* "
;ret
69
0
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
UMITKD DISTRIBUTION
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OK CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the national Security Agency, and the intelligence organisations of the Departments of Slate, the Army, the navy, the Air Force, The Joint staff,na the Atomic Energy Commission.
concurred th bp the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
onune MSB. Concurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of State: the Assistant chief of staff for intelligence. Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence,of UiC Nmy;-thc Assistant Chief of Staff,usaf; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary ofpecialthe -Atomic Energy Commission Rcpresentatlce to the L'S/B: and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of the jurisdiction of his Agency.
estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for trasinformation and use of the recipient indicated ori the front cover andeed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may befollowing officials within their respective detriments.'"
ofl^teUlgencc and Research, for the apartment of State-'
Chief oNJtaff for Intelligence,.Department of the Army
Chief of Na>aLOperations for Intelligence, for the DepartmentNavy
Chief of Stall, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the
for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for>theJoint Staff
of Intelligence, AEC, for the AtomlcSsqergy Commission. . / -
Director, FBiy for trie Federal IJuroau Sh^cstigatior; m^'.
to the Secretary of Defense, Special OpeiatiortsWpr theDefense g
L Director of the NSA, for the National Security. Assistant Director for Central Refercuce, CIA, for anygency
copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security^regiUatlons, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement
with the OfficeoT-Ccntral Reference, CIA.
'* * hen aneminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it
either be destroyed, returned to quested of the forwarding agency to ret
he title of this estimate, when used separately from CONFIDENTIAL.
Thisontains Information, affecting. Uie NaUonaf^wiqise of the. United States within the meanlng^'fttijhe espionageSC,trTeKSjH. theor revelation of which iHTrn^jriariner to an unauthorized person li prohibited
eriod not in excess of orfe-jaiar. At the end ot this period, the estimate should
m
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
9
This estimate supersedes,he Supplement to,8 ando,
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligencewhich is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, The Joint Staff, the National Security Agency, tlie Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See appropriate footnotes, however, for the dissenting views of the Army, Navy, Air Force, The Joint Staff and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations. The FBIthe subject being outside of its Jurisdiction.
A group of expert consultants working with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has reviewed this estimate and generally concurs with it. The estimate, with footnotes, was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
SUMMARY AND. 1
I.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY
IO. SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN NUCLEAR
IV. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR
Status of Reactor
Development
Research Reactors and Reactor
Power Reactors and Reactor
Production
Propulsion and Special-Purpose
V. THE SOVIET CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR
VI. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Soviet Uranium Ore
Uranium
Lithium
Heavy
Tritium
Margins of
Plutonium Equivalent
Plutonium Equivalent Production
Margins of
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
VII. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Soviet Proving
Nuclear Weapons Test
Weapon Development
Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,
Current
Weapon Development by
Requirements In Future
Stockpiling of Nuclear
National Assembly and Stockpile
Regional or Forward Storage
Operational Nuclear Storago at
Other Operational Storage
Soviet Atomic Energy Detection
VIII. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF FISSIONABLE
MATERIALS TO WEAPON .
Illustrative Stockpile Allocations,nd
General
llustrative
llustrative
Calculations of Feasible Weapons
IX. THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AID AND
X. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR
ENERGY
TO PtWILC RET
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
Figure 1 Estimated Cumulative Production of Fissionable
Mat* 4
TableOrganizational Relationships of the Soviet
Atomic Energy 13
rganizational History and Selected FunctionsPrimary AgcncleB of the Soviet Atomic IS
FigureNuclear Research
FigureResearch Reactor
TabicResearch Reactors and Reactor
Figure-Nuclear Electric Power Reactor Sites
Table 6 Soviet Nuclear Power Stations and Experimental
24
Figure 6 European Soviet Satellites: Principal
Uranium Mining 29
Figure 7 Principal Uranium Mining Areas
iollma 29
Table 7 Estimated Soviet Bloc Uranium Ore Production up
to 30
Table 8 Soviet Heavy Water 31
Figure 8 Materials Production Sites. follow* 32
Tabic 9 Estimated 34
Table 10 Estimated Soviet Production of Nuclear Material*.
38
Figure 9 Weapons Testollow 30
Tableoviet Massive Underground Explosions.High 43
Table 12 Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear 45
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS {Continued)
Table 15 Functional Breakdown of CumulativeThrough 70
Table 16 Comparison of Capital Investment in Nuclearto that in Selected Industries,. 71
"
the soviet atomic energy program
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic energy program lo
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
n contrast with Khrushchev'sstatements of nuclear sufficiency, there is substantial evidence that the USSR isigh priorityof its atomic energy program. Although the atomic energy effortoriented primarily toward military applications, emphasis on non-military uses has continued to increase since the formation6 of the Chief Directorate for the Utilization of Atomic Energy. However, centralized control of nearly all aspects of the program has beenunder the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, one of three industrial ministries which were allowed to retain all-union status in spite of the general Soviet program for decentralization of industrial control.
TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
emphasis on nuclearthe Soviet Union has continuedpast year with steady pressureall scientific frontiers.stemmed both from the USSR'sand from prompt andof open WesternNevertheless, it Is estimatedbasic research in nuclearwhile highly competent infields, is not comparable inscope to that of the US.
PROPULSION REACTORS Naval and Marine Application*
first Soviet nuclear poweredship, the icebreaker LENIN, willinto operation during theased on the status ofevidenced in the LENINnuclear electric power plants,ubmarine propulsionhave been available late inno firm evidence of theof Soviet nuclear submarines has
2
P tMIC ret
obtained to date, wc estimate that one or possibly as many as three nuclear powered submarines could have gone into operation by the endnd that byhe Soviets could have aboutuclear powered submarines.
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion
we have no firmestimate that the USSR has beenin the development and testingnuclear propulsion (ANP)and sub-systems for somebelieve that at any tuneuclear testbed with atnuclear power unit providingduring some phase of theprototype reactor system suitablecruise propulsion onalone could become availablebut it would4 beforesystems could begin tofor operational use.'applications of ANP wouldlong test and developmentwe estimaterototype willachieved until
NUCLEAR ELECTRIC POWER REACTORS
USSR is exploring thevarious types of power reactors into obtain competitive nuclearis constructing several largeis also certain that they will fail bytwo years to reach thedown6 in their sixth five-year plan. However, they have madeprogress, and it is estimated that they willlectrical megawatts (EMW) of installed nuclear generating capacity
CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR REACTIONS
research on controlledreactions appears toeriod, and theof its program is comparablear with that of the USThis program couldontrolledas soon as any other groupworld, but the production ofcannot be expectedong time.
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION Uranium Ore
availability of substantialore reserves within the Sovietparticularly the USSR indicatesamount of uranium ore productiononly by the investment theto make in the program and notscarcity of exploitable oreexploitation of these resourcessteadily expanded.0 metric tonsuranium will be minedof whichetriccome from the USSR and abouttons from the Satellites.are in excess of thatsupport the current estimates ofmaterials production.
have firm evidence that therediffusion plants atand Tomsk which have been in
operation since thehird plant, near Angarsk, may have gone into operation during the first halfhere is evidence of continuingof the capacities of these three
estimate that the Soviets willthe equivalent0yhis cumulative amount willtog.nresentscumulative production atuphe actualup1 could range withinthe stated values, with oven greaterafter that year.*
IMutuniuin Equivalent '
eriod,put plutonium productionoperation at sites located inof Kyshtym, Tomsk, and prob-
enriched.
'In order to accept the estimateho Assistant
Chief ot Naval OperaUons for Intelligence, De-partir.cnt of Uie Navy, finds that lie would have to accept major factors of Soviet capability3 which an In his opinion not rafacienlly supported by available evidence. These factors Include: fai initial operation dates of new plants, (b) degree of enrichment and depleUon ofproduced, <c> useew diffusionand new equipment, and (dl over-all plant efficiency. However, he believes that the assumption Urnt an Improved technology and Unproved plant efficiency have been developed and Incorporated In new plants InstalledB9 Is consistent with known Soil.tcapabilities. The Assistant chief of Narat Operations for Intelligence. Department of Um Navy, believes that the lower limits of tbe estimated values for tbe eumulaUve productionre the more cearly correct
'The production of plutonium ami all otherIsotopes Is of necessity esUmated collectively In terms of equivalent quantities of plutonium.
ably Krasnoyarsk. We have evidence of continuing expansion at these sites.
We estimate that the Sovietproduction of plutonium equivalent will haveotal of0 kg. byhis amount willhave increased to something in the order0 kg. bynresents the estimated cumulative production at each mid-year uphe actual production up1 could range from one-third to twice the stated values, with even greaterpresent after thate estimate that as muchf the total plutonium equivalent produced would be in the form of tritium up toith this percentageafter that date.'
The Soviets probably had strongincentives to process fully allore. However, if this course were followed andstimate iscorrect, the actualof plutonium equivalent would be substantially greater than the most prob-
u:'iiiuitt production 'For planning purposesrams of tritium Is considered equal to one kilogram of plutonium.
vicw of the above ond the uncertainty ofas to the possible form and size of stockpiled uranium, as well as the uncertainty of Information as to the input of uranium metal Into production reactor operation, the Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUons for intelligence,of the Navy, believes that the lower limit of the estimat
its tne mosi proBawvorae-
ESTIMATE I) CtTMlXAVTIVK PBOUliCTlOH CIS KILOGRAMS) OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS1
iSc*ndor the ranice ofae valiMv*
Plutonium
WraiKwt Grade- 2J$
Now; itiii fluiiTL^ ii, pamrarmm represent csttmawl iimauni*5 Available tor> Non-weapons uwi of plu-Lonlun* MiniVHkni an*o De nvultelbk during liitn period
I
r j
0Sff^ffff 1?
Secndageor the positionssistant Chief of Naval Opurallcnw for intelligence, Department of the Navy.
FIGURE 1
TOP
0
TOP SftCRET
values indicated above. On the other hand, I-
hirty-one of theoviet nuclear tests
minimum estimate to about one-third of the
estimates of the Sovietmaterial production made inhave not materially altered,information obtained overyear has increased our confidenceestimated Soviet production
NUCLEAR
Test Program
Soviet nuclear weaponprogram has growngreat progress in weaponsand included the test of aof devices from whichplanners can draw inrequirements. Soviet testsconducted with yields ranging1 kiloton (KT) tomegatons (MT).
|were conductedhis effortarkedin their test program and was prol>-ably designed to exploit, in the faceossible test ban, the several avenues of investigation which emerged fromtest series. We have evidencethat some relatively low-yield tests were conducted by the USSRl-
reliminary analyses of theSoviet tests conductedoncertedcontinued on
nuclear (TN) devices! yields8 MT were achieved,^
The Soviets further developed economical low-yield (less thanT) weapons possibly for air defense or tactical use.
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
o direct information is available on the specific nuclear weapons types in the USSR stockpile. The estimate of Soviet nuclear weapons development potential shown inas been based on data acquired in connection with thenown Soviet tests, and by using US weapons technologyuide. Some of the weapon designs listed have been de-
Table 1
SO VIKT TlI KKMOVl'CLEAR WEAPON DKVKmi'MKXT POTENTIAL (Based on eattmatsd ciirrent Soviet capabilities.evelopment*uide) (Potential improvements indicated foreriod are bated on unlimited teating)
Approx. Amounts of Nuclear Materials
eight Class (lbs) r- attain* able mir.imura
weigh ta)
Bomb
R 9
Appro* 1
IMS
est!mated sqvibt fission weapon development potential (iwi'il on estimated current soviet capabilities, using"tjs development*uide) (seee estimated future lusion weapons development capabilities)
weight claai
(lbs) (reasonably attainable minimum
approx. amounts of
approx. Yield (kt-
I9SO
6
F
eat ing, we believe only slight improvement will be made in these weapon9 Soviet usaion weapons development potential adequately reflects their capabilities for the. Seen text for discission of extremely light-weight device* ana gun-assembly weapon*.
' Based on analysis of specific Soviet tests.
on Soviet teats conducted8 and would not be available in stockpile9 except in limitedeapons).
" Includes fuzing and tiring system, but not ballistic raae or iiodo cone.
rived from analysis of specific tests. Others represent projections oftechniques and the estimated status of Soviet nuclear weapons
nnde estimate that9 the Soviets have theto produce thermonuclear missile warheads with weights and yields from
| These same devices could be used in bombs if additional weight is allowed for the bomb casing. The Soviets could also have available9 fission weapons with yields of from one toTariety of weights and dimensions. If no further nuclear testing occurred, these capabilities could only be marginally improved. However, with continued unlimited testing the Soviets could improve the fissionableeconomy of these weapons, increase the maximum yield, and develop still further weapons toide variety of military requirements.
