PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Created: 5/5/1960

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climaxed his pre-summlt maneuverspeech to the Supreme Sovietay in which he resortedime-honored Soviet devicefrequently on the ovo of importantwhich is designed to place the Western powers on theand to demonstrate that the USSR's peaceful coexistence policy does not result from any weakness the West could exploit at the negotiating table.

The Soviet premieressimistic assessment offor agreement at theciting recent Westornstatements and actions as providing little ground for hope that the Western leaders "are really looking forsolutions." He charged that "aggrossive forces" in the united States recently havetheir efforts to "wreck the summit conference, or at least prevent it from reaching agroements."

Although Khrushchev'sto President Elsenhower wore couched ln moderate terms, he went further in criticizing the President than at any time since his visit to the United States, tie remarked thatspeeches by American spokesmen wore1 omen"favorable outcome" at the summit and said thishas been "aggravated" by the "unfortunate fact that even the American President approved these speeches." He expressed regret that President Eison-hower intended to limit his presence at the summit to only

seven days and observed that this shows that questions to be discussed in Paris "do notdue attention on the part of the United States Government."

Khrushchev apparentlyto build up his charges of rocent violations of Soviet air space by US aircraftajor international issue. Hethese flights as aprovocation" and announced that the USSR would bring these incidents before the UN Security Council. Ho charged that tho incidents were timed to coincide with the summit meeting and that the United States is seeking to weaken the USSR'sto fightelaxation of International tension and an end to the cold war and arms race."

In an effort to portray Amorlcan policy as Irresponsible and provocative and to generata widespread public alarm.over its possible consequences,warned that the USSRthe right to reply to "such aggrossivo actions" in the future "with measures which we shall find necessary to ensure the safety of our country."committing the USSR toourse, he attempted to' convoy the notion that It would employ missile retaliation.

Khrushchev's threat to bring the Issue before the Security Council closelyoviet movean emergency session of tho council in 8 to condemn flights of US Strategic Air Command

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bombers over tho Arctic "in tho direction of theof thohis move coincided vith the beginning of the abortive preparatory talks ln Moscow tore-summit foreign ministers' conference. 8 maneuver

etohe Soviet -Union-'ol an can resoIutlohloaTling'for an Arctic* Inspection system: tothe danger of surprise

In addition to the primary effort to discredit the United States on tbe eve of the summit meeting, Khrushchev's speech probably was calculated to warn against any exaggeratedin.the Communist world rogarding the outcome of the Paris talks, which ho has been careful to portray as only the firsteries of such negotiations. Khrushchev's harsh criticism of the United States may also be Intended toase for blaming American "insincerity" should the talks break down.

Having invoked the threatew and dangerous crisis, Khrushchev concluded his speech by reaffirming his commitment to the "Leninist policy" of peaceful.coexistence and by pledging himself to "spare no effort at Paris toutually acceptablehis pledge was intended to reassure Western leaders and forestall speculation that he has lost interest in summit talks.

Prior to Khrushchev's speech, Soviet and bloc officials

oviet official that the one ing tne" West could be assured of was that Khrushchev would come to Parismile"illingness to discuss issues seriously.

la Soviet Em- assy*%Tflciai expressed the iew that some progress could be achieved on disarmament and nuclearreportsop diplomat" to the effect that Khrushchov will mark time until the US elections and will seek only broad general agreements in.Paris, leaving the details to bo worked out later.

Bloc spokesmen,!

sought privately last week to de-emphasize any suggestioncrisis onhe summit. ThewBt

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acting on instructions, went out of his way tp. stress' Khru-shchev'sprrT speech in Baku was not intendedhreat to use forco on trieissue. mmmmmmmmV "attaches also took ipproach in private conversatlons^andthemmmammwl |ftenied that Khrushchev'scould be Interpretedhreat.

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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT

probably views the summit meeting,which opens in Paris onay, notecisive confrontation with the West butew and important stagerotracted period of high-level negotiations. This outlook probably precludes any move tohowdown at the summit Itself orafter, prior to President Eisenhower's visit to the USSR ln June. The Soviet leader summed up this approach during his trip to France bying "hope that the meeting will ushereries of Important negotiations between theof the great powers, with the object of putting an end to the cold-war policy."

Moscow's general policy line during the pre-summithas reflected the moreposture adopted by hrushchev during his visit to the United States. Moscow has endeavored to appear responsive to Western views on the timingummit meeting with no fixed agenda. Except forin Its positionuclear test ban treaty,the Soviet Government's efforts toavorable pre-summit atmosphere have not gone so far as to presageconcessions on major East-West issues.

