I
REMARKS:
AjiJM'vlil
Action
oncurrence
Direct Reply Preparation of Raply Recommendation
Signature Raturn Dlapatoh Fllo
BE-EXAMIRflTIOH OF THE SOVIET ICJJM PRODUCflOK
AND EEPLOYMEW RiCGRflH COSSIDESED
(OREO GMIC)
CIA/SR
oJect'* October ipsfi
Offit-f- of
io? mm
'WOIHSEOKOTOff AHu IH IIIHWI KKXKAM COUS3
l
i. ygmagB.
have do CQncluci-.'o evidenceCh?lof the type eettoatc* Inbeine In light of our currents.ulliti.ua, houavor,preclude the existence of sod) osAnca At would otillltu preliminary puaseo codow level of. Is fraanantcu-y, tliough inccnclualve, evidence which isthe timing of the estimated progra-a.
full lajooct of the eatiaaAed pro*;TEs vould wot9 or0 nfa which time tha lapliad ngaitiida of
activity could hardlyetection |
believe tiiat the oBtebllshtent of SB ewly iuUlclcapability ie olecet otrtaliily r.hj&otrju. 'Jliisthe USSR ulth the opportunity to tout daployaent conceptscospatiblllty of ell cajor elcctntu of the sntSMj to acquirefacility, and in addition to obtainaa early datapsychological advsntoaa, BXthowjliimited Therefore, wc bcJAova thatii ncucaauy decisionIn the early pcjrfche US-iR Boalu DOu havj or be veryattaining this capability.
The date of decision to initiate aeriesuldprecede tho delivery of production jziacilJK toulooal sitecleant eighteen months. In thex' ths vcvJjmzIelivery of production ICQHa indecision would havehe firing of
tha first ICBM ut Tyurutem. Although we lielisvu this <iuv.Uoet program could bsmed with difficulty cad ni'slifc even OS ftiing on without our knowledge, vo consider it to be the leesfc iitely of the three pro-SMH conaidercd.
5. Although the catlmatad nrcgrtLan arehey would rc^uirand closely integrated effoi-ts in aear-uiiiliaattperl ode. Any unanticipated ncjor problems, therefore, could result ia Biflftiflosnfi slippage in the prosprssi Bciierhilorj.
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II. irjBCUSStOP
ttiioe/fraiaioaspects of iac Soviet ICBM prodi* tlcm sad deployaent program astijwted- tn* dlocw<3toa is pressated to terms of tue physical activities tblcb shouldccurred to date if tbe estimated progreu ofc/jectdvd le to be met; thii rote-at wbjcii voeu* ocUVIKcb ncwuH prtERSTuture; tbelaood that evidence" of thtfne acfcU'itdeu would be available, given current collect loo; ;iud the evidence vhlc5 has been received to date. ilial section discusses some ofmajor decisions vMcb tbe USBB vojld haw* lo max- la connection vith this program and their Implications.
The program selected for aaalyalsne-half year production program vhlch ossuiMa lhnt delivery ui. production ICBMs to completedacilities would begin laith attain' meatapabilityu at the eivll-Thi-s* dntes rwprue*nt the old-poiato of therJTOgeo given In HIE
A* Actlyltlea Which
To achieve the le*li ofmplied in ouraitlvltdes should have cecurred by cav In reany aa.xjctsprogram. We believe that pilot Un* pvodiistius, facilitiescompleted and operating, aeries prodwetjoe facilitiesd oupplvara fhouid be Mtfscllitteu should baUctj training should be
under way.
1. Pilot Liu* Prcduettoce.
Pilot.fabrication cfsvelosaaspt missiles should base begun no later than early t'jSl, with fabrication of some components itarted FoUouiiuj the initiation of the ICBM test flight progrtra in7 and lncorpo ration into uw missile of modifications Indicated by thoft-.Hrt.lie fnusicfttloave gradually increased. SaMttme durlnj;fabrication of productionf alnsilec andi.vuitave
* Although three eltornatlvo profh-ivc Wva ax&ained, the two
a Ltftrasc* olb0*d
only to the extent, that they differ 4lgalfica*.tl; frcs tnu too nnd one-half ye;j* projiraia.rcadetail. Inpendlx.
