LETTER TO HONORABLE GORDON GRAY FROM ALLEN W. DULLES RE HANSON BALDWIN ARTICLE

Created: 10/24/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Honorable GordonAssistant to the Prca'.Ont Chits Bouse

Deer Gordon:

In response to your lettex ofa enclosing two copies of ouron ths validity of the stoteaairta nodo by Hanson Baldwin on

sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles Director

Enclosure: Cocoeats cn Article

Assistant Dlrector/ocleatific intelligence"

ddressee CIDCI D/l

boputyddressee

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8 COMMENTS ON BALDWIN ARTICLE

In tbe New York Times ofanson W. Baldwin wrote of the alleged concern among official* Ln the Pentagon and tba Atomic Energy Commission about tbe accuracy oi Soviet announcements dealing. nuclear tests. He also stated these same officials believe that Soviet knowledge wae derived by leaks or espionage.

Tha Soviet announcement of the detection of. testa was undoubtedly based on monitoring. comrnunlcation*.umber of tbe teats were of sucb low yield as to almost certainly preclude their detection by long range detection menodf.wo of tba announcedes were false wltb no nuclear toat having occurred. On tbe second of these2 pounds) High Explosive charge was exploded. Oa the Otheruclear test was scheduled, but cancelled at tbe laet mftnent. However, tbe Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting tbe tests report* tbat on both of theseormal count-down waa conducted, auch count-downs being carried ln the clear by radioo allips and Installation* supporting tba Task Force. other Information (urnisbed by tbe JTF, It la cUar that the Soviet* would kav* ancoenlared vary little difficulty In monitoring tba Internal communication system at'the proving ground. Searches conducted by tba JTF to clear tba last area ware primarily

Evenubmarine staved outside the test restricted aonc. It could have been veil within the general rang* of the local communications system. One additional Item la support of ths likelihood lhat the USSR information came from communication monitoring is ths fact that. test, conducted onuly, vas announced in Moscow vithin twenty-four hours after detonation. It is doubtful that espionago could have provided sucb rapid transmission of information.

As reported by Mr, Baldwin, officials in the Pentagon and the AEC

a

are undoubtedly concernsd about ths Soviet announcements dealing vith Unitad States tests, although the announcements axe partially Inaccurate, but the further allegation that thene officials beliove that the Soviet

knowledge was derived by leaks or espionage, is probably not shared by

rsaponeible officials of ths Pentagon and AEC vho have full knowledge of ths conditions under. oversea nuclear tests are conducted.

Our conclusion vould be tha: ths Soviet information came from. announcements about tha test series, open broadcants made for safety reasons announcing closed and restricted areas for surface ships and aircraft at specific times and dates, and finally from monitoring of the JTF count-dovn communication*oint inside or Immsdlately adjacent to tba restricted area surround Ins; tha test

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