Germany and Berlin

Despite Khrushchev'sstatements assigning top priority to disarmament and his intention to negotiateissuesuclear test ban treaty, he probably regards the German and Berlin questions as the focal point of the summit. Over the past few months,has increasingly Invoked the threateparate East Gorman peace treaty to soften

Western resistanceeace treaty with both German states converting West Berlinree city. Moscow probably realizes that, on thesehange in the status quo would be of little advantage to the West, and believes thatare unlikely to befor tho USSR unless conducted under the threat of unilateral Soviet action.

At the same time, Moscow does not wish to detract from the general policy of detente or appear to be repudiating the Camp David agroement not toa time limit on Thus, the threat toeparate treaty has beenformulated andto create uncertainty as to the timing and circumstances of such action.

Against this background, Khrushchev's initial move at the summit on these Issues probably will be to reintroduce hisdemandseace treaty signed by both Germanand the establishmentree city in West Berlin.of this position, as Indicated by authoritative East German statements reportedlyat Moscow's direction, would probably Include an offer to draft two separate documents containing the same basicone of which would be signed by the Western powers with Bonn and the other by the bloc with East Germany.

art of his peaceproposal, Khrushchev will probably urgo that the heads of government agree on theprinciples. He will press for the establishmentour-power commission to develop the details and of an all-German commission tooint

proposal to tha four powers. The Soviet leader nay accompanyroposal with an offer to hold the Berlin question ln abeyance during peace treaty talks, buttrictly defined time limit. As avariant, Khrushchev may propose declarations ending the state of war, which would be signed by the bloc and Bonn and the Western powers and Eastcitingrecedent the6 Sovlet-Japaneso Joint declaration.

However, Khrushchevdoes not expect at this stage to win Western agreementour-power commission toeace treaty or to an all-German committee to discuss an expansion of contacts and reunification. Westernto these proposals would Imply acceptance of theSoviet position that conclusioneace treaty ls the only task remaining for the four powers and thatis the exclusiveof the two German states,

Largely for the record, Khrushchev will advanceeparate Issue9 proposal to make Westree city, garrisoned either by token contingents of all four powers or by neutral troops. As an ostensible concession,may drop Its suggestionoviet component Join the "symbolic" Western units ln West Berlin, and instead build up the' UN and neutral role in guaranteeing tbe free city.

Finally, Khrushchev may Indicate that the free-city status can be reached in stages, provided the final goal lsspelled out. Tho first stage might not go beyond the severance of all ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, with troop reductionsater date. Agreementimited first stage, however,

would probably be contingentlear commitment to discuss further stages at an early date.

Interim Berlin Agreement

After the maximum Soviet demands have beon put forward for the record, Khrushchevwill try to move onto the question of an Interim Berlin solution along the lines discussed at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference1 rko recently hinted thli

Moscow

sharp propaganda crrxiclsm of alloged Western attempts toout the "positive results" of the foreign ministers'suggests that the USSR considers the Western proposal

for an interim solutionpen to negotiation.

Khrushchev may Introduce certain modifications to make the Soviet Interim-solutionmore palatable to the West. He may drop Sovieton formal East Germanin such an agreement and suggest that East Germany could be associated by means of separate commitments. He may Offer to extend the time limit on an interim agreement fromonths to two or three years, and he may refrain fromon linking an Interimto the creation ofan all-German committee. He can beto stress that an interim solution would not involve any change ln existing Westernarrangements.

Khrushchev would probably insist,in return,estern commitment to reduce troops ln West Berlin, possibly in phases. On the basic question of the status of Western rights at the expiration of such an/agreement, there is no evidence that the USSR would abandon itsto explicit confirmation of these rights.

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Alms

It Is unlikely thatexpects to reacheven on the main elements of an Interim Berlin solution In the few days available to the heads of government. He probably will concentrate his main efforts oneneral statement which Moscow could then represent as marking Western acceptance of thethat the Berlin situation is "abnormal" and shouldbe modified in theof ending the "occupationn West Berlin.

Khrushchev may even bo satisfied with an, agreement to resume high-level negotiations on Berlin with terms ofwhich the USSRtep toward an eventual change in West Berlin's status. He will be particularly vigilant to maintain Intact the provision of his Camp David agreement with Presidentthat new negotiations on Berlin should not be protracted indefinitely. Therefore, he may press forpecific dateubsequent summit meeting, or at least for another foreign ministers' conference.