In theeriod, we do notthe advancement of Soviet nuclear weapon development to be as rapid as in the past, since we believe that they havetate of the art where major improvements in performance are difficult to achieve.
Although no major changes have been made in the Soviet weapons development capabilities from those estimated in, analyses of the Soviet tests8 indicate that!
ounds
Nuclear Weapons Stockpiling
e believe that extensive long-range plansispersed assembly andsystem were under way at least as earlyhe development andof these long-range plans have been closely integrated with the growth of Soviet nuclear weaponcapacity, and the design andof the physical facilities have paralleled specific requirementsfrom developing nuclear weapon
e believe that at least threeassembly and stockpile sites were built by, and possibly are operated by, the Ministry of Medium Machine Build-ing. r
Our knowledge of the location and nature of storage faculties available to the military is confined principally to two types of operational storage sites located at airfields of Long Range Aviation. We estimate that, in addition to these sites,
TOP^ffXCRET
for nuclear weapons storage exist at several naval airfields andof the Tactical Aviation. Although no nuclear weapon storage facilities have been identified at naval surface facilities or co-located with ground force units, wc believe that appropriate storagefor them probably exist
ALLOCATION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS"
' The AssUUnl Chief of Naval Operation* for In-lelliKencc. Drpartmrnl of the Navy, believes thai the range of possible Soviet Quantitativeto weapons stockpiles la so broad that. In view of the status of available intelligence on this subject <as Indicated In, an esUmate of "poKtdble allocations" Is unrealistic and of doublful usefulness. Therefore, he docs not concur with Uio general methodologyto derive this section or with theallocations (paragraph 2fl).The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,of the Army, does not concur with the methodology employed to derive this secUon or with the "Illustrative allocations". In view of the Insufficiency of evidence on this subject (as indicated In. he considers that the "IllustraUv* allocations" arc merely biehly speculative possibilities selected arbitrarily from an almost In finite number of alternativet best such theorizing from unsupported eonjeelnrr ti anrealistlc and of donMful value: itigh risk ofmisuse, for example, In briefings for budgrlary or planning purposes, leading to the danger of miscalculation by those responsible for naUonal security.
We have insufficient evidence toa firm estimate of the Soviot weapons stockpiles by number, by type, byor otherwise. Accordingly, insuch an estimate we ure forced to rely on our general assessments of over-all Soviet military policy and strategy and on our estimates of the types of weaponand missions which might employ nuclear weapons wholly or in part
To derive illustrative weaponwe have combined our specificof Soviet development andof nuclear weapon delivery systems, studies of probable targets for nuclear weapon systems, the estimatedof fissionable materials, andinformation on stockpilingand doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons. All of the above factors arc subject to appreciable margins of error.
y varying the number of high-yield weapons allocated to the Long-Range Aviation (LRA) we have arrived at two alternative allocations.ntails greater emphasis on weapons for support of ground forces and air defense, andlaces dominanton long range strike forces. Inhe total number of weapons is. Forhere would beigh-yield weapons for the LRA and for missilesof employment against the US. For Alternative B, there wouldigh-yield weapons for these uses. Inhe number of weapons variesotal oforithigh-yield weapons for the LRA and for missiles capable of employment against the US,otal oforithigh-yield weapons for these uses. Considering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and tho level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSRpossesses sufficient nuclear weapons toajor attack by its long range striking forces, including sufficient nuclear warheads for all of Its operational submarine launched missiles and ground launched ballistic missiles. range and greater. At present theof fissionable material will limit the
number of nuclear weapons available for air defense and tactical uses. Thiswill be considerably alleviated
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AID AND PROGRAM
The Soviet Union apparently has two objectives behind her offers of material and technical aid to other nations throughout the world. The Soviets have used their aid and exchange program to improve and tighten their relationship with Bloc nations whileubstantial degree of control over the atomic energy activities in theseIn the offers to the Free World nations, the objective has been largely one of propaganda.
There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has the technical capability tothe offers of aid that have been made. Promises of equipment, radioisotopes, and basic technical training to the Satellites have been largely fulfilled. Offers to the non-Bloc countries, however, have been largelyi-lateral basis, and neither Egypt nor Yugoslaviaeactor in operation at present. Sovietin exchange conferences with the free world appears to be slanted toward
^RET
propaganda purposes and collection of technical information on western atomic energy developments.
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM ,J
e estimate that the approximate cumulative cost of the Soviet nuclearthroughas been overillion rubles including aboutillion for plant and equipment and aboutillion for operating expenses. Totalhave been less thanfgross national product In recent years. In monetary terms, Sovietin plant and equipment formaterials production has beenf that of the US, but because of estimated low process efficiencies the estimated Soviet plant capacities arevery much smaller. These and other cost estimates must be considered as first approximations and are subject to wide margins of error; however, it is felt that they adequately reflect generaland relations.
" The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy, docs notIn the economic section because It Is basedethod of cost analysis that he does not consider can be applied lo the USSR fissionable materials estimate.
DISCUSSION
general nature and some of the details of the Soviet uUimlc energy program can be assessed with reasonable reliability. There can be no doubt that the USSR Is continuing to expand Its extensive; atomic energy programigh priority basis and to direct ittoward military applications.
Available Information still doc* notprecise estimates of Soviet fissionableproduction. However, additionalhas been obtained over the past year which Increases our confidence In theSoviet productionp
Technical methods of collection continued to provide high quality coverage of thenuclear weapons test program. We have also achieved more understanding of Soviet weapon stockpiling practices from reliablereceived during the post year.
OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC
ENERGY PROGRAM
tohe operation ofatomic energy program was thetwo chief directorates attached to theof Ministers. The First Chiefitself with fissionable materialsund with nuclear weaponproduction. The Second Chiefwas responsible for raw materials.tho development of new uraniummining, and ore concentration andboth Inside and outside the USSR.Chief Directorate.was also attached to the Councilprovided supply andfor both the First and. Berlya was theChairman of tbe Council ofexercised over-all direction of theof the Soviet atomic energy program.
Alter the arrest of Beriya inhe Ministry of Medium Machine Building was created with V. A. Malyshev as the minister. The new ministry gradually assumed all the functions of the three chief directorates and over-all control and direction of tlie Soviet atomic energy effort.
The formationeparate "peaceful uses" atomic energy coordinating body, the Chief Directorate for the Utilization of Atomic Energy attached to the Council of Ministers, to be headed by Yefim P. Slavskiy, wasby TASS inG. Slavskiythis position until his appointment as Minister of Medium Machine Building Innhe USSRthe appointment of Dr. Vasiliy S. Yemel'yanov to replace Slavskiy as Chief of the Chief Directorate. Yemeryanov, who has been Director of Research for the atomic energy program, has headed the Sovietto both Geneva Conferences onUses of Atomic Energy.
his Chief Directorate was created toseveral announced functions: lo develop cooperation between the USSR and other countries in the non-military uses of atomic energy; to make extensive use of atomic energy in the national economy in cooperation with industry and to resolve problemswith this application; to designfor power stations and to developpowered engines for use into build and operate experimentalto coordinate research inhe production and use ofand the effect of radiation on metals; and to supply laboratories with experimental equipment such as counters, reactors, andThe Chief Directorate is alsofor the publication of scientific and technical works on the utilization of atomic energy and for holding exhibits on peaceful uses of atomic energy both in the Soviet Union and in other countries.
TOF^-tWLCKET
The third major organization concerned with atomic energy in the USSR is theof Sciences of tlie USSR. The role of the Academy of Sciences In the field of atomic energy has been changingthe Academy oiwrated classified nuclear laboratories of the USSR which directlythe programs of the Ministry ofMachine Building and its predecessor, the First Chief Directorate.
3fi. The Ministry of Medium Machine Building is responsible for all production aspects of the atomic energy program, the Chief Directorate for the Utilization ol Atomic Energythe application of non-military uses of atomic energy within the USSR and theof the USSR with other countries in these matters, and the Academy of Sciences is apparently used to advise and conductresearch for both the Ministry and the Chief Directorate. The majorrelationships of the Soviet atomic energy program ore presented inn
14
he Ministry ol MediumBuilding has been graduallyclassified work from several of thesensitive atomic energyDubna, Moscow Atomic EnergyThnrmotcchnlcal institute,Research Center, LeningradInstitute. The Academy of Sciences isassuming more direct controlactivities, and it is apparent thatnow controls the following:
research which thewilling to release hi the fields ofphysics and accelerators,reactions, researchreactor physics, and biology andand radioisotopes; and
respect to East-WestRussian participation inactivities and visits of Westernthe USSR.
Nuclear research and developmentand institutes appear to be grouped into several general areas according to theof the work conducted therein and their organizational subordination orThe USSR maintains that the Academy of Sciences controls all basic research in the USSK, operating the vast majority of theinstitutes and laboratories. However, we believe that the Minister of MediumBuilding controls at least theof nuclear fuels for peaceful uses and,trict security classification policy, nuclear research and technical aid.
Identification ol the organizationalaffecting- the research, uraniumfeed materials production, and fissionable materials production aspects of the Soviet atomic energy program lias been based onfirm evidence. Organizationalaffecting the nuclear weapon design, development, testing, and storage aspects of the program are less well defined.
Very little is known of the Soviet nuclear weapons and research laboratories atmaterial production sites, either withto size, scope, manpower or past and present subordination. It fs believed that these laboratories are under the directof and operated by the Ministry ofMachine Building. We believe that the principal Soviet weapons development center is located in the vicinity ofubordination of this researchalso is believed to hare been to the First Chief Directorate3 and to theof Medium Machine Building thereafter.
The nuclear wcaf.>ons proving ground at Semipalatinsk and Installations supporting the test area on Novaya Zemlya are probably under the operational control of the military. Test activity itself isoint effort by both the military and tho scientificinvolved, with the Ministry of Medium Machine Building exercising technical
We believe that the Ministry of Medium Machine Building is responsible for theof national assembly and stockpile sites and that Die individual services arefor the operational storage of nuclear weapons. We have noo which Soviet governmental clement isfor the allocation of nuclear weapons from the national stockpile to the individual services- We believe, however, that thismost likely restsommittee composed of the highest ranking members of the Soviet government, who represent jointly the economic, political, and military interests of the Soviet state.
Recent evidence suggests that atomic energy has not been the sole concern of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building but that at least one Soviet missile designhas also been subordinate to thisLate3 tlie Lcningradskoye Shos-see Instituteoscow, was transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. LSI reportedly worked on guidance andsystems for air-to-air, alr-to-surface. and surface-to-air missiles. However, the extent of the association between the Ministry ofMachine Building and the Soviet guided missile program remains unknown.
fWtC_ Ii F. T
It is significant that the Ministry ofMachine Building is one of the three remaining all-union Industrial ministries in the USSR.n conformance with Khrushchev's decentralization program, the all-union industrial ministries have beengradually and their functionsto regional economic councils. Bythe Ministry or Medium Machine Building as an all-union ministry, the USSR continues toigh degreetrict, centralized control over at least all production phases of the atomic energy program. The organizational history of the Soviet atomic energy program isgraphically inn
III. SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES INENERGY
INTRODUCTION
emphasis on nuclear technologySoviet Union during the post yearwith steady pressure on nearlyfrontiers. Advances In Soviethave stemmed both from theeflorts and from prompt andof open Western scientific work.
NUCIEAR PHYSICS
Significant advances In Soviet nuclear physics have been made during recent years. Among them areillion electron-volt (Mev) synchrocyclotron0 billion(Bev) proton synchrotron whichlimited operation7 but has only recently attained designed proton beamIn addition,ev prototypeO Bev proton synchrotron using strongIs nearing completion at theLaboratory, Moscow. Also under construction at tho present timeyclotron specifically designed for acceleration of heavy Ions.
Various sources reveal that Soviethave become competent in standard measurement techniques employed in nuclear .spectroscopy, in addition, they have initiated their own refinements and Innovations In this field. An Intensive and competent Sovietappears to bc directed toward theof high-resolution tlme-of-flightspectrometers. They are currentlya pulsed reactor design to supply high flux bursts of neutrons ln conjunction with time-of-flight neutron spectroscopy.
However, the obvious priority accorded by the Soviets to their high energy nuclear physics research has probably diverted effort from the less dramatic but equally important low energy research. In general, it isthat the Soviet Union still lags behind the US substantially In basic nuclear research and that the deficiency lies mainly in the quantity and diversity of the research being performed.