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been aborted aod should nov/'ba irali. cuule of tbi3 activity vould call'for the productioj. of acwv.Vi. yro.-Miypeonth at; present. These would be intended i'ur aavijlopiaaafcWrings, apace Vehicle adaptation, es well aa delivery to ;tOC facilities.
2 - Series Production,
f ICBMs should also be wall advaoced. ejorityactivity
'*
/way vojild ctill be re3.ated tofor initial pi-nouction rather
/ tfcaiyprodacWdn itself- Because of the relatively highrates of
production necessary to Lisctroductiont Is probable that 'two large and separate plants would have beau -selected early in the planning of tha program for manufacture) ol' the ICBHfinal nseambly of thend factory tout checkout. These facilities, each with two to threesqitara feet of floor space, should by now have been eithes1 aowly constructed orfrom other production. Siitsnsiva pjoductidn fr " and proof-testing facilities for tlie necessary ensirioajniidance components of the missile nhould be- sviolab3.fi now.
Production tooling at these plants shouldbo .in the finaltages of installation, Kith manufacture of vbc .first production JCIM about to be otarbad. The labor force inquired i'Or eneh of the plants , would be building up in sufficient quantity so nvovittet for initialdeliveries of production ICBMs fromInat illation hagiiretng in about. With theca preparations fov cu-arid/vy production approaching completion, there would be an incraaiiing volx&io of activity between production facilities and both tha St i) pilot liny Installation producing prototypes tndhousairf. d nrlnor subcontractor foclliiieo.
An
3- Sub^optractZn?; '
the precant tiice, eubcoritxa-jiiuvfr i'or the usnufacturo
of ell parts of the ICBM system should have beer, designated.drawings furnished them, androfiitction und of parts and components bsgitn. Theseiee would
bo engaged in shiftingnd resources,.
too line and making other coaptations and find production arrangements'.
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A rapid, expansion of output vould be required of these plants in order to provide the working inventory of ports and components needed tomooth and uninterrupted build up of ICBM production vhlch would be programmed
h tU'iching Facilities.
Concurrently with all of these production activities, at
oderate level of activity associated with preparations for future ICBM deployment should now be under way. Both the level and nature of tblc activity would depend on whether the Soviet ICBM system has been designed for hard {underground) launching sites, soft (surface) sites, seal-mobile roll launching facilities, or some combination of these deployment concepts. If fixed, hard sites are contemplated, preparation of several such facilities, possibly In widespread locations, should now be well under way, with most of the sub-surface construction phases completed- Installation of the necessary wiring, plumbing, storage tanks, and other facilities and equipment for these sites vould probably be scheduled to begin shortly. The initial construction workumber of other sites should be about tond the planning and surveying of virtually all sites contemplated lo the prolan ahouXd be nearirg coc$>letlon. If, on the other hand, 'Cio USSR ban chosen totatic soft site ICBM system, sits construction would probably be somewhat less advanced at the present time, since the construction effort required would be substantially loss than in the case of underground launching facilities. Ia the eventaobllo, roll-mounted launching unit system has been adopted, the principal tjctivlty to date would probably have been the partial conversion and adaptation of one or more rolling stock plants In the USSR to tho Eflnufacture of special purpose rail cars or the modification of cars requiring installation of electronic or other specialized equipment. Production or modification of these special rail unitsurrently be under way.
