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Syria and Iraq.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Boycott: Moscow, apparentlyopportunity afforded'by the Arab boycott, hasthat It has turned down as "untimely" anmade in late March, for Ben-Gurion to visit theradio propaganda to Arab countries is charginginfluence is behind the refusal to unload theand that the dispute is "further proof offor the(Page 1)
O
- Middle East: The Soviet Union, which isto assist in projects for the development of theRiver in both Syria and Iraq, may soon findin UAR-Iraqi rivalry over Uie utilization ofwaters. Moscow is trying to promote anbefore proceeding with construction, butand Baghdad may insist that the Soviet Unionthe planned projects in their respectiveettlement.2)
in February revealed the ease with which popular feel-
J(Page 3)
Poland: (General Kazimierzreatly feared and despised Stalinist who was virtually exiled after he victory of the Gomulka forcesas reportedly been) appointedigh party post which exercises major influencej over military and security forces, the police, and thehe report of his appointment has provoked alarm amongPolish intellectuals and party moderates, and may reflectthe growing ascendancy of hard-line elements within the party. It would also reflect the regimels determination to deal firmly with any future expressions of popular discontent; the demonstrations at Nowa Huta and Olsztyn last week and at
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkey: .Sporadic student demonstrations continued in Turkish citiesay. Many students have been arrested in Istanbul, but morale apparently remains high anc more demonstrations are possible. Members of theRepublic Peoples party expect the party to bend its leaders arrested, now that the NATO Ministerial Coun-i"
meeting has ended, j
4)'
President Shihab told the American ambassadoray that in spite of renewed Christian-Moslem tension, elections will begin onune and be held on three successive Sundays. Shihab plans toaretaker government tothe Karami cabinet and carry out the elections. Theof voting dates will intensify political maneuvering and may precipitate clashes.
South Vietnam: frhe Diem regime is coming underopen criticism in the relatively small circles of informed Vietnamese for its authoritarianism. Blame for maladministra-
tion, corruption, and dictatorial practices has centered in theMay
South Korea: (ghees Liberal party, after virtually abdicating] its leadership in the National Assembly following the overthrow of" the regime, now may be moving to reassert itself in the highly fluid political situation. There are also indicationsiberal, minority may be maneuveringeturn of Rhee, possibly asresident under the new parliamentary system which the assembly has taken the lead in developing. The student protest movement has not as yetnified organization or leadership, and an unstable multiple-party situation might emerge, page 5)
the President's close entourage, particularly on his brother Nhu, but now is shifting more directly to Diem himself. Nhu heads the regime's chosen political instrument, the corrupt Can Lao organization, and Isrincipal architect of South Vietnam ventures against Cambodian leaderage 6)
Afghanistan-USSR: (The Afghan Government hassubstantial oil deposits have been discovered innear the Soviet border by the Soviet teamarea under the8 assistance agreement Minister Nairn has expressed an interest in findingIn the West, transportation difficulties make It almost
certain that the crude oil will be exported to the USSR forat least until thereefinery in the area. Nairn hasshown concern that exploitation of the oil may Increase Afghan dependence on the USSRJ
jPage 7)
IIL THE WEST
reak In relations between Generalis-simo Trujillo and the church may be imminent. ay
|that it now is apparent that Trujillo has
trong anilchurph program inside the country.F
LATE ITEM
'USSR: The Soviet leadership has undergone the mostpersonnel shift since the defeat of the Malenkov-Molotov "anti-party" grouphe evidence Indicates that the changes were made at Khrushchev's direction. The net result is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov team Is still prominently In the forefront and that Kozlov's position as Khrushchev^ de-signated successor has been strengthened (Page 9)
IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
he basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:j
A iNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiateagainst the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future."]
Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately
to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit
in the immediate future/)
following developments are susceptible ofby Soviet/Communist hostile actionjeopardize the security of the US in thefuture^
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR Rejects Bidfor Ben-Gurion Visit
Moscow, in keeping with its continuing campaign to convince the Arabs that the Soviet Union is their big-power protectorestern-supported Israel, has announced that lt turned down as "untimely" an Israeli bid, made in late March, for Ben-Gurion to visit the Soviet Union. The Israeli prime minister had hoped to meet with Khrushchev as part of his series of talks withleaders who will attend the summit meeting in May.