NUCIEAR CHEMISTRY
The Soviets' open literatureigh degree of technical competence in most fields of nuclear chemistry. Various Soviet publicationsidespread and rapidly growing use of radioisotopes in research and industry* The Soviets have studiouslyany discussion in the open literature of uranium or heavy isotope separation.
In the last year and one-half the Soviets have started to publish on chemicalmethods, particularly on solventIt appears that chemical separations technology in the USSR is fairly welland that the Soviet Union apparentlyorkable solvent extractionearlier than previouslyaboratory process described atonference on Peaceful Uses Included, according to the Soviet paper, provisions for removal of radioactive materials, iodine,and xenon in order to facilitate the re-use of nitric acid solvent.
The Soviet work which was revealed in papers presented at8 Genevaon Peaceful Uses Indicates that theiron ion exchange techniques and on separation and identification of transuranium compounds may be lagging behind similarin the US. Furthermore, they do not seem to have put much effort as yet into advanced separation techniques such asvolatility and pyrometallurglcal process-
NUCIEAR METAUURGY
Soviet emphasis on the field of nuclear metallurgy continues to be very strong. The Soviet effort is being assisted slightly by the Satellite countries not only in coordinated production but also ln coordinated research on such metals as lithium, beryllium,and thorium.
8 Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses indicated that the major research efforts in Soviet nuclear metallurgy have beenwith uranium, plutonium and There Is reason to believe that nearly
all tlie essential metallurgy of uranium and plutonium for weapons and for conventional reactors is now known to Soviet metallurgists. Soviet research on plutonium alloys forsolid and liquid reactor fuels apparently lias been more extensive than that In Western countries. It is very possible that Jn the area of fused salts they have advanced to the stage that would permit the preparation inquantities of the extremely pure metals required in nuclear reactor construction.
exploitation of fundamentalbeen emphasized by the Sovietsregard to structural materials suchfor nuclear power reactors. Itthat the Soviets are making usebest features of both Soviet and USThey have concentrated theabout one hundred scientists onplutonium and plutoniumlarge number for such aof science. We estimate that Sovietmetallurgy is quite sufficient todemandsrogressive nuclear program.
INSTRUMENTATION
reactor control andis not as elaborate as that found InBecause the Soviet control systemsunder stringent safeguards criteria,easier to design and construct, and itthat automatic and continuouscontrol has not been emphasized.
MEDICINE AND BIOIOGY
estimate that within about tenSoviets will have enlarged theirprogram to fill present gaps incoverage, and their work willsophisticated. They may utilizeanimal research facilities tolong-term radiationpecific field in which tlieforge ahead of the rest of theSoviets will continue to Investigateof radiation on the centraland will retain their presentover the West. The Soviets willthe US in use of radioisotopes forand therapy, in general radiobiology, in tracer work, in theory of action of radiation, and in health physics.
oviet use of radiological techniques and radioactive materials in biological andresearch lags behind similar efforts in the West in both quantity and quality.some narrowing of this gap is expected during the period of this estimate.
LABORATORIES
any laboratories throughout the Soviet Union have contributed lo the atomic energy program althoughew have borne the main weight of the work. The Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow (formerly Laboratory II) has worked primarily on heavy isotope separation anddevelopment and is now the center of Soviet Controlled Thermonuclear Reactions (CTR) work. The adjacentas been responsible for the chemistry of uranium ores; uranium andmetallurgy; and, with the Radiumin Leningrad, for development ofseparations technology. The Radiumhas also contributed cross-section data for the reactor program. The Stale Institute of Rare Metals (GIRKDMET) has worked on the extraction and metallurgy of thorium, beryllium, zirconium, and other non-ferrous metals necessary to the program. Intlie USSR Academy of Sciencesast network of research institutes andsuch as the Tomsk Polytechnicwhich are engaged in the broad fields of science and technology or occasionally in specialized fields, and at which some basicpertaining to nuclear energy isMany educational institutes under the Ministry of Education are also engaged in generalized nuclear studies. Priority is being accorded to the nuclear sciences in theof major new centers of science in Siberia. The development of these largeand training centers will gradually strengthen Soviet scientific capabilities. (See map showing major Soviet nuclear research3.)
THE SOVIET NUCIEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
STATUS OF REACTOR TECHNOLOGY
The USSR has demonstrated excellentin reactor technology and has aand comprehensive reactor program, which has grown considerably during the last three years. The USSR has made the greatest advances ln the important fields of heatthe superheating of steam directly in reactors, and the development of plutonium breeder reactors.
The present Soviet reactor capacity isalmost exclusively to plutoniumBoth graphitcnioderatcd and heavy-water moderated tyi>es arc In use. There is reason to believe that. Soviet technology has been conventional in tills field and has shown no outstanding advances.
The USSR is not committedpecific power reactor type but Instead is exploring the advantages of various types in prototype reactors and reactor experiments in an effort to obtain competitive nuclear power.
In the USSR, pressurized waterappears to be the most advanced. All large power reactors which the Soviets plan to build in the USSR in the near future employ water as the coolant in either the pressure vessel or pressure tube configuration. However, the Soviets are definitely interested in boiling-water reactors, but they appear to bc awaiting further development ofwater technology before utilizing this type of reactor. Little Soviet work has been conducted on organic moderated reactors or liquid-metal fueled reactors. Large Soviet power reactors are being designed to use fuel of relatively low enrichment1 and natural uranium. Soviet scientists areto obtain high burnupa (forWD ton in their pressurized water reactors) in fuel elements In order to decrease the cost of nuclear power. Sovietfor reactor safety are not stringent by Western standards; however, there Is evidence of growing Soviet concern with reactorand controls.
t Is estimated that the Soviets ore still trying to overcome the materials problems present in the construction ofreactors for aircraft and rocket propul-
DEVELOPMENT HISTORY
There are three known major installations for reactor development in the Soviel Union. Two arc administratively subordinate to the Academy of Sciences, although their research programs are probably under the operational control of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The first is the Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, which is directed by I. V. Kurchatov, and the second Is the Thermotech-nical Laboratory. The third reactor research center is composed of the laboratories at Obninsk which have now been organized Into the institute of Physics under thecontrol of the Chief Directorate for the Utilization of Atomicew large establishment for reactor experiments Is now being set up near Kuybyshcv Lake InOblast'.1*
The first reactor built in the USSR was the so-called "Fursovhich is believed to have gone criticalhis reactor was designed to demonstrate the feasibility of sustaining andhain reactionatural uranium-graphite pile. Thesecond experimental reactor, which was heavy-water moderated and cooled, went critical at the Thermotechnical Laboratory in Moscow inoth these reactors furnished information which contributed to the final design ol large plutonium production reactors.
The Soviets recognized early that they would have to build up their experimental facilities in order to develop more advancedtypes. The Reactor Physical Technicalhe Soviet equivalent of the USTesting Reactor, was brought up to its
"The locations of nuclear research reactor sites arc indicated In Figure 4.
20
power ofegawatts latehis reactor gave the Soviets the means to test fuel elements, cooling systems, andmaterials under actual reactorand furnished Information forlectrical megawattW) nuclear power station at Obninsk, which was put Into operationhe RPT was precededank-typeand water-cooled research reactor (thehich was used for shielding studies. This type reactor is being exported to five of the satellite countries. At the same time, the Soviets were undoubtedly carrying outexperiments and critical assembly work on other reactor types. Known reactor experiments have Included the construction and operationeryllium-moderated(thegaseous reactor, and several fast reactors employing plutonium as fuelnd
RESEARCH REACTORS AND REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
t8 Geneva Conference onUses, the Soviets demonstrated that they have made marked advances in their research reactor program. Whereas at Geneva5 the Soviets revealed only two high-fluxreactors, the Reactor Physical(HPT) and the8 they revealed the existence of three more research reactorank-type research reactor, the W'R-S.hermal neutron flux- neutrons cm' sec has been exported to severalwimming-poolthe JJtT. was developed and put Into operation in7 at the Institute of Atomic Energy In Moscow. This reactor is the prototype for rcuctors which will be built at educational and research institutes in Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tashkent, Minsk, Tbilisi, Kiev, Leningrad and otherhart of research reactors currently In operation in the USSR is shown inn
Soviets are also making progressdevelopment of high flux researchnovel design, such as the flux-traptypes. They are building aintermediate research reactor usingtrap principle, which is expected tofluxesulsed reactor is being built atthe Joint Institute of NuclearDtlbna. This reactor should alsofluxes in the orderre useful for radiationand large-scale production ofelements. The Soviet Unionbe prepared to go ahead with suchthe basis of very limited experimental data.
POWER REACfORS AND REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
is almost certain that theeriod of at least two years tonuclear power objectives laid down inFive-Year Plan. This Plan calledinstallationegawattsgenerating capacity by the endAt the present time, the USSRof any fixed goal in terms ofinstalledertain date. The Soviets are proceeding cautiously with the construction of power reactors of severaltypes to determine the economicof each. We estimate that they will obtain an additional amount of electric power from dual-purpose reactors.
he present plan for construction ofpower stations with sites and estimated dates of completion is shown in the chartn. It is estimated that the USSR willegawatts ofnuclear generating capacityhe Soviets have indicated that they willthe operating experience with theirpower stations and select particulartypes for their "second-round" of large power stations. It is impossible to predict which reactor types the Soviets will select. However the majority of large power stations under construction are of thepressure-tube reactor type, one of which uses nuclear superheat. The locations of present and planned nuclear-electric power reactors is Indicated in Figure 5.
1
l
i i
i ii
PRODUCTION REACTORS
staled int isexperience gained with the Fursovthe Institute of Atomic Energy andreactor at thecontributed to the finalearly production reactors in the USSR.further believed that Sovietreactors of both the graphitemoderated types arc stillThe Second Geneva Conferencethat the large new Sovietis graphite-moderated andA detailed discussion of Sovietproduction sites and productionis given in Section vi.
PROPULSION AND SPECIAL-PURPOSE REACTORS Naval and Marine Reactors
Soviet Union has exhibited aIn nuclear propulsion for severalmerchant and naval vessels.
first Soviet nuclear-poweredship, the icebreaker LENIN,at Leningrad in Decemberin6 three nuclearof the pressurized waterwere Installed in this ship.that the LENIN will be putduring the latter half
the past few years there hasincreasing number of reportsexistence and production ofsubmarines. However, we haveevidence that any are inWe estimate, based on the statustechnology evidenced in papersthe LENIN and the largoelectric power production, thatdateuclearubmarine could have beenfor installation wasndcoidd have had one or possiblyas three nuclear submarines inby the endcestimate that byhehave aboutuclear powered
c. All Soviet nuclear propelled2 will probably utilize the PWR with enriched fuel.he Soviets will have developed all of the following reactor types sufficiently lo be able to apply them to nuclear propulsion:water, gas-cooled cycle, sodium-cooled, and homogeneous.
Aircraft and Rocket Reactors
lthough wc have no firmhorough survey of the literature and current Soviet research and development indicates that the Soviets intend to develop an aircraft nuclear propulsion system. We estimate the Soviets are capable oflying testbed airborne at any lime in the next few years with at least one nuclear power unituseful thrusthase of the flight. The results of this program are expected to leadseful nuclear propulsion system. We estimaterototype reactor system suitable for cruise propulsion on nuclear heat alone for subsonic aircraft could be available to the Sovietsut that it would4 before reliable reactor systems could begin to become available for operational
".
he Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations do not agree with the first four sentences ofnd believethat the USSR has been engaged In the high priority development and testing of reactor components and sub-systems for some time, andeactor system suitable for nuclearof subsonic aircraft could be available to the Soviets
Supersonic applications of ANP wouldong test and development program, and we estimaterototype will not be achieved untilhey have probablyfeasibility studies on several possible reactor coolant systems for aircraft nuclear propulsion purposes. It is not known whether the coolant system to be finally utilized will bc mated to either turboprop or turbojet alr-
craft engines. The Soviet Union has probably conducted feasibility studies onramjet engines.
It is estimated Uiat the Soviet Union is at this lime engaged Inuclear rocket engine Dr. Leonid I. Sedov was quoted at thr International Astronauticin Rome,s saying that Soviet atomic rocket research was progressing at various institutes throughout the Soviet Union. Although the Sovietsell-rounded program of research inrefractory compounds and high-flux reactor facilities are now under construction for materials testing within the Soviet Union, it Is estimated that no more than preliminary constructionuclear rocket test facility has begun.
It is known Uiat the Soviet Union hasmetallurgical research which is also applicableuclear ramjet program.