In order to receive the maximum benefit from an IOC facility, in terms of testing the capabilityomplete prototype system, acquisition of experience in the operation of the system, and the possibility cf obtaining an important psychological (although extrearfi-ly Halt-id Military) Edvontogc, the USSR should now have
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so^alfiLeju ofc- vi very cxobc to ciajjiieticg preparation of an IOC site. Assuming that iiajor technical dlfficultlloe have not boon encountered, ICBM prototype production to ante should have amounted to overlocd I sooc ofave already been fired, others are undoubtedly bexng prepared for test firing, and still others are probably being adapted for ESV or space flight purposes, the USSR should by no- beosition tomwn number of prototype mlssllco to an IOC progrcm, ocoe of which could have alreadyrototype lrnincalng facility.
5- alnlns Activities-
Preparation of operational launching facilities would be accompaniedarge-scale training program for military launchingich should already have attained olzable proportions. Large numbers of officers and enlisted ncn should already be assembled at opecloliet schools, pilot line facilitloo, and other Installations, probably tncluttiug the Tyuratam test range, undergoing formal training In the vide variety of skills required for the operation of the Soviet ICBM system. Many of these personnel uould probably have been transferred .from other units experienced In the operation of shorter range &dealle systems. Training vould also be under vay at any operational, sites uhlch have already been completed. b. Current Activities Should Proceed.
The acti-Jity which should already be under vay In the early stages of oil. uajur aspects, of tlie Soviet ICBM production and deployment program would base to bu expanded very rapidlyeak rate
1. Irit;ial Operational Copability.
By3 or9 at the lateot, tho IOC site should be complete and turned over to the military user If the USSR is to obtain the noxlwvi Vnwfit fromacility. Following user acceptance, fling and equipping of the facility, an Intensive program of training ona operational toetlag of thoystem on site vould begin. Depending upon thi location of tlm site and the degree of security whichUSSS uinhes to maintain regarding it, live test firings with prsfcotype missiles might bo expected to occur as part of this Initial operations! Groining and testing program.
ho seal* and tempo of the ICBM production activity cow under woy should increase very sharply. By the end of the year, whente of production should have Brown to aboutCBMs per month, tlir? number o7 people directly or indirectly engaged in tbe ICBM prodaction program would probably. The number of production fccllltles directly involved to varying degrees wauld be in the hundrols and possibly, with many of these facilities working multiple shifts. The total volume of activity would continue to increase until about0 and would bo reflected bya& rapid build up in ton rate of ICBM production an tho first few months0 until peak production of overissiles per month was achieved. Thereafter, tne level of activity should remain fairly constant throughout the ixcoir.der of the program.
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Satictimc afterthere should occur the firstegular and accelerating program of firing of production ICBMs, primarily for quality control purposes. These firings might take place at ulther Tyurutamraining or IOC facility, and would probably continue throughout most of the remainder of the production program.
b. pcployocnt.
IfSR hasixed, underground deploymenthorn lucre ate in activity relating to construction of launching facilities vould occur,eak in9 andO. Thi' expansion of this activity vould roughly parallel the correspondingly sharp increase in production nativity although preceding itew months. During tho period of peak activity,onstruction and installation workers would be directly engaged in ICBM site construction and preparation at about j'j separate and probably viucopread locations. This activity would be accompanied by en extremely heavy flow of materials sod equipment to those site locations. luring lateandn average of well over two completed launching sites per mouth would be turned over to the military usor.
oft, surface configuration haa been adopted for Soviet launching facilities, both the level and tempo of construction activity
vculd bo ouch lene than tbot required for construction of bard sites. Pcrsouuel, notarial ana lead-time requirements would all bo much smaller and, although the effort would still be sizable, area at peak rate probably less thanites vould be under construction at any given tine. Oi the other hand, the activity associatedcal-moblle mil gyite* of deplojiacot would take on entirely different form. By9 andn extensive program would be under way of construction Of the railroad sidings or spurs which vould serve as launching sites. These spurs UOttld presumably bo constructed In large numbers la order to Increase the flexibility and decrease tbe vulnerability of the system- Simultaneously, production of aof aspecial purpose rail cars and locomotives would bo in an advanced stage at one or more rolling stock plants. Most of these cars would be modified versions of standard railroad equipment and iould representnail fraction of total Soviet output. The piogrem'o requirements for diesel switching locomotives and adapted and modified all-metal passenger cars of several kinds vould amount toercent or moie of normal Soviet output of such equipment. There would also be an active program In process on lnutullutloa of special equipment in rail cars Intended for use In missile trains. During this period, there shouldteady Increase in tbe number of cuided mlssilo trains moving Into and within pre-selected launching areas, as wellonsiderable volume of movement of special cam to and from factories and outfitting and supply centers.