Disarmament

Often- in the- past, when the Soviet leaders have wanted to Impress world opinionheir peaceful and constructive purposes, they have turned to the disarmament problem. Since Khrushchev's speech to the UN, Moscow's main effort has been to focus on disarmament as the central theme of its peaceful coexistence campaign' and toa convincing case that the USSR is prepared to move toward total disarmament.

In six weeks of actualat the Genevaconference, howover, the bloc delegations have resisted Western efforts to discuss the

vital question of effectivecontrols. Thedelegation declined to spell out Its position, beyond the vague and general proposition enunciated by Khrushchev that the extent of control should be commensurato with the various stages of tho disarmament

Soviet tactics ln thehave been aimedat obtaining ain Soviot terms, ofand general disarmament as the final goal of theand winning Western agreementet ofprinciples liftod directly from the Soviet plan. position at the summit will probablyontinuation of this effort, with theofointinstructing representatives in the ten-power committee to take into account Soviet and other plans in working out the frameworkreaty.

The Soviet leaders would probably seek to representtatement as being tantamount to acceptance of the mainof the Soviet plan and press the West to agreeiscussion of the first stage, which calls forof conventional forces. Such tactics would also allow Hoscow to place the onus forgeneral disarmament on the West, before permitting the talks to shift to specific first measures or partial plans. econdary position, Khrushchev may follow the lines of hiswith Presidentsand De Gaulle and agreetatement reaffirming general disarmament as the most important international problem.

Nuclonr Test Ran

In contrast to its approach to disarmament, Moscow haso narrow the differences on the main issuesuclear test

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ban treaty ln preparation for submitting those problems to tho summit for decision. Since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the USSR has proposed compromise solutions on aof key points, whileits long-standingthat all tests must be banned at the outset of an agreement. After resisting the American position on theof detecting smalltests, Moscow in effect acknowledged this position byestern proposalimited treaty withoratorium on small underground explosions.

Following the Eisenhower-Macmlllan communique onarch proposing that abe achieved throughand voluntary declarations, Soviet officials served notice

that the main issues still Including the nature and duration of the moratorium, werehe competence of the Geneva conference and couldbe resolved only at the summit. They listed as possible summit topics, besides the moratoriumuota for on-sitethe composition and voting procedures of thecouncil, and the staffing of control organs.

Khrushchev has indicatod that the paramount issue is the duration of the moratorium. He' Impliedpeech at Baku onpril that the Sovietfor one of four to five years could bo adjusted The Soviot premier has. dropped his Insistence for formal incorporation of the moratorium into the treaty, either as an annex or protocol,andoluntary declarationagreement is reabhed on the duration.

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nuclear explosions, Moscow has madoajor element of its position on controls but has carefully avoidedrecise figure. The USSR has made lt clear thatetermination should be basedigh-level politicalrathercientific ostimato of the annual number of probably natural disturbances .which could be mistaken forexplosions.

mamamaaaaaarli Idoubt that Moscowuld agree to as many asuchin the USSR. is likely to take astand, while pressing for American acceptance "in principle of the conceptuota based

on an arbitrary political determi nation.

Other Issues

Under the general category of East-West relations,may attempt to secure an agreed definition of principles on which these relations should

bo based and set forth hisof "peacefule may also bo prepared toa more generalized agree-mont along the lines of the Camp David communique, reaffirming the four governments' intention to settle disputes byrather than by force.

gesture to the summit

Khrushchev also plana to raise the question of outer space, probably ln connection with UN plans to convene anscientificto exchange Information on peacoful uses. Sovietin tho UN havo pri-vatoly urged that the United Nation's Outer Spaco Committee meet bofore the summit andworking out plans--for the conference. The USSR, however, is insistingreponderance in the key conference posts. Khrushchev will probably make

demonstrate has yielded

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and to create thethat the USSR is taking the lead in the field of peaceful uses of outer space.

Conclusions

Although Khrushchev has deeply engaged his prestige in the campaignummitand haseeting as the most "effective manner" ofinternational problems, he has been extremely cautious in setting forth any specific objective for the initial in his recent remarks in France, he limitedope to findnd morein Baku he resorted to the standard expression that the meeting should produce arelaxation of tensions and "advance the settlement of the urgent questions."

Khrushchev has beenvague in defining thegoals to be achieved on the main issues underand has taken an equivocal position in acknowledgingin Franceolution of the Berlin problem "evidently demands some time."

Khrushchev'sin spelling outfor the Parisprobably reflectserieswill be held. he may attempt tospecific commitment onmeeting. Such ansuggested by his speechto the Supremehe asserted thatwill be followednumber of summitadded that It would beto try to guess the possible of the

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