Nuclear PropuKion for Land Vehicles
is estimatedrogram for thepropulsion of land vehicles begantime the USSR realized that suitabletypes were probably feasible.the Soviets have made manythe feasibility of nuclear propulsionvehicles and to the existence of aprogram. The announced Sovietincludes nuclear propulsion fortruck-trailer trains forhauling, and "commercialthe reactor types under study bywhich are potentially adaptablevehicles are the pressurized-water.boiling, and the liquid-metal reactors
Small Power Reactor*
nuclear power plants, bothand mobile, with military as weU asconstruction and agriculturalhave been officially announced asthe Soviet reactor developmentmobile stations are to be mounted oncaterpillar, and special military typesunder study which willnormal" transport plane inway that the various reactor parts can be air-dropped and then reassembledery short time.
transportable station intended forindustrial construction sites lackingsources of electrical energy wasat8 Geneva ConferenceUses. This package reactora pressurized-water reactor with acapacity assembledesselmeter in diameteretersWaterressureis used as coolant and moderator.was scheduled to be assembled atat the end8 to undergono scheduled dates are knownof other projects in theprogram, the announced goalsbe qualitatively consistent with theof Soviet reactor technology.
V. THE SOVIET CONTROLLEDREACTIONS PROGRAM
Soviet research on ControlledReactions (CTR) appears to haveineriod with some basic theoretical work by I. Ye. Tamm and A. D. Sakharov. The Soviet program remained under tight security until6 when I. V. Kurchatov, the Director of the Institute of Atomic Energyoscow,aper at Harwell, England, wldch gave the technical details and recorded dataigh current dischargearefied gas in attempts to attain fusion of the deuterium atoms with resulting release of energy.
The original Soviet experimental work was carried out with equipment of straight tube geometry, with which they were able to obtain approximately one million degreesAlthough neutrons were detected, the Sovets realized that they were not oforigin.
Soviet research on straight tube, dynamic pinch experiments continued but on ascale. At the time of theConference on Ionization Phenomena
in Gases all was evident that the Soviets considered thisheld little promise of success.they obtained sufficient information at the Venice Conference to permit them tothis research with at least astabilized pinch discharge. This work was variedorus geometry wasAt the Venice Conference the Soviets also disclosed that they bad independentlythe "magnetic mirror" and some of the other tccliniques known to the West.
Information obtained at the SecondConference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,3ndicated that the USSR has an extensivecompetently staffed, which includes work on essentially all the known approaches to the problem of obtaining useful power from controlled thermonuclear reactions. Also at the Second Geneva Conference, the Sovietsthe existence of their ALPHA. Thisarge toruslightly larger copy of the Uritish ZETA, which was apparently constructed during the period when the United Kingdom was ovcr-optimistically announcing their success with ZETA. No results of work on this machine have been published.
Research has been carried out usinggeometries, or the so-calledate inust prior to the opening of tho Geneva Conference, the Soviets revealed their largest machineGHA. Thisarge "mirror" machine, making use of molecular beam injection and collision breakup scheme for productionlasma within the magnetic field. They failed to make use of the much more favorable "arc-breakup" scheme but have indicated that such amight possibly be made. OGRA had not yet then been operated owing lo difficulty in obtaining the necessary vacuum.
Western scientists visiting Moscowmaller version of OGRA, this one called OGRINA. Theyeam has never beeninjected into OGRINA. The reason for this difficulty is unknown. Construction of large, complex machines such as OGRA,first proving Ihe principles involved Indevices, indicates that the Soviet approach to this problem follows the so-called "brute force" approach found in much oftechnology.
Research on stationary processes, quite similar to the highly published 3TEI.LE-RATOR process, is being conducted atunder the direction of R. Demirkhanov.
There appear to be two major efforts in CTR research in the USSR, one of which is under the direction of L. A. Artsimovich at the Institute of Atomic Energy, Moscow. M. A. Leontovich, aidedew capable assistants provides the theoretical studies to support the experimental work of Artsimovich, and I. M. Golovin is In specific charge of the work on OGRA. The other, under Demirkhanov at Sukhumi, was apparently unknown to the staff of the Moscow Institute until the advent of the Geneva Conference. Demirkhanov gave the impression that heairly large staff working on the problem at Sukhumi and that he was not revealing all the details of hisPractically all of the publicationsto date by the USSR in the field of CTR pertain to work done at the Institute of Atomic Energy, although there is evidence of work being conducted at other locations.
There is evidence that the over-all scope of the Soviet controlled thermonuclearprogram is comparable to and almostar with that of the Western powers. However, analysis of the compiled evidencethat the Sovietsompleteof the problem of stabilization of the pinch discharge but arc well advanced In the confinement techniques and energy lossTheir research on mirror geometries appears less complex tlian that of the West; however, they have gone directly to theOGRA device in contrast to the Western approach to the problem. Their theoretical studies have indicated the possibilities ofin some approaches to controllednot previously recognized in the West.
In general, the Soviet program of research directed at obtaining controlled Ihcrmomi-
reactions la well .stalled with capableand technical personnel, adequately supplied with money and equipment andwith sufficient incentives and demand toell-rounded, progressive program.rogram Is deemed capable ofgood research toward attaining athermonuclear reaction as soon as any other group in the world, but useful energy cannot be expected to be obtainedong lime.
VI. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALSPROGRAM
SOVIET URANIUM ODE PROCUREMENT
Present Mining and Milling Activities
nformation on East German (GDR) ore grades as well as increases In GDIt uranium ore shipments to the USSR have caused us to raise slightly the estimates of containedin European Satellite ore. Theof the Polish government production figures has caused us to lower somewhat the estimate oi Polish production. We havedocumentary Information on Hungarian uranium mining operations whichominal production untilfter which production will gradually rise tohemical concentrating plant will be in operation in Hungaryome new quantitative information is available on the other Satellites, notably Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania but the reliability of the Information fur these latter countries is considerably less. Kcllable Information has been received Indicating that ore procurement from the Chinese Peoples Republic, though now still small, will rise during the next few years.
The USSR has continued to exploit well-known deposits and develop new areasowever, quantitative Information on uranium ore production within the USSRto be limited for most uranium mining areas, although the situation improved slightlyc have obtained someon the Krivoy Rog district from awestern uranium geologist who visited one of several uranium mines there and was able toairly firm estimate of thefrom this one mine. Well-knownsuch as those in the Fergana Valley were probably worked at the same rate asut there Is some evidence that mininghave been curtailed in the low-yield,deposits of northeastern Siberia.
An analysis of ground photographsranium ore concentrating mill nearin the Caucasus built several years ago indicates that the Russians havemodem mills probably utilizing high yield recovery processes.
The estimated ore production by country for the Soviet Bloc is presented innhile the reliability of thesevaries greatly from country to country, actual total cumulative production is believed to be not moremallerreater than the estimated valueshese estimated amounts are more than sufficient to support current estimates ofmaterial production and allowof considerable tonnages of uranium oxide or metal. (The location of Satellite and Soviet uranium mining localities is shown in
Future Sources and Production
he US Geological Survey estimates that the Soviet Bloc has reserves of severalthousand Ions of uranium In medium grade ore deposits and an even greaterin low grade deposits. Many of thesearc within the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples KcpublU: and could beby present ore recovery methods. By continuing present trends through thocountries of the Sovieteasonable estimate can be made of future orealthough the possible error inwill be necessarily very large.
eliable Information that orein the GOR will begin to decreaserobablyew hundred tons per year. The level of prospecting In Easterna geologically promising area forsuggests an Intention to increase or at least maintain production In that country. We judge by estimated reserves thatin Bulgaria may continue tohe USSR seems uninterested in Polish ore, which is believed to be of low grade, and at one time attempted to break the So vict-Polish purchasing agreement.information indicates that the Poles would cease delivery of uranium ore8 and use their production for domesticExtensive prospecting continues inand new deposits are expected to beDetailed plans for2 suggest this country muyajor producerellablo information Indicates that the ChineseRepublic, with Soviet assistance, is nowajor ore productionwith Uie possible implication that not al) the resulting ore will go to the USSR.
n summary, while there is good reason forecrease in GDR ore production over the next ten years, the over-all BlocIs expected to increase considerably4anner similar to thatIn Table 7.
stimates beyond that date are somewhat speculative since actual production willupon Soviet policies and plans.our present analysis of trends Indicates that the total cumulative production will have
WLC
toetric tons ofuranium by
URANIUM METAL
ranium metal is producedarge scale at three known locations in the Soviet Union: Elektrostal', near Moscow; Olazov, Just west of the Urals, and Novosibirsk, in central Siberia We have good Information on aincrease in production al Elektrostal" between9 and7 andajor expansion in facilities which started at the Novosibirsk plant about two years ago.intelligence on these three sites clearly Indicates that their uranium metalcapacity is adequate to support the Soviet plutonium production program as estimated herein,
LITHIUM
within the USSR is not yet at the desired level or that its cost is considerably above the open market price outside the Bloc.
HEAVY WATER)
imited production of heavy water started7 at the ChirchikCombine. Five additional facilitiesa water electrolysis-catalytic exchange method went into production8eventh plant, whichydrogen sulfide-water exchange method, went into operation at Aleksin"
t Is probable that the USSR has been producing enriched lithium isotopes insince atlthough the locations and capacities of Soviet lithium Isotopeplants are unknown. SubstantialIn the production of lithiumwithin the USSR have occurred inyears. Probable lithium productionthe amounts of natural lithium required for the manufacture of the thermonuclear weapons. However, Bloc attempts in the last two years to procure major quantities ofore from the West suggest that cither the production of suitable lithium concentrates
he Soviets recently disclosed that anscale plant using the hydrogenprocess had been built. There is fairly strong evidence thatlant had been installed3 at the Chirchik heavy water plant which had beenaterexchange system.ould still be governed by the amount of electrolytic hydrogen available; however, the deuterium recovery therefrom could be increased by atecause of the greater efficiency of the distillation system.
" For the locations of Heavy Water Plants sec8.
TOfTHtCR ET
laic7 work was also under way at Noril'sklant using an ammoniasystem. This plant probably began production abouto other heavy water plants have been identified in the Soviet Union.
We estimate the annual heavy waterof the known eight plants lo be aboutetric tons per year. Because it is quite possible that wc are unaware of one or more operatingange of error ofo minusercent places the estimaterobable range ofetric tons per year.
Soviet interest Instarted aboutithpecial directorate for theirAlthough part of this interestthe requirement for lanthanum whichin thorium-bearing minerals andfor the Soviet plutoniumplant, German scientists atwere also required to design athe production of pure thoriumthe USSR acquiredthorium slocks. However, untiln the high-yield2he onlyofrom thorium was thequantities mentioned at theMoscow Conference on Atomichas been no detected weapon usesince this5 shot, andprobable that the Soviets arc notimportant quantitiesorat present. The interest inusing the thorium cycle inreactor program does nota future weapon utilization of
TRITIUM
he first known Soviet interest in tritium was revealed by the publication in8omprehensive review of the literature on tritium by M. B.taff member ln the Soviet atomic energy program. Returned German scientists report that2 tritium was available in their laboratories for re-search. Evidence of
78 indicates is an appreciable demand forin the Soviet weapons program.of tritium up tos estimated at not moref the total plutoniumfterhis percentage is expected to increase. This increase cannot be predicted but in any case would be limitedf production reactors' andf power reactors' capacity for plutonium
RODUCnON Background
he existence of large gaseousroduction plants at Verkhneyvinsk in the central Urals and near Tomsk in central Siberia Is positively confirmed. Information from several sources on atomic energyactivities near Angarsk in the Lake Baikal region indicates the probable existenceaseous diffusion complex, althoughconfirmation has not yet been obtained. Thus, we know therogramat least two and probably three large sites, as shown on the Map
a. The Verkhneyvinsk plantmall-scale plant productionut this early plant wasotal failure.
j There Is good eviaence oiplant expansion since that timecontinuation of this expansion
" The term "plutonium equivalent" Is used because our incUiod of estimation does not permit us to distinguish between, tritium, or other reactor-produced Isotopes. For planning purposes.rams of tritium is considered equalilogram of plutonium.
TOP ^SECRET
Tomsk plantaroundnd expandedprobable capacityew plant constructionat Tomsk0 and willleast
Angarsk plant probably startedduring the first lialfassociated power expansions inindicate that its eventual capacityvery large.