SaemBfl'
9 and ISKjO, as the rat* of completed missiles
and sites Increased rapidly, there vouldigh and expanding level of tralnins activities of mary types. 0 probably wellersons per month would be comploting Initial training, receiving assignments to operational units and taking over the operation of fully equipped, newly completed operational launching facilities.
C. AdEdDlstratlon and Control.
The wide range of activity described above, all of which
Is essential to achievement of the Soviet ICBM capability by the ondould generate rn exceptionally heavy and continuing flow of cctrrjunlcntlons, travelers, Materials, parto and equipment between
industrial facilities, launching site areas, military sod admini strati wotions, and ^he central authority controlling tbe entire program. The inspection and acceptance procedures associated with delivery to the military of completed missiles, equipment and launching sites would aloneigh level of activity from9 or0 throughout the remainder of the program. Moreover, tbereiuiramentG of a. program of this complexity and urgency vould almost certainly result in an unprecedented amount of detailed reporting on the status 'f the piograra and on problems being encountered from widely separated installations throughout the Soviet Union to the central sntfaarlty, uuich vould be attempting to exercise rigid control over allpncto of tho integrated program. Colleton Capabilities.
As yet 'here In no conclusive evidenceoviet ICBM
production and deployment program of the magnitude described has
actually bsen initiated >ix- that any of the activity anticipated to ante has in fact taken plane.
the program io as estimated, we
should cxpocti'^es to be currently under construction; by the end9ites should have been completed and anotherhould be under construction.
m
D. Current Evidence.
tbe currently nvailahle evidence bearing on Soviet ICBMand deployment consists primarily of fragmentary information on individual facilities and activities vhlch indicate possible Soviet activity related to the pre-production piloses of an ICBM program. There is limited informationossible Soviet ICBM launching site, tvo possible prototype production facilities, and unidentified activity at several locations vhlch mlglit be associated with ICBM pioauctlon. Heme ot thia evidence, bovover, Is subject toas conclusively indicating ICBM production or deployment activity.
I. Ceo urgent.
iro/jaentaxyconcerning unidentified activity
in the Polar Uralo regies suggests that establishment of an ICBM launching nlto might be under way. The available information, however, revoalo onlytUtiiry corstructloo project of undetermined scope und character its under uuy In the latter part7 and is probably still eoittluuin,;.
Othnfoimatlon, similarly fragmentary in nature, permitsf jrcnees to be drawn with respect to the location of twoossibly engaged in Soviet ICBM and space flightproduction, as veil as the possible tinlineoew program at these facilities in tho past.
u
itprobable that tlie construction of the Tyuratnm range, uhlch also began Inould not have been undertaken without atlanning concept of tha vehicles, presumably Including tbe ICBM, to be launched. The timing of these events uuggests that Important decisions regarding an ICBM development program had already been made by the USSR prior to
There is tenuous evidence that activity in some way related toand/or ssace flight programs might be under way at severalIncluding Sverdlovsk, Kazan and Kuybyshev.
we" Cannot at present Identify specific
facilities in ties* cities with guided missile activities of any kind, nor can we determine whether the flights have been occasioned by aisslle development activity, an emerging missile production program, or both.
Considerably firmer evidence exists linking the city of Enepropetrovit cod the former DnepropetroTsk Automotive Plant to ballistic missile production activity, probably as earlylthough this plantajor Soviet producer of ballistic missiles, the evidence available on the plant's activity and status during the pait several years is Inadequate to determine tfoether any of this activity has been specifically In support of an ICBM program.
evidence does not preclude the existence, in on early stage,rogram> sLignltude or the two andf year production program under coaslderatioo.