The Soviet refusal appears to have been timed to take fullof the propaganda opportunities afforded by the Arabboycott. Radio Moscow, in propaganda to Arab audiences, declareday that Zionist influence in the United States isthe refusal of union labor ln New York to unload the UAR ship Cleopatra. Censuring the amendment to the US foreign aid bill which was stimulated by the boycott, the commentator asserted that the dispute is "further proof of Western "hatred for thehich helong-term politicaln contrast the broadcast cited Moscows economic aid policies as contributing to the establishment of "independent" national economies.
Soviet leaders have gone on record repeatedly as favoringon the head-of-government level, and the public refusalisit by Ben-Gurion shows that the USSR is prepared to rejecteeting_when it conflicts with Soviet policy obiectlvesJ
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Soviet Economic Aid Conflicts in the Middle East
Moscow may be confronted shortly with an awkwardarising out of its apparently conflicting economic aidto the UAR and Iraq. Under Its economic aidwith Damascus signed inthe Iraqithe USSR is to construct an irrigation and hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River in Syria. Now, however, theUnion also plans to build two dams, mainly for irrigation, on tbe same river in Iraq under9 economic aidwith Baghdad.
At present there is no UAR-Iraqi agreement on the divleton of the Euphrates waters?
| tt is unlikely, however, that an amicable accord win be reached in the near future.
Should the USSR now staU on its Syrian project, this would seriously damage Moscow's prestige in Cairo. On the other hand, Moscow presumably is well aware of Iraqi PrimeQasim's opposition to the UAR's unilateral plans forof the Euphrates. The Soviet Union probably willinitial survey work for the river projects in Iraq, in order not to give Baghdad cause for further disenchantment with the Soviet aid program.!-
Stalinisl Appoin ed to Higii vany Post in Pplant
tbeneral KazimierzWitaszewski reportedly has beendirector of the recently reactivated administrative section of the Polish party central committee, which controls party cadres in the government. Such an appointment would giveole in the execution of policy relating to Polish military and security forces, the police, and the courts.^
LWitaszewskiell-known Stalinist who was "exiled" to Czechoslovakia as military attache" following Gomulka's return to power6 but recalled for an assignment with military intelligence in the fall The transfer of Witaszewski to this powerful position in the party apparatus mayrowing ascendancy of hard-line elements within the party hierarchy and the regime's intention to deal firmly with all manifestations of antiregime attitudes. Gomulka--either of his own volition or as the result of prodding by elements of the party or the USSR--may have thought it necessary tothe administrative section of the central committee apparatus andtrong man at its headj
(There appears toefinite lack of strong, decisive leadership in the Polish party and government, and theis becoming demoralized by the regime's inability to cope with the country's many problems. The clashes with police over religious issues in Nowa Huta and Olsztyn last week and worker demonstrations in Poznan in Februaryhow easily popular feelings can erupt, even over purely local matters.,'
Gifltaszewski, who received his nickname "Gaspipe"esult of his advocacy of brutal suppressive measures during the Poznan riots ofs generally regarded by the Polish people, particularly the Intellectuals,as the symbol of the tough line In Internal
SECRET
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkish Demonstrations
Sporadic student demonstrations continued in Turkish citiesay, but security forces now appear to have control of the situation, Student leaders have been arrested ln Istanbul,where the major rioting took place
|some have been beaten in attempts to extract confes: sions that the demonstrations were plannedeans to sabotage the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Istanbulhile their numbers have been reducedarrests and the police appear to have successfully penetrated their ranks, the students seem determined to continue their struggle; new incidents are possible]
the students in Istanbul are alsoetition listing their grievances for submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights/;
There are indications that the government is about to take new and possibly drastic action against its political opposition. Premier Menderes has denounced the Republican People's(RPP) for sponsoring "opendenial of RPP involvement in the riots by both party spokesmen andleaders. Important press organs of the RPP have been closed, and opposition newspapermen have been taken into custody. Several local leaders of the RPP reportedly have been arrested, and other RPP spokesmen have beenby the Grand National Assembly's "Committee of Fifteen"-created in mid-April to investigate the partyfe "illegal and subversive" actions.