Hasis forroduction
uch is known from returned German scientists about the quality of the mcsh-backed barrier used in the earlygaseous diffusion cascades. Thiswas poor in both separating efficiency and pressure of operation, although thesewere somewhat offset by its very high porosity. Good information was available on barrier manufacturing methods andof tlie nickel wire meshstimatesroduction on the basis of the quantity and quality of installed barrier are consistent, up to this time, with those based on power and efficiency calculations.
available at Verkhneyvinsk in this period. We estimate that3 power utilizationgradually improved, primarily as aof Improved compressor performance, which is In line with known Soviet technical achievements.
lectric Powerroduction. The electric power supplied to Verkhneyvinsk can be closely estimated, first, on the basis of the transmission line network leading to the site, and second, on the net generatingfeeding the network. Therearge body of information available on this subject, including voluminous data gleaned piecemeal from Soviet electric power publications.
lanteturned scientist reported that the Soviets used afigure ofegawatt days per kilogram (MWD/Kg) as the efficiency for the gaseous diffusion cascade in3 when it was compared with competitive systems. That the USSR could achieve this efficiency3 is indicated by the information on the technical capabilities and known research andwork on gaseous diffusion technology. Operation at this efficiency is consistent with estimates of the electric power and barrier
Jhave confirmed these analyses.
Moreover, independent power balances over the entire Urals region, based on publishedon unclassified consumers, indicate an unexplained surplus usage which corresponds with the Verkhneyvinsk estimate. Thus, the power supplied to Verkhneyvinsk can beto the presentumulative error of plus or.
he Tomsk gaseous diffusion plantarge on-site thermal power plant now being augmented by both thermal and
C RET
nuclear power plant additions. Reliablepermits estimation of power at Tomsk within an accuracy equal to that of the Verkhneyvinsk power estimate.
llfj. Much less information is available on Angarsk power. An on-site power estimateto be reliable within plus oras Ixjen made by combining generatingand transmission hue Information with power balances in Irkutsk Oblast and using power build-up rates comparable with those at Verklmeyvinsk and Tomsk.
ower actually usedroduction has been estimated by subtracting the power used for other siLe functions from the total power supplied. Except at Tomsk, the non-cascade power values must be assumed, but In any case they would be small compared with the total power available.
Related Economic Analysis
stimates based on sitehave been compared withderived estimates of uranium, fluorine, and nickel supplies available to the program, with estimates of ruble costs and expenditures, and with indications of economic motivation to improve or alter production operations. These Independently derived estimates and conclusions indicate that budgetaryand required materials were certainly adequate for the demands of the programherein, and in several cases appear to considerably exceed these demands.theroductionimproves rather slowly in the light of economic Incentive for Improvement. Inthis economic intelligence research has shown Uiat underestimationis more likely than ovcrestimation.
roduction
stimatedroduction isbelowogether with theelectric power consumption values and average power utilization factors used in deriving it The estimate has been prepared as
follows:
a.arly pilot plant information, electric power and plantestimates]
-lectricplant efficiency estimates have
lectricplant efficiency estimates haveand the power estimate is basedof generation andnow under construction in
1 See foouiol* IB.or Uie poslUon of tho Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for IntiiUI-geiice, Department of the Navy.
-lectricplant efficiency estimates havehowever, efficiency estimates include
TOP^tUiliKT
assumed incorporationuchbarrier In new plant sections. Power estimates am tiused upon announced plans for expansion of generation and estimates of power usage for purposes oilier than atomic energy.
h continued expansionthe Soviets could liuve uproduction ofg ofbyf the annualconstant alterheproduction would reach aboutbyhese estimates aresince actual production willfuture Soviet policies mid plans.
Margins of Error
Information has beenover tlie past year which Increasesinstimate up toactual Soviel cumulativeup to that your could range between
of the stated vulues.'"eaningful margin of error cannot be assigned
PLUTONIUM cOUIVALENr PRODUCTION Background
have established ihu existence ofplutonium production reactor sites innear Kyshtym and in crntralTomsk, and probably near Krasnoyarsk. Other sites may also exist, but none have been identified.
Construction of theproduction reactor started atIn the Urals earlyomebefore the first research reactorUSSR went critical In Moacow.good evidence that this firstwas graphite moderated andfueled withonsand operatedthermal megawatts. Construction ofseparation plant forreactor fuel was completed aafter the first reactor wentreactor* have been built attheir construction schedule lauranium metal and heavyand site timetable* arewith the construction of aboutat Kyshtymne orwhich were heavy waterIs evidence of currentat the Kyshtym site.
There is gooda chemical separation plant wasIn the area of Krasnoyarsk lnbyeactors to feedprobably went into operationWe believe that expansionsite li currently under way
c Tomsk. The fissionable materials production site north of Tomsk is probably the location of the "Second USSR Atomic Power Station" described at the Second Geneva Conference on tlie Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. According to Soviet statements, tile station will include six reactors, which we believe are dual purpose. One reactor went into operationhe existence of an earlierbuilding without an associated power plant and the construe lionhemical separation plant have been reliablyTlie reactor building la believed to hove storied operation earlyhird reactor building ie now underol Tomsk with operation expected Ineriod.
ther Sites. No other productionsites have been identified. However, the role ol the possible atomic energyat Nizhnyaya Tura remainsThe large power plant near the old town probably exportsMW southward lo the Nlzhniy Tagil industrial complex and to the gaseous diffusion plant at Vcrkhncyvinsk. Thus, the Nizhnyaya Tura Installation islant, but may be. among othereactor site.
c. Reactor Ojterating Practices.evidence suggests that Sovietreactor operations are conservative.
tes that
by lateome uranium 'was beingsuccessfully from plutoniumplants and fed to gaseous diffusion plants.
Alternate Methods of Estimating Plutonium Production
/ Moreover, analysis of the published pictures and information concerning the Tomsk dual purposeindicates that these graphitewater-cooled reactors withon loading develop onlyhermal megawatts. This thermal power level represents an improvement, in specific power level over the firstactor of about two but is still far below the specific power that can be achieved with graphite-moderated water-cooled production reactors.
f. Chemical Separation Processes.the Soviets separated plutonium from uranium and fission products by an oxidation reduction, co-precipitationIt was evidently planned to recover uranium as well as plutonium, since the uranium metal plant at Glazov wasto process reactor-depleted uranium as partial feed material. However, this initial process apparently was unable to produce sufficiently decontaminatedSoviet and German research on solvent extraction and other methods later resulted in better processes, I-
tained by the Soviets, all the necessarydata for such an estimate are either known or reasonably capable ofsage rates, flow patterns, plpe-line lags, etc. ^
fatcriats Balance. Information onreactor construction and siteparticularlys insufficient to permit use of reactor capacityasis for estimating plutonium equivalent production.easure of possible Soviet plu-lonium equivalent production can be obtained by converting to plutonium equivalent the excess of estimated amounts of uraniumover non-reactor usage. Except foron the form and size of any reserve stockpile of uranium that might he main-
Economic Factors. Economic studies indicate that there would have been economic Incentives for the Soviets to have processed their above-ground uranium resources as fully as possible, at leasttockpile of uranium for emergency feed purposes were desired, they had strong incentives to increase their productiony operating their cascade at very high tailsercent orolicy would have given them earlier productionarger quantity of weaponsower unit cost and would still haveeadily accessible stockpile. Available Intelligence establishes an ample capability to Iiavc followed this course. However, we have evidence that the tails assay of Soviet diffusion plants dropped2ndicating that the Soviets have not over-fedlants. Therefore, the only way the Soviets could have made more intensive use of the uranium was by increasing plutonium androduction either by moreor by substantially improving theof existing plants. Assuming avail-ability of reactorull response to economic incentives would have resultedumulative stockpile of plutonium equivalent about four times as great as that estimated by extrapolating on the basis of krypton measurements.
Stockpiling Considerations. The Soviets have maintained1 largereat many commodities on the basis of varying periods of future use of these commodities. Calculations for the period
top stxjiet
statedeaningful margin of error cannot be assigned
VII. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SOVIET PROVING GROUNDS
General
hree areas of the Soviet Union have been used more than once for the testing of nuclear devices: (a) the Semipalatinskground where at leastests have been detected, (b> the Novaya Zemlya area where al. leasthermonuclear and seven low-yield experiments have been detected, and (c) the general vicinity of the Kapustin Yar guided missile test range where air defense missile systems may have been tested on one, and possibly three occasions. One further low-yield nuclear lest may have been held in this vicinity and probably was associated with the firingautical mile ballistic missile. The locations ol Soviet nuclear test areas are shown in Figureist of all Soviet nuclear tests detected to date isin Intelligence sources]
/indicate that the Soviet
Union lias conducted some nuclear tests of relatively low yield in addition to the74.
The Novaya Zemlya area was first usedite for the testing of Soviet nuclear weapons In5 when the firstumber of underwater, surface and low air-burst environmental effects tests was held off the southern end of the island. Inesting of thermonuclear devices began somcwliat farther northndorth laUtude).
The assumed delivery aircraft for these operations, and possibly their crews, would logically have been acquired from Soviet bomber units which have been trained indelivery tactics. Logistic rapportalso has been provided by the military,thethe Soviet air forces and Navy. Technicalof the test program Itself undoubtedly has been exercised by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building
High-Yield Test Operations. This area ippcm to have been selected for tbe full-scale testing of thermonuclear devices because of its remoteness, Its very low population density, and Its proximity to well-establishedoperational bases. Novaya Zemlya is not know to have any airfields capable of handling Soviet bombers such as the BADGER and BEAK; consequently, we believe that anyemployed in delivery operations arcstaged from bases on tlie nearby
i as can be determined, noproving ground, with elaborateand support Installations, has been created in the Novaya Zemlya area.
per-lormance data requiring more elaborateare probably acquired byinstrumentation and possibly by the radiochemical analysis of nuclear debris.
T
Low-Yield Test Operations. The Novaya Zemlya area was first used lor low-yield nu-cleer15 whenT device, was detonated under water atfl the southern tip of the island. In succeeding yeara. in this general area, six more devices of comparatively low yield have been tested, consisting of at least one additionalT underwater lest, oue test which detonated within one fireball radius of the surface, and four believed to have been air bursts. The yields of thesetrsts were derived from information released by the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Expertsember of the Soviet delegation alsoTtest I
xcept forhe area around Novaya Zemlya has been closed because of "naval maneuvers" during those test jieriods when low-yield devices have been tested off the southern end of the island. While we have no confirmation that such maneuvers were undertaken, there can be little doubt that the underwater bursts represented tests of naval devices. Furthermore, the similarity in locations and yields leads us to believe that some of the airbursts in this same Reneral area were probably in support of navalto lest the response of surface targets to nuclear effects or to develop naval nuclear warfare tactical doctrine.
underwater tests were almostdesigned tit acquire basicon the response of naval targets toexplosions In such environments
Thei'1 roving Ground
Semlpalatinsk proving ground,during thehe principal area In the USSR forof nuclear weapons. It is locatedKazakhstan,of the city of <Semipalutin.sk,theoviet nuclear tests detected byhave been held at, thisear-round capability andused for the full-scale testing ofupT.
ToN
ajor logistic support areas for theground have not been Identified.they must exist in the general area of the proving ground in order to Insure adequate support for test operations.
HO. Although the majority of Soviet tests detected at the Semlpalatinsk provingave been air burstgj
/These tests
have probably included tbe acquisition ofand basic blast effects data as well as comprehensive measurements of the response of equipment und structures to nucleareffects.
a large number of the testdetonated occurred as air bursts attoo great for accurate balloonbelieve that ground instrumentationHowever, where tower shots arethere presumably were heavilyarrays tor the acquisition ofdata. Those experiments whichmeasurements of the responseand structures lo nuclearwould probably have includedrevetments for vehicles, tanks,bridges, buildings and other
Other Test Locations
The Soviet Union3 hasat least five nuclear tests at locations other than the established testing areas at Semlpalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya. These tests occurred at) onrobably in the area north ol the Anil Seand on7ithin an area northeast of the Kapustin Yar rangehead defined.;.
Totskoye. The Totskoye armyand weapons effects test undoubtedly was designed both lo test emerging Soviet Army nuclear warfare tactical doctrine and toa demonstration for officials of the Soviet Bloc and Communist Chinese militaryThe test appears to havearked
[CRET
T OP wftCRET
on Soviel military doctrine, rcsult-iiiB in changes in the recommended speed of deployment, grouping of forces, and theand employment of atomic weapons under the controlront Commander. Some uncertainty exists regarding the type of weapon and delivery vehicle employed with the experiment. However, availableindicates that thisTT device was air dropped.
apustin Yar Area. All nuclear tests conducts in the general area of the Kapustm Yar missile test range are believed to have been associated with missile delivery systems. However, in none of the four experimentsbelow do we have direct and unequivocal evidence of the specific types of missiles cm-ployed or the cliaracter of the test operations. It has been necessary, therefore, to hirer tlie most probable nature and purpose of these tests from the characteristics of the warheads and from our Knowledge of the state of the missile development program.
he confirmationurfacc-to-air missile launching site
lie statements by sources at the Ocneva Conference of Experts in8 that the Soviet Union haduclear device yielding aboutuotons at an alUlude of0one of theoviet tests detected up to the time of the statement fitthe yield and environment of the reported test. However, JOEppears to be most nearly compatible with these data.
