the eve ofh anniversary of the Russian revolution vasunctional unit in the Soviet empire. Dlssldence was under control, bloc solidarity wasa fact, and liberalism had been confined to thefield, where it existed more by definition thaneality.
XV. EARS OF COMMUNISMEW COMINTERN
7 Moscowtage for the mostarray of Communist notables to gather inears. The meeting war ostensibly in honor of the achievements ofears of Soviet communism, but Khrushchev's anniversary-eve keynote address served actually to kickonth-long congress of world communism. This occasion, for the Soviet Union, marked the accent of the steep hill up from6 nightmare ofand Warsaw, the culminationull year's effort toultilateral declaration of faith in the future of Soviet-style communism. The Kremlin badly needed, forpurposes abroad and for psychological effecthepectacular demonstration of the restoration ofunity In its sphere of influence, and this was its chosen forum. Sixty-four Communist parties celebrated the return of the tent-meetingacade for Moscow's central direction of the international party line. Although the gathering was out of deference for the sensibilities of the Polish,Yugoslav, and Italian parties,ew Comln-torn was born in Moscow in November. The participants took care to establish the precedent-setting nature of their convention by announcing, before adjourning, their intontion of convening as often in the future "as the need arises."
Of the three policy statements issued by the Moscowby far the most important in terms of Soviet-blocwas tho joint declaration of policy signed by tho USSR and thether parties of the bloc onovember. ovember speech outlined tho essential points of this document, and the "peace manifesto" signed by all attending parties onovember reiterated well-worn Soviet foreign policy alms, never the object of serious controversy in the
bloc.
The policy declaration itself was more notable for itsignatures than for any Inherently new ideas. Substantively the documenth congress doctrine, with theof new, admonitory control clauses. For the first time,
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however, all tho parties of the bloc agroed, publicly and in concert, that, while "dogmatism"erious threat, "tho main present danger is revisionism."
In Moscow the recent Chinese Inclination to condemnsatellite revisions became clearly evident. The Chinese Communists had maintained since the revolutionary fall6 that "groat-natlon chauvinism" constituted the principal threat to the Ideological solidarity of the bloc. Peiping now withdrew from tnls position in favor of the USSR's contention thatwas the acute present dangor. This policy switch directly reflected Mao's unsettling experiences at home thesummer when the attacks on his regime by Chinesehad attained an unexpected degree of Intensity and
Mao also joined Gomulka in acknowledging the ideological leadership of the Communist party of the Sovlot Union. Peiping had habitually hailed the USSR's state leadership, but always before had stressed the "equality" and "independence" of all Communist parties. Even now the theorotical concession, which Mao's adherence to the policy declaration Implied, was not absolute, for be reserved the right to continue to innovate "socialist development" within the Chinese party and toguiding influence ovor tho other Communist parties of Asia. In like manner, Gomulka could take refuge, should an occasion demand, behind the extremely broad generalities which theproposed as the nine basic principles of communism. Nothing In these relatively innocuous platitudes Interdicted the Polish party's post-October course. There was evidence, on the contrary, that Moscow bad leaned over backward to satisfy Gomulka in the formulation of the principles. No otherfor example, so plausibly accounts for tho curious, Bukharinlstic phraseology of the basic principle on agricultural policy which calls for "gradual socialist reconstruction,"omitting specific references to collectivization.
Despite the anomalous wording of portions of thethe countries of the bloc, In following Moscow's political load, committed themselves to an extromoly narrow doctrinal channel. Implicit In this endorsementrofession of the correctness of the USSR's role as custodian of truo Communist doctrine. Both ideological heresies cited in the declaration, "dogmatism" andere, by definition, deviationsorrect, doctrinal norm, to be enunciated and Interpreted by the Soviet party. The Soviet Union thus regained, byIts unique role as oracle of the Communist world. ommon consent Moscow was awarded tho right to condemn asor "revisionist" any politically embarrassing independent satelliteevelopment fraught with future significance.
Nothing was really solved at the Moscow congress. Behind the spangles of ideological unity, the basic problems of the individual differences which distinguish and separate theof tho bloc remained. Tho remarkablo thing about the policy declaration was the factroup of influential Conununlwt leaders, so acutely aware of national prerogatives, could agree among themselves not to disagree in public. This,ense,ribute to Mao who,ad urged public agreement on the countries of the bloc. The Moscow meeting put this advice ioto practicerandiose scale. Pressing problems, involving obvious conflicts of opinion, wero either discussed in private or were filed for future disposition. Nothing, for example, was said about the extent of legitimate self-determination permissible in Communist countries, or the future course of agricultural collectivization In the bloc. The nine principles wore worded to promise all things to all people yet nothing specific to anyone. The show was the thing inin November. And this came off almostitch.
A discordant note in Moscow's carefully staged chorus of Communist unity was managed by Tito, sulking in Belgradeudden attack of political lumbago. The Yugoslav leader found himself in late Octoberarticularly delicateposition which manifestly excluded his participation in the founding conventionomintern-type organization. Tito's recognition of the black-sheep East German regime hadensitive nerve in the West, and had placed in serious jeopardy Yugoslavia's professed intent to arbltrato East-West differencesonbloc neutral. Khrushchev's rude dismissal of Zhukov, Belgrade's candidate for champion of the liberal line in the Soviet presidium, undoubtedly sorved to weaken further Tito's resolve to consumate his previously burgeoning rapprochement with the Kremlin.
As earlyovember, Belgrade's Komunist blasted the product of the Moscow meeting as unrepresentative of theviewpoint. The party weekly restated Tito's "separate roads" thesis, and concluded that socialist forces were so varied that it was "Incorrect to supply universal recipeshow the rule of the working class should behat should be tho forms of authority, wbicb are the compulsory forms of social ownership, etc." Tito thus succinctly dismissed the bloc's nine principles before thoy had been committed to paper. Even without the East German complication, it would have been Incongruous for the Yugoslavs to bind themselves to an ideological commitment such as that drawn up at Moscow. Tho declaration was weak enough in its final form; compromises of the type which Tito would certainly have demanded would have rendered it entirely meaningless.
In summary, the November congress reasserted Sovietprimacy in the Communist bloc and signaled the returnentrally conceived and promulgated world Communistovember gave no cause for revision of the early fall'sof Soviet-satellite relations, although it presaged aof the Soviet-Yugoslav vendetta as the coat ofwhitewash applied in7 began to peel. Unity under duress continued to characterize interparty relations in the bloc. The manner in whichh anniversary of thoRevolution was celebrated guaranteed the continuationhard-line" policy in the Soviet sphereonsiderable time to com.
Original document.
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