While no national RPP leader has yet been arrested,spokesmen believe such arrests are imminent andthe government to ban the party. The RPP already has drawn up plans to go underground if it is proscribed. In the event of severe reprisals, opposition leaders may ask for political asylum in foreign embassies.
JSyngman Rhees nueraiiteT virtually abdicating its leadership ln the National Assembly immediately following the overthrow of the regime, may be moving to reassert itsposition in the highly fluid political situation in South Korea. At the same time, the party is resisting student demands fordissolution of the assembly and the holding of general elections, and is attempting instead toovernmenta premier and cabinetto the assembly- which would preserve Liberal control. The opposition Democrats, equally unwilling to surrender thenewly acquired power and hesitant to face elections under present circumstances, are also supportingrior stepj
[There are also Indicationsinority group in the Liberal party may be maneuvering to make possible RheeB returnew cabinet system. Vice President and Democratic party leader Chang Myon, while not indicating support forove, favors indirect election of the president by the assembly. Some loyal Rhee supporters, apparently impressed by the strong public affection shown for Rhee following his resignation, arean immediate presidential election to test popular feeling j
[It is not clear which course public opinion favors. ajority of the press is supporting constitutional revision as the first step, but student demonstrators in major cities continue to demand the assembly's immediate dissolution. The student movement istonified organization and leadership, but has not yet succeeded^/
Preparations already are under way for the formationumber of minor parties from the Progressive partyleft to the militant National Youth Corps on the right. Anmultiple-party situation may develop. The army seemson adopting stiller measures than heretofore to CODC with
demonstrations.!
Growing Criticism of Diem Regime in South Vietnam
[The Diem regime If* faouTn Vietnam, 'in addition toerious challenge from resurgent Communist guerrilla forces, is also under increasingly open criticism in the relatively small circles of informed Vietnamese for its authoritarianism. Resentment over various malpractices is felt throughout the country's political and military substructure- Variousofficials, including several cabinet members and Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, have expressedabout the government's future stability unless political reforms are speedily effected^
LNgo Dinh Nhu, the President's brother and chief political adviser,ajor cause of resentment. As leader of the semicovert, corrupt, and pervasive Can Lao organization, Nhu has graduaLly fashioned over theommissar-like network which, on Diem's behalf, exercises the real power and control in the government. He alsorincipal architect of South Vietnam's clandestine efforts to unseat Cambodian leader Sihanouk, who,esult, has become suspicious of the West and is looking increasingly to Peiping for support,}
tBlame for maladministration, corruption, and dictatorial practices has centered in the past on the President's close entourage, but now is shifting more and more to DiemDiem is taking some steps to curb the excesses ofofficials so as to undercut Communist subversion in rural areas. Thus far, however, he has refused to disavow his inner circle of advisers, and tends to attribute criticism of his regime to the work of Communists or disgruntled polti-calespite signs of increasing opposition to his narrowly based government, such as the petition for political reforms made public inew days agoroup of former Vietnamese officials, Diem probably will maintain his position that the exigencies of the times preclude more democratic practices.!
Oil Discovered in Afghanistan
[The Afghan Government -rias confirmed that substantial oil deposits have been discovered at Shibargan in north-central Afghanistan someiles from the Sovieteam of moreloc technicians has been exploring in the area under the terms ofoviet oil explorationagreement signed inhe Afghan minister of commerce says the area now being tapped is estimatedons of high-quality oil. The total extent of the field is believed much broader but is stillenior member of the Soviet team estimates the field also containsillion cubic meters of gas under pressure.]