JOE2
issile
ringebruary, that this nuclear test was probably associated with the firingautical mile ballistic missile. Since analysis of the characteristics of the JOEevice indicates lhat it
t
-lyield much smaller than expectedarhead in theautical mile surface-to-surface missile, we believe that the test mosl likelyell-instrunicnted weapon system chock-ouluclear device of small mass and yield for range safety considerations.
b. JOE9.esult of new intelligence, this event is nowto have involved the testissile nuclear warhead for use in an air defense system. Recent information related to the JOEvent includes:
e-evaluulion of Un* probable alli-tude of the detonation. ^
c. JOEnd1. Within the limits of the errors of the available geophysical data, the test sites for IhcscT eventswere the same as that lor
/We believe
thai theeor JOEndas dictated by the vehiclesrather than by the warheads and that the tests may liavc been associated with air defense mKillcs. either to acquire effects data or louclear weaponHowever, the possibility that other types of short range missiles may have been involved cannot be ruled out at this time.
42
any case, the timing of the experiments after the opening of the political phase of the Geneva Conference on theof Nuclear Weapons Tests suggests that some priority was associated with them.
NUCIEAR WEAPONS TEST PROGRAM Test Philosophy
hroughout the history of the Soviet nuclear weapons test program, there has been evidenceillingness to accept certain risks and to forego the acquisition ofquantities of diagnostic data in order to achieve asace of weaponsas Soviet scientific capabilities would allow. This philosophy has been exemplified by tests in which several weapons parameters were changedingle experiment and by the use of aerial deliveryarge majority of the tests.
similar example occurred with, which was an air dropr was probably designed to exploit, in the faceossible test ban, the several avenues of investigation which emerged from previous test series. The pace of testing was unusually intense, with the spring test series beingsimultaneously in the Semipalalinsk and Novaya Zemlya areas and two tests per day being conducted on four occasions during the year.
emphasis on aerial deliverythe Soviet program, though involvingin the quantity and quality ofdata acquired, has hadof simplicity and has probablytlie testingeaponized deviceassociated delivery vehicle. The useexplosions probably has alsoa check on the performance of aconfiguration of the device.
Test Instrumentation
respect to the quantity andinstrumentation used, Soviet nuclearbe divided into three categories:shots in which the tests areand extensiveir drops in whichground instrumentation (andairborne instrumentation) is useddiagnostic data arein which airborne Instrumentationrelied uponrimary meansbomb performance data./
recently, continued Sovietof this philosophy is apparent in the use of the Novaya Zemlya area for the full-scale testing of new designs of thermonuclearIn this area we estimate that theprobably place primary reliance upon airborne instrumentation.
Thirty-one of theoviet nuclear tests
/Test types (l)re the Semlpalatinsk proving
eorinucTcri trr ground, ands conducted at theZemlya proving ground.
he Soviets probably rely on theirfew tower shots for the acquisition of extensive diagnostic data. On the other hand, data obtained from the air-burstare probably acquired primarily by ground or airborne fireball photography^
conducted
his eliortarked acceleration in the Soviet test program and
/However, we
estimate that sufficient data arc acquired by this method to satisfy the basic requirements of the Soviet weapons development program.
TOrT^ECRET
with their weaponsand development program, the Soviets have carriedeapons elTectsprogram involving both basic physical measurements of blast, radiation and thermal intensities, and comprehensive measurements of the response of military equipment and structures placed at varying distances from the fireball.
ew basic effects tests,by the use of yield-reliable stockpileand vehicle and structural target arrays, have been observed. These include at least two underwater tests and one test of on air-delivered device with which vehicle andtarget arrays have been associated.
Test Environments
evidence indicatesoviet tests detected, att heights of burst to achieveblast and thermal effectsfireballwo in underwaterand at least eight within oneof the earth's surface. Tlie twodevices tested to date (JOEndapparently detonated at the lowestconsistent with prevention offallout, and to maximize thevehicle slant range. There is alsothat the Soviets have detonated anumber of devices on towers at the Semi-palatinsk proving ground. On at least onend possibly two other occasions (JOE, the Soviets may havetests of nuclear warheads In an air-defense role.
No underground Soviet nuclearhave been identified. However, between8 tho Sovietseries of massiveTT) subterranean high explosive detonations in the Soviet Union and Communist China in connection withprojects and scientific experiments, which probablyarge amount of data on the feasibilily of underground nuclear tests and the likelihood of concealing them from US detection. (Seeoviet Massive Undergroundhe widespread publicity given these explosions and Soviet announcements of the planned use of such massive explosions with future construction projects couldover for futureunderground nuclear tests.
Of theoviet nuclear tests detected to date, none are believed to have beenat altitudes greatereel. We believe, however,onsiderablemotivation for such tests must exist, and we would expect any future Soviet nuclear
44
program to incorjxiriite one or moreexperiments In very high altitude
Oroguing
all serin of high-yield testsZemlya lias been analyzed forSoviet use of parachute retardation,technique, to increase flrenallto-airerange. We estimate on the basis ofand height ol burst of the device andestimated opeinitoiial characteristicsSoviet bomber aircraft, that ontwo occasions (JOEmust have beenscape.
Test Failures
Soviet test program has not been
without its failures.
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM Introduction
he Soviet nuclear weapon development program has grown rapidly, achieved great progress In weapons design, and included the testaried assortment of devices from which Soviet military planners can draw in meeting their requirements.
/Tableives the chronology ol the
test program.
reliminary analysis of the thirty-one Soviet tests conducted8 provides fairly good insight Into the emphasis accorded by tlie USSR to various nuclear weaponsand the progressoncerted development effort continued on
achieved.
[thermonuclear devices, and yields upr were a
Available evidence It:
further suggests that on at least one occasion (JOKMT) the Soviets experienced either the failure of the fuzing system toest device al the desired altitude or the failure of device to perform as
Device to Stockpile Lead Time
o direct evidence is available on the amount of time which elapses between the testoviet nuclear device and its entrance into stockpile in weapons configuration. The extensive use by the Soviet Union of airtechniques, with the implication that the lest devices are in ballistic configurations,that the lead time currently is likely to be in the order ofoonths for devicesigh operational priority.
/ However, only slight progress
in the fissionable material economy of hlgh-yield weapons is apparent.
The Soviets further developed weapons ylcld-ing less thanT, possibly for air defense or tactical use.
o direct information is available on the specific nuclear weapons types in the USSR stockpile.
If"
IB
illl
IJ
i!
it..
iii
1
ill 1 II ill sllsf lt(
- i= i
i
i| I 1
l
1 1|
*- i
I 3. I
I Ih
ifAt!Ml
I
nottrong present requirement for weapons In this yield range.
e estimate that9 thethe capability to produce fissiona variety of types and
ing HVfl KT;.
Nuclear Weapons
c estimate that9 the Soviets have the capability to produce thermonuclear weapons in the following yield and weight
neve mat tne Soviets
^develop verydevices and. If the requirement exists,the yield in some of theweight categories at the expensefissionable material. Withwe do not expect tliedesigns of fission weapons to begreatly during the period of this
iVvnue we believe they
have the technical capability to develop large weapons in this yield range, we would expect them to have conducted testa oi fullr reduced yield versions If they had afor such weapons In view of theof any such tests during the extensive scriese estimate that the Soviets
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,
n theeriod, we do not expect the advancement of Soviet nuclear weapon development to be as rapid as in the past, since we believe that they, havetate of the art where major improvements in performance are difficult to achieve.unlimited testing, we estimate that the USSR will be capable of producing nuclear weapons in the range of yields andrequired for support of major anticl-pated Soviet military requirements.
i
ESTIMATED SOVTET THKKMONUCLBfR'WF.APQN DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL (Based on estimated current Soviet capabilities, using US developmentsuide) (Potential imp rove merits indicated for1eriod are based on uidiinilcu les'.iiig)
Wi ielil ii.
(Reasonably attnin-
iriici .tn
>
Apppr-x. Amounts ot Nuclear
Approx. Yield 'MT)
Nr
'
TN
000
'ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSION WEAPON'! li'j;i>iiU'.
(Seee estimalfld future fission weapons development capabilities)
Weigh'. Class
Reasonably attainableomb
Approx. Amounts of Nuclear
Materials
Approx. Yield (KT;
Includes fuzing and firing system, but not ballistic case or nose.rone.
" Assuming continued testing, wc belie.vc Only blight improvement will be made in these weapon categories and we estimate that the0 Soviet fission weapons development potenlial adequately reflect* their capabilities for theeen text for discussion of extremely light-weight, devices and gun-assemhly weapons.
' Based on analysis of specific Soviet
" Based on Soviet tests conductedS and would not be available in stockpile9 except in limitedeapons).
During the fallhe Soviets tested what Isew class of thermonuclear weapons. JOET%
d. The test of five TN devices8T Indicates strong emphasiseight class
ission Devices. We have reasonablein our estimate of fission weaponfor yields greaternformation on lower yieldis very limited, and our estimate ofcapability in yield rangesuch less complete.
TOF TfcEC RET
In Future Tests
II more tests are conducted, we estimate that future Soviet tests would be primarily directed towardreater yield-to-mass ratio in all classes of thermonucleara continued reduction in weight and diameter for thermonuclear devices, and an effort to increase the economy of fissionable materials.
In addition, should Soviet military policy require, we would expect tests of devicesin the order ofT andoviet Interest in such devices has not been demonstrated to dale. However, the development of such high-yield devices might be achieved by the testing of reduced yield configurations, thereby avoiding the need for very high-yield tests.
Wc estimate that the Soviets willto develop and test low and very low-yield, small-size weapons. We alsooviet requirement for effects tests In rarl-ftcdeet or higher.
5TOCKPIUNG OF NUCtEAR WEAPONS General
availability of fissionableweapons uses and the progress ofand vehicle developmentthat there was no need for andispersed storage program untilDuring this early period we believeand storage of Sovieteapon design andwhich is probably in the Sarova area
tions, would be eight Inches in diameter, weightounds,!
L
closely integrated with the growth ol Soviet nuclear weapon production capacity, and the design and construction of thefacilities have paralleled specificemerging from developing nuclear
National Assembly and Stockpile Sites
e believe that the first of the national stockpile sites were probably designed and under construction in the. It is likely that the location of these sites is based on geographical and militaryso that they can serve all armed forces operational storage sites locatedpecific area.
Wc believe that at least three national assembly and stockpile sites, which possibly are operated by the Ministry of MediumBuilding, arc the central part of the Soviet nuclear weapons logistics system and are designed to supply weapons for all types of military nuclear delivery systems.
Our knowledge of the lucation and nature of storage facilities available to the military is confined principally to two types ofstorage sites located at airfields of Long Range Aviation. We estimate that, into these sites, facilities for nuclearstorage exist at several naval airfields and airfields of the Tactical Aviation. Although no nuclear weapon storage facilities have been identified at naval surface facilities or co-located with ground force units, we believe that appropriate storage facilities for them probably exist.
We believe, however, that extensive long-range plansispersed assembly andsystem were already underway at least as earlyhe development andoi these long-range plans have
national sites prooaoiy containto assemble the weapon to stockpile configuration, in addition, they probably also have facilities to store the weapons and to ship them to the operational storage sites.
ET
of the various elements appears to be divided, with geopliysiea) activities probably under the leadership or M. A. Sadovskiy and debris collection under another, as yetdirector.
Debris Collection Program
The Soviets attending the Genevaof Experts confirmed the existenceebris collection activity by the USSR, but failed to indicate its subordination. Of the Soviet delegation, only N. N. Semcnov,of the Institute of Chemical Physics,of Sciences, and Genady Kirdin, from the Institute of Applied Geophysics, Academy of Sciences, appeared to be knowledgeable on the subject of debris collection and analysis.
Specifically, the Soviets acknowledged that they had employed airborne collection in the past, but stated they had since changed overround systemollectionemploying air fdtering devices as well as passive debris collection on plates and rain water. They claimed that these techniques were fully as effective as the airborne filtering and less expensive to operate. Although the political motivations behind the Soviet desireround collection component hi aninspection system aro understand-
, able, the reasons for their apparentof airborne collection for intelligence purposes remain obscure.