At the present time we have no direct evidence Indicating that tooling or initial production has begun at the numerous subcontractor facilities or that final assembly plants have been converted or constructed.
1. go Sato
Even if it is assumed that theas encountered no major technical difficulties with its ICHM vhlch vould delay preporationo for initiationuantity production progran,hment ofalnslle progrwa eetlEcted for the end1 aicht veil be determined by she extcit to which ports and ccaponents developed end tested at KftpmrtlD Yar have been applied to the IC3K. ecision to rely heavily co eouipnontr could bavu been eadn so early? andubHtantlally reduce the difficulties that the OSCR vculd encounter ia fulfllllai; the estimated productlou and deployment progn-JB within thaod of tvo end one-half yearn specified.
A Soviet decision to aata'oUfih anoodrototype ICai syotco, if Kftde in7 prior to flight testing of the entire misrlle, aa ve believe likely, wild suggest thnt the USSit was prepared to initiate quantity production of the system in the event that the Initial dewxisfuroved snt'.afactory. euoce the primary purpooe of the tOZ vould b; toihe elements of the ICEH program lo operationyeten uad to amruj.re early experience und training vith the xdsuileeieh should oubscisicotly be available in qurntity, tberauld cVjsirsj tjjit the IOC prototype reflect as doealgr aa possible Uip raanon ayotcB uhlob will ultimately be deployed. Aa early IOC decision, the afore, -jouldonsiderable degree of confidence icmissilestea as it existed nt that tijse. Moreover,ild olijuify Sbvlot recognition of the syntax concept in Its iiiaalle pTOarsst, with usxcllol planning, production and deployscat cf all eles^ats of the ZCPH nadccnlpannt end facilities asnociated with It.
Bfel lead-tinsof theproduction pro gran vould behat the dedcioa to go into large-scale production would kava hud too later thou aboutfter the successful laurchlag of ec'tnik IT, if on estimated target date ofcr del!very or fctrst/CVMo una to be met. Bals decision in7 waMnvolved tho occoptantio of theesign. Includingf tho code of deploy.;snt, and vould heva coi. tncAiatlon uhasi.T. of the program.
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Theoolingolt of facilities would have bad to begin fcbortly after the successful ICBM firing at the end of Implicit in the Initiation of tooling vould haveecision with respect to the maximum rate of output to be provided for. dield probably Lave been establishedigh level, which could be revised downvara at any time in the future. Ifecision to tool onlyevel appreciably below the eeortjon anticipated production requi-ement would deprive the USSBonsiderable element of freedom of future choice, because expansion of output beyond the level provided for in the original tooling ofroduction facilities could not be accomplished rapidly.
Although it cannot be determined whether the USSR has actually made the decision to initiate large-ecale ICBM production without the ^further improvements In tbe missile which might result from additional- - testing,ecision,vould^strohgly.lBpXy that it ia an important
ofnumber
jX;gbf ICBMS at the earliest posslbie^tc^ It would also .Imply that
r
hadoviet objective lor'some time, since achievement ofrogram of the magnitude estimated vould be dependent, as indicated "above,eries of major decisions which vould have had to bede during the past two to three yearile magnitude ofesources which would already be eoonltted to this program and allocated to it over the next several years, together with the risks involved In the commitmentissile system which say not be fully proven as yet, vould provide an indication of the significance of on ' early and sitableapability to thefarge-seule productiona Is actually under way. lhere could also be little doubt that tbe Soviet leaders bad clearly determined the role to be played by long-range missiles in future Soviet military strategy.
