IMPLICATIONS OF A BREAK-OFF OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Created: 5/17/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE CF HATIOBAL ESTIMATES

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HEMGRANTUM

SUBJECT: Implicationsreak-Off of the Sumnlt Conference

I. KHKUoHCHEV'S MOTIVES

1. Ve believe it Ukely, though not certain, that Khrushchev hoG for coos tloe considered that tbe Sumlt Conference would be unproductive for tho USSR. His Baku speoch ofprilistinct hardening of his position. Be probably saw little prospect of gain for the USSR In tbe Berlin issue. with the subsequent stateosnts of high US officials, gave bin what he apparently decided was an opportunity to break off the conferenceanner favorable to Soviet Interests. Be probably believes that there will be support for his position by public opinion in tbe world, end criticion of the US, and that these can be used to Soviet advantage. Dy brooking on the issue ofrather than that of Berlin, be retains ouch flexibility; he can, if he wishes, poertpone action on Berlin while he further tests and Influences the international situation.

2* Ir. addition, ve believe that Khrushchev and hie aeBOCi-atee are seriously aad deeply concerned by tbe vbole ant tor of IS overflights. They are oeea not only as on affront to tbe eovereigcty and prestige of tbe USSR butangerous lnvosion of tho secrecy on which the whole Soviet syeten so largely rests. The Soviet rulers ore alDOet certainly unable tolola, whether expressed cr lnplied, that the IE or any other foreifro poweright to aerial inopection of Soviet territory. They want to atop this breach In tho security of the Dloc.

3. Finally we bolleve that Khrushchev has probably beento ocos pressure free elements in the USSR, and free ComuniBt China, to DOdlfy his general policy of detente and peaceful We do not believe those preouureo ore strong enough to control hie conduct, but they probably have acne effect. Besees tbe breakup of the conference as on opportunity toy these elecenta In the Ccccunist world, as well as to serve Soviet interests in other respects.

k. In breaking off the Sun.-It on the issue of USflights over the USSR Khrushchev would presumably have tbe following oIds in Dind:

To mgnlfy too bio do be hoc attested to attach to the US for dierupting the Sunnit withncident, and by raising toneion over It, to oblige the US to ncdlfy its position on aerial roc ciowi seance. In either case, he would expoct the credit of the US to be dirir.lshsd and its ability toixD position on other issues weakened.

To iatididate US nlUea from supporting tbe US on this Ibguc acd thus,ituotion of high tension,plit in tbe Western front on this and ether natters, in particular Berlin.

To retrieve tha loos of face be feelo ho has suffered ot hcae and abroadesult of thencursionsong period, and in particular to establish that Soviet sovereignty over its airspace cannot be violated with iqpur-ity.

hus we believe that Khrushchev's pricory concern ia not only toisavowal ofncident itself, but also to utilize that affair to divide the Allies and tc create asituotion favorable to pressing Soviet deconda on otherespecially on Berlin.

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FUPTEZH SOVIET ACTIOfS

6. Khrushchev la representing the present situation to neon that negotiation at the Summit to reduce tensions has,esult of the US actions and attitude, been mde lsn.OBslble.pt thtr tig. We think tbio moans that XhniahaUev does net at present Intend to embarkrotracted period of greatly intensified cold wor. is unlikely to admit that he has altered bio geceral policies, or to eoy that beo longer Id favor Of reduction of tendons through negotiations. Be will count an developments In Western opinion toesumption of negotiations latex co toroe and In an atooephere core favorable to tbe USSP.. Through aetioc In the UN agulnst the US andajor propaganda campaign, on attempt will be mode to bring the U3 to the negotiating table again under serious psychological cisadvantage8.

It lo unlikelyreakdown of the Summit vill be foUcwed by precipitate Soviet action oo the Berlin issueind vhlcb wouldediate dancers, although oome limited meaeurea to holghten pressure oo Berlin nay be undertaken. The risko ofsevere Sovlot action such ao interference with acceso to Berlin would be heightened. We believe that Khrushchev still warttigh risk cf war over Berlineversal of world opinionhio claims to beolicy of peace.

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The initial discny andam in vorld opinion which will alnost certainlyunoit breakdown would be iocreaeed if Soviet propQgandaennciog line. The pressure of public opinion, even in Western Europe,caprcaise will probably be great. We do not believe, however, that, in the icnediate afteroathure-it breakdown. Allied gcverncents will abandon theirto the essentials of Western positions on other issues,Berlin.

It is possible that the Soviets will overplay their hand in exploiting the overflight issue, and that the initial blaae attached to the US for the Sumit breakdown will fall away. This would be particularly the case if tbe USSR refuses to settle for the President's statetaeot that overflights will not be repeated. oviet attenpt to press tbe case further, for exanple by Insistingepudiation of the past actions and reooval or punisboent of those responsible, would probably result in world opinion turning against Soviet exploitation of the incident.

Original document.

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