Soviet delegates al Genevasubject of radiochemical analysis ofHowever, since radiochemicaland dating have been mentioned inliterature, there can be little doubtare aware of the principles involvedprobably made use of at least theThey appeared Impressed byWestern scientists hadtheir analysis, and it appearsthe potentialities of radiochemicalto obtain Information on weaponshave not been exploited In the USSRextent that they liave been In theUK.
"top**!
The Seismic Element
The seismic; element of the data collection system is under the direction of Ivan Petrovlch Pasechnik, of the Institute of Physics of the Earth, Academy of Sciences, Moscow. The network of Soviet stations provides facilities at the east-west geographic extremes of the USSR, while two stations set up for theGeophysical Year at Mirnyy and Oazis in the Antarctic, which began operation78 respectively, could provide the Soviet Union with information on UK tests in Australia, an area to which their domesticare denied access for geographical
Data presented by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Conference of Experts revealed that the USSR employs throughout Itsof stations high quality seismicDiscussions revealed, however, that the Soviets lacked experience in differentiating explosions from natural seismicact which would lower their capability to detect and Identify underground nuclear explosions, especially in the lower yield ranges.
The Acoustic Element
Confirmation of Soviet use of acoustic techniques was acquired at the Genevaof Experts. The Soviets at Geneva stated that ten stations were In operation at the end ofnd it appearsthat some. If not all, are co-located with seismic stations.
of the delegates present at theK. I. Balashov appeared to be responsible for the operation of the Soviet acousticwith K. E. Gubkin connected with its theoretical and analytical aspects, and L. M. Brckhovskikh acting as an advisor.
In general, the Soviet experts appeared to have worked with less data than had their Western counterparts. They displayed ato draw conclusions more fromcalculations than from experience, but claimed to have detected nuclearistance0 kilometers.
cret
TOP
T
in the case of the acoustic clement, the existenceoviet electromagnetic (radio wave) activity was not verified until theConference, although it had beentn be well within the capability of the USSR Of the Soviet Conference delegates. Aleksandr Ustyumcnko appeared to be in charge of the Soviet electromagnetic element, with I- M. Hickhovsktkh probably acting as an advisor
Soviel discussions of the subject both in the conference sessions and In privateindicated that Soviet work in the electromagnetic field had been vigorouslyand their techniques may well be more advanced than those of tho West. Inthe Soviets advanced new theoretical methods for discriminating natural and man-made electromagnetic disturbances. They further implied that work wns In progress on developing some type of automaticlor the screening and Identification ol these signals
VIII. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OFMATERIALS TO WEAPONS
INTRODUCTION
lack sufficient evidence to supportestimate of the Soviet weaponsnumber, byby mission, or otherwise.
" This Section auperncdes Uic Supplement to NIKossible Soviet AlloraUons ofMateilal to Weapons Stockpiles,pprovedeptember IBM. (Referred toaa theSupplement."t
"The Assistant chief of Naval Operation* lor In-telUcence.f Uve Navy,ves that the range of possible Soviet qaanUUUve sdloc*-Uons to weapons stockpiles Is so broad that. In view of the stains of available Intelligence on this sob]ret 'as Indicated In> an estimate of -possible allocations* Is unrealistic and of doubtful usefulness. Therefore he does not concur with the central methodologylo derive Uiis section or with theoUoeatlons (Table* II.
;'The Assistant Chlet ot Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, does not concur with the iKctliodolony employed lo derive this section or
Accordingly we rely on the following general factors:
assessments of over-all Sovietpolicy, and of Soviet strategy forand limited war, derived from ourestimate,. (MainSoviet Capabilities and;
of the types ofby the Soviets and of relativeon missions and weaponsthat might employ nuclearor In part.
ith these factors as general guides, more specific factors bearing on weapons stockpile allocations at any selected period are:
specific estimates of Sovietand in some cases production,systems inighdelivery vehicles must be equippedweapons in order to performmissions with acceptable
studies of the major targetagainst which the Soviets wouldseek to employ nuclear weapons
wlth the "Illustrative allocations" (Tables. In view of the insufficiency of evidence on tills subject (as Indicated Ine considers Dial the "illustrative allocations" are merely highly speculative possibilities selected arbitrarily from an almost Infinite number ot alternative choices. At best auch theorizing from unsupported conjectures is unrealistic and of doubtful value: Itigh risk ofmisuse, for example. In briefings for budgetary or planning purposes, leading to the danger of miscalculation by those responsible, for national security.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,of lhe Army believes that, on tbe basis of available Intelligence, the mostdcflnltlveprcs-en tat ion that can bo made of the availability or nuclear weapons lit the Soviet stockpile Is oneroad range of technologicalas shown graphically in figure II,
of technical factors,the balance of available fissionable(asnd plutonium-
top Secret
production rate and retrofitK problems, and the degree of interchange-ability of weapons assemblies for various uses;
d. Intelligence information on stockpiling practices and doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons for various pur]>oses.
THE SOVIET WEAPONS DEVEIOPMENT PROGRAM IN REtATION TO MISSIONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS
he Soviet test program over the years since its inception has shown the development of nuclear weapons toide variety of military requirements, including all the major categories ofbomberwarheads for long- and intermediate-range guided missiles, air defense, support of naval and ground operations, and navalIn comparison with the USprogram, the Soviets have notlear interest in extremely low-yield (lessT) tactical weapons (on which, however, it is possible that tests would not have beenery high-yield weapons (greater thanT) and, with one possible exception, "clean" weapons. Our estimate of the various weapons types reflects these omis-
Planncd Long Range Aviation Employment;;
oviet emphasis on the development of Long- Range Aviation (LRA) throughout the post-war period has indicated great interest In strengthening their capabilities in this field. While early medium-yield weaponsprobably were an interim armament fororce, the Soviets clearly laid heavy stress on the rapid development and continued re-
Retrofit Is defined as Uie modernization of atomic weapons and components, and related equipment, by applying changes In design and fabrication to stockpile weapons. "Sec, "Strength and Composition of tbe Soviet long Range nomber
top
"As used iii this estimate, the term hlgli-yteld weapons Includes all yields greater) KT, modiuni-ytold weapons includes yields fromT, and low-yield weapons includes yields less thanT.
finemcnt of thermonuclear weapons suitable for bomber delivery. Confirmation of on-base nuclear weapons storage sites at long and medium range bomber bases demonstratespreparations for deployment andthat nuclear weapons are now widely deployed to Long Range Aviation forces. We believe the Soviets will seek to provide nuclear weapons for all LRA bombers intended to be used for weapons delivery in the event of general war.
Planned Long-Range and Intermediate Range Guided Missiles Employment
is good evidence thatery high priority to tlieof land-basedhaving ranges of. We alsothe Soviets have developedsurface-to-surface missiles. Inof our estimate of the accuracy ofmissiles, their most effective usebe with high-yieldand Soviet emphasis on suchis confirmed by the nature of thetest program, plus Soviet publicAccordingly, we believe thatwarheads are being, and will be,in numbers sufficient to equip allintended for operational use in. categories, and. category.
Planned Ah Defense Employment
cret
Soviets have placed strongair defense, and have developedmissiles now deployed in largeMoscow and possiblyew otherwith advanced types probablydevelopment. We believe thatwere originally designed towith HE warheads but thatarc adaptable to some modelsthe Soviets would seek to furnishfor some proportion of these atpractical date. Four lo sixtests appear to be related to theof air defense warheads or toapplications In air defense systems. Wc
TOP
that9 the Soviets will allocate nuclear wnrheads U> surface-to-air missiles.
Planned Employment in Support of Ground Operations
4 considerable reliable evidence on current Soviet army doctrine has revealed that the use nf nuclear weapons In support oferatkms la contemplated. Thisalso visualizes delivery ofariety of methods, including rifled artillery, free rockets, missiles, and aircraft. Intelligence on Soviet training continues to indicate the planned employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Soviet forces.lie Soviets conducted an air drop at Totskoye ol an estimatedTn connection with Army maneuversilitary effects test. Thisbefore communist Bloc military leaders was clearly associated with tho development of nuclear warfare tactical doctrine. Amilitary delegation which visited the USSR In8 was told that the Soviet army has in itsT atomicT rocket warheads,ndT tactical bombs. Furthermore, there is some evidence that nuclear weapons storage areas mny be located adjacent to certainairfields. Eight of theevices testedB were less thanT in yield. Some, by their small size and economy ofmaterial, probably represented the development of air defense or tacUralWc do not beliere that the presentfissionable material stockpile permits the use of very large numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical uses along withnumbers of high-yield weapons.within the next two years presentlyrates of production of fissionablewill permit the Soviets to afford large numbers (in the thousands) of tactical weapons
Planned Naval Fmploynwnt
uring recent years, statements bypolitical leaders and senior naval officers have stressed the naval warfare requirements of the USSR In general war. limited war, or cold war. and have both stated and implied the necessity for possessing nuclear weapons to wage present-day naval warfare. Wcthat certain naval aircraft units have been designated for nuclear delivery roles,the use of alr-to-surface missiles. Moreover, we estimate that the Soviets willimited number of existingfor missile delivery and will probably also construct new submarines specificallyfor this purpose. Of the weapons tested by theumber of medium and low-yield weapons types would be suitable for use against naval targets. In addition, evidence of naval concern for nuclear weapons has been provided by tests conducted inwaters off Novaya Zemlya, once5 (under water) and twice in the fall7 (one under water, one airhichcertainly were related to naval effects. Four additional tests during the fall8 were conducted at the south end of Novaya Zemlya and may have had naval associations. In addition, the Soviets, at the Geneva Experts Conference during the summerhird underwater test, presumably nuclear,ieldT. In thethe evidence substantiates an allocation of fissionable material to naval missions.
PATTERN OF SOVIET military ESTABLISHMENT
e continue to believeline with our basic estimates of Soviet military policy, including the concurrent development of many types of forces andprincipal components of the Soviet armed forces undoubtedly have submittedfor nuclear weapons to carry out their various missions. Available evidencethat the Soviet leaders would not be likely to allocate all of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile to any one of theseto the exclusion of the others.we estimate that, to the extent that the USSR continues toizeableestablishment with extensive ground, naval, and air components, available nuclear weapons will be stockpiled for use by each of the major components.
DELIVERY SYSTEM ESTIMATES
varying levels of confidence inof future Soviet strength insystems requiring nuclear weaponsimportant bearing on our estimates ofstockpiles. This is especially trueaviation and guided missiles,the latter our estimates presentlydates of development and potentialtotals, so that we are forced toassumptions only.
TARGET STUDIES
preparing this estimate, we haveinto target studies directed intargets related to us nuclear deliveryThe selection of these targets ismost cases, difficult. However, manyestimates ofcapabilities obtained frominvolved infrom the Soviet standpoint theyield of nuclear weapons in stockpileto attain, under estimated attackcertain probable damage levels ontargets. Accordingly, weour target studies arc subject tomargins of error in judgment, as wellthe effect of changes in US capabilities.
TECHNICAl FACTORS
account must be taken ofof Soviel weapons in relation toamounts of fissionablef
second technical factor Is that ofproduction rates for new designs andof retrofit. In general, we liavethat it wouldthe Soviets to achieve quantitya weapons type once successfullythe production model were an almostreplica of the tested device, thebc slightlyconverselymuch adaptation were required. Thishas required special attention in thethellustrative stockpiles, inSoviet test series of the fallumber of tests which weSoviets would wish to stockpile at anIn line with the above discussion,used only small quantities of suchfor purposes of computing theillustrative stockpiles shown In
IllUSTRATIVE STOCKPILE ALLOCATIONS,ND
Feasibility of Illustrative Allocations
the light of the range andthe factors discussed above, we do notIt is possible or desirable to arrive at"most probable" estimate of thestockpile at selected periods. Ithowever, to arrive atnd we believe that,certain missions, these allocationsbe said to represent aand minimum.
Assumptions of Soviet Military Policy for Illustrative Allocutions
the purposes of the illustrativeshown below, we have assumedof Soviet strategic emphasis atextremes to which we believemight bc pressed in the periodTlie first, Alternative A, stressesof forces tending to increase Sovietfor limited war while seeking to pre-
eterrent to general war through long-range capabilities adequate to threaten the US with majorhe second.B. Is based on dominant emphasis on long-range strike forces and isilitary policy of preparing to fight. Ifeneral war while seeking to deter its occurrence. The two alternative assumptions would affect particularly the number of high-yield weapons allocated to Soviet Long Range Aviationnd theof low-yield weapons to air defense and tactical ground support. Theseappear as the major variables in our illustrative allocations.