Another basic and extremely important olementoviet decision to initiate quantity production of ICBMs would have been the concurrent decisions with respect to civilian and other military production to be oaorlfloedesult of the new demands of therogram. Even if entirely asv industrial facilities were constructed for the specific purpose of final assembly of ICBMs, the program would have to be supported by hundreds of other major and minor sub-contractors aad
ecisions baoeuse of tbe tine press'irss und dose Integration of tho entire program. These problems vould be concerned withund uUuojiea of dasiiiii, deliveries, shipaents, funds, schedules, quality control, Inspection, personnel, rejects, shortageside
variety of ottwr fucots of ton pragma. It seens hichly probable tnat tbe result would to the referral of problo&is to central authority for urgent decisionate eituout precedent in any prior Soviet military or civilian peacetime program.
ByUe coti'tated Soviet ICBM production and deployment program should have ro-ichcd proportions unparalleled in size and urgency by any previous post-war railitar> program in the USSR. At least the Initial activity associated with it would necessarilylear priority ever virtually all ofehar military or fcunoado activities for critical resources, facilities, snd oltilled manpower. This would be particulnrly eseontial during the most difficult production period, in9 and early li^C, when output of the entire system would have to be increasing very rapidly to maximum program rates, if the objective is to be met. Once this build up bed been achieved and production at peak rates sustained, the problems encountered should begin to decrease in both importance aud frequency. ftoverthelcss, despite provision ia over-all Soviet producticn scheduling of allowances for contingencies and reserves, tho estlaatec program cpTsarc so tightly compressed in time that any aa.}or production problems might delay the entire program.
3* AJ torw, tva Pro^yaoia.
When theyear program discussed above is compared
with progrnciE uhieli -representieo of the time spans eotiaated loS-SS, it sppsera tbai the primary differences are in the degree of urgency involved andiming of decloioos. In order to begin deliveries of productionurly as the beginning9 (the earliest data consistent wLMihe Soviet decision to accept theeaign end to initiate series production would have bad to be nailvmths before the first ICBM test firing of Although this writer program could be accomplished with difficulty sod might even be (fling ou without our knowledge, we consider rhafcjicltcly of tlie three alternatives.
While recogvdiing tse magnitude* of economic effort requiredUSS3 to carry outrogram, we must reefflrE theTOEprogram lies uitbln SOvlet economic
capabilities, provided tbe neceflaary major decisions were made enrJy enough andH considers She program of sufficient importance to asiign to it the requisite priorities- It is virtually impossible tos that any given industrial program cannot be accompli Jibed inarge end varied Industrial, material end ;opilatioii base such as that of the USSR. Ibe ICBM program examined here, for example, wauid representraction of one pel-cent, of total Soviet economic activity. tSiile It would unquesttionablj' require a. far larger share of the activity of certain keyctors, and coulf. account for as anch aa ten percent of Sovietper.diturej, the most difficult nopect of thisld probably be its pace cad complexity, rather than its sheer economic magnitude!. In our Judynent, the USSR bos the ecenoalc itkills aad rasourcea to carry cut this ICBM program, If It chooses to aaploy then for this purport*,
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fBhreo alt-srnatlvo eoviet ICBM production and deployment programo have been examined vhlch would result in tho acquisition by the USSR of on operational copabilltyCBMsI or at the latest igG2. These era: wo-year production program uhlchlret operational capability vita prototype* at the beginning9 and attainmentCBMs by the beginningho earliest dates cco3lstoat vlth;hree-year production program whichirst operational capability with prototypes at the end9 and attainmentCBMs by the end2he latest dates conn latent with; andwo and one-half year program whichalance between these two extremes, with an initial operational capability with prototypes innd attainmentCBMs at the endItbeof the ranges given in*
An attempt bos been made (ace Figuresndo distinguish between several major and distinct kinds of activity uhlch would have to occur in parallel or sequentially, in order for the USSR to achieve any of tho three program being examined, these are:
Ttenoastration and Evaluation
Apart from tholight tenting, this activity Includes engineering tests of production prototypes to dotensine physical properties of the system as well as its pro dueI-billty and nalntalnabllity. It also Includes, at some point, service and troop tests by ths user to evaluate the military suitability of the eyotcm.
