96
FECIAL
ATI OVAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 71
FRATCE AKD HOME AFRICA (Uvnaa* Ceoclualccu)
y the
Director cf Central
Tba following ir-ellieeocc organlsatlone participated Id tha preparation of thla evtlnotei in* oetrtral ZoteUlgnee Asracy and tba intelll/jeaeo orgwlaatlou of the Dnjurtntots of State, the fimj, tho fcvy, the Air Faroe, and tb* Joint Staff.
in by tbe
Intelligence Adrltory CoaoLttee
an Oajeux-rtiie ware Ihe Dlnctor of IMvUIskmm and Re March, Depirtoent cf State; tb* Aaslrtaat Chief cf Staff, IntcllleKie*,cf tbe Arnyi tbe Director of Ho vol Irrtclllsaeocj tha AMlatont Cfaiaf of Staff, ZBteUisenoc, USAFj and tb* Deputy Director for Znt*lUg*ooe, "ffae Joint Staff. Tbs Atonic Energy Ccccilealco Repreeentotlv* to tba IAC and tbe Aaaietast Directcr, Paderal Bureau ofobetolrjad, tba aubjact balno cutalda cf their jviadletlcn.
ii
central INTELLIGENCE aoiici
0
SBBJECTi* Pranoe end aorta Africa
THE pftOBLEH
To astisute probable fl>relopBK>otj lnTun! sin, aod horocco orar tho next few ninths, with particular raforooco to their inplicaUona for the future vuUm poeltioa In too area*
CfSSGUHOaS
a* Doralocaonta our too next Ant aontha ldli booof ratainirg aposition in Worth Africa. falluroto staka substantial progress toward rosolTinc too oooXllotwould Increasela It* relation* with Jtorooco andwould alaosttreagtban tha position of axtrasdatHortb Africa, Do Oaolla la trying to prepare- thafor aoolutloa by aetabllatdBg hla authority orar tha solitaryInand by seeking to eoefttfne* the HoalsaaIt to be truatod. 9)
B. Da Oeullo has bsen vague about his policy, but ha say offer the Hoolams hope by rs-opoeing scea fora of aatoaony for Algeria* Be attaches groat iarertanca tortieipetioo in tha referenda* and elocttoos which an to take place la tho early fall* Ssspite bitter TIM (Front da Idb-retlooalUoo to wslaa participation, the French car. probably seooro toe appearaooa of etaiTUal Koalaa support. Wo believe, however, that do Oaullo baa lata than aa avail chance to persuade tbe FLU loedoxs to cooperate idtb Ma rather than to setowraaat-lxi-exlln. Da Oeulls's chances would ba better If bis relr.tlooa with Ifozoeeo end Tunisia lsavorsd and they urged tb* FIN to accept aodernta taras. (Paras*I)
0* Tho establishmentneot-dn-exlla, which could cone at any tisa, would aasa asgcrteUtloos between tb* French and tha TUT virtually -Laposaibla. hough ds OssOls woold atteapt to develop altercatlve Hoelea leadership, wa believe that the TIM would probably continue ssftteleat reatstsoce to prevent ain Algeria. Koroceo and funlaia would feel compelled tothe FIJIovs which would sod lrlaadly relations between theae ootavtrles and France. Extremist and sntlJfaatern forcei throufihout abrth Africa would ba greatly strengthened, and their leaders would probably torn to Egypt and tho Bloc for easlatenoe and supportj. Id)
Original document.
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