[_Kabul presumably hopes that oil exports will greatly improve Its international trade position in general and will increase its capacity to discharge its debts to the USSR in particular. Foreign exchange previously used to pay for Imported petroleum products imports will probably be diverted to purchase more machinery and other capital goods abroad to develop the national economy. Prime Minister Daud, who has been visiting the USSR sincepril, will almost certainly Include oil exploitation in hiswith Soviet officials about assistance for Afghanistan*Five-Year. He now may feel thatwill be better able to repay additional loans, and relax his policy of accepting only grants.}
^Although Foreign Minister Nairn has expressed an interest in finding markets in the West, transportation difficulties make it virtually certain that Western companies will not be interested and that the crude oil will be exported to the USSR for refining, at least until the Afghans are able toefinery constructed in the area. The USSR in the past has objected to free-worldin northern Afghanistan near its borders, and it may offer toefinery for the Afghans. The USSR does not need the Afghan oil exports, but may accept them for political reasons. Nairn has already shown concern that exploitation of the oil may increase Afghan dependence on the the USSR.,'
SECRET-
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republics Relations With Catholic Church Deteriorating Rapidly"
A break in relations between Dominican dictator TrujiUo and the Catholic Church may be imminent. I
lit now is apparent that Trujillo has
trong anticnurch program inside the country. The local church hierarchy has been denouncing his regime since January for violations of human rights, and all segments appear to be becoming more militant in opposition to Trujillo.l
The Immigration Serviceayesident permit held by Monsignor Thomas J. Reilly, an American citizen and one of the most vocal critics among the six Catholic bishops in the Dominican Republic. The next day, however, Reilly was summoned by Generalissimo Trujillo, who reversed the order expelling Reilly andpanish priests. |
The Generalissimo probably believes that he can control Reilly if the Vatican honors his request madeay to have Monsignor Beras--whom Trujillo believes to be responsive to his
archbishop. However church has gained so much local
presuge in opposing xne mctator
LATE ITEM
Khrushchev Shakes Up Top Soviet Leadership
The Soviet party central committee, meetingay, made extensive changes in the top party and government leadership. The evidence indicates thatthechanges were made at Khrushchev's direction.
Frol Kozlov, whom Khrushchev said last year would be his successor, has been moved into the partyand has relinquished his jobirst deputy premier. This move will give Kozlov the opportunity to gain control over the hard core of party professionals. In addition, the secretariat has been reducedman bodyight group ofize reminiscent of the Stalin era.
Four old members of the party secretariat have been transferred out, but remain on the party presidium. With the obvious exception of Khrushchev, Suslov appears to be the only remaining party secretary who might have the semblance of an independent voice.
The net result Is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov team appears to be stronger than ever.
In other significant changes, three presidiumAleksey Kosygin, Nikolay Podgorny and Dmitrywere promoted to full membership in the presidium. Kosygin and Polyansky particularly had been mentioned frequently as rising stars on Khrushchev's team.
The central committee also fired Aleksey Kirlchenko and Nikolay Belyayev from the presidium, thus formalizing their demotion earlier this year when they were assigned to remote provincial posts.
The principal shifts in the government were the promotion of Kosygin from Deputy Premier and USSR economic planning chief to Kozlov's old job as one of the two First Deputy Premiers. Mikoyan remains the other First Deputy Premier. Kosygin ln turn was succeeded by Vladimir Novfkov who workedime
-
in Leningrad, Kozlov's old bailiwick. For the past year he has been the chief economic planner in the Russian(RSFSR).
The Soviet announcement also stated that the central committee had discussed matters pertaining to today's Supreme Soviet session. Khrushchev hasroup of foreign ambassadors that he willajor speech at this session.
Khrushchev also told the foreign diplomats that the central committee would consider "constitutionalwhich would then have to be formalized by the Supremeand there has been talk in Moscow that the office of President of the USSR would be created. Khrushchev may desire the constitutional change so he could become chief ofemonstration that the Soviet people were solidly behind him as he goes into the Summit meetings. F
THE PRESIDENT The Vice President
Ejtecutive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civli and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
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Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
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Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
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The Director Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman National Security Agency
The Director National Indications Center
The Director
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