Pro-pnxuctlon activity begins with the nominal freezing of the design of the ICBM ami ayot&mo equipment, and includes all of the subsequent activity which aast occur in order to prepare for mass
* There ore, of course^ "cany other possible alternatives cuch as an essusKd very early initic:'. operational capability coupled with aattainment ofICEb, etc. Ihe three programs chosen, however, are sufficient to illustrate the variations in kind and volume of activity requiredciviat ICBM production and deployment program Isao eotfccated In HSE
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proCuetlou of the nyataa. Ituch activity as preparation of production data, including facilities rcciuircnants, procurementand Interim and final production drawings, for all parts and ccsipcnents; the adaptation, reoxrongeocnt and tooling of
andequipment. Bie prototype period begins with the design release th;it pomlts fabrication of ICBMe and systems equipment patterned after tiwcc expected to be produced in quantity, and ends with tbe delivery of thi lost prototype equl potent. de tooling period begins with the design of the production tooling and endsthis tooling iibeen proven by tbe production of the first of many acceptable units.
(3) Production
Production lacludea all activity aoooclated with the actual manufacture and final assembly of parts and components of tho ICBM and systemor deployment to operational units. It has three distinct iiboaea:
(a) Stnrt Pp. Be time from the beginning of manu-
focture of production tooling until delivery of the first production unit (eiieludtug prototypes). It Includes the lead-tiff* for activating subooatrsctors, for building up tho direct labor force in the prists and principalfncllltias, and for buildingacklog of work in process to Insure continuous Increase infrom first production to planned monthly rates of production.
urp. Elapsed time between the delivery of the first production unit and the uchlevesjeat of the peak planned monthly rate of production. Production units are identical, or at least uubstentlally uo. Minorthat di> not change performance levels may be made during prediction. Major modification* cannot be made without delays in the build up.
SSJJBSSsBS at tete' Tloc betusca the aehleveuvsnt of tlie peci pIsjOBefl uontbly rate of production and delivery of the Inatunitthe Initial requireutoots
iven program
PepV>ya?pt
Tnis activity concerns placement lo the field of the operational unite (including training units) requirediven program. Preparation of launching sites includes site selection, surveying, and coiatructlon, installation of equipment, and delivery to the military user, draining Includes off-site Instruction of key indivliinln,nd teams, as veil as on-site operational ICBM system training of troop units*
The aeeowi-uv/lag cherts and graphs illustrate the phasing through tine of the various oepscts of the three alternative ICBM programs selectedmlnatloo.
hovs the cumulative delivery of tho ICBMs to
operatloorl inite rcQUlred for each of the three programs.
hows the throe curves as they vould appear
if each pi-ognun were started at the same point In time
ripui-eallustrate the time phoning of the principal categories of activity which vould have to occur for each pro jraa to be achieved. Ibe length of time ohovn for eachf activity In the minimum considered reasonable fori of the scale bolng considered.
PtC'crrenent, for illustrative purposes, detailed ich:dullng by months of the production programs aa they Blch' dsvelop ever tlao to meet the indicated target dates. Trie /lumbers are not Intended to be precise, but merely to surest tec 1Vl: at uhlch activity vould progress end the inter-rclatlonshipa cmons activities.
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ltaa are ecwleWd, includlne crwt and cevlpnent. in the aoatft that first nissilss are delivered. Tho sit* would than have an fence dials United ODsratlonal csnabUltT and would bo oonsidsred fully operational (able toull walvo) two-throe scnths after first ICBM do! ivory.
Veoaocnent tasting isturned to have Dreviooaiy taken pleos at Kaoustln far,itsiles are MMMd to bs und far .rtlea Wat log paroosa*.
his cstsaorr allovii forallocated for static and laxa-atory tests, production tUMM, other degradation of sll types andxpended for training nurooses.
y It is attuned that tha flight tost DFOejMH will lnoreat* to satisfy oth development needs and to developnd reliability data.
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Original document.
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