Genera! Caveat
In making these illustrative allocations, we have postulated totals of fissionablefor weapons purposes in line with the basic estimates shown in Tablen pageIf these totals were in fact in error within the possible margins stated in the estimatea to twice the staled plutonlum-cquiva-lent values forndof thealues forith greater uncertaintieshen the totals shown in these illustrative allocations would of course bc sharply affected. Moreover, the effect would be felt with greater acutencss In some of the subtotals than in others, partly because of the variation in unit requirements of fissionable materials, but more especially because of possible differences in strategy and basic allocation policy if greater or lesser amounts of fissionable materials wereIt is conceivable, for example, that if the amounts were only half those postulated forertain allocation categories might bc reduced to nil. Por this over-all reason, as well as for the reasons statedthese Illustrative allocations must be treated with great caution.
Considering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR probably possessesnuclear weapons toajorby its long range striking forces.sufficient nuclear warheads for all of its operational submarine launched missiles and ground launched ballistic missiles. range andt present the quantity of fissionable material will limit the number of nuclear weapons available for air defense and tactical uses. This shortage will bealleviated
possibility ofeterrent concept Is discussed Inl, "Main Trends ln Soviet Capabilities andated
IX. THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AID ANO EXCHANGE PROGRAM
OBJECTIVES AND CAPABILITIES
The Soviet Union apparently has twobehind her oilers of material andaid to other nations throughout the world. In making such offers to members of the Sino-Soviet bloc, the objective Is clearly to improve and tighten the relationshipsthe Soviet Union and her Satellites while at the same time maintaining adegree of control of the atomic energy activities in these countries, In the offers to the Free World nations, the objective has been largely the propaganda Impact that such offers are certain to produce. Offers to the underdeveloped nations have apparently been motivatedesire to picture the Soviet Union as the great world leader andIn the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Offers have been made to such "neutral" nations as Yugoslavia nnd Egypt as part of more general proposals of economic aid with the obvious intent of luring them Into the Communist camp.
There Is little doubt tliat the Soviet Union has the Industrial, technical andcapability to fulfill such offers of aid as have been made. The fissionable material required to meet the requirements of reactors completed, under construction, and promised to other nations of the world docs notnny significant drain on the existing
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of this material in the Soviet Union. Scientific personnel mid laboratory facilities are available to give tint technical training promised to scientists and technicians of both Bloc and non-Bloc nations.
CURRENT AND fUIUBF AID TO BlOC COUNTRIES
ince as earlyany of thenations have contributed extensively to the Soviet atomic energy program. Uranium ore was mined and shipped to the USSR as reparations payments from East Germany. Czechoslovakia. Poland. Rumaniahe Soviet Union allegedly in gratitude Tor theirctually the Soviet Union now pays these nations for the ore shipped, ulthough strict supervision of mining, processing and shipment isby the Soviets. Communist China has also supplied ruw materials for the Soviet atomic energy program. Several of theliave supplied significant, quantities of instruments and equipment. (
ilowatt (thermal) capacity are due to go into operation90 in Hungary and Bulgaria. In addition to the reactors and cyclotrons and radioisotopes furnished to the Satellites, basic technical training has been givenimited number of Satelliteat laboratories and universities within the Soviet Union and at home from visiting Soviet scientists. However, steps have been taken to insure that advanced nuclearwould take place in the Soviet Union, where Satellite scientists would be subject to more effective control.
Soviet aid has beento several of the Satellite countries inof additionaleactor is already underin East Germany and completionzechoslovakia isstart constructionWreactor in the second halflannedoland hasaid in the construction of anresearch reactor and Inower reactor. The powerbeen tentatively plannedungary has also beenin the constructionowerare Indications that Communistbe provided with two power reactorsthe Chinese Second Five-Year PlanSoviet controls over these powerprograms include retention ofon Soviet isotope separationfuel element processing facilities.
CURRENT AND FUTURE AID TO NON-BLOC COUNTRIES
date, the only significant offers ofnon-Bloc nations have been those madeand Egypt. While theseoriginally madeeitheryet point to an operating reactorfrom this Soviet aid. The reactorin Yugoslavia is similar incapacity to that built inThe Egyptian reactor Is to bc oftype and size as those to be foundEuropean Satellites.
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past two years have seen adecline in the number and extent of Soviet offers of atomic aid to nations in the Free World. The Soviet-proposed General Regional Body for Peaceful Uses oi Atomicwhich was to include all the East and West European countries and the United States, has not materialized. Thewas probably proposed to disrupt thewhich were being carried out in the formation of EURATOM. When EURATOM was successfully organized and the Western nations refused to enter into thegroup, no further attempt by theto fosterlan was made. Soviet overtures to Japanilateral agreement as noted6 were not followed up.
A large number of the offers made during the past year have been made to countries in the Asian area. An offer toeaceful uses of atomic energy exhibit was made to and accepted by Indonesia. Similar offers were made to Burma, Iran and India. Inhe Soviets offered to exchange "know how" in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy with countries of Asia and the Far East. They further suggestedody within the Economicfor Asia and the Par East to study the economic factors and facilitate theof information on this subject.
A slight interest in the South American area was noted in an interview between Brazilian newspapermen and Khrushchev inn this interview,pronounced Soviet readiness towith Brazil in the atomic energy field through bilateral accord as well as the international Atomic Energy Agency. Inhe Soviets, through the UN,the University of Chile with instruments for the Laboratory of Nuclear Physics.
There is no evidence that the Soviets arc attempting or soon will attempt to compete in the Free World for agreements to build research reactors. Tlie offers are vague, such agreements as are completed are generally limited to basic technology, andof the agreements is slow. It can bethat in individual cases bilateral-type agreements will be signed similar to those in Yugoslavia and Egypt, but there is no evidenceidespread program approaching that conducted by the US or the UK.
IOINI INSIITUTE FOR NUCtEAR RESEARCH, DUBNA
The Joint Institute for Nuclear Researchubna, USSR, was organized by the Soviets in6 to encouragebetween scientists of different countries in theoretical and experimental research in the field of nuclear physics in order to widen the possibilities of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."
Much research has been conducted at JINR usingev synchrocyclotron and theev proton synchrotron. Thishas been comparable in techniques and results to that of Western countries but lias been somewhat lacking in originality. The research has little application to the nuclear power program for which the Satellitestrained scientists.
Additional research facilities being planned for JINR include an experimental high-flux reactoryclotron formultiple-charged ions. This equipment is under construction but probably will not be completed for several years.
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
date, the Soviets have co-operatedworkings of the International AtomicAgency, although their attitudeAgency might best be described ashave offered scholarships throughand have made atokenfissionable material. Yemal'yanov, themember on the Board of Governors,privately that he is not satisfiedoperations of the Board and that hetoo many politicians rather thanhave positions of responsibility inThere has been furtherol the lackirm program for
o date, the Soviets have offered tothe Agency with onlygnd have announced the availability ofocholarships for study of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the USSR. However, none of the Soviet institutes offered for IAEAhaveignificant role, if any. in the Soviet atomic energy program.
arc no indications that theintends to drop out of the IAEA,is believed that any significant Sovietunderdeveloped nations will bc carriedbilateral agreements ratherany Agency program.
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
Through participation in international conferences, tho USSR has carried out agres-slve information collection and propaganda programs,eak8 at the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held lninI is also apparent that tlie USSR rapidly integrates US results into the Soviet program. Intelligence reports, as well as evaluation of Soviet tactics atconferences, indicate that the USSR carriesell-organized, comprehensive and intensive information collection program through their participation in theseaimed at acquiring all availableinformation as well as industrialtechnology and classifiedfrom the West, in many cases directed toward solving specific technological problems they have encountered in their own work.
The USSR has attempted lo set forth one or all of three main propaganda theories atscientific conferences related to atomic energy both at the conferences and in propaganda broadcasts for domestic as well as foreign consumption:
"The Atom Must Serve Onlyofnd the USSR is thein this clTorl;
a primary goal of theis to open up "possibilities for theof scientists and the exchangelatest knowledge and experiencecountries in the sphere of atomic science andnd the USSR has expended "great efforts in promoting wide international cooperation in peaceful uses of atomicnd,
c. That the USSR, as with Sputniks, is first ln atomic energy, primarily inthermonuclear reactions andpower reactors.
X. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIETENERGY PROGRAM "
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
It seems probable that Soviet officials were willing to accept high-cost methods of plant design and operation during the earlier phases of their nuclear energy program In the interests of achieving an assuredmaterials production more quickly.
However, intelligence strongly suggests that economic considerations exertedgreater influences in the operation of uranium ore, metal, andfacilities throughouteriod.
We estimate that Soviet officials, within the limits of assigned production goals, have accordednotto economic considerations, since atn the selection of operating procedures on the basis of which production directives were carried out. This is to say, we feel that the managers of the Soviet program4 attempted to an even greater extent to achieve the assigned output of fissionablewith the least possible expenditure of economic resources; in contrast to the earlier policy of an assured production In the shortest possible period. Wc feel, further, that within the near future, the determination of the size of fissionable materials production will not
1 The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of lhe Navy, docs not concur in the economic section because it Is basedethod of cost analysis that he does not consider can be applied to the USSR fissionable materials estimate.
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immune to economic considerations, ifthey are completely so at the present time.
our present estimates offeed procurement and fissionableoutput arc inconsistent with theuse of Soviet resources. Wethat,he Sovietsdiffusion plants and reactors onlyof the uranium they procuredless than one kilogram ofand Pu) for each ton of uraniumSoviets have had strong economicto use their above-ground uraniummuch more intensively, at leastIf the Soviets had the plantstrip the economically recoverablesubstantially all of theirpotential production of fissionablewould have been about four timesestimated total. The productionfor which we have evidence,have produced no more than twiceestimated here, even at Hieof estimated size and efficiency.probable estimate of actualbased on evidence that suggests thatand efficiencies were considerablythe upper limits.
SIZE OF THE PROGRAM
estimate that the approximatecost of the Soviet nuclear energythroughas been overrubles of which aboutillionfor plant and equipmentillion rubles for operatingdata are in terms5 rublewere derived from cost studies ofSoviet nuclear energyJ5 shows the estimatedin terms of investment andby major functions. Thesecost estimates must be consideredapproximations and are subject toof error; however, it is felt thatreflect general magnitudes
FUNCTION AI, BREAKDOWN OP CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURES THROUGH
Million*B55Ruble* Total
Total prndi- iCurc
Funriion
4,
0
0 0
0
c.:i
- Dom nol include amovi-ixation.
Omitting investment in uranium mining and ore concentrating, which arc notas such in reported US-AECwe estimate that as ofhe Soviet program has spent approximately5r less% of the gross national product of the USSR for the same period. Similarly, estimated average annual expenditures during this period% of total Soviet budget appropriations for heavy Industry
Tableompares investment hi plant and equipment for tlie nuclear energywith that of other priority programs. It should be borne in mind that the nuclear energy program had essentially no capital structure prior, while the other industries which are herein considered were well established by that lime, and each one was undergoing expansion with the greatest rapidity In order toarge andincrease in total industrial output of the country.
1 For comparison purposes the US programomparable period has spent about5 dollars.
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ia
COMPARISON (ir CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN NtlCl-KAR KNEROV Tfl THAT IN SHLCCTKO IXDUKTKIHS. DM
ul, Ii|i5
Niirlem Km>rgy
in Nuli<
ouiy Tut:il Industry Clii'iuiral Imlusuy I'Vrtirtia Moliilltirpy IViPttlmiii India try t'h'iiLric l'owii
S.I
N.A.
*.7
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USSR isublesased on published US charges for enrichedthe apparent ruble-dollar ratio for this commodity Is, therefore, at leastubles per US dollar. This high ratio is due to lowSoviet plant efficiencies and relatively high charges for USSR electric power. For example, it has been estimated that lhe Soviet diffusion plant at Verkhneyvinsk cost on the orderillion rubles.lant of equal capacity were constructed in the US, it would have costillion dollars. In terms of comparable capacities,atio ofubles per US dollar Is Indicated. This value is more than twice5 rubles per US dollar) which appears reasonable for converting nuclear energy investment costs of one country in terms of currency of the other. In short, the difference is largely due to the greater physical plant required in the USSR tonit of.
ram of weapon grade plutonium is estimated to haveubles9 when no credit- is allowed for the re-use of reactor tails.redit for the value of the reactor tails, which are estimated to have been usedroductionould reduce the costram of plutoniumubles in that year. The costubles per gram is aboutimes theUS dollar price for the purchase of plutonium produced in private powerThis high Indicated ruble dollars comparedor theof plant) results from our estimate of Soviet failures to approximate USadvances ln plutonium production.the failures are toar with the US with respect to:pecific power levels for production reactors;uellevels and;ull utilization of reactor tailings as subsequent feed for gaseousplants.
Original document.
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