KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO FRANCE

Created: 3/11/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CHlaAL IKTSLLTGEKCa AGEHCI OFFICE CFESTZ-IATES

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KEKCRATCUM FCR TEE UNZrZD STATES HiTELLIGENCE BOARD SUBJECT; Khrushchev's Visit to Franca

SHEFI'AN SEIiT Assistant Director Kitlocal Estloates

Pursuant to the discussion of tte sensitive situation itea st tte US3 nestlesorch, tte Board of fc'atiorsl Estimates has studied possible isplicetiocsrustchev's forthcccicg visit to Frar.ce and forwards the attached fcr your inforsaticc andasis for discussion at the US3 neeticg ofarch.

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KeJOKA-TDUH FOR TEE DI SECTOR CF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SJTJEJT: Khrushchev's Visit to France

1- Although Precier Khrushchev's visit to France ^ecl^lcsarch call* for nucarcus coafereaces vita President devo week period, weIt unlikely tact1rortllaj results. Nevertheless, the aere feet of the Khrushchev visit vlU b* regarded by d* Gaulle os iccreas-tac Preach atoture lotera Alliance; ha cay topet* visit la futur* deallr.es with his oUles.Soviet Ucioc's clrcucspect attitude towards de Caull* ia receat rooths su-^gests that Khrushchev regards the visitrecis lac oppor-tunlty to widea tbe dlffer*=ceo between Froace and itse Gaulle, however. Isll oware that the Soviets hav* littl* to offer hl= Ic return for upsettiag or weakening allied unity,the talks are likely to be United to each leader's

assessing tte attitude of the otterariety of subjects, iaciudla- likely positions at subsequent highceetiass.

2. Khrushchev coy ettacpt toe Gcuil*or* foithccdna; ettitude towards East Cercsay would perconencly divide the Gercea people aad henceraditional French security prablec. Eovever, da Gaulle Is apparently dedicated to tb* coccept of French security through tbe solidarity of Western Europe, lecludlrj; tbe aslatennac* of the Fraaco-Geraca rapprocbezaat. De Gouile has teea Acerauer's stoutest cefeader lo supportard policyis tbe Soviets oa tbe Derlic issue. He is olcost certainly awere that cay cove towards en eccocccdatloa vith East Gercony would seriously Jeopardize bis cordial relationship with Adenauer, socethias be wculd be cost reluetaat to do.

Khrushchev aay try to set ce Geuileee to aoa Westracaatat, perticulorly tbeof auclear weapons. While de Geulle dtjht betoicitetloa, ba is uaiibely to cocolt bicaelfagreeceat related to West Ceraaayballeve

ttot aucb octioa would seriously stroia tbe Frn-co-Gercna relc-tloosblp. It cccaot be excluded however, tbat de Cculle would privately tell Khrushchev that be vculcifting of tbe WEU restrictions oa Geraea nuclear weapons developcent.

Kfcrusacaev vUl alzott certainly raise tte generalof claorcaceat. Gaulle, wto bos atotec be is notoraoceat but rather nuclear equollty, aLrfit besubscribeeneral ctatecect giving topto ccatrol cod evs-tual eUcisatlao of auciearbelieve be viU ctterpc to ovoid oafciasoo filsoraaceat while tbe Geaevo talks are iait is coacelvcbleushccev night offer socetechnical aid to Freace ia itscpceatthis* this is highly unlikely. As far os .Khrushchev iavould raise extrerely difficult probleca with tbe As far es fie Caull* is cor.ceraed, it uculfi beto his allies, aad he, hicsblf, would-

taioly beo have tte Soviets perticipota ia Fra era's prograa.

5- For his port, de Caull* cay ottacpt to secure fron Khrushchev soce reccgcitioa of France's special positioa ia Africa, especially la Algeriacitheroint public statement or perhaps by sere act, suchisit to tee Sobore oile do aothowever, that to obtain this,wouldvim as to cakeuld seriously aatogo-it* his western

6. In general, de Gaulle cc- be expected to ovoid caking cocnitcents unacceptable to his allies. Although he wishes to revise the orgonlzatioa of the Atlantic Alliance, he knows full well that it is the best protection France has at the ooccat. As yet hit country does notuclear capability that could enable It ta risk doing without the alliance. He is still far free ending the Algerian War, and until this is done, he cannot seriously entertain.even If he desired toc revision of France's basic security policies.

7- General de Gaulle's well known confldor.ee that he Is edcirably fitted to negotiate with the Soviets, his belief that the USSa has core In coccon with tbe West than vith Coaounist China, ocd bis iasisteace that tbe cost desirable course of long range policy is to exploit ccceor. East-West Interestseans of disrupting the Sl:iO-Sovlet Alliaoce cannot be ignored. However, the Caullist perspective is long, and the General has shove- hla-self capable of patience. Be has always guarded against the undertaking of preaature initiatives, no cotter how convinced he coy have been of tbe ulticate correctness of his assessmentituation.

3. Khrushchev end de Gaulle will each beo Inpress tbe other with the strength of his country and the vigor of his policies. In so doing both parties win probably initially be on their best behavior, but it is possibLe that the confrontation of two such different personalities will result in serious clashes either open cr concealed.

?C8 THE BOARD CP NATICKA1 ESTIMATES

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KSST Choiroan

Original document.

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